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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the role of Iraq in Russian foreign policy from the 
first Gulf crisis in 1990 to the American invasion of Iraq in 2003. In particular, it 
identifies the main internal and external factors influencing Moscow's policy 
toward Baghdad, as well as Russia's objectives in this country. 
The aim of the thesis is twofold. On the one hand, it is to use the historical 
study of Russian-Iraqi relations to illustrate the evolution of Russian foreign 
policy throughout the 1990s, to provide an understanding of the mechanism of 
Russia's foreign policy formation and to highlight the interplay between domestic 
and foreign policies. On the other hand, the objective is to provide a new 
perspective of Russian policy in the Middle East by focusing on Russian-Iraqi 
relations as a means of drawing conclusions about the Moscow's Middle East 
policy in general. 
Despite a large volume of academic work, both in the West and in Russia, 
on Russian policy in the Middle East during the 1990s, no study focuses 
exclusively on Russian-Iraqi relations. The thesis therefore fills this knowledge 
gap by providing a detailed study of bilateral relations between the two countries. 
By identifying the variety of factors that influenced Russia's policy toward Iraq, 
the thesis hopes to provide a new perspective on Russia's relations with Iraq away 
from the simplistic explanations of Russia's pro-Iraqi stance, towards the 
complexities of Moscow's international and international policies. 
The thesis integrates events in Russian domestic politics and developments 
in the international fora, in particular the United Nations Security Council, 
focusing on the role of the United States, Britain and France in influencing and 
2 
shaping Moscow's approaches to Iraq. It argues that Russia's Iraq policy is 
primarily a function of Russia's relations with the US and the only place where 
the Moscow's and Washington's interests are not simply at cross-purpose, but 
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INTRODUCTION 
`I can't remember when for the last time since the fall of the Berlin Wall, events abroad 
became the main domestic issue. But last week heated debates took place among the 
politicians with regard to the far and not the friendliest Arab state, where a regime 
sympathetic mainly to Zhirinovsky is in power. The possibility of U. S. strikes on Iraq and 
death of the civilian population caused a political activism and upheaval in the political 
establishment that was not observed even when thousands of Russians were dying in 
Chechnya. ' 
Vyacheslav Nikonov, Epoch of 'Changes ' 
Even though the Middle East has never played a primary role in Russia's 
foreign policy, since tsarist times the region has been viewed as an important 
instrument in Moscow's policies towards the Great Powers, in particular Britain, 
and later the U. S. As one of the most volatile regions in the world, the Middle 
East was of particular importance as a scene of strategic competition between the 
USSR and the U. S. during the Cold War, and remains a hotspot of international 
politics today. 
Throughout the Soviet era, Moscow's policy in the Middle East was 
dictated by its overall global objectives, namely the general weakening of the 
West followed by its replacement with Soviet influence, and marked by 
opportunism skillfully concealed under the veil of the communist ideology. 2 
While intent on avoiding a war that could potentially trigger a nuclear conflict 
with the West, Soviet policy in the region aimed at the ultimate elimination of 
1 Vyacheslav Nikonov. The Epoch of Changes: Russia in the Eyes of 'a Consewative, (Moscow: 
Languages of Russian Culture, 1999), p. 711 
2 Report by Joint Intelligence Committee on Soviet Foreign Policy, 15 December 1969, Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office, Documents on British Policy Overseas, JIC(A)(69)41 Final, pp. 200- 
205; Malcolm Mackintosh, `Soviet Foreign Policy', The World Today, Vol. 24, N24, April 1968, p. 
146 
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Western military power and political influence, especially in the Persian Gulf and 
the Indian Ocean, while increasing the Soviet capacity to threaten or control 
Western oil, mineral sources and transportation routes. 
In addition, with the expansion of the Soviet navy in the 1960s, in 
particular with the establishment of the Mediterranean Squadron in 1964-65, the 
traditional Soviet strategic interest in the region, the protection of the access 
routes to the USSR from the south, was complemented by the broader strategic 
considerations of becoming a major power in the Mediterranean and gaining 
access to the Indian Ocean via the Suez Canal. 3 Moscow's ambitions constituted 
part of the struggle for strategic parity with the U. S. and were determined by the 
goal of securing a permanent and direct access to those areas where the USSR had 
major interests and commitments. 4 This could be achieved by exploiting tensions 
between the West and its allies in the region, using the Arab-Israeli conflict, the 
Indo-Pakistani dispute and wars in the Horn of Africa to create Soviet influence 
over the entire region, 5 as well as by transforming the Arab countries into 
revolutionary states adhering to communist ideology. 
However, in the long-term the most effective instrument for achieving 
Moscow's objectives proved to be the economic and military assistance to its 
Middle Eastern clients. Whereas under Stalin assistance was provided exclusively 
to countries declaring themselves socialist, after his death the new Soviet leader, 
3 Ciro Zoppo, 'Soviet Ships in the Mediterranean and the U. S. -Soviet Confrontation in the Middle 
East', Orbis, Vol. XIV, X2 1, Spring 1970, pp. 119-120; Curt Gasteyger, `The Super-Powers in the 
Mediterranean', Survival, Vol. XVII, N26, November/December 1975, pp. 272-73 
4 T. B. Millar, `Soviet Policies South and East of Suez', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 49, N21, October 
1970, pp. 71-72; Alvin Z. Rubinstein, 'Soviet Policy Toward the Third World in the 1970s', Orbis, 
Vol. XV, No1, Spring 1971, pp. 109-110 
s A. Gorokhov, `The Struggle of the Soviet Union for the Elimination of War Hotbeds, for 
International Security', International Affairs (Moscow), N27, (July 1970), p. 6-7; R. Petrov, `The 
Soviet Union and Arab Countries'. International Affairs (Moscow), NN11, November 1972, pp. 
22-29 
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Nikita Khrushchev, extended Soviet aid to those states who distanced themselves 
from the Western camp without subscribing to communism. Even following the 
modification of this ambitious and unsustainable policy by Leonid Brezhnev in 
the mid-1960s, during which time aid was only provided to those countries that 
offered a practical advantage to Soviet national interests, assistance was still 
available to `progressive' countries in the Middle East classified as important 
clients, notably Syria, Libya, Yemen, Algeria and Iraq. 6 
Given Soviet objectives in the Middle East, Iraq throughout the Cold War 
era occupied an important place in Moscow's policies in the region. Emerging as 
a major regional player of anti-Western orientation in the 1950s, 7 rich in oil and in 
need of industrialisation, Iraq at an early stage appeared an ideal tool for the 
attainment of Russia's objectives. 8 Not only did Baghdad allow the Soviet Union 
to consolidate its presence in the Middle East, but it also proved a useful 
bargaining instrument in the hands of Moscow when dealing with the West, and 
particularly the U. S. 
Despite its major successes in the Middle East, by the early 1980s Soviet 
policy in the region began to stagnate. Not only did the prolonged war between 
Iran and Iraq strain Soviet diplomacy, 9 but also its clients' pronounced turn to the 
West for better quality weapons and commercial goods, apparent since the mid- 
6 For a comprehensive account of Soviet policy in the Middle East during that period, Amnon 
Sella, Soviet Political and Military Conduct in the Middle East, (London: MacMillan Press, 1981) 
For detailed account of Iraqi politics see, for example, Majid Khadduri, Independent Iraq: A 
Study in Iraqi Politics Since 1932, (London: Oxford University Press, 1951); and Republican Iraq: 
A Studv in Iraqi Politics Since the Revolution of 1958, (London: Oxford University Press, 1969); 
Edmund Ghareeb, `Iraq in the Gulf, in Frederick W. Axelgard, (ed. ), Iraq in Transition: A 
Political, Economic and Strategic Perspective, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986): Stephen H. 
Longrigg, Iraq 1900 to 1950: A Political, Social and Economic History, (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1953); Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000); Phebe Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985) 
s Oles Smolansky, The USSR and Iraq: The Soviet Quest for Influence, (London: Duke University 
Press, 1991) 
' Fancine Lecours, `L'URSS face ä la Guerre du Golfe: une Strategie Singuliere', Etudes 
Internationales, Quebec, Vol. 17, N24, (December 1986), pp. 785-800 
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1970s, 1° created competition Moscow found hard to match. In addition, far- 
reaching domestic reforms, perestroika, introduced by Mikhail Gorbachov 
following his accession to power in March 1985 in an attempt to halt the 
economic erosion of the Soviet state meant a substantial shift of Soviet foreign 
policy priorities towards creating favourable external conditions for internal 
restructuring. 11 
This study of Russia's Iraq policy takes as its start point Gorbachov's 
accession to power and concludes with the U. S. invasion of Iraq in March 2003. 
In view of the dramatic transformation in Russian foreign policy in the late 1980s, 
the first Gulf crisis of 1990-91 can be viewed as a new point of departure in 
Moscow's external strategy and a `year zero' for a new period of Russian foreign 
policy. The beginning of the war in Iraq in 2003 and Russia's de facto exclusion 
from participation in Iraqi affairs signifies the end of its policy towards one of its 
most important Soviet-time allies. Despite the evolution of Moscow's approach to 
Iraq throughout the 1990s, Russia's policy towards Baghdad from 1990 to 2003 is 
marked, as this thesis will show, by a distinct set of strategies and objectives, 
allowing it to be viewed as one distinct period in Russian-Iraqi relations. 
Even though there is a large body of scholarly literature on Russian policy 
in the Middle East, little work has been dedicated specifically to Moscow's 
relations with Iraq during the 1990s. While Soviet policy in Iraq is well 
documented in the context of the Cold War, to date, no comprehensive study has 
been undertaken on Russia's Iraq policy in more recent times. Furthermore, no 
10 Edward M. Kennedy, `The Persian Gulf: Arms Race or Arms Control', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 54, 
No 1, October 1975, p. 20 
'' Mikhail Gorbachov's speech in the Kremlin at the meeting with the participants of the 
International Forum for a Nuclear-Free World, for the Survival of Humanity, TASS, `Learn the 
Art of Living in Peace', Pravda, 17 February 1987, p. 2 
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academic study has so far used Moscow's policy towards Baghdad as a case study 
for the examination of Russian foreign policy. 
This thesis fills this lacuna by providing a detailed historical account of 
Russia's policy towards Iraq from 1990 to 2003 and by offering a new perspective 
on Russia's policy in the Middle East. At the same time, a rigorous examination 
of the available historical evidence and documents aims to highlight the 
complexities of Russia's Iraq policy, challenging simplistic explanations of 
Moscow's pro-Iraqi stance. 
This thesis will also show that as one of the most contested issues in 
Russia's foreign policy, Iraq provides an excellent example for understanding 
post-Soviet Russia and can be used to examine and conceptualise Russia's foreign 
policy in this period. It allows analysis of the country's political landscape and 
interest groups, identifying the main factors impacting on foreign policy, as well 
as understanding the process of policy-making. At the same time, this study will 
demonstrate that Russian-Iraqi relations cannot be viewed solely on the bilateral 
level, but rather as a function of Moscow's relations with the U. S. It will show 
that despite its significant economic interests in Iraq, Russia was prepared to trade 
Baghdad for U. S. silence on Chechnya, a free hand in Georgia, and, more 
generally, recognition by Washington of the post-Soviet space as Russia's sphere 
of influence. By using a variety of Russian and Western sources, this study hopes 
to shed light on the motivations, but also on constraints of the main political 
players involved in determining Russia's Iraq policy, providing new insights 
lacking in previous historical studies on the topic. 
II 
Iraq as an object of study 
Following the disintegration of the USSR in December 1991, Iraq continued to 
play a special role in Russia's Middle Eastern policy for a variety of reasons. First 
of all, as this thesis will demonstrate, Iraq throughout the 1990s remained one of 
the most contested issues in Moscow's foreign policy and more than any other 
country of the region became an indicator of Russia's policy in the Middle East. 
On the domestic level, Iraq has highlighted the debates on foreign policy 
orientation and illustrated the disorganisation in Russian foreign policy-making. It 
revealed the dynamics of various interest groups within Russian politics and their 
impact on foreign policy formation. On the international level, Iraq highlighted 
Moscow's position in the global arena and remained an instrument in Russia's 
relations with the United States. 
Of course, there were still the other two main Soviet allies in the region - 
Syria and Libya - but Damascus had lost its important place in Russia's foreign 
policy agenda after the collapse of the USSR, not least because it refused to 
recognise the Russian Federation as a legal successor to the Union in order to 
avoid debt repayment. 12 Even though an agreement was later reached and 
military-technical co-operation revived, Syria never regained its former status in 
Russia's Middle Eastern policy. Similarly, Russia's relations with Colonel 
Qaddafi, a long-standing, but `unpredictable' Soviet ally, 13 had declined as a 
result of U. N. economic sanctions against Tripoli following Lockerbie bombing, 
which Russia voted in favour of. Although the government's position on Libya 
caused heated debates, mainly because of the financial losses accrued as a result 
12 Alexei Pushkov. `New Tales of Old Damascus', Moskovskie Novosti, 25 October 1992, p. 12 
13 Dmitry Zgersky, `The Colonel is in Trouble as We are... ', New Times, n. 15, April 1992, p. 19 
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of the embargo, 14 the issue did not remain as major and constant factor in Russian 
domestic and foreign policies as Iraq. 
There was, of course, Iran, which since the collapse of the USSR, assumed 
an increasingly important role in Moscow's foreign policy due to the new geo- 
strategic situation in the south. 15 But economic, technical and military co- 
operation with Tehran that caused frequent tensions with the U. S. was primarily 
due to Iran's regional conduct, such as a partnership with Russia in conflicts 
around Tajikistan and Afghanistan, co-operation on the division of Caspian Sea 
resources, an alliance against Turkey's policy in Transcaucasus and Central Asia, 
and later Iran's non-interference in Russia's conflict with Chechnya. 16 As such it 
was never a contested issue within Russian politics. 
Conceptualising Russia's foreign policy 
Much has been written by Russian and Western scholars about the nature of the 
Russian transformation in both domestic and foreign policy. However, the 
existing theories of International Relations prove unsuitable for the explanation of 
the disintegration of the USSR and Russian foreign policy, which in the 1990s has 
been marked by an `essential ambiguity'. '? On the one hand, they fail to explain 
the reasons for the collapse of a political and socio-economic system that was 
equal to its rivals in military terms in the absence of a significant international 
14 Vladimir Skosyrev, `With one End on Libya, with the Other on CIS', Izvestia, 31 March 1992, 
p. 6; Vadim Iputev, `Libya is Keeping the Doors Open. Russia is Trying to Slam Them Shut. 
Why? ', Rossiyskava Ga-zeta. 1 December 1992, p. 6 
15 For a detailed account of Russia's relations with Iran in the early 1990s, Alvin Z. Rubinstein, 
`Moscow and Tehran'. in Alvin Z. Rubinstein and Oles M. Smolansky (eds. ), Regional Power 
Rivalries in the New Eurasia, (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1995), pp. 31-61 
16 Gillian Tett, `Pragmatism Rules in Tehran over Chechnya: Iran is Keen to Maintain Good 
Relations with Russia', Financial Times. 27 January 1995, p. 8; Leonid Mlechin, `Iran is Ready to 
Forget Chechnya for the Sake of Friendship with Moscow'. New Times, September 1995, p. 45 
17 Richard Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society. (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 265 
13 
military conflict. '8 On the other hand, neo-realism, as the prevailing international 
relations theory, falls short of explaining the nature of Russian transformation 
because it views the internal processes as irrelevant for international relations. 19 
For the examination of Russia's policy towards Iraq this thesis uses an approach 
which focuses on internal factors as the main determinants of foreign policy and 
highlights the increasing politicisation of Moscow's foreign policy during the 
1990s. 
Compared with the Soviet period the importance of foreign policy relative to 
domestic politics has dramatically decreased in Russia since the 1990s. In the face 
of a deep economic and political crisis, policy-making became highly reactive and 
lacked strategic vision. As Bobo Lo pointed out, one of the most important 
features of Russian foreign policy became its `sectionalised' character, `with the 
country's political elite deeply divided over underlying concepts and values, 
policy priorities, and the means with which to realise them'. 20 The absence of a 
generally accepted idea of national interest2i led to the emergence of opposing 
political camps and interests groups eager to influence the conduct of foreign 
policy in accordance with their beliefs and values. 22 
18 P. Allan, K. Goldman, (eds. ), The End of the Cold War, (London: , 
1992); J. L. Gaddis, 
`International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War', International Security, Vol. 17, No. 
3,1992-93 
19 Kenneth Waltz, `Neorealism: Confusions and Criticism', Journal of Politics and Society, Vol. 
XV, 2004, p. 3; Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (New 
York: Cornell University Press, 1997), p. 31 
William C. Wohlforth, `The Russian-Soviet Empire: A Test of Neorealism', Review of 
International Studies, Vol. 27,2001, pp. 213-235 
20 Bobo Lo, Russian Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Era: Reality, Illusion and Mythmaking, 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), p. 8 
2! For the analysis of the evolution of the state identity in the foreign policy of Russia on the 
theoretical level and application of the underlying concepts to the major Russian official foreign 
policy documents, Alla Kassianova, `Russia: Still Open to the West? Evolution of the State 
Identity in the Foreign Policy and Security Discourse'. Europe - Asia Studies, Vol. 53, N26, pp. 821 
- 839 22 For a study of a conflict in foreign policy values and its impact on Russia's relations with the 
external world, Leszek Buszynski, Russian Foreign Policy after the Cold War, (Westport: Praeger, 
1996) 
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This resulted in a foreign policy that lacked cohesion and a sense of 
orientation. 23 While disagreements over foreign policy were used by the 
opposition as a means of undermining President Yeltsin and his government, 
Yeltsin himself used foreign policy issues to either appease his opponents or 
indicate a particular course in Russia's domestic politics. At the same time, the 
Yeltsin government was eager to demonstrate that Russia had re-emerged from 
the crisis of the early 1990s and despite its economic difficulties was re-gaining its 
position as a great power. In this context, the concept of `multi-polarity' became 
the favourite idea of the Russian government, which refused to acknowledge, at 
least publicly, U. S. supremacy in international affairs. 24 
Despite the process of de-ideologisation of foreign policy, various new 
ideologies appeared and came to play a central role in setting the foreign policy 
agenda. 25 While the "Atlantists" emphasised integration with the West, 
"Eurasianists" advocated the ubiquity of Russia's national interests and 
diversification of the country's foreign policy. 26 At the same time, the Russian 
political establishment continued to perceive foreign policy in predominantly 
geopolitical terms27 as a zero-sum game, conditioned by a balance of power and 
23 The renowned Russian political analyst and member of the Presidential Council, Andranik 
Migranyan, in 1994 characterised the essence of Russia's foreign policy as `vanity, improvisation, 
incompetence, and as a result the rush fro side to side'. A. Migranyan, Russia in Search ofIdentity, 
(Moscow: International Relations, 1997), p. 387; also Robert Legvold, `Russia's Unformed 
Foreign Policy', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 80, N25, September/October 2001, pp. 62-75 
24 Andrei Kozyrev, `Russia and the US: Partnership is Not Premature, it is Overdue', Izvestia, 11 
March 1994, p. 3; Yevgeny Primakov, `Multipolar World on the Horizon', Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 
22 October 1996, pp. 15; Igor Ivanov, `Thousandth Session of the UN: Moscow's Foreign 
Policy', Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Dipkurier (supplement), N21,20 January 2000, p. L also National 
Security Concept, signed by President Putin on 10 January 2000, available online at: 
http: i/www. russiaeurope. mid. rui'russiastrat'000. html, viewed on 10 November 2006 
25 Sergei Medvedev, Power, Space and Russian Foreign Policy in Understandings of Russian 
Foreign Policy, (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999), pp. 15-57 
26 Alexei Pushkov, `Russia and America: the Honeymoon is Over', Foreign Policy, Ns 93, Winter 
1993-94, pp. 77-82 
27 For example, Konstantin Sorokin, Particularities of Russia's Geopolitical Situation in the 
Contemporary World, (St. Petersburg: The Russian Geographic Society, 1995), pp. 17-18; Dmitri 
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spheres of interest. In spite of attempts to diversify Russia's foreign policy, 
Moscow's policy remained largely centred on the West, taking the U. S. as its 
principal point of reference. Under president Putin, Russia's foreign policy, 
despite a newly set agenda and the announced shift towards the primacy of 
economic goals, underwent only cosmetic rather than substantive changes. It 
retained its geopolitical outlook, Western-centrism, and remained reactive, lacking 
a realistic long-term vision for the attainment of Russia's foreign policy 
objectives. 
Tracing the stages of Russian foreign policy from 1990 to 2003, this study on Iraq 
clearly highlights the above debates concerning the country's foreign policy and 
the main factors that led to collapse of Moscow's relations with Baghdad. 
Literature review 
Among the works that provide an understanding Soviet and Russian policy in the 
Middle East, especially in the political, economic and military spheres, are those 
by Karen and Adeed Dawisha28, Walter Z. Laqueur29, Aaron S. Klieman30, Galia 
Golan, Catherine Kaminsky31 and Simon Kruk, as well as excellent studies by 
Oles Smolansky, Haim Shemesh33, Francis Fukuyama 34 3s and Ronald McLaurin 32 
The ideological aspects are particularly well developed by George Lenczowski 
Trenin, The End of Eurasia: Russia on the Border Between Geopolitics and Globalisation, 
(Washington: The Brookings Institution Press, 2002), pp. 187-188 
28 Adeed and Karen Dawisha, The Soviet Union in the Middle East: Policies and Perspectives, 
(New York: Holmes & Meier, 1983) 
29 Walter Z. Laqueur, The Soviet Union in the Middle East, (New York: Praeger, 1959) 
30 Aaron S. Klieman, Soviet Russia and the Middle East, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970) 
31 Catherine Kaminsky and Simon Kruk, La strategie sovietique au Moven Orient, (Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France. 1988) 
32 Oles M. and Bettie M. Smolanski, The USSR and Iraq: The Soviet Quest for- Influence, Duke 
University Press, 1991) 
13 Haim Shemesh, Soviet-Iraqi Relations 1968-1988: in the Shadow of the Iran-Iraq Conflict, 
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992) 
34 Francis Fukuyama, The Soviet Union and Iraq since 1968, Maryland, 1980 
35 Ibid. 
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and Jaan Pennar. 36 Many of the studies are based on the theory of the balance of 
power, which became popular during the Cold War and, in particular, in the 
beginning of the 1980s, when it became fashionable within academia to analyse 
bilateral relations and conflicts from this perspective. Thus, the majority of Cold 
War Russia experts viewed relations between the Soviet Union and Iraq merely as 
a means for the establishment of equilibrium of power, or for the Soviet 
dominance in the Middle East. 
Robert Freeman distinguishes between those who viewed the main Soviet 
goal in the region as an offensive one, namely to dominate the Middle East in 
order to deny its oil, strategic communication routes and other assets to the U. S. 
and its allies, and others who believed Soviet objective to be the defensive one - 
the prevention of the region from being used as a base for an attack on the 
USSR. 37 
A different point of view was presented by Alexei Vassiliev, a Russian 
journalist who having spent thirty years working on the problems of the Middle 
East, distinguishes two concepts that mark Soviet policy in the Middle East - 
Messianism as a concept of salvation at the core of the Soviet state's ideology 
after the October Revolution and pragmatism as a reaction to realities in the world 
arena, determined by the need to prevent, or at least to reduce any military or 
strategic threat from the South and to weaken Western positions in the region. 38 
Vassiliev argues that although the ratios of pragmatism and mythology had altered 
with time, the thinking and the behaviour of the Soviet leaders was still imbued 
36 George Lenczowski, Soviet Advances in the Middle East. (Washington: American Institute for 
Public Policy Research, 1971); Jaan Pennar, The USSR and the Arabs: The Ideological Dimension 
1917-1972, (London: C. Hurst, 1973) 
37 Robert O. Freedman, Soviet Policy Towards the Middle East since 1970, (New York: Praeger , 1975), p. 1 
39 Alexei Vassiliev, Russian Policy in the Middle East: From Messianism to Pragmatism, 
(Reading: Ithaca Press, 1993) 
17 
with Messianic ideas that distorted both the priorities and the concrete actions of 
that policy. 
In his study, Mark Heller characterises the relationship between the USSR 
and the Middle East as `more in the nature of a bargain', whereby Moscow 
exchanged its political, military and economic support of its regional allies for 
`political and ideological support for the USSR against the US-led imperialism. ' 39 
The end of the Cold War and the transformation of the Soviet Union prompted 
various studies on the changes in Russian foreign policy, many of which, 
however, did not specifically refer to the new direction in Russian policy in the 
Middle East in general, and in Iraq in particular. Galia Golan in her examination 
of Russian foreign policy under Gorbachov argues that two themes have 
characterised the new Soviet foreign policy in the Third World, and specifically in 
the Middle East: the cultivation of more favourable relations with a variety of 
regimes regardless of ideology, and the emphasis on resolving regional conflicts. 40 
She views the nature of this new foreign policy as `an indication if not a test case 
of the depth and significance of the New Thinking'. 41 At the same time, Golan 
observes that the changes in Soviet policy have been designed `primarily to please 
the U. S., and secondarily, the supporters of the perestroika, while contending with 
domestic opponents who sought to enlist public opinion so as to torpedo New 
Thinking and perestroika itself. '42 Similarly, Mark Heller argues that the 
elaboration and implementation of the new foreign policy in Russia appeared 
39 Mark A. Heller, The Dynamics of Soviet Policy in the Middle East: Between Old Thinking and 
New, (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Post Press, 1991), p. 102 
40 Galia Golan, Soviet Middle East Police under Gorbachov, Research Paper, Rand/UCLA Center 
for Soviet Studies, March 1990, pp. v-vii 
4' Golan, Soviet Policies: From World War- II to Gorbachov. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1990) 
42 Golan, The Foreign - Domestic Nexus in Gorbachov's Middle East Policy, Research Paper, 
(Jerusalem: The Hebrew University, 1997), p. 7 
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extremely difficult due to the existence of conservative forces within the 
government, `whose world-view, self-image and institutional interests were 
threatened by New Thinking' in domestic, as well as foreign policy. '43 
Interestingly, numerous Western studies of the Gulf crisis and war in 
1990 -1991 remain silent about the role of the Soviet diplomacy in the conflict, 
discussing the Soviet position solely in the context of the U. S. policy. Exceptions 
are the articles by Vladimir Nosenko, Irina Zviagelskaya, Jean-Christophe 
Romer44 and Roland Lomme, which focus on Moscow's diplomatic efforts for the 
peaceful resolution of the conflict. 
The body of secondary literature on Russia and Iraq dramatically 
decreases following the Gulf War and is virtually non-existent for the period from 
the early 1990s up to the present. The discussions of Russian foreign policy, such 
as the study by Nikolai Petro and Alvin Rubenstein, dedicate, if at all, just a few 
pages to Moscow's policy in the Middle East, pointing out that this region while 
remaining on the Russian foreign policy agenda, is not as important to the 
Kremlin as Russia's southern tier, Europe and the U. S. 45 The only more or less 
complete account of Russia's approaches to Iraq throughout the 1990s is provided 
by Talal Nizameddin, who using a large number of Russian sources reconstructs 
the thread of main events between the two countries, as well as the general 
debates within Russia on the issue of Iraq. 46 
Following the terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001, 
the subsequent year saw the revival of the discussion of Russian policy in the 
43 Heller, p. 1 
as Jean-Christophe Romer, L'URSS et la Guerre du Golfe, Strategique, (Paris: Institut de Strategie 
Comparee, 1991) 
45 Nikolai N. Petro and Alvin Z. Rubenstein, Russian Foreign Policy: From Empire to Nation- 
State, (New York: Longman, 1997) 
a(' Talal Nizameddin, Russia and the Middle East: Towards a New Foreign Policy, (London: Hurst 
& Co., 1999) 
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Middle East. In particular the Russian media focused its attention on the topic in 
the context of heated debates on the war against terror, the so-called `axis of evil', 
the disarmament of Iraq, as well as on preparations for war against Baghdad. 
Nonetheless, no complete study bridging the events of the first Gulf War and the 
present debates from the Russian point of view has appeared up to this point in 
time. 
This thesis therefore aims to fill this gap by covering the period between 
1990 and 2003 and by examining in detail the role of Iraq in Russian foreign 
policy rather than looking at Iraq merely in the context of Russia's Middle Eastern 
policy as is the case in the existing scholarly work. Given the lack of availability 
of official documents for recent years, this study addresses the need to diversify 
the primary sources by using both Russian and Western open documents together 
with the press, and supplementing them with a number of memoirs and personal 
accounts of the most important political players and witnesses to the events. It is 
hoped that the new perspective taken in this thesis coupled with the use of hitherto 
untapped sources will provide a better understanding of Russia's foreign policy in 
general, as well as Russia's Iraq policy in particular. 
Structure 
The thesis is divided into eight chapters, which in chronological order address the 
main themes in Russia's Iraq policy from 1990 to 2003, focusing on the role of 
Iraq in Russian foreign policy, Moscow's strategy at the U. N. Security Council, 
and the Kremlin's diplomacy on the issue of Iraq with the U. S. 
The first chapter, `Moscow in the Persian Gulf Crisis 1990-1991', 
examines the transformation of Soviet foreign policy under Mikhail Gorbachov 
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and its impact on Moscow's policy during the Gulf crisis. It highlights the 
discrepancy between the requirements of the New Thinking and the actual 
interests of the Soviet State, focusing on Gorbachov's dilemma between co- 
operation with the West, and in particular the U. S., and the pursuit of Moscow's 
traditional interests in Iraq. To Moscow, the Gulf crisis is about much more than 
Saddam's aggression against Kuwait. It is about the decline of the Soviet 
superpower status, the emergence of a new international world order and 
Moscow's search of its place in international affairs, a search that continues up to 
the present time. 
The second chapter, `Iraq in Russian politics during the first phase of new 
Russian foreign policy, 1992-1993', focuses on the role of Iraq in Russian 
domestic politics as the most contested foreign policy issue used by the opposition 
to undermine the Yeltsin government. Moscow's pro-American stance in 
international affairs, including the question of Iraq, determined by the need of 
U. S. financial support for the continuation of the country's economic reforms, 
fuels the domestic opposition and culminates in a failed cup-d'etat, forcing 
President Yeltsin to take a more assertive and independent line in foreign affairs, 
including the issue of Iraq. 
The third chapter, `Russia at the U. N. Security Council during the 1994 
Iraq crisis', examines the impact of the Moscow's new assertive foreign policy on 
its responses to the first major post-Gulf war crisis around Iraq. Russia's position 
in the UN Security Council on the question of Iraq is compared and contrasted to 
that of other permanent members, the U. S., Britain, France and China. Despite 
unflagging diplomatic activities, Moscow's efforts to mediate between Iraq and 
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the U. N. remain without success, showing Moscow's diminished role in 
international affairs. 
The fourth chapter, `The politics of trade and diplomacy, 1994-1995', 
analyses the new dynamism in Moscow's approach to foreign affairs, exemplified 
by Russia's active engagement in the Middle East Peace Process during 1994, for 
the first time independently of the U. S. Moscow's newly found assertiveness in 
foreign policy is also seen in its Iraq policy. Moscow re-establishes bilateral 
economic co-operation with Baghdad in the hope of obtaining the repayment of 
Iraqi debts and securing an advantageous position in the Iraq before the end of the 
embargo. At the same time, Russia steps up efforts at the U. N. to bring about the 
lifting of sanctions against Iraq. 
The fifth chapter, `Striving for influence: Moscow's diplomacy on Iraq 
1996-1997', deals with Moscow's Iraq policy under the new foreign minister 
Yevgeny Primakov. Under his leadership, Moscow for the first time successfully 
mediates between Baghdad and the U. N., and for the first time receives 
international recognition for its diplomatic efforts. However, the limit of Russia's 
international power is indicated by its inability to accelerate the lifting of 
sanctions against Iraq. 
The sixth chapter, `Russia and the UNSCOM crisis, 1998-1999', focuses 
on Russia's relations with UNSCOM and its chairman, Richard Butler. Unable to 
exercise control over the working of the Commission, Moscow becomes 
increasingly irritated by the lack of progress in Iraq's disarmament, blaming 
Butler for the delay in the declaring Iraq free of WMD. Moscow therefore seizes 
the new confrontation between Baghdad and UNSCOM as an opportunity to 
dismantle the Commission in the hope of replacing it with a more compliant body. 
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The seventh chapter, `Russia's economic co-operation with Iraq, 1996- 
2000' shows that even though Moscow's political influence on Baghdad had 
greatly decreased throughout the 1990s, Russia's economic co-operation with Iraq 
during the same period substantially intensified. Economic co-operation between 
the two countries developed along three vectors - the conclusion of large-scale 
contracts, mainly in the oil industry to be implemented after the lifting of the 
embargo, agreements within the framework of the `oil for food programme' and 
illicit deals between Moscow and Baghdad. 
The eighth chapter, `Moscow and operation `Provide Freedom', examines 
key policy drivers at the time of crisis and draws a parallel between Gorbachov's 
dilemma in Iraq during the first Gulf crisis and Putin's ambition to secure 
Russia's interests in Baghdad while maintaining co-operation with the U. S. Both 
Gorbachov and Putin erroneously believed that their personal friendship with U. S. 
Presidents would allow them to prevent a military confrontation. At the same 
time, Putin like Gorbachov, and to greater extent, Yeltsin, was greatly constrained 
in his political choices by the strong domestic opposition against the war in Iraq. 
While Putin's balancing act allowed him to strengthen Russia's relations with 
European allies, France and Germany, and maintain the strategic partnership with 
the U. S., it resulted in Moscow's exclusion from participation in the 
reconstruction of Iraq, and ultimately, in the loss of Iraq as its economic and 
political ally. 
Sources 
The secondary literature on Russian foreign and domestic politics, as well as 
Russia's policy in the Middle provided a useful background for the present study 
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and helped to identify the gaps in the existing scholarly work with regard to the 
understanding of Russian-Iraqi relations and the role of Iraq in Russian foreign 
policy. On the basis of the existing scholarly research, it was decided to take a 
new approach by examining Russia's Iraq policy not in the context of Russia's 
Middle East policy, but as a separate issue in Russian foreign policy that would 
shed light on Russia's Middle East policy and provide an insight into the post- 
Soviet Russian politics. 
As the events covered in this study are very recent, no access was 
available to Russian or Western archives. Therefore, the main primary sources 
used for this thesis were publicly available official documents, press reports, 
published interviews and radio broadcasts, which were complemented by a variety 
of Western media reports. After giving it full consideration, it was decided not to 
use interviews with key players as a source for this thesis for the following 
reasons: it was highly unlikely that interviewees would have presented a view that 
would differ from what they have stated publicly, while restricting my freedom to 
quote their statements. Instead, their published statements were crosschecked in a 
number of above-mentioned sources to form a balanced opinion of their view of 
events. 
The most important official documents were the statements of the Soviet, 
and later, the Russian government, as well as statements of the Russian Foreign 
Ministry published in the main Russian newspapers, Pravda and Izvestia. Such 
statements, responding to a particular event with regard to Iraq outlined Moscow's 
position and its preferred line of action. Similarly, Declarations of the Russian 
President, prompted by important developments on the issue of Iraq, focused on 
the actions undertaken by the President in this matter and spelled out Russia's 
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desired course of action. In addition, speeches of Soviet leaders at the Supreme 
Soviet and the CPSU Central Committee, as well as presidential addresses at the 
Foreign Ministry and other political establishments provided a valuable source for 
understanding the agenda and the objectives of Russia's foreign policy. 
Official UN records, including the transcripts of the Security Council 
meetings, were used to gain insight into the positions of Russia and other 
permanent members of the Security Council. In addition, the Royal United 
Services Institute's (RUSI) web-based Iraq Resources proved an essential source 
for UN documents on Iraq, including Russia's alternative draft resolutions, but 
also for a variety of other international documents involving Iraq. 
In Moscow, the Lenin State Library was consulted for additional primary 
sources on Russia and Iraq. Despite a vast amount of references to any thinkable 
topic, it seemed that the issue of Russian-Iraqi relations was covered in secrecy. 
Therefore, it was only possible to obtain full text copies of a number of bilateral 
agreements concluded between Moscow and Baghdad in the period of 1993-1995 
(see Appendices). While in Moscow, this author had meetings with some 
members of the Oriental Studies Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences 
who having repeatedly travelled to Iraq, provided me with interesting insights of 
Russia's policy and objectives in that country. 
Another major primary source used for this thesis was the Russian and 
Western media. A large number of Russian daily newspapers, in particular, 
Pravda, Izvestia, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Krasnaya Zvezda, Argumenty i Fakty, 
Komsomolshaya Pravda, Sovetskaya Rossiya, Literaturnaya Gazeta and 
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Mikhail Gorbachov. 48 His insight was complemented by the memoirs of his 
foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze, 49 his personal advisors Anatoly 
Chernayev50 and Yevgeny Primakov5) who was directly involved in Russia's 
diplomatic efforts with regard to Iraq, as well as the deputy foreign minister 
Alexander Belonogov52 who provides the most comprehensive account of Foreign 
Ministry's actions during the conflict. 
Boris Yeltsin's memoirs, even though primarily focusing on the personal 
aspects of his life during his presidency, 53 were useful for understanding Russian 
domestic politics and challenges faced by the first Russian president. Memoirs of 
Russian politicians, such as the ultra-nationalist leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky, 54 
the conservative leader Vyacheslav Nikonov55 and Yabloko leader Alexander 
Yavlinsky, 56 although of varied quality and of the propagandist nature, also 
contained interesting details on some episodes covered in this thesis. 
UN diplomacy on Iraq and his own personal experiences in dealing with Baghdad 
were best explained in the account of the UNSCOM chairman Richard Butler. 57 
However, his overt bias against Russia and Moscow's objectives in Iraq 
somewhat diminished the reliability of his work. Among other accounts of UN 
policy on Iraq, memoirs of the chief arms inspector Scott Ritter58 and the 
48 Mikhail Gorbachov, Memoirs, (Paris: Editions du Rocher, 1997) 
49 Eduard Shevardnadze, The Future Belongs to Freedom, (London: Sinclair-Stevenson, 1991) 
50 Anatoly Chernyaev, Diaries of a Presidential Aid, (Moscow: Terra, 1997) 
sr Yevgeny Primakov, Years in Big Politics, (Moscow: Collection `Very Secretly', 1999) 
52 Alexander Belonogov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Kremlin. The Kuwait Crisis, (Moscow: 
O1ma Press, 2001) 
51 Boris Yeltsin, Midnight Diaries, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2000) 
54 Vladimir Zhirinovsky, Vladimir Zhirinovskv Speaks with Russia, (Moscow: RAYT, 1995) 
ss Vycheslav Nikonov, Epoch of Changes: Russia in the Eyes of a Conservative. (Moscow: RAUT. 
2002) 
5e Alexander Yavlinsky, On Russian Policy (Speeches and Articles 1994-1999), (Moscow: 
Epizentr, 1999) 
57 Richard Butler, The Greatest Threat, Iraq, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the Crisis of 
Global Security, (New York: Public Affairs, 2000) 
58 Scott Ritter, Endgame: Solving the Iraqi Crisis, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999) 
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UNMOVIC chairman Hans Blix59 were also useful. Finally, the memoirs of 
George Bush Sr., 60 James Baker, 61 Bill Clinton62 and the Ambassador-at Large 
and Special Advisor to the Secretary of State on the New Independent States, 
Strobe Talbott, 63 provided a valuable U. S. view of some events discussed in this 
study. 
Summary 
Commenting on Russia's policy in Iraq, the former Russian foreign minister 
Andrei Kozyrev argued that Iraq was a `litmus test' in Russia's domestic and 
foreign policies. The intention of this thesis is to demonstrate that Iraq can be used 
as a means of examining the evolution of Russia's foreign policy throughout the 
1990s and a barometer for measuring Moscow's international standing. During 
the transformation of Soviet foreign policy under Gorbachov, the Gulf crisis was 
the first test for the viability of the New Thinking and the beginning of a new 
stage in international relations. During the Yeltsin era Iraq continued to highlight 
the debates concerning the orientation of Russian foreign policy, emerging as a 
function of Moscow's relations with the U. S. Similarly, under Vladimir Putin Iraq 
remained the only place where the interests of Russia and the U. S. were not 
simply at cross-purpose, but essentially in rigid opposition to each other. 
It is hoped that this study will present new insights into Russian domestic 
and foreign policies from the final year of the Soviet Union to the second term of 
51 Hans Blix, Disarming Iraq, (London: Bloomsbury. 2004) 
60 George Bush, Brent Scowcroft. A World Transformed, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998) 
61 James A. Baker, III, Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace, (New York: Putnam 
Pub Group, 1995) 
62 Bill Clinton, Lly Life, (London: Arrow Books, 2005) 
6' Strobe Talbott, The Russia Hand: A Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy, (Random House: New 
York, 2002) 
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president Putin and provide a historical background to the understudied Russian- 
Iraqi relations from the first Gulf war to the U. S. invasion of Iraq. 
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Chapter 1: Moscow in the Persian Gulf crisis 1990-1991 
However dangerous the Gulf crisis may be in itself and however important it is to settle, I 
think we should proceed from the fact that it offers a kind of laboratory, testing our 
efforts to create a new world order after the Cold War. 
President Gorbachov's advisor and special envoy to the Middle East, Yevgeny Primakov' 
While the dynamics of relations between the USSR and Iraq, marked by 
phases of rapprochement and cooling down, clearly demonstrated the limits of 
Soviet influence over Iraq and the latter's ability to pursue an independent foreign 
policy despite the reliance on Soviet arms, it also indicated that despite real 
differences, Iraq throughout the Cold War continued to regard Moscow as its 
steadfast ally. 2 It is not surprising therefore, that failing to detect the scope of the 
internal transformation of the Soviet state and its impact on Soviet foreign policy, 
Baghdad, in embarking on the invasion of Kuwait in the early hours of 2 August 
1990,3 still counted on Soviet support. This Iraqi aggression was subsequently 
explained by the inherent sense of insecurity of the Iraqi leader vis-ä-vis his 
neighbours, compelling him to choose war as a last resort, 4 and by Baghdad's 
serious financial difficulties in the aftermath of its war with Iran, further 
aggravated by the sharp drop in world oil prices in spring of 1990.5 The 
Quoted by Francis X. Clines, `Gorbachov Sends a Chief Advisor to Iraq in New Diplomatic 
Effort', New York Times, 4 October 1990. p. 14 
2 For detailed account of Soviet-Iraqi relations from 1958-1988, Oles M. Smolansky with Bettie 
M. Smolansky, The USSR and Iraq: The Soviet Quest for Influence, (Durham and London: Duke 
University Press, 1991) 
3 For the complete chronology of the Gulf crisis see BBC World Service, Gulf Crisis Chronology, 
(Harlow: Longman, 1991) 
4 Efraim Karsh and Inari Rautsi, `Why Saddam Hussein Invaded Kuwait', Survival, Vol. 33, Ns. 1, 
January/February 1991, pp. 18-19 
5 The oil price dropped from US$22 a barrel in January 1990 to US$16 a barrel by mid-April 1990. 
`Oil in the Doldrums', The Economist, 21 April 1990, p. 107 
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underlying motives were also found in Baghdad's long-standing ambition to settle 
finally its historic claims to Kuwait and obtain much-desired access to the Persian 
Gulf. 6 
Iraq's belligerent mood, in particular towards the United Arab Emirates 
and Kuwait, which were accused of pushing the oil prices down by disregarding 
the OPEC production quotas, and Baghdad's intensified propaganda campaign 
against Kuwait, charged with stealing US$2.4 billion from the Rumaila oilfield in 
the disputed border region and refusing to write off its war loans to Iraq, 7 caused 
some concern in the Arab world in the summer of 1990.8 However, neither 
Washington nor Moscow saw much reason for anxiety despite the alarming 
intelligence reports. 9 Not surprising therefore, that the Iraqi invasion took the 
world entirely by surprise, triggering the first major international crisis of the 
early post-Cold War, and putting to test nascent Soviet-American co-operation in 
the global affairs. ' ° 
For Moscow, the Gulf crisis proved particularly important for a number of 
reasons. First, it allowed the USSR to test its new foreign strategy, especially its 
new approach to regional conflicts and co-operation in the framework of 
international mechanisms. " Second, it assisted in defining Moscow's role in the 
post-Cold War world and set an important precedent for its role in future conflict 
e Richard Schofield, Kuwait and Iraq: Historical Claims and Territorial Disputes, (London: Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, 1991) 
7 `Goodbye Kuwait', The Economist, 4 August 1990, p. 49 
8 In a letter to the Arab League in July 1990, Iraq's foreign minister Tareq Aziz accused both 
sheikhdoms of a `direct aggression' against Iraq. 'Saddam's Gulf of Threats', The Economist, 21 
July 1990, p. 57 
9 Although later, it was claimed that Saddam Hussein in his conversation with the U. S. 
Ambassador April Glaspie on 25 July 1990, had given clues as to his intentions. For the transcript 
of this meeting see, James Ridgeway (ed. ), The March to War. (New York: Four Walls Eight 
Windows, 1991), pp. 50-53 
10 The Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, when informed about the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait during his meeting with James Baker in Irkutsk, did not think it possible. See Eduard 
Shevardnadze, The Future Belongs to Freedom, (London: Sinclair-Stevenson, 1991), p. 100 
1 Fedor Burlatsky, `A Tough Lesson to Dictatorship', Literaturnaya Gazeta, 23 January 1991, p. 1 
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resolution scenarios. 12 Third, it revealed the main priority of the Soviet foreign 
policy - cooperation with the U. S. - while exposing the Soviet dilemma between 
the aspiration to fully integrate into the Western structures and the desire to 
preserve its own interests, not always identical to those of the West and the U. S. 13 
The Gulf crisis also put an end to the domestic approval and support of 
Gorbachov's new foreign policy, which previously had been considered the strong 
side of his government. 14 Finally, it indicated the limits of Soviet influence in Iraq 
and Baghdad's failure to fully comprehend the impact of the internal 
transformation on Soviet foreign policy. '5 
At the time of the Gulf crisis, the Soviet Union found itself in deep economic 
decline accompanied by a grave social crisis, requiring far-reaching measures to 
prevent further decay, and indeed the collapse of the Soviet state. ' 6 Already on his 
accession to power in March 1985, Mikhail Gorbachov realised the extent of 
economic stagnation and was determined to counter it with a policy aimed 
initially at accelerating economic growth and the large-scale transformation of the 
qualitative structure of production. '7 However, it soon appeared clear that 
superficial economic restructuring was not enough to halt the impending crisis, 
and that simultaneous political and social reform at all levels -perestroika - was a 
12 Alexei Vasiliev, `I Know that You Know... ', Komsomolskaya Pravda, 25 November 1990, p. 3 
13 As revealed by Anatoly Chernyaev, quoting Gorbachov in Diaries of a Presidential Aid, 
(Moscow: Terra, 1997), p. 55 
14 Mikhail Pogorely, `How the Desert Storm Echoes in Our Hearts', Krasnaya Zvezda, 8 February 
1990, p. 3 
" For example, Saddam Hussein's speech in Amman, mentioning the Soviet restructuring. Full 
text in `Saddam Husayn on the Post-Cold War Middle East', Orbis, Vol. 35, Ns ), Winter 1991, 
pp. 117-119 
1e According to the estimates by the Soviet Academy of Sciences' Institute of World Economics 
and International Relations, the USSR in producing a unit of national income was spending 80% 
more in fixed assets, 60% more in materials, 110% more energy, and twice as much in shipping 
operations as the U. S. Yevgeny Primakov. `A Look into the Past and the Future', Pravda, 8 
January 1988, p. 4 
" `Speech by Comrade M. S. Gorbachov. General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee at the 
Plenary Session of the CPSU Central Committee on 11 March 1985', Pravda and Izvestia, 12 
March 1985, p. 3 
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prerequisite for the successful transformation of the Soviet Union. 18 
On the international level, the economic decline of the USSR, brought to 
surface by Gorbachov, meant that Moscow was no longer able to maintain its 
present level of strategic competition with the U. S. At the same time, Gorbachov 
realised that the failure to transform would lead to even greater isolation in an 
increasingly globalised world. 19 He recognised that the current political and 
economic system in the USSR prevented it from benefiting from globalisation and 
technological progress, leaving it lagging behind the industrialised world, and 
ultimately threatening the Soviet Union's superpower status. 20 Instead of 
Brezhnev's doctrine of peaceful co-existence accompanied by a heavy military 
build-up to achieve parity with the U. S., the only way of preserving Moscow's 
position in the changing world appeared to be giving up military competition with 
the U. S. in favour of a new approach based on non-military instruments. 21 
According to the Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, the main 
requirement of the new foreign policy was that the USSR 
should not bear additional expenditures in connection with the necessity of 
supporting our [Soviet] defence capabilities and the defence of our legitimate 
foreign policy interests. That means that we must seek paths to the limitation 
and reduction of military rivalry, to the removal of confrontational moments 
in relations to other states, to the damping down of conflicts and crises. 22 
18 Mikhail Gorbachov, `Restructuring is an Urgent Matter that Affects Everyone and Everything', 
Pravda, 2 August 1986, pp. 1-2 
19 Gorbachov, Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Counts- and the World, (London: Collins, 
1987), pp. 17-25 
20 Ibid. 
21 Similarly, Michael Mandelbaum argued that while earlier, detente was undertaken for offensive 
motives, in the late 1980s, the overriding purpose became defensive. `Ending the Cold War', 
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 68,. N2.2, Spring 1989, p. 18 
22 Speech at a meeting of the Diplomatic Academy on 27 June 1987, Vestnik Ministerstva 
Inostranl, kh Del SSSR, 26 August 1987, p. 31 
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The primary task of the country's foreign policy, therefore, consisted in 
developing favourable conditions abroad to assist domestic restructuring, while 
minimising the damage caused by its weakened position. 23 This could be achieved 
first by strengthening the international mechanisms, which would allow the Soviet 
Union to maintain its influence and act as an equal partner of the West at a 
cheaper price, while preventing the U. S. from approaching world problems 
unilaterally. Second, by abandoning ideological baggage, namely rejecting 
ideological struggle with the U. S. and thus, assistance to burdensome clients in 
the Developing World. Third, by advocating the peaceful resolution of regional 
conflicts, which would reserve a leading role for the USSR as a mediator, avoid 
costly military commitments, and the reduce competition with Washington 
without a loss of face. 24 
The first step in this direction was the announcement of the end to the 
arms race with the U. S. In his political report to the 27th Communist Party 
Congress in February 1986, Gorbachov acknowledged that `no state can defend 
itself using solely military-political means' and that `ensuring security is 
becoming more and more a political task, ' achievable only by political 
instruments. 25 Therefore, there appears to be `no alternative to co-operation and 
interaction among states... especially with the U. S'. 26 
23 Gorbachov's speech in the Kremlin at the meeting with the participants of the International 
Forum for a Nuclear-Free World for the Survival of Humanity, TASS, `Learn the Art of Living in 
Peace', Pravda, 17 February 1987, p. 2 
24 Director of the Department of International Organisations at the Foreign Ministry, Andrei Kozyrev, 
`Regional Conflict: Co-operation and Competition: Paper 1', in The Strategic Implications of Change 
in the Soviet Union, Part II, Adelphi Paper 248, Winter 1989/90, pp. 45-48 
25 The Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th Congress of the Communist 




At the same time, particular attention was paid to the revival of the United 
Nations as a new forum for the pursuit of the Soviet interests. 27 Since 1984, the 
USSR had not exercised its right of veto in the Security Council, and in 1988, 
Moscow set about to liquidate its debts for the U. N. peacekeeping operations by 
paying US$25 million. 28 On the rhetorical level, the United Nations was hailed as 
a `place of joint search for a balance of various contradictory, but real interests of 
today's nations. '29 Closely linked with co-operation at the U. N. and Soviet 
concepts of creating a comprehensive system of international security, was the 
Soviet effort to promote peaceful settlement of conflicts in Namibia, Angola and 
Cambodia. 30 
Interestingly, these measures on the part of the USSR were not presented 
as retreat under the U. S. pressure, but rather as concessions to `common sense'. 31 
Emphasis was placed on the need to new approaches to international affairs free 
from old stereotypes and dogmas `inherited from the past. '32 The theoretical 
underpinning for these policies was provided by the concept of New Thinking, a 
term coined by Gorbachov's close collaborator, Alexander Yakovlev, in 1987.33 It 
was based on the assumption that the accumulation of weapons of mass 
destruction would leave `no winners' in case of a nuclear war, making peaceful 
27 Kozyrev stressed that the USSR was seeking to 're-define its U. N. membership in order to 
promote its domestic and foreign policies in the spirit of the New Thinking and in a manner that 
will serve the Soviet national interests'. 'The New Soviet Attitude toward the United Nations', The 
Washington Quarterly, Vol. 13, No 3, Summer 1990, p. 41 
28 USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, `The Foreign Policy and Diplomatic Activity of the USSR, 
April 1985-October 1989, International Affairs (USSR), No 1,1990, p. 56 
29 Gorbachov's speech on the occasion of the opening of the 42nd session of the U. N. General 
Assembly, 'Reality and Guarantees of a Secure World'. Pravda, 17 September 1987, p. 1 
30 Richard K. Herrmann, `Soviet Behaviour in Regional Conflicts: Old Questions, New Strategies and 
Important Lessons', World Politics, Vol. 44, No. 3, April 1992, pp. 454-57 
" Primakov, 'A New Philosophy of Foreign Policy', Pravda, 10 July 1987, p. 4 
32 TASS, 'Learn the Art of Living in Peace', Pravda, 17 February 1987, p. 2 
33 Primakov, Years in Big Politics, (Moscow: 'Collection Very Secretly', 1999), p. 45 
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co-existence a vital requirement for the `survival of mankind. '34 While 
recognising the `unprecedented' diversity of the world, the new principles 
emphasised the global interconnectedness and interdependency, which constituted 
an integral whole. 35 Security of some could therefore not be achieved at the 
expense of the security of others. Closely linked with the concept of 
interdependence was the notion of human values and morality, which constituted 
the new criteria for the Soviet behaviour. 36 The `human factor', `directly invading 
world affairs' was regarded as one of the main elements of the new political 
thinking. 37 
However, the internal transformation and the sweeping changes in the 
Soviet international strategy did not mean changes in the Soviet global objectives. 
Whereas the theoretical framework was newly reconstructed, the requirements of 
practical policy remained unchanged. The extension of the Soviet power, the 
limitation of the American influence and the elimination of pretexts for the U. S. 
military involvement in any part of the world remained the ultimate objectives of 
the Soviet foreign policy agenda. 
Not surprising therefore that a new crisis in the Persian Gulf caused by the 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait revealed the discrepancy between the requirements of the 
New Thinking and the actual interests of the USSR. In an attempt to reconcile its 
objectives, the Soviet policy of `sympathetic neutrality' therefore followed two 
34 Gorbachov, `Televised Speech on Foreign Policy, Moscow 18 August 1986', in Gorbachov, 
Toward a Better World, (New York: Richardson & Steirman, 1987), pp. 363-372; Shevardnadze's 
Report to the 19th All-Union Communist Party Congress, `Foreign Policy and Diplomacy', 
Pravda, 26 July 1988, p. 4 
15 Gorbachov, Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World, pp. 136-138 
36 Shevardnadze's speech at the second session of the Supreme Soviet, `Foreign Policy and 
Restructuring', Pravda, 24 October 1989, pp. 2-4 
Report by Gorbachev at the joint ceremonial meeting of the CPSU Central Committee, the 
USSR Supreme Soviet and the Russian Republic Supreme Soviet, devoted to the 70th anniversary 
of the October Revolution. `October and Restructuring: the Revolution Continues', Pravda, 3 
November 1987, pp. 2-5 
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distinct vectors. One was directed at the co-operation with the international 
community in accordance with the new principles Soviet foreign policy, and the 
other at the preservation of its relations with Iraq, and, more generally, at 
improving its standing in the Arab world. 38 
The main objective of Soviet diplomatic activities during the Gulf crisis 
was to find a peaceful solution to the conflict for a variety of reasons. First of all, 
Moscow was anxious to avoid a war in proximity to its borders, and as the crisis 
continued, appeared increasingly concerned by the potential use of the biological 
and chemical weapons and the resulting ecological disaster at the USSR's 
doorstep. 39 In addition, the government was concerned about the fate of some nine 
thousand Soviet nationals in both Kuwait and Iraq. 40 
More importantly, the Kremlin understood that a military confrontation between 
the U. S. and Iraq would mean a certain defeat for Baghdad, and therefore a loss of 
a strong ally and a reliable economic partner for the Soviet state. 41 Moscow also 
recognised that the American military involvement in the Middle East would 
further weaken the Soviet position in the region, already in decline since the 
1970s. 42 On the domestic level, the resort to force would demonstrate that the 
38 Leonid Medvedko, The Seventh Middle Eastern War: Russia's Geopolitics and Security after 
the War in the Persian Gulf, (Moscow: RAN, 1993) 
39 Major-General Vadim Makarevsky, `The Threat from the South', Novoe Vremya, No. 34,21-27 
August 1990, p. 12; Yuri Glukhov, `The War was Tomorrow', Pravda, 5 November 1990, p. 3; 
`Statement on the Meeting between Prince Feisal and Mikhail Gorbachov', Vestnik Ministerstva 
Inostrannykh Del SSSR, No. 82, December 1990, p. 51; Vitaly Khrustov, `The Persian Gulf: War 
and Ecology', Pravda, 30 January 1991, p. 4; Gorbachov, `Statement of the President of the 
USSR', Krasnaya Zvezda, 12 February 1991, p. 1 
40 According to Reuters, there were 880 Soviet nationals in Kuwait and 7,830 in Iraq. `How Many 
Foreigners in Iraq and Kuwait', Izvestia, 15 August 1990, p. 4: However, two weeks later, the 
number of Soviet nationals in Iraq was increased to 9,000 according to Reuters, `The Fate of 
Hostages', Pravda, 27 August 1990, p. 4 
41 This question was raised at the meeting between Shevardnadze and Aziz in Moscow on 25 
November 1990, as reported by deputy foreign minister Alexander Belonogov, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. The Kremlin. The Kuwait Crisis, (Moscow: Olma Press, 2001) p. 232 
42 On the state of Soviet policy in the Middle East at the time of the Gulf crisis, Vitaly Naumkin, 
Deputy Director of the Oriental Institute at the Academy of Science of the USSR, quoted in Sergei 
Zevorotnykh. Igor Chernyak, `And Oil Washes Away All Traces', Komsomolskaya Pravda, 14 
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concept of New Thinking, one of the foundations of the transforming Soviet state, 
was not working, undermining the credibility of Soviet reforms. For Gorbachov 
personally, the failure of his foreign policy would mean a decisive victory for his 
reactionary political enemies, bitterly opposed to his policy of restructuring. 43 
Consequently, while efforts were undertaken to deepen the co-operation 
with the U. S., to pursue an active policy at the U. N. and to maintain ties with 
European leaders, continuous contacts were upheld with Iraq, either directly with 
Baghdad, or through the Iraqi ambassador in Moscow, and no efforts were spared 
to activate the Arab factor. 
In line with this policy, on 2 August 1990, the Soviet government issued a 
statement condemning the Iraqi actions, but limited its reaction to `what could not 
remain unsaid'44: 
The Soviet Union believes that no disputes, however complex, justify the use 
of force. This development greatly contradicts the interests of the Arab states, 
creates new obstacles on the path of the settlement of conflicts in the Middle 
East and goes against the positive tendencies of the revitalisation of 
international life. The Soviet government is convinced that the immediate 
and unconditional withdrawal of the Iraqi troops from the Kuwaiti territory 
would contribute to the liquidation of the dangerous tension in the Middle 
East. The sovereignty, national independence and territorial integrity of the 
45 state of Kuwait should be fully restored and protected. 
February 1991, p. 3; Also Karen Dawisha, `The Correlation of Forces and Soviet Policy in the 
Middle East', in Adeed Dawisha and Karen Dawisha, The Soviet Union in the Middle East. 
Policies and Perspectives, (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1983), pp. 147-165 
`" On conservative forces in Soviet politics and their political vision, Andrei Lipsky, `New 
Thinking is Ending. What's Next? '. Moskolskie Novosti, 10 February 1991, p. 3 
44 According to Belonogov, it was important to choose the right tone: `firm, but not threatening', 
expressing `pity and puzzlement concerning the invasion, and the hope that reason will prevail and 
quick settlement found. ' Belonogov, p. 35 
45 TASS, `Statement of the Soviet Goverment', Pravda and Izvestia, 2 August 1990, p. 1 
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At the same time, in accordance with its established practice, 
46 Moscow 
suspended all military deliveries to Iraq, 47 and at the U. N. Security Council, 
convened the same day, voted for the adoption of the Resolution 660, which 
condemned the Iraqi aggression and demanded its immediate and unconditional 
withdrawal to positions held on 1 August. 48 
In a further attempt to demonstrate its co-operation with Washington on 
this matter, 49 Gorbachov also agreed to a meeting between Shevardnadze and his 
counterpart James Baker at Vnukovo airport in Moscow in the hope that it would 
lead to an unprecedented joint declaration on the crisis. 50 Still, while both sides 
agreed that aggression should not remain unpunished, the preparation of the 
declaration revealed the fundamental differences in approaches between the U. S. 
and the Soviet state, which were to shape their positions for the duration of the 
crisis. 51 Whereas the former was willing, if necessary, to use force to restore the 
status quo ante, the USSR was determined to avoid it. As the Soviet Deputy 
Foreign Minister Belonogov later reported, while the U. S. preferred `tough words 
and expressions, which would make the future [Soviet] dialogue with Baghdad 
difficult', Moscow was interested in preserving this `channel of communication in 
the working condition'. 52 
While undertaking the minimum it could to show its adherence to the New 
Thinking without damaging its real interests, Moscow made its next steps 
46 Previously, arms deliveries to Iraq were haltered in 1975 during Baghdad's massive offensive 
against the Kurds, and in 1980 at the start of its war with Iran. 
47 TASS, 3 August 1990, Krasnaya Zvezda, p. 1 
48 United Nations Security Council Resolution S/RES/660 (1990) 
49 For a detailed account of the Soviet-American diplomacy in the first month of the crisis, 
Margaret Garrard Warner, The Moscow Connection', Newsweek, 17 September 1990, pp. 10-12 
so Full text of the Soviet-American Declaration in TASS, 'Talks in Vnukovo Airport. Joint Call by 
E. Shevardnadze and J. Baker', Pravda, 4 August 1990, p. 1L 'Moscow and Washington Join in 
Condemnation'. Financial Times, 4 August 1990, p. 2 
51 Mikhail Ponomarev. 'A Long Echo of Aggression', Krasnaya Zvezda, 31 August 1991, p. 3 
52 Belonogov, pp. 44-45 
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dependent on Iraq's further conduct. For this purpose, the Soviet government 
already on 2 August, forwarded a message to Saddam Hussein, which stated its 
position and demanded explanations. However, the Iraqi stance at the U. N., 
playing down the invasion as an Iraqi internal matter53 and Saddam's belated 
response to the message, which accused the Soviet state of acting `hastily', hinted 
the latter's incompetence in Middle Eastern politics and reminded it of its own 
invasion of Afghanistan, 54 did not provide Moscow with a reason to deviate from 
the position taken. Furthermore, the preservation of the friendship with Iraq 
became more difficult in the face of the unanimous disapproval of the Iraqi 
aggression. 
Yet, the USSR was determined to leave the door to Iraq open, and sent 
another message to the Iraqi leader on 5 August, which remained undisclosed, 
responding to Saddam Hussein's claims and warning him about the impending 
economic sanctions. 55 Although the USSR did consider such measures an 
effective instrument in obtaining the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, 56 Moscow, in 
contrast to other Security Council members, notably the U. S. and Britain, 
favoured a gradual toughening of the sanctions rather than the adoption of a broad 
embargo regime straight away. 57 Nevertheless, faced with the fact that its message 
remained unanswered, not to mention a blatant anti-Soviet article in the main Iraqi 
53 Speech of the Iraqi representative to the United Nations Security Council on 2 August 1990, as 
reported by Belonogov, p. 38 
54 Excerpts of the message in Belonogov, p. 59 
55 Ibid., p. 61 
56 It has been argued that Moscow was interested in imposing economic sanctions on Iraq, as it would 
push up the price for oil on the world market, meaning higher earnings for the Soviet petroleum 
industry. However, the Soviet economic losses and potential political damage to its relations with Iraq 
seemed to overweigh the short-term commercial interests, and have therefore not influenced the 
Soviet vote at the UN. `Comrade oil', The Economist, 11 August 1990, p. 42; `Shoe on the Other 
Foot', The Economist, 18 August 1990, p. 39 
57 Belonogov quoted in a press conference in the Soviet Foreign Ministry on 6 August by Maxim 
Yusin, `In the Foreign Ministry of USSR: Iraq-Kuwait: No Solution in Sight'. Izvestia, 7 August 
1990, p. 3 
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newspaper Al-Iraq the following day, 58 it chose to support the tougher option and 
on 6 August, voted in favour of Resolution 661, which imposed economic 
sanctions on Iraq. 
59 
In fact, the Soviet willingness to look for a compromise within the 
framework of the U. N. did not only correspond to the main principles of its new 
foreign policy, but also to the real interests of the Soviet state. By keeping the 
Kuwaiti within the framework of the U. N., Moscow could, if necessary exercise 
its right of a veto and use the U. N. as a forum to underline the Soviet position. 
More importantly, though, the USSR hoped that the active role of the U. N. would 
ensure that the issue remained on the collective track, preventing Washington, 
willing to deploy force if a peaceful solution could not be found, from acting 
unilaterally. 
On the rhetorical level, the Soviet government emphasised that the Iraqi 
aggression could not go on unchallenged in the new era of the Soviet foreign 
policy. It was pointed out that it was very difficult for the USSR to support the 
U. N. resolution against Iraq in view of its close relations to Baghdad, but that the 
New Thinking did not allow it to be guided by what it perceived as `double 
standards'. 60 With an eye on Baghdad, it was repeatedly stressed that Moscow had 
no choice but to condemn Iraq because `the use of force to redraw borders, 
especially in order to annex the sovereign country, threatens a periculous chain 
reaction endangering the whole world community', 
61 and also because the 
sR As reported by Belonogov, p. 62 
59 United Nations Security Council Resolution S/RES/661 (1990) 
G0 Editorial, 'Saddam Hussein is Testing the World Community', International Affairs (USSR), N. 
11,1990, pp. 51-52 
61 Quoted in Mary Dejevsky, 'Gorbachov Backs U. N. Action', The Times, 18 August 1990, p. 2 
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aggression was committed using Soviet arms supplied, according to Moscow, for 
defensive purposes only. 62 
Belonogov at a meeting with journalists on 6 August also explained that 
although Iraq was `one of the few countries with which we had not only close, but 
also mutually advantageous relations ... there was no other way'. 
63 At the same 
time, an unnamed article in Pravda added that the Soviet reaction to the Iraqi 
aggression did not mean `that we are not willing to undertake all efforts to find a 
honourable way out of he crisis, providing all possible assistance to the sides of 
the Iraq-Kuwaiti crisis. '64 Still, to find a peaceful way out of the crisis required a 
degree of co-operation on the Iraqi side, which Baghdad failed to provide. On the 
contrary, the repeated incursions of the Iraqi army into the Saudi territory, and 
Baghdad's announcement of its annexation of Kuwait, increased the sense of 
threat on the part of the monarchies of the Gulf and triggered Washington's 
decision to deploy its military forces in Saudi Arabia. 65 
For Moscow, the American presence in the region appeared not only as a 
great blow to its interests in the Middle East, but also to its diplomatic efforts 
directed at preventing the U. S. military involvement. Consequently, on 9 August, 
the Soviet government issued a statement, addressed to both Baghdad and 
Washington. 66 It stated that Moscow's hopes for the quick resolution of the 
conflict had not been realised, reaffirmed that the USSR was interested in 
62 Gorbachov in his speech in the Odessa military district `Honourably Get Over the Past in the 
History of the Country', Sovetskaya Rossia, 19 August 1990, p. 2; Foreign Ministry spokesman 
Gennady Gerasimov in a press-conference on 6 August 1990. `In the Press-Centre of the Foreign 
Ministry', Krasnaya Zvezda, 7 September 1990, p. 3; Kozyrev, `Legal Basis for Arms Trade', 
Krasnaya Zvezda, 3 October 1990, p. 3 
63 Quoted by Yusin, `No Solution in Sight', Izvestia, p. 4; Similar view also expressed in an 
interview with Novoe Vremva, N. 32, `Common Sense Must Prevail', 14-20 August 1990, pp. 4-5 
64 `Anachronism: an Opinion' Pravda. 7 August 1990, p. 4 
65 Michael R. Gordon, `Bush's Aims: Deter an Attack, Send a Signal', New York Times, 8 August 
1990, p. 1 
66 TASS, `Statement of the Foreign Ministry of the USSR', Pravda and Izvestia, 9 August 1990, 
p. 1 
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preserving its friendship with Iraq, but declared that in the given situation `we 
cannot adopt a position of silence'. The declaration reiterated that the Soviet 
position `to this question of principle' remained `firm - the sovereignty, national 
independence and territorial integrity of Kuwait should be fully restored and 
protected'. At the same time, addressing the U. S., the statement stressed the 
importance of showing restraint and not to allow action that could further fuel the 
situation. 67 It restated its opposition to the use of force and unilateral decisions: 
`The experience of many years proves that the best and most reasonable course of 
action in the conflict situations is the collective efforts, the full use of the 
mechanisms of the U. N'. 68 
At the same time, a commentator in Pravda concluded that in view of the 
scope of the U. S. deployment, it was not only about measures for the territorial 
protection of Saudi Arabia. In his view, it was about strategic actions that 
corresponded to the interests of the U. S. and some of its allies, and were directed 
at `cardinally changing the balance of power' in the Middle East. 69 According to 
Soviet military, it was also about an encirclement of the Soviet southern borders . 
70 
Alexander Belonogov at the meeting of the Political Committee of the Parliament 
summarised the Soviet concerns: `The growth of the American military might 
cannot please us either in the short-term, because the situation is becoming more 
and more explosive, nor in the long-term because there is no guarantee that the 
7 
.i U. S. will leave Saudi Arabia once the crisis is over' 
67 Ibid. 
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In fact, Saudi Arabia also requested Soviet participation in the 
multinational coalition forces based on its territory, even on the symbolic scale, in 
the hope of sending a strong signal to Saddam Hussein. 72 However, Moscow 
appeared reluctant. Officially, its refusal was explained by the lack of the practical 
necessity for the Soviet deployment in view of the great number of multinational 
forces already in place, by the internal difficulties in the Soviet Union, and finally, 
by the impossibility to obtain support from the Soviet publics, haunted by the 
Afghan syndrome. 73 In reality, Moscow believed that the dispatch of Soviet troops 
to the Gulf would have contradicted the proclaimed Soviet objective of avoiding 
the use of force, impeding the search of a peaceful solution. More importantly, the 
USSR was cautious not to provoke Baghdad, not least because over 8,000 Soviet 
specialists were still held in Iraq. Their fate became an important issue for the 
Soviet government in the face of the public concern for their well-being and the 
Western allegations concerning the nature of their occupation in Iraq. 74 
On a domestic level, the Kremlin's position on the crisis was far from 
generally accepted. Many felt that by siding with Washington Moscow was 
betraying its long-standing ally Iraq and giving up its economic interests in that 
country and the region as a whole. A commentator in Izvestia acknowledged that 
the Soviet position was influenced by the need to co-operate with the U. S. that 
was `one of the main levers to get us out of the crisis', but concluded that the 
72 Nicholas Beeston, 'Kingdom Wants Soviet Presence', The Times, 11 September 1990, p. 11 
73 Galina Sidorova, `The World Closes in', Novoe Vremya, No. 36,4-10 September 1990, pp. 5-6 
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Alexei Ostalsky, `The Fate of Soviet Citizens in Iraq: Contradictory News', Izvestia, 8 October 
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Soviet and American policies were not `compatible. ' 75 While Moscow showed its 
adherence to the new course and went against its `friend', Washington wanted `to 
dominate the oil-rich region' and `still relies on force and the promises that forces 
will be used in the interests of peace and stability. '76 
Another article in Sovetskaya Rossia argued that although it was right to 
give up the confrontation with the U. S. and to end the Cold War, the USSR should 
have sought a different position with regard to the crisis in view of its economic 
interests in Iraq. 77 It deplored the fact that it was foremost the Soviet Union that 
`lost out' in the crisis, while America profited from its presence in the region. 78 
The author predicted that when the Soviet economy recovered and the political 
life was re-ordered, Moscow would want to return to its role in the Middle East. 
`But in a few years our place will be occupied, and no one will wait for us 
there. '79 In contrast, Komsomolskaya Pravda raised the question of whether the 
change in Soviet foreign policy was justified, and concluded that although 
economic co-operation with Iraq was advantageous, the Soviet hesitation in 
condemning Iraq would have cost Moscow the trust `we have earned with such a 
difficulty over the past years. ' 80 
These discussions in the press were echoed by heated debates within the 
government. While for some, notably Gorbachov and his foreign minister 
Shevardnadze, the Soviet position appeared a question of principle, for others it 
75 Stanislav Kondrashev, `Together Against the Aggressor. What's Next? ', Izvestia, 14 August 
1990. p. 4; Later similar view by E. Gudkov, `The Right Guarantees? '. Krasnava Zvezda, 20 
February 1991, p. 3 
76 Ibid. 
77 Eduard Volodin, `An Arab Knot', Sovetskaya Rossia, 23 October 1990, p. 4; Later similar view 
by Alexei Vasiliev, `Without Nostalgia', Moskovskie Novosti, 27 January 1991, p. 13 
78 Later, similar view expressed by Roman Mustafin, `Is it Possible to Blow Out the Fire in the 
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was, a question of necessity. 81 Although all factions across the Soviet political 
landscape considered the condemnation of the Iraqi actions justified, the 
reactionary bloc `Soyuz' (Unity), led by Colonel Viktor Alksnis, from the onset 
vehemently opposed Gorbachov's policy in the Gulf, advocating support for 
Baghdad and playing up the question of the Soviet hostages in Iraq. 82 In the view 
of its adherents, Iraq was part of Soviet spheres of influence that had been ceded 
unilaterally to the West along with Eastern Europe and parts of the Third World. 83 
While the left-wing democrats and the so-called centrists, supported co-operation 
with the U. S., the conservatives and much of the senior military appeared 
suspicious of American objectives, and advocated an independent Soviet policy in 
the Middle East. 84 
There was, however, a general consensus that war in the Gulf should be 
avoided, but for different reasons. Whereas the democrats believed that military 
actions would undermine the very concept of the New Thinking, the conservatives 
rejected the war due to their support of Iraq, and the military, because of the 
strategic concerns related to the proximity of the conflict zone to Soviet borders. 85 
In fact, the struggle for power on two levels, between the democrats and 
the conservatives within the government and between the centre and the republics, 
which had intensified throughout the 1990, had already visibly weakened 
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Gorbachov's power and strengthened his main rival, Boris Yeltsin. 86 It was 
therefore crucial to the Soviet leader to show some success at home, where his 
reputation was waning and to prove that at least one wing of perestroika - that of 
foreign policy - was functioning. 
As a consequence, Moscow, to complement its West-oriented policy, also 
concentrated its efforts on activating the Arab factor in the hope of stimulating the 
search for a peaceful settlement by the Arabs themselves and mobilising the Arab 
world towards applying collective political pressure of Baghdad. In practice, the 
Arab solution meant an inter-Arab compromise, aimed at avoiding the war, 
removing foreign troops from the region and allowing Saddam Hussein to save 
face. 87 However, the Kremlin soon realised that the deep division within the Arab 
world over Iraq's intransigent claims, first revealed at the Arab League meeting in 
Cairo on 9 August, had greatly diminished its capability to influence the events. 88 
Still, Soviet interests in the Middle East dictated the maintenance of close 
relations with the Arab states, in particular to counterbalance the growing 
American influence in the region. 
Saddarn Hussein, too, appeared aware of the deep division in the Arab 
world, and attempted to use it to obtain support for his cause. 89 Thus, on 12 
August, Baghdad announced its peace initiative for the resolution of the crisis, 
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based on the gradual settlements of Middle Eastern conflicts in accordance with 
their occurrence. 90 
The plan proposed the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from Palestinian, 
Syrian and Lebanese territories, followed by the withdrawal of the Syrian forces 
from Lebanon, and finally, by the retreat of the Iranian and Iraqi armies from their 
respective territories. Only then, would Iraq agree to deal with the Kuwaiti 
question `with the due consideration to the historical rights of Iraq to its territory 
and to the choice of the people of Kuwait. ' It was followed by demands for the 
immediate withdrawal of the American and all other troops from Saudi Arabia 
and the instant halt to all measures adopted against Iraq. Although rejected by the 
anti-Iraqi coalition, the concept of linkage put forward by Saddam, which tied the 
Kuwaiti crisis linkage of the Kuwait crisis to the Arab-Israeli conflict was 
enthusiastically welcomed by Jordan, the PLO and the Arab `street', but not by 
the Arab governmental circles, which did not want Saddam to make gains 
regarding the Palestinian cause. 91 
Even though Moscow realised that the Iraqi peace initiative in its present 
form was unacceptable to the international community, the Kremlin thought the 
linkage of the Kuwaiti question to the Arab-Israeli conflict a useful basis for the 
search of an acceptable compromise. 92 Not to forget that Baghdad's plan largely 
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corresponded to the Soviet own initiatives on the Middle East, such as the call for 
an international conference for the resolution of the regional conflicts. 93 
The `linkage' question, however, created a further crack in the Soviet- 
American common stance on the crisis. While for Moscow, a peaceful resolution 
could be based on a compromise that would allow Saddam Hussein to save face 
and appear as a champion of the Palestinian cause, Washington rejected any 
solution that would reward the aggressor, or broaden the scope of the crisis into 
wider regional issues. 
For Gorbachov, who was ambitious to find a peaceful settlement of the 
crisis at any cost, while maintaining Soviet co-operation with the U. S., this 
created an insurmountable dilemma. Shevardnadze and Gorbachov's personal 
advisor, Yevgeny Primakov, also found themselves split on the issue. The former 
considered Iraq's fulfilment of the U. N. Resolution 660 as the only acceptable 
solution to the crisis and viewed it as the main task of the Soviet policy to 
preserve the unity of the coalition and demonstrate Iraq the absence of an 
alternative to withdrawal. 
Primakov, however, believed that in view of Saddam Hussein's `unique 
personality', the only way to resolve the crisis was to allow the Iraqi leader to 
save face, even at the expense of Kuwait. While Shevardnadze later rejected 
Iraq's attempts to link the crisis to other regional issues as `not serious', calling it 
an `adventurist plan aimed at turning the conflict into the Arab-Israeli one, '94 
Primakov maintained that Saddam was `generally right when speaking about the 
93 Present in the Soviet official statements since the Geneva Conference in December 1973, and 
more importantly since Camp David. 




double standards in the Palestinian and Kuwaiti questions', wondering `why not 
try using the situation for the resolution of the Palestinian problem? '95 
This difference in approaches towards the crisis by Gorbachov's closest 
advisors led to speculations in the Soviet and the Western press about the 
existence of two policies, one identified with the Foreign Minister and one with 
Primakov. 96 It also contributed to the increasing suspicion on the part of the West 
concerning Soviet objectives in the crisis, with Moscow being accused of playing 
a `double game' of co-operating with Washington, while working on the 
preservation of its close ties with Baghdad, or attempting to create a split in the 
anti-Iraqi coalition. 97 In reality, it was Gorbachov himself, who was torn between 
a more flexible approach toward Iraq advocated by Primakov, and the tough line 
called for by Shevardnadze, necessitated by the nascent partnership with the U. S., 
as well as by the deterioration of the situation in Kuwait. 
Despite its rhetorical overtures, Baghdad throughout August continued to 
consolidate its military-strategic position in Kuwait and even agreed to a 
humiliating peace settlement with Iran, which while rending the eight years of war 
entirely meaningless, provided Iraq with additional troops, previously needed on 
the Iranian border. 98 Fearing an imminent American, or perhaps Israeli retaliation, 
Baghdad also attempted to exercise pressure on the West, by detaining Western 
nationals and moving them to Iraqi military installations, to act as a `human 
95 Interview in Komsoinolska 
, 
ya Pravda, 15 January 1991 
96 Andrei Kortunov, 'Crisis in the Gulf and the Soviet Approach', Moskovskie Novosti. 13 January 
1991, p. 3-, Alexei Vasiliev, 'Who Determined and How the Soviet Position in the Conflict 
between Iraq and Kuwait', Konisomolska 
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25 February 1991 ý p. 15 9' Efrem Mikitenko, 'Baghdad is Turning to Tehran', Pravda, 16 August 1990, p. 4, Belyakov, 'A 
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shield' in case of an attack. 99 Apart from further increasing Baghdad's 
international isolation, these Iraqi actions provided a great impetus for a new U. N. 
resolution, sanctioning the use of force to uphold the naval embargo against 
Iraq. 100 
In Soviet eyes, this resolution appeared particularly important as it raised 
the question of command and control arrangements for multinational forces. '°' 
While the Anglo-American partners favoured a tough approach to Saddam 
Hussein and the control of the military action by the states which had contributed 
forces, the USSR, in accepting the possibility of the use of force, advocated direct 
control by the U. N. 102 In an attempt to tie the political-military reality to the U. N., 
and more importantly, to create a precedent for the future, Moscow tried to 
activate the moribund Military Staff Committee (MSC), which according to the 
Article 47 of the U. N. Charter was to `advise and assist the Security Council on 
questions relating to the Council's military requirements. ' 103 The Provision on the 
use of this Committee was indeed included into paragraph 4 of the resolution, and 
resulted in a meeting of the body at a senior level to review the situation in the 
Gulf. Otherwise, the MSC remained inactive and did not receive much 
prominence outside the Soviet press. '°4 
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In an attempt to influence the USSR's position at the U. N., on 20 August 
Saddam Hussein sent Deputy Prime Minister Sadoun Hammadi to Moscow. '°5 
During the talks with Shevardnadze, Hammadi expressed Iraq's willingness to re- 
pay its debts to the USSR within one and a half years through the deliveries of the 
Iraqi oil, and offered Moscow closer economic co-operation, in return for the 
Soviet veto of the U. N. resolution authorising the enforcement of sanctions 
against Iraq. 106 Shevardnadze informed the Iraqi representative that Moscow did 
not favour the adoption of that resolution, but that Iraqi actions did not give it a 
choice. Moscow could delay its adoption for a few days, but only if Iraq would 
use the time to re-assess its position. 107 This offer gained no response. In a final 
effort, Gorbachov on the eve of the vote at the U. N. Security Council sent an 
urgent message to Saddam Hussein, trying to convince the Iraqi leader to accept 
the Resolution 660 and avoid confrontation. 108 However, the Iraqi response, 
which remained unpublished, prompted Moscow to support adoption of the U. N. 
Resolution 665 on 25 August. 109 
In view of intensive American contacts with Moscow on the Iraqi issue, 
President Bush in August proposed a Soviet-American Summit in Helsinki to be 
held on 9 September. On the eve of the summit, the Soviet government invited the 
Iraqi foreign minister to Moscow to get an up-to-date impression of Baghdad's 
intentions in the hope of reaching a compromise with Washington over the 
crisis. 110 During his talks with Gorbachov on 5 September, Tareq Aziz' 1 
105 Yusin, 'Did Soviet Approach ChangeT Izi, estia, 22 August 1990., p. 3 
106 Belonogov, pp. 95-96 
107 Ibid., 98 
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reiterated Iraqi claims to Kuwait and expressed Baghdad's determination to 
confront the U. S. 112 He negatively assessed the Soviet reaction to the 
developments in the Gulf, arguing that although Baghdad `did not expect Moscow 
to protect Iraq, ' it would have liked the latter `not to limit the problems to the 
Kuwaiti question alone' and to oppose the `American extremism in the military 
sphere'. 113 In his view, the USSR should have supported Saddam Hussein's peace 
initiative of 12 August, which would have strengthened the Iraqi position. ' 14 
In subsequent talks with the Soviet deputy foreign minister Belonogov, Aziz 
requested Soviet support at the Security Council, and Moscow's rejection of new 
resolutions against Iraq. ' 15 However, Belonogov made it clear that the USSR 
would not go against the international community and stressed that Moscow 
wanted to see `any signs' in the Iraqi behaviour that would give it a `space for 
manoeuvring'. 
116 
Considering the failure of the talks with Aziz, '' 7 Moscow during the 
subsequent Helsinki Summit decided to base its proposals of a peaceful settlement 
of the crisis on the idea of an international conference on the Middle Eastern 
issues and on Baghdad's peace plan of withdrawal, albeit in reverse order, placing 
Kuwait on the top of the agenda. "8 Although Bush rejected the Soviet proposals, 
the meeting in Helsinki appeared particularly important, as it sent a strong signal 
to Baghdad and demonstrated unity between the USSR and the U. S. More 
1 12 Gorbachov, p. 692 
113 Belonogov, p. 127 
114 Ibid. 
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importantly, Washington, for the first time officially acknowledged the Soviet 
interests in the region and invited Moscow to participate in the regional affairs as 
a legitimate partner of the U. S. ' 19 However, the talks also revealed real differences 
between Bush and Gorbachov on a number of issues, such as the possible use of 
force, Soviet participation in upholding the embargo against Iraq, the linkage with 
other Middle Eastern conflicts, and the Arab role as possible brokers of a 
120 
compromise. 
Under the Soviet presidency in the U. N. Security Council in September, a 
further four resolutions were adopted on the Kuwaiti question. '2' Shevardnadze in 
his speech at the 45th session of the U. N. General Assembly on 25 September, 
called the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait a `terrorist act against the emerging 
new world order', and once against appealed to Baghdad to `hear reason, to obey 
the demands of law and of plain common sense. ' 122 He stressed that the U. N. had 
the power to `suppress the acts of aggression', and that `it will be exercised if the 
illegal occupation of Kuwait continues. ' 123 While Shevardnadze emphasised that 
diplomacy had to be given every chance to work, he also warned that `war may 
break out any day, any moment. ' 124 
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For many, Shevardnadze's remarks suggested that Moscow was not 
opposed to the use of force against Iraq under the terms preferred by the U. S. and 
Britain. 125 In the West, this was regarded as a key shift in the USSR's position 
towards the crisis. 126 On the domestic level, it prompted a sharp response from the 
conservatives, who accused Shevardnadze of sending the Soviet forces to the 
Persian Gulf. '27 
While pursuing an active policy at the U. N., Gorbachov, in response to the 
growing conservative pressures within the government, decided to intensify 
Soviet contacts with Iraq and send Primakov, a renowned Arabist and an old 
acquaintance of Saddam Hussein as his personal envoy to Baghdad in early 
October. 121 Primakov's mission consisted primarily in finding any indications of a 
shift in the Iraqi position, which would allow the search for a peaceful settlement 
of the crisis. ' 29 However, Saddam Hussein showed himself not willing to search 
for a solution of crisis and chose to hand over the initiative to the Soviet side by 
requesting Moscow to forward him written proposals on a possible 'package 
solution' of the conflict. 130 
Even though the subsequently prepared 'Invisible package', also known as 
the 'Primakov package', proposing an international conference on the Middle East 
and ceding to Iraq the Kuwaiti islands and Rumaila oil fields, 131 was clearly 
unacceptable to the U. S. and the coalition, Gorbachov in mid-October instructed 
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Primakov to present his proposal to governments in Rome, Paris, London and 
Washington. 132 On his retum, Primakov was once again sent to Baghdad via 
Cairo, Damascus and Riyadh in order to clarify to Saddam Hussein the 
consequences of his refusal to accept the demands of the international community 
and raise the question of the Soviet nationals held in Iraq. ' 33 However, despite his 
optimism, echoed by Gorbachov's spokesman Vitaly Ignatenko, 134 this second 
mission too, remained without success. 135 In the West, Primakov's 'shuttle 
diplomacy' was met with suspicion as 'muddying the waters surrounding the 
multinational effort', 136 and as a Soviet attempt to play an independent role In the 
Middle East. ' 37 
Throughout the autumn of 1990, the stalemate in the settlement of the 
crisis, the increasing tensions in the international coalition, as well as the 
realisation that the sanctions had so far not achieved the desired effect, as 
confin-ned by Saddam Hussein himself in an interview with CNN on 29 
October, 138 led to a unilateral decision by the U. S. to double its forces in Saudi 
Arabia and adopt an offensive posture. However, this controversial move 
intensitied the domestic pressures on the White House to obtain U. N. legitimacy 
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for the potential use of force. 139 Holding the presidency at the Security Council for 
November, which was subsequently to be handed to Yemen and Cuba, 
sympathetic to the Iraqi cause, Washington was therefore interested in a rapid 
adoption of a new resolution on Iraq sanctioning the use of force. 
The situation was quite different for Moscow. In view of the increasing 
opposition to his policies at home, Gorbachov who at the time 'could see the 
power slipping from his hands', 140 was anxious to prevent, or at least delay, the 
adoption of such a resolution, advocating a further toughening of sanctions, and 
considering the use of force as the last resort. Instead, he proposed a two-stage 
approach, whereby the Security Council first posed an ultimatum to Baghdad 
demanding the fulfilment of its resolutions, and then, in case of Iraq's defiance, 
once again reviewed the situation with the aim of adopting tougher measures, 
including military option. 141 
However, when his suggestion was rejected by Washington, Gorbachov 
did not insist. Anxious to prevent a potential American unilateral action in 
accordance with the Article 51 of the U. N. Charter, Gorbachov agreed to the 
adoption of a new resolution, while attempting to minimise the damage for his 
domestic position and leave the door open for the Soviet diplomatic efforts. He 
therefore proposed to call the period between the adoption of the resolution and 
the deadline for the use of force, fixed for 15 January, a 'pause of goodwill', 
aimed at inviting Baghdad to change its stance. In addition, Gorbachov requested 
the U. S. to replace the word 'force' in the draft text by 'all necessary means'. 142 
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Taking into account the sensitivity of the issue, in mid-November, the 
Soviet deputy foreign ministers Belonogov and Petrovsky toured the Middle East 
and the Gulf to find out the Arab attitudes towards a new resolution, and to 
present the Soviet position. 143 As usual, Moscow also decided to check the Iraqi 
position before its vote in the Security Council, and invited Tareq Aziz to 
Moscow on 25 November. 144 As before, Iraq remained defiant, visibly irritating 
the Soviet government, 145 that decided voted for the adoption of the resolution 
678 on 29 November. 146 In his speech in the Security Council, Shevardnadze 
stressed that for the Soviet Union the resolution did not mean a 'step towards 
war', but rather the 'last chance to avoid it', and expressed hope that the 'pause of 
goodwill' would allow Baghdad to take the right decision - to withdraw from 
Kuwait. 147 
In an interview the same day, the Soviet foreign minister emphasised that 
Moscow was not ready to send its military forces to the Gulf, but warned Baghdad 
of 'serious consequences' if a single Soviet citizen in Iraq was harmed. 148 
Shevardnadze's statement prompted a new wave of opposition at home to any 
potential Soviet military participation in the crisis. 149 Although the possibility of 
sending troops to the Gulf was repeatedly denied by Gorbachov, the Foreign 
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Ministry and Shevardnadze himself, 150 the accusations continued to persist, 
contributing to the latter's decision to resign on 20 December 1990.151 
If initially the USSR perceived itself as most suitable mediator in the crisis 
given its strong ties to Iraq, when faced with the tight timeline, the Kremlin was 
willing to hand over the diplomatic initiative to the U. S. Moscow therefore 
welcomed the offer by President Bush, announced on 30 November, to receive the 
Iraqi foreign minister in Washington and to send James Baker to Baghdad. 152 As 
Saddarn Hussein at first rejected the proposal, the Soviet diplomatic efforts 
concentrated in facilitating the Amcrican-Iraqi dialogue through its ambassador in 
Baghdad, as well as through the Soviet delegations to Iraq. Moscow also appealed 
to Yasser Arafat, the leader of the Palestinians, who supported Saddam and 
maintained close ties to Baghdad. 153 When the subsequently arranged Baker-Aziz 
talks in Geneva on 9 January, broke down as expected, 1-54 Gorbachov was willing 
to once again take the initiative and send Primakov to Baghdad with the 'invisible 
package', but Washington declined. 155 
It appears that until the very last moment Gorbachov strongly believed that 
in view of the impending military action by the coalition forces, Saddam Hussein 
would change his mind and begin the withdrawal from Kuwait. Only this can 
explain his request of a 'personal favour' to Bush to delay the war for at least 24 
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hours, when Baker informed his counterpart in Moscow about the start of the 
operation Desert Storm 
156 
in the night of 16 January 1991.157 The next day, 
Gorbachov in a televised statement informed the Soviet public about the start of 
the operations 'provoked by the refusal of the Iraqi leadership to withdraw from 
Kuwait', and the last minute diplomatic efforts undertaken by the Soviet 
government. ' 58 
Considering the war an 'evil that Baghdad brought on itself and a 'lesson 
for Saddam Hussein', Moscow was more than ever determined to obtain the Iraqi 
withdrawal from Kuwait by peaceful means. For this purpose, the USSR directed 
its policy towards intensifying its contacts with the Arab world, maintaining close 
co-operation with the U. S., and increasing political pressure on Baghdad. On the 
Arab front, Moscow focused on Yemen and the PLO who were urged to use their 
influence in Baghdad to pressurise Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait. 159 
Russia also maintained intense contact with Iran and Turkey, which did not 
participate militarily, with the aim of localising military action. 160 More 
importantly, particular attention was paid to Israel whose participation in the war 
in retaliation to Iraq's Scud missile strikes was considered as highly undesirable 
by the West as it could split the alliance, and was viewed by the USSR as a blow 
to the Arab-Israeli settlement that Moscow was planning to reanimate after the 
end of the Gulf crisis. 161 
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At the same time, Gorbachov requested that the Soviet ambassador in 
Baghdad contacted Saddam Hussein to find out if he would consider declaring his 
withdrawal from Kuwait if there was a break in the military operations. 162 The 
Soviet leader also telephoned President Bush to obtain the halt to the aerial 
strikes. On a rhetorical level, the Soviet leader argued that there was no sense to 
continue the war and increase the human losses because the strategic aims were 
achieved, and the Iraqi military-industrial complex badly damaged. 163 In reality, 
his efforts to stop the military actions were motivated by the ambition to show at 
home, but also to the Arab World that the Soviet Union still mattered in 
international affairs and that he was able to persuade the U. S. to stop the war. 
However, both Bush, and later, Saddam Hussein rejected Gorbachov's pleas for 
peace. 
In a new attempt to reactivate his hitherto unsuccessful diplomacy, 
Gorbachov instructed the new Soviet foreign minister, Alexander Bessmertnykh, 
to travel to Washington in order to clarify the conditions under which the military 
operations could be stopped, but also to raise the question of the post-crisis 
Middle Eastern settlement in the light of the Arab 'street' disapproving reaction to 
the U. S. strikes on Iraq. Bessmertnykh's mission resulted in the publication of a 
joint Soviet-American declaration. 164 While Moscow regarded it as a major 
diplomatic success for the Soviet diplomacy, the U. S. subsequently attempted to 
diminish its significance. 165 
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In the document, James Baker reiterated that the aim of the coalition was 
not the destruction of Iraq, but the liberation of Kuwait, and for the first time on 
the official level declared that a stop of the military operations was 'possible' if 
Iraq indicated its firin commitment to withdraw from Kuwait. Echoing earlier 
declaration of the U. S. representative to the U. N., Tom Pickering, he also 
reaffirmed that the establishment of stability and peace on 'the basis of effective 
security structures in the region' would become the 'priority task' for the U. S. 
government after the tennination of the Gulf conflict. He also agreed that the 
elimination of conflicts in the region was impossible without the settlement of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. Effectively, the declaration linked the Gulf conflict to 
broader Middle Eastern issues as proposed by Saddam Hussein in his August 
peace plan, providing for a face saving fon-nula advocated by the Soviet Union, 
and more importantly, securing the Soviet place in the future Middle Eastern 
negotiations. 
However, Moscow hoped in vain that Baghdad would take this life-line, 
and declare its withdrawal from Kuwait. Instead, Iraq's defiance led to the 
intensification of the military operations, which in Soviet eyes threatened to 
exceed the U. N. mandate for the liberation of Kuwait, and aimed deliberately at 
the destruction of Iraq. 166 This Soviet concem was expressed by Bessmertnykh 
during his talks with Baker in Washington on 26 January, 167 as well as in 
Gorbachov's statement on 9 February, in which the Soviet leader also announced 
166 Volodin, 'Iraqi Tragedy. Situation in the Persian Gulf Continues to Escalate', Soiýetsk-a 
,m Rossia, 31 January 1991, p. 3; Vasiliev, 'Every One for Himself in War Against Saddam, , 
Kwnsomolskaya Pravda, 5 February 1991. p. 5; Gudkov, 'The Right Guarantees? ', Krasncýya 
Zvezda, 20 February 199 1, p. 3 
167 Martin Fletcher, Dejevsky, 'Divisions Over Conflict Pose Further Threat to Summit in 
Moscow', The Thnes, 28 January 1991. p. 4 
62 
his decision to once again send Primakov as his special envoy to Baghdad. 168 
Many in the West, but also in the USSR regarded such pronouncements as the 
beginning of the Soviet effort to distance itself from the U. S. -led coalition in order 
to improve its standing in the Arab world and position itself for the afterinath of 
the crisis. 169 It was also argued that the change in Moscow's position toward the 
conflict was prompted by the increased domestic shift to the right, revealed in the 
coup in the Baltics, and growing pressure from the conservatives and the military, 
concerned by the scope of the military o ensive. 170 
On his return from Baghdad on 13 February, Primakov in a press conference 
indicated a change in Saddam Hussein's stance, speaking of 'rays of hope' that 
allowed one to think 'more optimistically'. 17 1 He also announced that Aziz was to 
arrive in Moscow to continue the talks initiated in Baghdad. At the same time, the 
special envoy reiterated that the Soviet position remained unchanged, and referred 
to a number of initiatives proposed by Gorbachov in his latest statement that 
allowed finding a political solution to the conflict. 'We are against war, and we do 
everything possible to Stop it,. 
172 
However, the Soviet leader's subsequent talks with the Iraqi foreign 
minister revealed no change in Baghdad's position. 173 Still, Gorbachov, aware that 
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171 TAS S, 'Rays of Hope', Prai, da, 13 February 199 1, p. 2ýA detailed account of Primakov's third 
mission to Baghdad in his interview in 'Tanks Didn't Wait', Literaturna. va Gazeta, 27 February 
199 1, p, 4 
17-1 Ibid. 
173 Yusin, 'Visit to Moscow by Tareq Aziz', Izvestia, 19 February 199 1, p. 4 
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the time for a peaceful solution was running out, was determined to reach a 
compromise without fall. He therefore proposed a four-point plan, which 
previewed the Iraqi declaration to withdraw from Kuwait in return for a cease-fire 
and U. N. guarantees for the security of the retreating Iraqi troops. 174 In his view 
such a plan opened the way for the calling of a meeting of the U. N. Security 
Council to review the situation and to address broader regional issues. ' 75 Aziz 
accepted the idea and requested time to present it to Saddam Hussein. 
Despite Soviet optimism, expressed in a press conference by his 
spokesman, Ignatenko, late in the evening of 21 February, Gorbachov's proposal 
received a mixed reaction in the West. 176 In particular, Washington was suspicious 
of the Iraq's real objectives, which it regarded as delaying the ground offensive. 177 
While Gorbachov believed he would be able to further modify his proposal to fit 
the demands of the U. S. and the coalition, Saddam Hussein thought it possible to 
adjust the plan to obtain maximum concessions possible. 178 A compromise was 
finally reached over a seven-point plan prepared by Primakov during the second 
meeting with Aziz in Moscow on 22 February, which the latter forwarded to the 
Iraqi leader for approval. 179 The Soviet government appeared optimistic, 
convinced of having achieved a break-through in the negotiations with Iraq. 1 80 
However, Gorbachov failed to understand that the U. S. at that point was 
not longer interested in halting the military operations. While he was searching for 
174 Gorbatchev, Altýmoires, p. 703; Enthustically reported in the press, but at first, the details of the 
plan were not disclosed. TASS, 'Plan for peaceful Settlement Proposed', Pravda, 18 February 
1991, p. 1. First details of the plan: Vasiliev, 'Gorbachov's Plan: Details', Komsomolskaya 
Pravda, 20 February 1991, p. 3 
175 Ibid. 
176 Yusin. 'Persian Gulf: Will the Soviet Initiative Stop War? ', Izi, estia, 20 February 1991, p. 4 
177 Maureen Dowd, 'Soviets Say Iraq Accepts Kuwait Pullout Linked to Truce and End to 
Sanctionsý Bush Rejects Conditions; War is to Go On', Neiv York Times, 22 February 1991, p. I 
I" Gorbatchev, P. 704 
IN TASS. 'Meeting of M. S. Gorbachov with T. Aziz', Pravda, 23 February 1991, p. I 
ISO Schmemann, 'Moscow Says Iraqis Accept Withdrawal Tied to a Truce', New York Tin7es, 22 
February 1991, p. 6 
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ways to find a compromise, Washington was 'looking for a possibility to brush it 
aside'. 1 81 If for the Soviet leader it was essential that Iraq was willing to accept the 
U. N. resolution 660 and withdraw from Kuwait, to the U. S. and the coalition it 
was a question of principle, which would not allow Saddam Hussein to be 
rewarded for his aggression and regain his military MiglIt. 182 Not surprising 
therefore, that the saine day, and before Saddam Hussein had given his final 
response to the Soviet initiative, President Bush announced his non-negotiable 
ultimatum to the Iraqi leader, demanding a complete withdrawal from Kuwait 
within a week to start on 23 February. ' 93 Although a few hours later, Saddam 
Hussein accepted the Soviet plan, it was dismissed as failing to fulfil the 
conditions of the ultimatum. 
Even though for the USSR the Iraqi declaration created a new situation, 
opening the way for the transition of the military operations onto a political level, 
Moscow lacked the means the oppose the American decision to continue the war. 
In vain did Gorbachov, desperate to seize this last opportunity, try to persuade 
Bush and European leaders to delay the start of the ground offensive to work out a 
new plan acceptable to the U. S. and the coalitlon. 184 The ground offensive was 
initiated as planned on 24 February, and in 100 hours succeeded in achieving all 
military objectives. In its statement, the Soviet government expressed its regret 
that the 'instinct of the military solution' prevailed, claiming that Iraq had agreed 
to withdraw from Kuwait. It stressed that the differences between the fon-nula 
agreed by Baghdad and the proposals of other states were not large and could be 
181 Russell Watson. Ann McDaniel, Garrard, Coleman, 'Why Diplomacy Failed', Newsweek, 4 
March 1991, p. 32 
182 Alexei Vasiliev, 'USA-USSR: How Will We Live? ', Komsoinolskaya Pravda, 26 February 1991, 
p. 3 
W 'Statement by Press Secretary Fitzwater', Neit, York Thnes, 22 February 1991, p. 1 
184 Gorbachov., pp. 707-708 
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co-ordinated in the framework of the U. N. Security Council, calling the latter to 
immediately start a review of the present situation. 18 5 
In his Memoirs, Gorbachov deplored that even though the Soviet efforts 
met the 'blind obstinacy and irrational behaviour' of Saddarn Hussein, 'we also 
have not always found in the U. S. the understanding we have hoped for. 186 
Indeed, apart from political consequences of the military actions against Iraq, the 
introduction of economic sanctions against Iraq led to the complete rupture of 
Soviet-Iraqi economic and commercial relations, and a halt to the repayment of 
the Iraqi debts to the Soviet Union. 
195 TASS, 'Statement of the Soviet Government', Pravda, 24 February 199 1, p. 1 
116 Ibid., p. 690 
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Chapter 2: Iraq in Russian politics during the first phase of the 
new Russian foreign policy 1992-1993 
Iraq has become a kind of 'litmus test' in both foreign and domestic policies. Members of 
the Communist-patriotic opposition who have made frequent trips to Iraq at the expense 
of its government have demanded that we precipitately take Iraq's side. In contrast to the 
'political riffraff, we from the very outset said to the Iraqi leadership: The day you are 
ready to renounce the role of international riffraff, take a new position and pursue a new 
policy, Russia will be with you. 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Kozyrev' 
Undoubtedly, Moscow's position in the Gulf crisis during 1990-1991 had 
clearly demonstrated that the Soviet Union could play a positive role in the 
Middle East .2 Gorbachov's 'New Thinking' 
had indeed passed the first test -a 
military confrontation with the U. S. had been avoided and replaced by 
unprecedented co-operation, the Soviet role in the United Nations had been 
enhanced, and Western goodwill for the country's domestic reforins had been 
secured. In addition, Moscow's stance in the conflict yielded immediate gains in 
the Middle East - the dramatic improvement of relations with the Gulf states, the 
upgrading of relations with Egypt, 3 rapprochement with Iran '4 the re- 
1 Mikhail Karpov, 'Moscow Needs a Stable Peace, Washington -a Small Victorious War', 
Nezavisinwva Gazeta, 12 November 1994, p. 1 
2 Assessing the consequences of the Gulf War for the USSR, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister 
Alexander Belonogov argued that in general, the Soviet position in the Middle East had become 
'stronger'. Alexander Belonogov. Foreign Ministi), '. The Kuwait Crisis, (Moscow: 'Very Secretly', 
2002), p. 406 
' Z. Nalbandyan. 'Ten Years at the Wheel of Egypt'. (on the occasion of Hosm Mubarak's visit to 
Moscow), Thid, 26 September 199 1, p. 5 
4, Memorandum on Principles of Political, Economic, Cultural and Scientific Co-operation 
between the USSR and the Islamic Republic of Iran', 26 November 1991, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Rzissian Foreign Policy, Collected Docunients 1990-1992, (Moscow: International 
Relations, 1996), pp. 118-121 
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establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel, broken off in 1967,5 and 
participation in the Middle East peace process as a co-sponsor at the side of the 
U. S., 
However, a closer examination of the consequences of the Gulf war for the Soviet 
Union revealed a grimmer reallty. 
7 First, the USSR's inability to prevent the U. S. - 
led military operation against Baghdad despite its unflagging diplomatic activities 
and the personal intervention by Gorbachov revealed Russia's impotence to 
oppose U. S. policies, and exposed the extent of Moscow's strategic weakness and 
the loss of its superpower status. Secondly, Soviet manoeuvring between 
participating in the international coalition against Saddam Hussein and protecting 
its own interests in Iraq created suspicion in the West and the Arab world 
conceming the real objectives of Moscow's policy. 8 
In addition, Moscow's failure to persuade Saddam Hussein to withdraw 
from Kuwait also indicated that contrary to its assertions, the USSR lacked any 
influence over Baghdad. This, together with the Soviet inability to continue its 
generous military and economic assistance to its Middle Eastern. clients due to 
Russia's domestic economic difficulties, contributed further to the erosion of the 
Soviet position in the Middle East. 
Finally, despite the American attempts to emphasise the Soviet role in co- 
5 Alexander Zhudro, Georgy Shmelyov, 'Diplomatic Relations Between USSR and Israel 
Restored', Jzvestia, 19 October 1991. p. I 
6 An invitation secured by Gorbachov during Soviet-American Summit in Helsinki in September 
1990 
' Galia Golan, Moscoii, and the Middle East: Neii, Thinking on Regional Conflicts, (London: Royal 
Institute for International Affairs. 1992), pp. 66-73 
' On the debate within the Bush Administration concerning Moscow's objectives in Iraq and the 
Middle East in general, Martin Walker, 'The Gulf Crisis: Moscow Role Revives Suspicion, The 
Guardian, 20 February 1991 ý p. 8 
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sponsoring the Middle Eastern peace process, 9 Moscow's role appeared merely 
symbolic, as highlighted by the Madrid Peace Conference in November 199 1. Not 
only was the Soviet role in the preparation of the Conference 'unclear', 10 but 
Gorbachov also astonished the participants by his speech at the opening of the 
event, which was much shorter than prescribed by the protocol, and was mostly 
dedicated to the internal problems faced by the Soviet Union. ' 
In the view of the Soviet press, some 'small, but meaningful' facts, notably 
that Gorbachov's speech was distributed with great delay in comparison with 
other speakers, and only in Spanish, that the Soviet leader had not, like President 
Bush met with heads of the Arab delegations before his departure from Madrid, 
and that the Soviet press centre at the Conference in contrast to that of the U. S. 
remained largely empty, ' 2 amply illustrated that Gorbachov's task in Madrid 'was 
not to reconcile the Israelis and the Palestinians, but as a co-sponsor 'to present a 
false image as an equal leader of a superpower to George Bush'. )3 
Even if Gorbachov tried to maintain the illusion of Soviet superpower 
status, the disintegration of the USSR in December 1991, put an end to this 
ambition and reduced Moscow's role to that of the secondary power. 14 The new 
Russian state that emerged as a legal successor to the Union, not only lacked the 
economic and military capabilities of the defunct USSR, but also had to adapt to 
' Speech of President Bush at the reception in Moscow at the Summit with Gorbachov on 30 July 
1991, 'USSR-USA: We Need Each Otber', Jzveslia, 30 July 1991, p. 1; Press-conference of the 
Moscow Russia-U. S. Summit, 'Presidents Gorbachov and Bush Pleased with Their Meeting', 
Izi, cstia, I August 1991, pý 6 
Sergei Filatov, 'What Awaits the Near East'. Pravda, 19 October 199 1, p. 4 
A. Polonsky, 'Madrid: Babel'. Trud, I November 1991, p. 3 
12 V. Vemikov, A. Ostalsky, 'Surprises of the Madrid Conference, Izvestia, 31 October 1991, p. 5 
" Stanislav Kondrashov, 'Last Tango in Madrid? ', Izvestia, 30 October 199 1, p. 5 
14 Deputy foreign minister Vladimir Petrovsky, 'New World Order and Us', Izvestia, 13 August 
1991, p. 4 
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the altered geo-political realities that resulted from the emergence of newly 
independent states on the post-Soviet space. ' 5 
It is not surprising therefore, that the dramatic internal and external 
transformations substantially modified Moscow's interests and objectives in the 
Middle East, especially since the six former Soviet republics in the south came to 
directly border the region, bringing Russia new threats such as religious 
extremism, 16 drugs and weapons smuggling, as well as regional border disputes. " 
To Moscow, this extension of the Middle East IS created a 'soft underbelly' 
in the south that was perceived as a source of instability, and therefore a major 
threat to the security of the Russian Federation. 19 In addition to increased 
vulnerability, Russia also suddenly faced competition for influence in Central 
Asia and the Caucasus from other major regional players - Turkey, Iran and 
China, but also from external powers, such as the U. S., attracted to the region by 
vast natural gas and oil resources in the Caspian Basin, the prospects of new 
20 
economic markets, but also by geo-strategic considerations. 
15 With the disappearance of the USSR, Russia lost direct contact with 30 million Russians who 
lived outside Russia in the former republics. For an analysis of geo-strategic transformation, Sergei 
Pechorov, 'Geo-strategic Threats to Russia: Are They Real or Imaginary? ', Krasnaya Zvezda, 20 
March 1992, p. 3 
16 Pechorov, Yuri Tegin, 'Islai-nic Extremism: New Challenge for Russia? ', Krasnaya Zvezda, 21 
April 1992, p. 3 
17 Igor Rotar, 'A Mine Laid by the Kremlin's Mapmakers', Nezavisinia-ya Gazeta, 25 December 
1992, pp. 1,3; Ivan Mogilyovkin, 'Russia Underestimates the Danger from the South', 
Nezavisima 
, va 
Gazeta, 15 September 1994, p. 3 
is Alexei Vasilyev, 'Is Central Asia to be Middle East"', Novoe Vrenlya, May 1992, No. 20, p. 5 
19 Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, Izi-estia. 18 November 
1993, pp. 1,4 
20 Robert 0. Freedman, 'Moscow and the Middle East Since the Collapse of the Soviet Union: A 
Preliminary Analysis', in Roger E. Kanet and Alexander V. Kozhemiakin (eds. ), The Foreign 
Policy of the Russian Federation, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), pp. 139-146ý Lutz 
Kleveman, The New Great Game; Blood and Oil in CentralAsia, (London: Atlantic Books, 2004) 
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The new Russian policy in the Middle East was therefore determined by 
two main factors - security and economics. 
21 On one hand, Moscow was 
interested in maintaining regional stability to prevent the spill-over of conflicts 
into the Russian Federation. 22 On the other hand, due to the difficult economic 
situation within the country that necessitated financial assistance, major 
investment, and the development of beneficial commercial ties, which would 
increase the hard currency flow into Russia, the economic factor turned into the 
23 key-deten-ninant in Russia's relations with the Middle East . 
While attempting to forge substantially new ties with its new neighbours, 
Moscow also had to re-define its relations with the old Soviet allies in the Arab 
world. Among them, Iraq continued to play a special role in Russia's Middle 
Eastern policy for a variety of reasons. First of all, Iraq throughout the 1990s, 
remained one of the most contested issues in Moscow's foreign policy and more 
than any other country in the region became an indicator of Russia's policy in the 
Middle East. 
On the domestic level, Iraq highlighted the debates on foreign policy 
orientation and illustrated the disorganisation in Russian foreign policy-making. It 
revealed the dynamics of various interest groups within Russian politics and their 
impact on foreign policy formation. On the international level, Iraq highlighted 
Moscow's position on the global arena and remained an instrument in Russia's 
relations with the U. S. 
21 Director of the Near Eastern and North African Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Viktor Posuvalyuk at the meeting with journalists on 3 November 1992. quoted by Ravil Mustafin. 
'There is Such a Concept'. Krasnaya Zvezda, 5 November 1992, p. 3 
22 Kozyrev's speech at the opening of the Moscow Meeting on the Middle East, 28 January 1992, 
Diplon7atichesk 
,v 
Vestnik, 1992, No 4-5, p. 37 ý Alexander Shumilin, 'Tell Me, Who is Your Middle 
Eastern Friend, Komsotnolskaya Prai, da, 4 February 1993, p. 3 
23 Filatov, 'Politics is a Subtle Business, But One Would Like Clarity', Pravda. 14 November 
1992, p. 3; Leo Cooper, Russia and the World. - Neit, State-of-Play on the International Stage, 
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999). p. 145 
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Throughout the 1990s, Russian policy towards Baghdad was driven by 
two contradictory ambitions. On one hand, ever mindful of the need to obtain 
Western economic assistance for the country's transition to market economy, 
Moscow was interested in supporting the international community against Iraq to 
demonstrate that Moscow shared Western values and adhered to international law. 
On the other hand, Russia was eager to end sanctions against Iraq because 
of its significant economic interests in that country, in particular Iraqi debts, 
estimated at US$6 billion, participation in the reconstruction of the Iraqi economy 
and the conclusion of profitable future oil contracts with Baghdad. Therefore, in 
the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the new Russian government 
continued the policy line elaborated by Gorbachov and his team towards Iraq by 
siding with the international community vis-ý-vis Iraq and co-operating with the 
West in the United Nations, while maintaining friendly ties to Iraq in an attempt 
to retain the preferential status in Baghdad. 
On 3 April 1991, the U. N. Security Council with the support of Russia 
adopted the Resolution 687, which apart from spelling out provisions directly 
concerning the Iraqi-Kuwaiti post-crisis settlement, required Baghdad to 
'unconditionally accept' the destruction, removal or 'rendering han-nless', 'under 
international supervision', of its chemical and biological weapons, ballistic 
missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres, as well as nuclear weapons and 
materials. 24 For this purpose, the resolution created a Special Inspection 
Commission (UNSCOM), which was to verify the elimination of Iraq's chemical 
and biological programmes, and mandated the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) to verify the elimination of the country's nuclear programme. In 
24 United Nations Security Council Resolution 687, S/RES/687 (199 1) 
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addition, in October 1991, the U. N. Security Council Resolution 715 approved 
two plans, one for nuclear items, and another for non-nuclear items, in order to 
monitor the Iraqi compliance with its obligations under the cease-fire agreement. 25 
However, in spite of accepting the terrns of Resolution 687, Baghdad from 
the outset greatly impeded the work of the inspectors. It denied the existence of 
many of its suspected weapons programmes, attempted to hide the prohibited 
materials and equipment, sought to deceive the inspectors through false 
documents, misinterpretation of the role of government officials and the purpose 
of facilities, as well as frustrated inspections in the field by moving equipment to 
hiding places and refusing entry to sites used for the development of its military 
programmes. According to Baghdad, the inspectors exceeded the responsibilities 
accorded to them by the U. N. mandate and were attempting to obtain secret 
inforination of purely scientific interest. 26 
In addition, Saddam Hussein tried to drive a wedge between the members 
of the U. N. Security Council by offering advantageous economic co-operation in 
return for support for the lifting of sanctions. The Iraqi tactic of 'cheat and 
27 
retreat" was to increase periodically the tensions in its relations with the U. N. 
through non-cooperation with the inspection team in an attempt to tie Iraqi 
compliance to the inspection regime to the weakening of sanctions. 
During the first major crisis due Iraq' defiance of the UNSCOM mandate 
in February 1992, the Security Council declared that Iraq was in the 'material 
breach' of Resolution 687. A high-level mission led by the Swedish diplomat Rolf 
25 United Nations Security Council Resolution 715, S/RES/715 (1991) 
26 For more detailed on Iraq's confrontation with the UN during that period: Greg Saiontz, 'A 
Chronology of Diminishing Response: UN Reactions to Iraqi Provocations Since the Gulf War'. 
Research Notes, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 3 June 1997, pp. 1-3ý Georgy 
Stepanov., 'UN Declares Ultimatum on Baghdad', Izvestia, 2 March 1992, p. 1 
27 Marie Colvin, James Adams, 'Iraq Reneges Over Deal on Missiles Sites', Sunday Thnes, II July 
1993, p. 1 
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Ekeus, the Executive Chairman of the Commission, was dispatched to Baghdad 
with a statement demanding Iraq give necessary assurances of compliance to the 
Security Council resolutions, or face serious consequences. 28 
However, the mission failed to secure Baghdad's co-operation '29 
prompting the Security Council to condemn Iraq's failure to comply with its 
obligations to accept the destruction of its weapons. 30 In spite of the demarches of 
Iraq's Deputy Foreign Minister Tareq Aziz in New York, aimed at reaching a 
31 compromise with the U. N .' 
the Security Council adopted an ultimatum, calling 
on Iraq to commence the fWfilment of its obligations within two weeks. The 
ultimatum provided a legal basis for a limited military action against Iraq. 32 
Moscow supported this decision, the Russian Ambassador to the U. S., Vladimir 
Lukin declaring that his government 'is willing to be a part of international 
community of civilised nations' and would support the use of force against Iraq to 
33 
obtain the liquidation of the Iraqi weapons proscribed by the U. N . 
Even though this crisis ended peacefully with Iraq's agreement on 19 
March 1992, to provide UNSCOM with a 'full, final and complete' declaration of 
its weapons programmes, on 5 July 1992, Baghdad once again initiated a 
confrontation with the U. N. by barring the inspectors from entering the Ministry 
of Agriculture that held the documents and materials on Iraqi military 
programmes. The Security Council issued a statement declaring Iraq's conduct as 
28 Statement by the President of the UN Security Council, 19 February 1992, United Nations 
Security Council document S/23609 
29 Special Report to the Security Council 26 February 1992, United Nations Security Council 
document S/23643 
30 Statement by the President of the UN Security Council, 28 February 1992, United Nations 
Security Council document S/23663 
31 Krasnaya Zvezda, 10 March 1992, p. 3 
32 Stepanov. 'U. S. and Britain Obtained Legal Pretext from UN for Military Action Against Iraq', 




constituting a 'material breach' of the provisions of the 687 Resolution. At the 
request of the Council, Ekeus once again travelled to Baghdad to hold talks with 
the Iraqi officials, but did not succeed in changing Iraq's stance. 35 
Following three weeks of crisis, the U. S. together with Britain and France 
issued a 72-hour ultimatum of renewed military action against Iraq, threatening air 
strikes against selected military targets, as well as buildings, earmarked for 
36 destruction by the U. N. As before, Iraq backed away from the military 
confrontation, and Ekeus reached a compromise with the Iraqi Ambassador to the 
U. N., Abdul Amir al-Anbarl, whereby an inspector team from countries which 
had not participated in the Gulf war, notably from Germany, Sweden, 
37 Switzerland, Finland and Russia, was allowed to proceed . 
As during the previous crisis, the Russian government maintained its 
stance against Iraq. In a telephone conversation with George Bush, President 
Yeltsin received 'high praise' for Russia's position that 'firinly supports' the U. N. 
Security Council resolutions. 38 Mosk-ovskie Novosti observed that the times, when 
Baghdad 'skillfully played out the confrontation between East and West' had 
passed, and that Saddam Hussein would no longer be able 'to take advantage' of 
the Cold War. At the same time, it emphasised that Moscow could play a positive 
role in the current situation, having the opportunity to mediate actively in the 
34 Statement by the President of the UN Security Council, United Nations Security Council 6 July 
1992, United Nations Security Council document S/24240 
35 Report of the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission to the Security Council, 20 July 
1992, S/24443 
3' Leonard Doyle, 'Allies Threaten Air Strikes on Iraq', The Independent, 25 July 1992, p. 11 
37 Stepanov. 'Saddam Hussein Goes Back on His Word in the Conflict with the UN and Gains 
Time', Izvestia, 27 July 1992, p. 4 
38 Stepanov. 'While UN Inspectors Searched for Documents, Saddam Hussein Swam Across the 
Tigris', Izvestia. 30 July 1992, p. 5 
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region, in order to regain the reputation of an influential great power and to assist 
in the prevention of yet another regional conflict. 39 
While co-operating with the West, Moscow was irritated with Baghdad 
because of the latter's defiant behaviour, which precluded all Russian efforts at 
the Security Council to raise the question of the lifting of sanctions. 
40 Moscow Is 
annoyance with Iraq was expressed in a statement issued by the Russian Foreign 
Ministry on 22 August, which raised concern about Baghdad's repression of the 
Shiite population in the south and the economic blockade of the north, its defiance 
of the U. N. resolutions and impediment of the work of the UNSCOM. 41 The 
statement emphasised that Iraq's action created a 'serious threat for the security of 
the region located in the immediate proximity of the southern Russian borders', as 
well as for the security of 'our friends' in the Persian Gulf, and for international 
peace and stability. Regarding Russia's position, the document stated: 
The Russian side has repeatedly raised the question with the leadership of 
Iraq on the inadmissibility of political games around the decision of the 
international community. The time of admonition and persuasion has passed. 
No one has the right to disregard the authority of the U. N. unpunished and to 
ignore the Security Council resolutions. The international community 
justifiably demands Iraq to comply with these resolutions, and if needed, will 
use all the necessary means to obtain compliance. In accordance with the 
U. N. Security Council Resolution 687, Russia will support all necessary 
measures with regard to Iraq, called upon to provide for the fulfilment of the 
U. N. decisions on post-crisis settlement in the Persian Gulf. 42 
39 Andrei Shumikhin, 'Damocles' Sword over Baghdad', Mosk-ovskie Novosti, 2 August 1992, p. 5 
40 Already in 199 1, the USSR proposed the easing of sanctions on Iraq in the UN Security Council, 
but it was dismissed. 
41 Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, 22 August 1992, Diplomatichesky 
Vestnik-, X9.17-18,1992, p. 44 42 Ibid. 
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Moscow also decided to support its rhetoric by practical actions and to 
respond to the call for Russia's more active role in the Gulf and its participation in 
the maintenance of regional stability on the part of the Gulf states, 43 which the 
Russian foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev visited at the end of April in an effort to 
obtain financial assistance and promote Russian an-n sales. 44 In September 1992, it 
therefore dispatched two military ships - the anti-submarine ship Admiral 
Vinogradov and the tanker Boris Butoma to the Persian Gulf to bear a 'concrete 
45 
even if modest' contribution to the provision of security in the region . The 
Russian ships were to take part in operations to enforce the U. N. resolutions on 
Iraq and to guarantee safe navigation for Russian vessels in the Gulf, but not to 
participate in combat operations alongside coalition forces. 46 
Commenting on the govemment's decision to send ships to the Gulf, the 
military newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda acknowledged that it would be 'naYve' to 
think that the Russian vessels would 'in any substantial way influence the strength 
of the group of the three Western states' in the Gulf, but viewed this step as 
having a 'symbolic character'. 47 In contrast, Pravda argued that it was not 
international law, principles of justice, nor Russian national interests that drove 
48 
this decision, but 'merely the desire to please the almighty West' . In turn, the 
Western press perceived the deployment of Russian ships in the Gulf as possible 
evidence of a change in Moscow's policy towards Iraq, which provided a 
43 Boris Vinogradov, 'Bahrain is Awaiting the Russians and Hopes for Their Presence in the 
Persian Gulf, Izvestia, 25 August 1992, p. 6 
44 Maksim Yusin, 'Our Visit is a Drive for Markets, Including Arms Market'.. Izvestia, 5 May 
1992, p. 6 
45 Alexei Portansky, 'Russia Dispatches Two Military Ships to the Persian Gulf and Joins Military 
Sanctions Against Iraq', Izi, estia, 2 September 1992, p. 4 
46 Boris Vinogradov, 'St. Andrew's Flag in Persian Gulf. Izi, estia, 6 October 1992, p. 4 
4' Ravil Mustafin, 'Russia is Sending Military Ships to the Gulf, Krasna-l-a Zvezda, 3 September 
1992, p, 3 
48 Vladimir Belyakov, 'The Objective - Destruction of Iraq', Praida. 19 September 1992. p. 7 
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ýpolitical boost for the U. S. and President Bush, who has sought broad 
49 international support' in the latest confrontation with Baghdad . 
The Russian position on Iraq during 1992 did indeed correspond to the 
pro-Western approach adopted by President Boris Yeltsin and his Foreign 
Minister Andrei Kozyrev in the aften-nath of the disintegration of the USSR, and 
marked the first phase of Russian foreign POIICY. 
50 Despite the changed internal 
and external situation, Moscow's foreign policy priorities remained essentially the 
same as during the perestroika era, namely the creation of favourable external 
conditions for domestic reforms aimed at a transition to a market economy and 
dcrnocratisation. 51 For the achievement of these objectives, as had been the case in 
the final years of the Soviet Union, diplomacy was placed at the forefront of 
foreign strategy, and the reliance on international mechanisms, notably the United 
Nations, was viewed as the only way to project Russian power abroad. 52 
However, Kozyrev significantly broadened Gorbachov's notion of co- 
operation with the West by regarding it as Russia's 'natural ally', and identifying 
the main objective of Russian foreign policy as 'entering the community of 
civilised nations of the Northern Hemisphere' . 
53 Considering the West as a model 
" Michael Evans, Christopher Walker, 'Russian Ships Head for Gulf Patrol as Shias Stir 
Rebellion', The Times, 2 September 1992, p. 9 
50 According to some interpretations, however, the period between December 1991 and early 
summer 1993 was classified as the second phase in Russia's foreign policy, the first being Russia's 
attempt to obtain sovereignty from the USSR in 1991. Vitaly Zhurkin, 'Phases in Modem Russian 
Foreign Policy', pp. 3-9ý On the political and technical issues related to the formation of Russian 
(in contrast to Soviet) foreign policy in 1990-199 1, Dmitri Rurikov, 'How it All Began: An Essay 
on New Russia's Foreign Policy', in Teresa Pelton Johnson and Steven E. Miller (eds. ), Russian 
Security after the Cold War, (Washington: Brassey's, 1994), pp. 125-147 
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for political and economic development, and more importantly, as the main source 
of much required financial assistance, 54 the Russian leadership, regarded co- 
operation with the U. S., even at the expense of Russia's interests in various parts 
of the world, of primary importance. 
As a consequence, in late December 1991, Moscow in its eagerness to 
undo all aspects of Soviet policy, declared that agreements between the USSR and 
North Korea, Cuba and Iraq did not conform to Russia's 'criteria of 
-55 expediency' . In March 1992, Russia for the first time voted for a U. N. resolution 
condemning the Castro regime for violation of human rights, 56 and under U. S. 
pressure cancelled the profitable sale of rocket engines to India. 57 The new 
Russian government also radically changed its attitude towards NATO on the 
grounds that the latter was gradually transfon-ning into a political organisation that 
could play a positive role in Europe. 58 Yeltsin in his address to the participants of 
the inaugural meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in December 
1991, declared that even though Russia 'today does not raise the question of 
59 
joining NATO', it is ready to 'consider that as a long-term political objective' . 
Regarding the Middle East, on 15 April 1992, Russia voted for the 
imposition of sanctions against Libya, which for the USSR had ranked second 
only to Iraq in ten-ns of arms sales profit and, following the disintegration of the 
Union, was one of the few countries in the Third World to agree to continue its 
Security Council, President Yeltsin stated that Russia regarded United States and the West as not 
just partners, but allies. Diploniatichesky Vestnik-, 1992, JV2.4-5, p. 49 
54 Andrei Kozyrev, 'The Strategy of Partnership', Mezchtnarodnayu Zhizn, JV2.5,1994, pp. 184-85 
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debt repayment to Russia . 
60 Even though Kozyrev attempted to find a compromise 
by proposing that Colonel Qaddafi hand over the two Libyans, accused of 
involvement in the terrorist acts against a U. S. and a French aircraft in 1988 and 
1989, to the jurisdiction of the U. N. S ecretary- General and a trial in a neutral 
61 
country, his mediation efforts proved unsuccessful . In response to 
Moscow's 
stance, Libya organised an attack on the Russian embassy in Tripoli in April 
1992, and refused to supply oil to 'unfriendly countries', including Russia. 62 
With regard to the Middle Eastern peace process, in spite of Kozyrev's 
assertions that Russia remained a great power, the country's difficult economic 
situation and disorganisation had dramatically reduced its ability to play a 
meaningful role in the multi-lateral negotiations, or pursue a policy independent 
from the U. S. 63 In particular, Moscow's Multilateral Organisational Session in 
January 1992 demonstrated that 'Russians have been unable to live up to the role 
demanded of them. 64 Before the Conference, Kozyrev himself admitted to have a 
'headache' concerning the organisation of the event, as the 'poverty causes 
troubles in carrying out our diplomatic functions. ' 65 At the same time, the Foreign 
Minister considered Russia's sponsorship as 'highly important politically' because 
Moscow had to prove that it could play a role in the Middle East settlement equal 
to its predecessor. 66 In his view, it also had economic implications - 'if Russia is 
60 U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, WorldMilitai-yExpenditures and A rins Transfers, 
1963-1973, Washington D. C. 1975, p. 70 and 1969-1978, Washington D. C., 1980, p. 160: Iputev, 
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unable to hold this three-day-long event, how would it be possible to invest 
there? ' 67 
However, it was not the financial side that proved to be the main 
problem, 68 but the boycott of the conference by the Palestinian delegation, 'linked 
to Moscow by long-standing ties of solidarity', 69 the refusal of fortner Soviet 
allies Syria and Lebanon to participate, as well as the absence of the Russian 
President himsel f. 70 Subsequently, despite Kozyrev's assertions that Russia 
'would continue to assist the advancement of the peace process', not only 'as a co- 
sponsor', but also 'in ten-ns of our traditional friendly relations with the peoples of 
the Middle East', 71 the initiative was entirely taken over by Washington. 72 
It is not surprising therefore, that Kozyrev's foreign policy was heavily 
criticised by various political factions within Russia, who argued that the 
country's foreign policy lacked a fundamental sense of national interest and was 
too accommodating to the West at Russia's expense. 73 However, whereas there 
" Ibid. 
68 According the Arab sources the bill was footed by the Gulf Co-operation Council. Annika 
Savill, 'Palestinians Tire of Bending over Backwards', The Independent, 22 January 1992, p. 12 
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Novosti, 19 September 1993, p. 14 
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Peace Process, his administration 'highly driven' to revolve the conflict. Consequently, Russian 
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seemed to be a broad consensus that Russian foreign policy needed to be 
corrected, there was disagreement as to what direction it ought to take. 
In fact, the debates concerning Russia's foreign policy orientation date 
back to the late 1980s, but in particular to the Gulf crisis of 1990-91, which for the 
first time created a dilemma between developing a real partnership with the West 
at the expense of Soviet interests in Iraq and continuing the old Soviet alliance to 
the detriment of Moscow's relations with the developed world. Since the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union, this discussion had transformed into a broader 
debate concerning Russia's place in the world, and on the philosophic-cultural 
level, regarding the country's European versus Eurasian idcntty. 74 In that sense, 
Iraq's defeat in the Gulf war represented a new point of departure in Russian 
foreign policy, and Moscow's policy towards Baghdad during the 1990s appeared 
to be an indicator of the direction that new Russia foreign policy chose to pursue 
in foreign affairs. 
The debate on foreign policy orientation was dominated by three opposing 
camps. 75 The pro-Westermsts ('Atlantists'), like Kozyrev, viewed Russia's future 
as a becoming a part of the Western civilisation, regarded the country's national 
interests as best served through close relations with the West and the U. S., and 
rejected the idea of Russia's dominance of the post-Soviet space. 76 This view was 
diametrically opposed by those who rejected co-operation with the West, 
contending that Russia was sufficiently powerful and would overcome internal 
74 Konstantin Pleshakov, 'The Russian Dilemma'. Noi, oe Frem 
' 
i, a, No. 2, January 1992, pp. 14-15 
" The divide is usually seen between the two main camps - 'Atlantism' and 'Eurasianism'. For an 
in-depth analysis, Sergei Stankevich, 'A Power in Search of Itself, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 28 
March 1992, p. 4 
7" Kozyrev, 'A Transformed Russia in a New World', Izi, estia, 2 January 1992, p. 3 
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difficulties without help from abroad. 77 In their opinion, the West was not 
interested in reviving Russian power and preferred to take advantage of the 
country's weakness for its own political ends. 78 The proponents of this view - 
communists and nationalists - continued to perceive the West as a threat to Russia 
79 
and advocated stronger ties with Russia's traditional allies . In contrast to pro 
Westernists and anti -Westernists, the third camp ('Eurasionists'), comprising 
moderate liberals and centrists, while acknowledging the necessity of a strategic 
alliance with the West, rejected Russia's one-sided orientation in favour of a 
diversified foreign policy that in their opinion would better serve the restoration of 
Russia's power. 80 
From the outset, the issue of Iraq was used by the opposition in the 
internal political struggle to undennine the Russian government. 81 In particular, 
the communists and ultra-nationalists who continued to regard Saddam Hussein as 
an ideological ally in the 'anti-imperialist struggle', as well as the military- 
industrial complex, that viewed Iraq as a vast market for the Russian weapons, 
were unwilling to abandon Baghdad. Hence, Moscow's firm line against Saddam 
was challenged in two ways. Moderate members of the opposition led by vice- 
president Alexander Rutskoi and the parliamentary speaker Ruslan Khasbulatov, 
exercised strong pressure on Kozyrev in the Duma in an effort to attack his policy 
77 For example, interview by Anne McElvoy with Vladimir Zhirinovsky in The Times, 
'Zhirinovsky Warns West to Keep Out', 21 December 1993, p, 1 
78 E. Pozdnyakov, 'We Ourselves Have Brought Down Our House, and We Alone Have to 
Rebuild It', Mezhdunarodna 
, 
va Zhizn, Mi. 3-4,1992, pp. 147-48 
79 For example, the leader of the Communist Party of Russia, Gennady Zyuganov, Russia and the 
Contemporai- -79; or Interview with Vice-Chairman of y World, (Moscow: Observer, 1995), pp. 61 
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February 1992, p. 6; Andranik Migranyan. 'True and False Guiding Points in Foreign Policy'. 
Rossivsk-aya GaZeta, 4 August 1992, p. 4 
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towards Iraq and other former Soviet allies as damaging to Russia's national 
interests. 82 Parliamentary pressure was accompanied by an ongoing campaign in 
the communist and nationalist media, which attacked Kozyrev personally, as well 
his foreign policy. 83 Moderate democrats also criticised Kozyrev in the media for 
lack of vision and for the disorganisation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 84 
There were also various opposition groups who established direct contacts 
with the Iraqi regime and travelled to Iraq, where they issued statements 
contradicting official Russian policy and publicised cordial relations with Saddam 
Hussein. Already in late July 1991, a delegation consisting of members of the 
conservative parliamentary faction Soyuz visited Baghdad and reached an 
agreement with the representatives of the Iraqi parliament to develop relations 
between the parliamentarians of both countries by 'exchanging visits and co- 
ordinating actions between them at international conferences. ' 85 The joint 
declaration adopted on I August 1991, remained silent on the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait, condemning the 'aggression against Iraq'. 86 It stated the 'necessity to lift 
the economic sanctions against Iraq', advocated 'non-interference in Iraqi internal 
affairs', condemned the position of the U. S. Administration and 'some European 
82 Yusin, 'Supreme Soviet Preparing to Review Russian Foreign Policy', Izvestia, IS December 
1992, p. 4; One of the main themes was the accusation that Russia bears financial losses as a result 
of sanctions on Yugoslavia, Libya and Iraq. For example, Konstantin Eggert on the report by the 
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countries' and supported the 'ambition of the Iraqi side to renew economic co- 
87 
operation with the USSR' . 
In autumn 1992, a delegation of members of the ultra-nationalist Liberal- 
Democratic Party, headed by its leader Vladimir Zhirmovsky travelled to Iraq, 
where it met with Iraqi officials and was received by Saddam Hussein. 88 
Embarrassed by the publicity of Zhirinovsky's trip, which was perceived in the 
West as the beginning of the weakening of Russia's resolve with regard to Iraq, 
the Foreign Ministry organised a briefing, stating: 
The impression is being made that the destructive forces of Russia and the 
Iraqi authorities are attempting to create an alliance to counter the firin 
position adopted by the international community with regard to Iraq. The 
Iraqi propaganda attempted to present Zhirmovsky as one of the most 
influential figures in Russia... Zhirinovsky's voyage has no practical 
meaning for Russia's foreign policy course. 89 
However, this did not stop the pilgrimage of the opposition to Baghdad, and a few 
weeks later Sergei Baburin, leader of the conservative Russian National Union 
travelled to the Iraqi capital to meet Saddarn, convinced that Russia ought to 
revive its old alliance with Baghdad. 90 
Throughout the autumn of 1992, attacks on Yeltsin increased as a result of 
conservative opposition to his economic reform and privatisation. The foreign 
minister also came under fire because of his policy towards the former 
Yugoslavia, Libya and Iraq. All these prompted Kozyrev's warnings at the 
87 Ibid. 
Vladimir Zhirinovsky, 'Outcome of the Trip to Baghdad', in Fladintir Zhirinovskv Speaks ivith 
Russia, (Moscow: RAYT, 1995), Vol. 1, p. 193-201 
89 Statement of the Foreign Ministry, quoted in Ibid.. p. 193 
90 Helen Womack, 'Russia: Hard-line Communists Take Road to Fascism', The Indepeudew. I 
December 1992, p. II 
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extraordinary meeting of the Council on Foreign Affairs on 27 November, that the 
country had entered a 'period of acute confrontation on questions of fundamental 
significance' and that 'the entire political field of our country is occupied ... either 
by the outright red-brown opposition, or by the grey opposition, which is dragging 
us into a swamp. '91 At the meeting of the European Foreign Ministers in 
Stockholm in December 1992, Kozyrev in a mock speech also announced a hard- 
line shift to alert the West to the threat to the existing policy. 92 
As consequence of domestic pressure on the part of the increasingly right- 
wing parliament, but also because of growing disillusionment with the West and 
its less than expected economic assistance - the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) strategy that would have brought US$24 billion to Russia was regarded as 
Istillborn 93 _ Russian foreign policy by 1993, was gradually shifting towards a 
more assertive and pragmatic approach in an attempt to diversify the country's 
foreign relations as an alternative way to earn hard currency, but also to regain 
Russia's position as a great power. In December 1992, Yeltsin paid a visit to 
China, concluding 24 intergovernmental and interdepartmental agreements on 
various aspects of Russian-Chinese co-operation. 94 In late January 1993, Deputy 
Foreign Minister, Georgy Kunadze, visited North Korea as a special 
representative of the President to revive the political dialogue which was 
91 Quoted in Karpov, 'Democratic Forces are Mobilising, Nezavisiincýva Gazeta, 28 November, p. 
1 
92 Robert Mauthner, 'Scare by Russia Stuns Security Conference', The Financial Thnes, 15 
December 1992, p. 1 
93 John Lloyd, 'Russia's Love Affair with West Ends in Disappointment: Moscow is Counting the 
Cost in Foreign Policy Ternis of Trying to Live up to Western Expectations', Financial Dines, 25 
February 1993, p. 2 
94 Diplomatichesky Vestnik, No 1-2, January 1993, p. I 
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interrupted at the beginning of 1992, and to re-establish trade and economic ties 
with Pyongyang. 
95 
The shift in Russian foreign policy was also illustrated by Moscow's 
changing attitude to the renewed crisis in Iraq in January 1993. The new crisis was 
prompted by Baghdad's defiance of the U. N., and its confrontation with the U. S. 
and the coalition. On 27 December, the U. S. shot down an Iraqi jet that violated 
the no-fly zone in southern Iraq, 96 which was established with Russian support by 
the U. S., Britain and France in August 1992 north of 32 nd parallel to protect the 
97 Shiite minority against Baghdad's military intervention. Subsequently, Baghdad 
redeployed eight SA-3 and 12 SA-2 anti-aircraft missiles launchers in the no-fly 
zone, threatening the allied patrols. In response, Washington together with Britain, 
France and Russia delivered an ultimatum to Iraq, demanding it to remove the 
launchers to their original location within 48 hours, or face possible military 
action. 
98 
Even though the Iraqi leaders issued a series of bellicose statements, 99 
Saddam Hussein removed the missiles from the southern no-fly zone, but once the 
ultimatum had expired, and in spite of the American warnings that action would 
be taken without warning if Iraq redeployed its missiles in threatening manner, put 
its anti-aircraft missiles on operational status in the northern no-fly zone, 
established by the allies in April 1991 south of 36 th parallel to protect the Kurdish 
population. 
95 Alexander Zhebin, Vadim Tkachenko, 'Kunadze Flies to Pyongyang Via Beijing', 
Nefavisimaya GaZeta, 17 February 1993, p. 4 
9' Stepanov, 'U. S. Policy Towards Baghdad Remains Unchanged', I. -vestia, 28 December 1992, p. 
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On 7 January, Iraq also initiated a renewed confrontation with the U. N., by 
declaring it would no longer permit the U. N. inspectors to use their own aircraft to 
fly into, or land in Iraq. 100 Consequently, Baghdad banned the flight into the 
country of 70 inspectors returning from abroad. The Security Council called the 
action unacceptable, warned of serious consequences if the decision was not 
reversed, and issued a statement describing Iraq as being in the 'material breach' 
of Resolution 687. '01 
However, continuing its confrontational course, Baghdad also challenged 
the U. N. border demarcation between Iraq and Kuwait. First on 2 and then on 10 
January, five hundred Iraqis crossed into the demilitarised zone between Iraq and 
Kuwait, seizing weapons that were left behind following Iraq's retreat and plaeed 
under the authority of the U. N. Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM). 102 
In spite of the official protest of the Iraqi action by the emissaries from the U. S., 
Britain, France and Russia to the Iraqi Ambassador to the U. N., on 13 January, 
several hundred Iraqis again crossed the demilitarised zone and began dismantling 
weapons warehouses. 
As a result of this Iraqi defiance, on 13 January, the U. S. together with 
Britain and France conducted air-strikes against Iraqi anti-aircraft missile sites and 
related control facilities in the southern no-fly zone. ' 03 Whereas the military 
action had a limited impact on Baghdad's stance in its confrontation with the 
United Nations - the Iraqi Ambassador to the U. N. infon-ned the President of the 
Security Council that Iraq would pcnnit the flights by the U. N. inspectors in their 
100 Iraq's written notification of the UNSCOM Office in Baghdad on 7 January 1993, Yearbook of' 
the United Nations 1993, p. 414 
'()' Statement of the President of the UN Security Council, 8 January 1993. S/25081 
102 Special Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, 10 January 1993, United 
Nations Security Council document S/25085 
103 Vladimir Kozlovsky, 'President Bush's Last Battle', Nezavisintaya Gazeta, 15 January 1993, 
pp. 1-2 
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own aircraft, provided they entered the Iraqi airspace from Jordanian airspace, 104 
and promised that the incursions into the demilitarised zone would cease - it did 
not change the latter's position with regard to 'no-fly zones'. Saddam Hussein 
vowed that he would continue to resist the enforcement of the no-fly zones, 
instructed the military to fire on coalition planes over Iraqi territory, and on 17 
January, activated its targeting radar in northern Iraq. 
In response, the coalition on 17 January, conducted an air-strike against 
the radar site and shot down an Iraqi MiG-23 that crossed into the northern no-fly 
zone. Countering the Iraqi refusal to grant the inspectors unconditional clearance 
for landing, 105 the same day the U. S. also launched cruise missiles at Zafaraniya 
manufacturing complex outside Baghdad, which was suspected to produce 
components for the country's nuclear programme. 
Even though Russia participated in exercising political pressure on 
Baghdad, Moscow refrained from participating in the allied air-strikes against 
Iraq. Nevertheless, demonstrating its solidarity with the coalition, the Russian 
Foreign Ministry in its statement expressed hope that Baghdad would submit to 
the will of the international community and emphasised support for the 
international community's efforts to 'ensure compliance with the decisions 
adopted collectively under the U. N. aegis to eliminate the consequences of the 
Iraqi aggression. ' 106 The statement pointed out that Russia, via its embassy in 
Baghdad, and in other ways, had repeatedly urged Iraq to co-operate with the 
104 Report to the Security Council by the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM, 2 March 1993, United 
Nations Security Council document S/25172 
105 It was not until 19 January that Iraq informed the Commission that it would allow the 
resumption of UNSCOM flights in accordance with established procedures. 106 , Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Fears Russia Will be Drawn Into Conflict, While Foreign 
Ministry Reaffirms Commitment to World Community', Nozavisiinaya Gazzeta, 15 January 1993, 
p. 2 
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United Nations and refrain from steps that destabilised the situation in the 
region. 1 
07 
However, while supporting the military action against Iraq by the allied 
forces, Moscow disapproved of the subsequent American air-strikes on Baghdad 
because of domestic considerations. The Foreign Ministry's situation appeared 
even more awkward when it became known that the Kremlin had not been 
notified about the impending U. S. aerial attacks, with President Yeltsin learning 
about the events from news reports. 108 Not surprisingly therefore, the Russian 
government was irritated not only by Iraq's confrontational position towards the 
U. S. -led coalition and the U. N., but also, and to a greater degree, by Washington's 
unilateral decision to conduct air-strikes against Iraq without seeking the approval 
of the U. N., nor consulting with Moscow on the issue. 
The senior Middle East official at the Foreign Ministry, Viktor Gogitidze, 
pointed out that 'our line towards it [Iraq] would be different', if Baghdad 
'fulfilled the demands of the U. N. resolutions'. 109 But he also observed that raids 
against Iraq 'would not achieve their desired goals'. " 0 Russian Foreign Minister 
Kozyrev in a note to the U. S. Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger 
emphasised that the actions against Iraq ought to be 'adequate' and 'flow from 
agreed decisions' by the Security Council. 1 11 
Similarly, in its statement, the Foreign Ministry, called for a review of the 
situation by the Security Council. It acknowledged that the 'key to the 
"' Ibid. 
108 Serge Schmemann, 'Russian Sensitivities; As Choices Become Harder, Moscow Grows 
Sceptical About U. S. Policies', New York Times, 27 January 1993, p. 6 
101) Pavel Shinkarenko, 'Iraq: New Spire of Conflict'. Rossi, Yskie Vesti, 19 January 1993. p. I 
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non-nalisation of the situation is in Baghdad', and that the 'solution lies in the 
complete realisation of the U. N. resolutions'. At the same time, the statement 
emphasised that the 'situation in Iraq has once again gone beyond the critical 
point' and that reaction to Iraq's actions should be 'adequate' and 'based only on 
concerted decisions'. ' 12 
The conservative newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta went further on the issue 
by quoting an unnamed high-ranking Russian diplomat as saying: 'We are sick 
and tired of a situation in which CNN reporters are notified of strikes against 
Saddam in advance, while Russian leaders are woken up in the middle of the night 
after an attack has already begun'. ' 13 Emphasising that Russia's position went 
against its national interest, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, 
issued a memorandum to the Supreme Soviet, stating, inter alia, that Russia had 
lost US$2.5 billion in arms sales and had suffered other economic losses as a 
result of the U. N. sanctions on Iraq. 114 
The frustration about what was perceived as Washington's disregard for 
Russia in an attempt to assume a role of enforcer in the region where Moscow had 
substantial interests, ' 15 turned Iraq into a 'rallying point' of nationalists and 
communists, who yet again rejected co-operation with the West and the 'betrayal' 
of the long-standing Soviet ally. ' 16 Moscow's official political support of the U. S. 
position with regard to Iraq, the inability of the Foreign Ministry to prevent the 
military actions against Baghdad that caused civilian deaths, but more 
112 Foreign Ministry Statement presented by Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, 'Iraq: 
Reaction Should be Adequate', MoskovskieVoivsti, 24 January 1993, p. 7 
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importantly, the fact that it was left in the dark concerning the forthcoming 
American air-strikes, provided the opposition with yet another opportunity to 
mobilise against the government, and in particular against the Foreign Ministry. 
Voicing harsh criticism against Kozyrevs foreign policy approach, the 
Russian vice-president Alexander Rutskol emphasised that the military solution 
would not lead to the resolution of the problem and argued that Russia ought to 
use its power of veto at the U. N. Security Council if the latter decided to launch 
new air-strikes against Iraq. 117 The nationalist leader Sergei Baburin claimed that 
'every attack on Iraq automatically undermines the international prestige of 
Western countries' and warned that 'even those who condemn Saddam and his 
regime understand perfectly well that tomorrow they may be treated in the saine 
way'. '' 8 Presenting Saddam Hussein as abandoned by the Russian government, 
Vladimir Zhirinovsky went as far as organising a trip for a group of fifteen of his 
supporters who volunteered to fly to Baghdad to fight alongside Iraqi soldiers 
against the American forces. ' 9 According to Zhirinovsky, 'we are going to Iraq to 
whip up anti-American fervour and unite the Arab world against the U. S,. 120 As 
before, in an attempt to distance itself from Zhirinovsky's conduct, the Foreign 
Ministry issued a statement, emphasising that 'this action has nothing in common 
with Russia's Middle East policy, and was 'at odds with efforts to restore peace 
and stability in the Persian Gulf region. ' 121 
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The parliamentary opposition also exercised pressure on the government 
concerning the fate of the Russian war ships in the Persian Gulf Sergei Baburin 
argued that 'Russia's servicemen on these ships have become hostages' and urged 
Moscow 'not to share responsibility for flagrant tyranny' with the members of the 
anti-Iraq coalition. ' 22 In spite of the statement by the commander of the Russian 
navy, Felix Gromov, that the Russian ships in the Gulf were under his command 
only and not subordinate to coalition forces, 123 the opposition raised demands to 
review the question of 'Russia's military presence' in the Gulf at one of the 
meetings of the Supreme Council, 124 and ultimately forced the government to 
withdraw the ships from the region all together. 125 
Analysing the Foreign Ministry's position during this crisis, Pravda noted 
that the 'role of Washington yes-man is unbecoming of any country, especially 
Russia' and 'inevitably conflicts with national interests'. 126 Similarly, Rossiyskaya 
Gazeta concluded that possibly the Foreign Ministry 'has finally begun to realise 
that Russia remains a great power and that such a power should have its own 
Policy,. 127 Moskovskie Novosti observed that Russian economic and political 
circles were interested in re-establishing ties with Iraq, and expressed concern 
about the probability of Russia's return to its previously held positions in that 
country, because of the competition on the part of the Western firins and the 
altered relationship between Baghdad and Moscow. While the article agreed that 
Russia's present policy towards Iraq ought to be primarily determined by the goal 
122 , Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Fears Russia Will be Drawn Into Conflict, While Foreign 
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of stability in the Persian Gulf, it also argued that Russia ought to keep in mind its 
economic interests in the country. 128 
The growing domestic pressure, which had already put Kozyrev on the 
defensive over Russia's policy in the war in former Yugoslavia 129 and the signing 
of the strategic anns limitation treaty, START-11, on 3 January, that was described 
as a 'high-water mark' in Russia's pro-Western policy, ' 30 compelled Yeltsin to 
signal a shift in Russian foreign policy towards a more assertive approach. At a 
press conference in the Kremlin on 25 January, Yeltsin noted that 'there have 
been accusations that our Foreign Minister's orientation is pro-Western, that he is 
always looking left and cannot turn his head to the right', and declared that 'now 
our policy is more or less balanced. ' 131 In a statement concerning American policy 
towards Yugoslavia and Iraq, the Russian President, in an attempt to appease the 
opposition, observed that the U. S. had shown a tendency to dictate terms instead 
of engaging in dialogue. 132 He admitted to have had a 'difference of opinion' over 
Yugoslavia and Iraq with Washington, and stated that 'there needs to be a political 
dialogue with Iraq and its government', adding that President Clinton appeared to 
him 'more inclined to carry out that sort of policy'. ' 33 
The following day, Kozyrev was eager to reassure the West that Russia's 
position had not radically changed, and should not be viewed as an effort by 
Russia to distance itself from the U. S. by calling the latest disagreements with 
128 Vladimir Rass, 'Iraq: What's NextT, Mosk-ovskie Noi, osti, 23 January 1993, p. 8 
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Washington a 'mature partnership'. 134 However, it appeared that Yeltsin was 
indeed deten-nined to underscore the independence of Russia's foreign policy in 
the hope of seizing the initiative from the opposition by reminding the West of 
Russia's national interests, and exercising pressure on newly elected American 
President Bill Clinton for more aid to Russia. It was probably for that purpose that 
at the end of January, the Russian President directed the Foreign Ministry to 
examine the prospect of resuming deliveries of the Iraqi oil to Russia, and in 
February 1993, dispatched the deputy director of Middle East Department at the 
Foreign Ministry, Igor Melikhov, to Baghdad. 135 
Whereas the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Foreign Economic 
Relations belittled the importance of the directive by promptly explaining that its 
was issued in the event that Baghdad complied with the U. N. resolutions and that 
sanctions were eased or lifted, 136 Melikhov's visit created controversy regarding 
the change in Moscow's position on Iraq. 1 37 This was further fuelled by the 
latter's statement that the objective of his trip was to 'strengthen and promote 
Russian-Iraqi tics. " 38 Even though Viktor Posuvalyuk, the Director of the Middle 
East Department at the Foreign Ministry claimed that his subordinate's comments 
were taken out of context and falsely interpreted by foreign journalists, he himself 
argued that Moscow could not ignore the 'potential for Russian-Iraqi co- 
operation'. 139 However, this move was not enough to appease the pro-Iraqi 
opposition. In April 1993, a right-wing delegation led by the former Deputy 
134 V. A., 'Kozyrev Isn't Afraid of Tiffs', Nez-avisimaya Gazeta, 27 January 1993. p. 1 
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Defence Minister of the USSR, General Achalov, and a conservative Supreme 
Soviet deputy and parliament speaker, Ruslan Khasbulatov, travelled to Baghdad, 
where the former expressed dismay at the sanctions regime, and declared that it 
was not the Russian people, but the Soviet and Russian leadership who had 
betrayed Iraq. 140 
Yeltsin's difficulty to maintain the balancing act between pacifying the 
opposition and continuing support for the West, and in particular Washington's 
tough stance towards Iraq, was illustrated at the end of June, when the U. S. fired 
twenty-three Tomahawk missiles into Iraq's intelligence quarters in Baghdad in 
retaliation for a plot to assassinate President Bush during his trip to Kuwait on 15 
April. 14 1 This time, the Russian leadership was infon-ned in advance about the 
planned air-strike and was provided with 'exhaustive' evidence of Iraqi special 
services' involvement in the plot. 142 Consequently, the Foreign Ministry in its 
statement published on 27 June, expressed understanding of the American action, 
but refrained from articulating open support for Washington's air-strike to prevent 
attacks by the opposition. 143 Similarly, President Yeltsin, on a visit to Athens at 
the time, when asked by a Greek journalist as to why Russia supported the 
American attack on Iraq, responded that the Russian statement did not contain the 
word 'support', advising the journalist to study carefully the text. 144 
However, while eager to avoid another confrontation with the opposition, 
Yeltsin needed to express support for the American actions to ease the latest 
tensions over Russia's stance on Bosnia and the sale of rocket engines to India in 
140 Shumilin, 'Hand Extended to Saddam Hussein Again', Nezai, isima. ya Gazzeta, 16 April 1993, p. 
4 
141 For detailed account, Bill Clinton, Yi, Lýfe, (London: Arrow Books, 2005). pp. 525-526 




the hope for Clinton's support at the forthcoming Tokyo G-7 Summit, which 
145 
exercised considerable influence over policies of the IMF and the World Bank . 
He might also have wanted to re-pay the Americans for their 'understanding' 
stance with regard to the presence of Russian troops in the Near Abroad. Their 
status under international law had yet to be clarified, and Moscow was anxious to 
keep the matter away from the U. N. Security Council. 146 
Yeltsin therefore left it to Kozyrev to articulate Moscow's approval of the 
U. S. retaliation, following his tactic adopted early in his Presidency, namely to 
use Kozyrev as his port-parole towards the West, while domestically distancing 
himself from the Foreign Minister's much criticised pro-Western policy. This left 
Kozyrev 'feeling lonely' in the Russian government as an 'advocate of co- 
operation with the U. S. '. 147 The Russian Foreign Minister at a press conference 
held at the conclusion of talks between the foreign ministers of Russia and 
Luxembourg, therefore publicly backed Washington's military retaliation, 
pointing out that 'we cannot consider hunting presidents, even former ones, to be 
normal. Tolerating this would be tantamount to endorsing a policy of state 
terrorism. ' 148 
As expected, the parliamentary opposition denounced the attack and the 
position taken by the Foreign Ministry. At the meeting of the Supreme Soviet, 
Deputy Iona Andronov declared that 'the world must know that not everyone in 
Russia condones the murder of unfortunate Iraqis. Russia has another voice - the 
145 Kondrashev. 'Blurred Effect of Missile Pedagogy', Izvestia, 30 June 1993, p. 3 
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Supreme Soviet - and it has real people'. 149 The Supreme Soviet lodged an 
official protest against the 'act of international violence committed by the U. S. ', 
with the Council of the Republic and the Council of Nationalities voting for the 
document, which the Foreign Minister was subsequently instructed to distribute at 
the U. N. as an official document. ' 50 
Commenting on the American attack and the position of the Russian 
leadership, the Russian press offered a largely negative assessment. Pravda stated: 
'Even those who have no love for Saddam Hussein's regime are shaken by the 
missile strike on Baghdad'. It described the attack as a 'serious precedent' and 
argued that henceforth any country suspected of terrorism could become a target 
of U. S. attacks. In its view, Russia's support for the strike on the basis of Article 
51 of the U. N. Charter was an 'incredible cynism', as it 'unties Washington's 
hands to carry out any armed action anywhere on the planet'. 151 An Izvestia 
commentator, while acknowledging that the U. S. had the 'right to self-defence', 
concluded that 'our multipolar and interdependent world can scarcely afford to 
give any state a totally unlimited right to act as supreme arbiter and ultimate truth- 
bearer'. 1 52 Another Izvestia commentator complained that the Russian leadership 
was 'too quick and too unconditional' in the support of the American action, 
'totally glossing over timid qualifications about the need to avoid escalating 
violence'. 153 
However, soon the domestic developments greatly diminished the 
influence of Yeltsin's pro-Iraqi opponents on Moscow's foreign policy. On 12 
149 N. Garifullina, 'Protest by Russian Parliament', Sovetsk-ay'a Rossia, I July 1993, p. I "0 Ibid. 
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August, the Russian President at a Conference in the House of Russian Press 
noted that the previous months 'have been marked by another high point of 
political tension, ' as the parliamentary opposition purposefully impeded the work 
of the government and stepped up personal attacks on the President, playing up 
the subject of Yeltsin's health, and announced parliamentary elections to be held 
in autumn. 1 54 Subsequently, faced with intensified struggle with the parliament, 
which essentially 'deprived the executive branch of the opportunity to function 
and to exercise its constitutional powers', 155 Yeltsin in a televised address to the 
nation on 21 September, announced the dissolution of the parliament and the 
establishment of a new supreme legislative body - the Federal Assembly, to be 
elected on 12 December, followed by early elections for the President. 
156 In 
response, the opposition on 3 October unsuccessfully mounted armed attacks on 
the Russian White House and Ostankino Television Centre in an attempt to 
remove Yeltsin from power. 157 
Yeltsin's victory over his opponents was reflected in Moscow's temporary 
distancing from Baghdad in favour of increasing co-operation with the wealthy 
states of the Gulf By the end of November, during a visit of Kuwait's Defence 
Minister Ali Sabah al-Salim to Moscow, Russia and Kuwait signed a ten-year 
agreement on military co-operation, which provided for conducting joint naval 
manoeuvres, exchanging military delegations and the Kuwaiti purchase of 
Russian military equipment 'in accordance with the needs of the Emirate'. 
158 In a 
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clear reference to Iraq that still refused to recognise Kuwait's independence and 
the newly redrawn Iraq-Kuwait border, the document called for Russia's 
assistance in the 'elimination of the threat to sovereignty, security and territorial 
159 
integrity and repelling aggression' . 
Later, commenting on the treaty, Rossiyskie Vesti observed that the Middle 
East 'constitutes a certain interest' for Russia, from the point of view of 
replenishing its hard currency resources, and 'even more so, since it appears that 
we are not going to obtain tangible assistance from the West'. 
160 The same month, 
Russian Vice-Premier Alexander Shokhin travelled to the United Arab Emirates 
for the opening of the international arms exhibition, where he declared that his 
visit took place in the context of Russia's pragmatic foreign policy aimed at 
creating favourable conditions for increasing Russian exports. 
161 
The low point in Russian-Iraqi relations was reached in late December, 
when Russia and Kuwait conducted joint naval manoeuvres as set out in the co- 
operation agreement. This prompted Pravda to complain that 'the door to co- 
operation with Iraq -a rich and influential state with which we used to 
have very 
close ties - has thereby been slammed shut'. 
162 However, Pravda's prediction did 
not materialise. By the spring of 1994, Moscow in its pursuit of a more assertive 
and pragmatic foreign policy, reactivated its contacts with Baghdad, and stepped 
up its diplomatic efforts in the United Nations, determined to obtain the lifting of 
sanctions against Iraq. 
159 , Russia-Kuwait Co-operation Agreement', Konnnersant., I December 1993, p. 6 
160 Mustafin., 'Arab East: Com, ass of Security'. Rossiyskie Vesti, 30 December 1993. p. 3 
161 ITAR-TASS, 'Shilchin in ýnitc_-d Arab Emirates', Pravda, 28 November 1993, p. 4; ITAR- 
TASS, 'Towards a More Pragliatic Foreign Policy', 29 November 1993, p. 4 
162 Belyakov, 'All Eggs in OneBasket, Prai, da. II January 1994, p. 3 
100 
Chapter 3: Russia at the U. N. Security Council during the 1994 
Iraq Crisis 
The difference between the Russian and American positions is simple: Washington thinks 
that Hussein's unreliability precludes anything other than an extremely tough approach to 
him. We, on the other hand, think that pressure on Baghdad will be more effective if it is 
stated publicly that there have been changes for the better, but such-and-such demands 
will have to be met in order for such-and-such restrictions to be relaxed. In relations with 
a country, one should proceed from a presumption of good, not evil. 
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Boris Kolokolov' 
The new constellation of forces in the Russian domestic arena and growing 
disillusionment with the West substantially had transfon-ned Moscow's approach 
to its traditional Soviet-time ally in the Middle East by 1994. The new dynamics 
in Russia's policy towards Baghdad became apparent at the United Nations 
Security Council, where Moscow stepped up efforts to have sanctions against Iraq 
lifted. At the same time, it became noticeable in Russia's increased bilateral 
contacts with Baghdad, aimed at securing the repayment of Iraqi debts and 
advantageously positioning Russia in that country in preparation for the post- 
embargo period. 
In mid-January 1994, Iraq, following its acceptance of U. N. Resolution 
715 in November 1993,2 which approved plans for monitoring the Iraqi 
compliance with its obligations under the cease-fire agreement, 3 submitted to the 
United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) its first declarations on past 
' Quoted by Konstantin Eggert, 'Russian Foreign Ministry Proposes that Saddam Hussein be 
Considered a Good Man', Izvestia, 9 August 1994, p. 3 
2 Communication of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iraq to the President of the U. N. Security 
Council, 26 November 1993, United Nations Document S/26811 
.3 United Nations Security Council Resolution 715, S/RES/715 (199 1) 
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proscribed chemical, biological weapons and ballistic missiles, as well as on its 
current dual-purpose capabilities in those areas. 4 In March 1994, the Intemational 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) completed the removal of all direct weapons- 
usable materials from Iraq, and in its April report to the Security Council declared 
Iraq's report, submitted by the end of March, as acceptable to its established 
reporting standards .5 Between February and November, high-level talks were held 
between Iraq on one side, and UNSCOM and the IAEA on the other, airned at 
facilitating the latter's recognition that Baghdad had taken all actions called for in 
paragraph 22 of Resolution 687.6 A joint staternent issued after the talks in 
Baghdad on 2-5 February, indicated that the two sides had consolidated a 
breakthrough in relations between Iraq and UNSCOM. It also reviewed the steps 
to put in place an Ongoing Monitoring and Verification (OMV) plans, undertaken 
since Iraq's acceptance of the resolution 715 in 1993, and expressed a readiness to 
expedite that process in a spirit of goodwill to achieve their shared objective - the 
lifting of sanctions against Iraq. 7 
During the subsequent talks between the Executive Chainnan of 
UNSCOM, Rolf Ekeus, and Iraq's Deputy Prime Minister, Tareq Az1z, in New 
York in March 1994, the latter repeatedly stated Iraq's view that it had completed 
all actions demanded of it under paragraph 22 of Resolution 687. He urged 
UNSCOM and the IAEA to report to the Security Council that the conditions for 
4 Report of the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM to the U. N. Security Council, 19 March 1994, 
United Nations Document, S/ I 994i341 
5 Report by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to the U. N. Security Council. United 
Nations Document, S/1994/490 
" Paragraph 22 established that the destruction of Iraqi weapons arsenal was to lead to the lifting of 
sanctions, 
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the lifting of the embargo had been met. 8 At the same time, Aziz stressed that Iraq 
could not trust UNSCOM to act objectively in pursuit of its mandate, as no such 
report had yet been made and no date set for it, and warned of serious 
consequences. However, Ekeus continued to insist that such a report required 
UNSCOM to possess full information on Iraq's prohibited weapons programmes. 
This was required for their definite accounting and the establishment of an 
effective OMV system that could be implemented in such a way as to preclude the 
clandestine re-activation of prohibited programmes. " 
Baghdad's hitherto unprecedented co-operation with the United Nations, 
and the significant steps reached in disan-ning Iraq by UNSCOM and the IAEA, 
provided Moscow with a long-awaited opportunity to modify its stance at the 
Security Council towards openly advocating the lifting of sanctions against Iraq. 
Russian officials emphasised that Russia's position with regard to the Iraqi 
question was based on the primacy of international law, meaning that Baghdad 
was required to implement the decisions that had been collectively adopted by the 
international community. At the same time, they stressed that over the previous 
three years Iraq had done much in meeting U. N. demands, particularly in the 
disarmament field, requiring the U. N. to react to these positive changes. 10 
In line with this approach, on the eve of the routine review of the sanctions 
regime against Iraq at the Security Council on 16 March 1994, a senior Russian 
diplomat expressed dissatisfaction with the Western position, and argued that the 
embargo should be lifted. However, he also admitted that Moscow wanted a 
8 Report of the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM to the U. N. Security Council, 19 March 1994, 
United Nations Document, S/I 994/34 1. Also interview with Tareq Aziz on 19 March 1994, Daniel 
Pipes, 'The View from Baghdad: Tareq Aziz', The Middle East Quarterl 
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4positive decision on this question to allow us to begin recovering the Iraqi 
debts'. " In Moscow's view, it was necessary to move to the next stage, the launch 
of a mechanism for the long-term monitoring of Iraqi military programmes, whilst 
rewarding Iraq for the constructive changes it had already undertook. 12 
Consequently, when the Executive Chain-nan of UNSCOM, during the 
talks with the head of the Iraqi military-industrial complex, Amer Rashid, 
emphasised the need for a six months full compliance with the U. N. resolutions 
before he could recommend the lifting of sanctions, Moscow was eager to fix the 
time-frame for this period and secure a commitment on the part of the Security 
Council members that it would end unconditionally following that date. ' 3 Later, in 
an interview with an Interfax correspondent, a Russian foreign ministry official 
explained that Moscow was worried that the continuing vagueness about the 
prospect of the lifting of sanctions, as well as the 'language of threats and methods 
of forcible pressure', could be 'counterproductive', as it could return Iraq to the 
position of 'blind defence' and lead to confrontation with the United Nations. ' 4 
Moscow continued to maintain this position at the subsequent review of 
the sanctions regime against Iraq on 17 May, this time supported by more than 
half of the 15 Security Council members who were ready to acknowledge that 
Baghdad was making progress towards meeting conditions for the lifting of the 
ban on its sale of oil. 
15 
Whereas there was a consensus that Iraq had not yet complied with all 
disarmament terins as required of it, the Council was divided over the issue of a 
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statement recognising Saddam Hussein's progress towards complying with the 
U. N. demands, aimed at encouraging his full compliance. As expected, the 
Russian representative strongly advocated the publishing of such a statement, 
arguing that Saddam Hussein needed 'encouraging gestures from the international 
16 
community' . 
Similarly, when during the subsequent sanctions review at the Security 
Council on 19 July 1994, progress had been noted in the discovery and liquidation 
of the Iraqi weapons and weapons programmes, as well as in the establishment of 
a long-ten-n monitoring system, Russia once more proposed that the Council react 
adequately to these positive changes. In commenting on his govemment's 
position, the Russian representative at the U. N., Sergel Lavrov, admitted that 
Moscow's view was influenced by 'our large economic and financial interests', 
but promised that 'we do not intend to advance our interests through breach of 
international law, but acting strictly within the framework of the Security Council 
resolutions and fixed procedures'. ' 7 According to Lavrov, Russia considered it 
necessary for Iraq to fulfil all other demands, including the recognition of Kuwait 
and clarification of the fate of the missing Kuwaiti prisoners. However, in a clear 
reference to the U. S. position, the Russian representative noted that 'we are 
against the revision of U. N. resolutions ex post fticto and against imposing 
conditions contradicting the adopted decisions. ' 18 
Commenting on Moscow's policy at the U. N., a Russian commentator in 
Moskovskie Novosti argued that it was not surprising that the Iraqi lobby relied on 
Ibid. 
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Russia, 'as Moscow has always been regarded as a weak link in the coalition'. 19 In 
another article, concerned with the consequences for Russia's prestige in the 
Middle East and the world at large, he also deplored the fact that Russia 'is a kind 
20 
of 'lobbyist' of Iraq in the Security Council'. 
However, Russia was not alone in desiring to bring an end to the sanctions 
regime. Although bitterly opposed by the U. S. and Britain, this position found 
enthusiastic support by France and China, creating a lasting split in the anti-Iraq 
coalition that was to continue until the U. S. -led war against Iraq in 2003. 
Like Russia, France expected the U. S. to set definite criteria for what Iraq 
had to do to obtain the lifting of sanctions .21 The French Foreign Minister, Alain 
Jupp&, like his Russian counterpart, insisted that Iraq was co-operating with the 
United Nations, and that the Security Council 'must in return make a positive step 
toward the softening of sanctions against Iraq in keeping with a fair and legalistic 
22 
interpretation with the Council's resolutions' . Similar to Moscow, Paris was 
eager to obtain the end of the embargo against Baghdad, its most important 
economic partner in the Middle East, in order to recover Iraqi debt repayments 
amounting to US$5.5 billion and to secure re-cntry into Iraq's lucrative market 
that Baghdad was promising in return for the French voice of support in the 
Security Council . 
23 It was certainly for that reason that already in spring 1992 Iraq 
had contacted the largest French state-controlled companies Eýf'Aquitaine and 
Total to negotiate potential exploration and production sharing agreements of the 
19 Alexander Shumilin, 'Baghdad Seeking a Breach in the Anti-Iraq Coalition', Moskovskie 
Novosti, 27 March-3 April 1994, p. 12 
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two large oil and gas reserves north of Basra near the Iranian border. 24 Even 
though both companies emphasised that they would not sign any agreements until 
the sanctions were lifted, the Iraqi vice-president Taha Yassin Ramadan, in an 
attempt to exercise pressure on the French government, declared that the oil 
production would re-start in the near future, and would not necessarily await a 
U. N. decision. 25 
In addition, the French position at the United Nations corresponded to its 
desire to re-build the country's influence in the Middle East, considerably 
weakened since the Gulf War in 1991. Already in 1992, President Franqois 
Mitterrand launched a political initiative in an attempt to re-gain France's lost 
influence in the region by visiting Jordan, and for the first time since 1982, 
Israel, 26 as well as by playing a more active role in the economic realm of the 
Arab-Israeli peace talks. 27 In 1994, France also attempted to bring Iraq into the 
peace process in order to gain support from Israel, Egypt, Jordan and Morocco to 
counter pressure from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia on Washington to block the 
lifting of sanctions . 
28 However, despite a flurry of activities by the foriner French 
Minister of Defence Jean-Pierre Chevenement, a handshake by Aziz's aide with 
two Israeli delegates at the United Nations in New York in March 1994, and a 
message from the Baath Party that it approved direct contacts with Israel since the 
29 Palestinians had opted for peace, the French efforts remained unsuccessful . 
24 William Dawkins. 'Commodities and Agriculture: Elf and Total Resume Iraq Oil Exploration 
Discussions', Financial Times. 5 March 1992, p. 30 
25 Ibid. 
26 Jean-Pierre Langellier, 'M. Mitterand veut renforcer I'amiti6 franco-isra6lienne'. Le Monde, 25 
November 1992, p. 1 
2' Dawkins, 'Mitterrand to Rebuild Mideast Relations', Financial Times. 25 November 1992, p. 4 
29 Adel Darwish, 'French Broker Deal Between Saddam and Israel', The Independent, 6 December 
1994, p. 12 
29 Marie Colvin, 'France Breaks Ranks on Iraq', Sunday, Times, 8 January 1995, p. 16 
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The French government had also maintained direct contact with Baghdad 
by initially arranging meetings with Iraqi officials outside France, and by using 
the services of the former government officials acquainted with Saddarn Hussein 
during the golden age of French-Iraqi relations in the 1980s. In spring 1994, the 
French Interior Minister Charles Pasqua held talks with Aziz in Germany. 30 In 
December 1994, the former French foreign minister Claude Cheysson travelled to 
Baghdad, where, at a meeting with Saddam Hussein, he discussed steps to bring 
about the lifting of sanctions, arguing that isolating Iraq 'represents a danger to 
peace' and 'gives a chance to fanatics in other parts of the world'. 31 
At the same time, marking a departure from cautious contact with Iraqi 
officials abroad, a member of the Iraqi Foreign Ministry, Ridyad al-Qaisi, was 
received in Paris, where he held talks with French Foreign Ministry officials, and 
reached an agreement 'to continue to work at the Security Council in line with a 
32 
co-ordinated plan with specific steps' . More importantly, indicating the growing 
French belief that the lifting of sanctions was in view, the French foreign minister 
Alain Jupp&, following talks with Tareq Aziz in Paris on 6 January 1995, 
announced the restoration of diplomatic link with Iraq by opening a French 
33 
interest section in the Rumanian embassy in Baghdad . 
China also supported the Russian position at the U. N. Security Council motivated 
primarily by economic considerations. 34 By 1978, domestic modernisation in 
China had begun to alter the nature of the country's involvement in the Middle 
30 Shumilin, Moskovskie Novosti, 31 July-7 August 1994, p. 12 
31 Reuters, 'Call to Lift U. N. Sanctions on Iraq', The Guardian, 19 December 1994, p. 8 
12 Baghdad Newspapers quoting the Iraqi News Agency. as reported by Reuters, 'Call to Lift U. N. 
Sanctions on Iraq', The Guardian, 19 December 1994, p. 8 
33 Colvin, Sunday Thnes, 8 January 1995, pp. 1,16 
34 On China's policy towards Iraq and the Gulf states, see John Calabrese. 'China and the Persian 
Gulf, Middle East Journal, Vol. 52, Xg. 3, Surnmer 1998, pp. 351-366 
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East, and by 1992, the region became Beijing's fourth largest trading partner. 35 
Subsequently, the sharp rise in domestic demand for oil, and more importantly, 
the fact that since 1993 China moved from being a net oil exporter to being an oil 
importer, 36 turned the Middle East into an area of special strategic importance to 
the Chinese govemment. 
At the same time, the demands of modernisation had created a continuing 
dilemma in Chinese foreign policy. On one hand, Beijing was interested in ending 
its isolation and re-building its political and economic relations with the West, 
particularly the U. S., which had been on ice as a consequence of the Tiananmen 
Square incident in June 1989.37 On the other hand, it was ambitious to limit 
American influence in the Middle East. Therefore China, while advocating a 
peaceful resolution of the Gulf crisis in 1990 'within the scope of the Arab 
countries', 38 supported the U. S. -sponsored U. N. resolutions, including the 
imposition of sanctions, but abstained on Resolution 678 that allowed for the use 
of force against Iraq. 39 
In the aftennath of the Gulf War, Beijing continued to support the Western 
tough line towards Baghdad at the Security Council 'in order to promote regional 
peace and stability in the region' . 
40 At the same time, it was interested in the 
lifting of sanctions to resume its trade ties with Iraq and prevent Washington from 
35 Yitzhak Shichor, 'Small Cracks in the Great Wall: The Prospects for Sino-Israeli Relations', 
Research Report n. 5, Institute of Jewish Affairs, 1987, as quoted by Jonathan Rynhold, 'China's 
New Pragmatism in the Middle East', Siwvlval, Vol. 38, No 3, Autumn 1996, p. 102 
36 On China's energy policy, see Calabrese, 'Dragon by the Tail: China's Energy Quandary', Paper 
for the Middle East Institute, available online at http: //w", w. mideasti. orc, ý/pdfsý/calabrese304. pd 
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York Times, 21 June 1989. p. 1 
38 Shichor, 'China and the Gulf Crisis', Problems o. fCommitnism, Vol. 40, X2.6, November- 
December 199 1, p. 90 
ý') Lillian Craig Harris, 'The Gulf Crisis and China's Middle East Dilemma' Pacific Rei, ielv. Vol. 
4, No. 2, Winter 1991, pp. 116-125 
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December 1994 
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strengthening its hegemonic position in the region. This strategy was expressed by 
President Jiang Zemin in his speech to Chinese envoys in 1994, in which he 
argued that China ought to oppose 'hegemony' and 'link up' with 'allies', such as 
Iran, while emphasising that Beijing's top priority was the consolidation of a 
peaceful international environment, favourable to economic reconstruction. 41 
Even though Chinese officials had called on Baghdad to comply with the 
U. N. demands, they also voiced strong reservations about many measures adopted 
by the Security Council, and objected the punitive strikes against Iraq. On a 
rhetorical level, China emphasised the dramatic impact of the sanctions on the 
Iraqi population and economy and advocated the removal of the embargo regime 
42 
at the earliest possible date 'on the basis of human considerations' . 
In return for Chinese support in the Security Council, Iraq, as in case of 
Russia and France, offered China favourable contracts for the development of its 
oil industry. In June 1997, the Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) 
and the state-owned Norinco signed an agreement with Baghdad for the 
development of the Al-Ahdab oil-field in central Iraq, forining a new company, 
al-J, Vaha for the development of the field. A year later, CNPC negotiated a 
contract for the exploration of the Halfayah field, the biggest overseas 
development project for this Chinese oil company. 43 However, in spite of the 
economic incentive on the Iraqi part, China, in line with its general approach not 
to take a leading role in the international affairs, 44 was reluctant to act 
41 Deng-Ker Lee, 'Peking's Middle East Policy in the Post-Cold War Era', Issues and Studies, Vol 
301 X2 81 August 1994, p. 85 
42 Statement of Li Zhaoxing, Chinese representative at the Security Council on 14 April 1995, 
U. N. Document, Security Council. S/PV. 35.19 
43 Xiaojie Xu, 'China and the Middle East: Cross- investment in the Energy Sector', Middle East 
Polic. Y. Vol. VII, X2.3. June 2000, p. 130 
44 Gerald Segal, 'Tying China into the International System', Sia-vival, Vol. 37, No. 2, Summer 
1995ý p. 72 
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independently at the Security Council, and avoided openly challenging 
Washington on the issue, instead preferring to join ranks with France and 
Russia. 45 
The American position with regard to Iraq, supported by Britain, was 
46 diametrically opposed to that of Russia, China and France. On 21 January 1993, 
the newly elected President Bill Clinton pledged to adhere to the policy towards 
Iraq set down by the Bush Administration. 47 The American strategy was aimed at 
weakening the Iraqi regime internally through economic sanctions and 
international inspections, making Saddarn Hussein vulnerable to overthrow. 48 As 
a consequence, Washington continuously blocked all attempts at the Security 
Council to lift the sanctions, arguing that the Saddam Hussein regime continued to 
defy the terms of the Gulf War peace and failed to comply with the U. N. Security 
Council resolutions. 49 
In his report to the Congress on 6 June 1994, President Clinton 
emphasised that 'four years after the invasion [of Kuwait] a pattern of defiance 
persists', and accused the Iraqi regime of the 'sponsorship of assassinations in 
Lebanon and northern Iraq, incomplete declarations to weapons inspectors and 
ongoing and wide-spread human rights violations'. He concluded that as a 
consequence, 'the United States will continue to enforce those sanctions'. 50 To 
secure support for this policy, the American representative at the U. N., Madeleine 
45 Rynhold, Survival, Autumn 1996, p. 104 
46 On the division in the U. N. Security Council, analysis by Claude Lorieux, 'Irak: les 'liberateurs' 
du Kowelt divisýs', Le Figaro, 12 November 1994. p. 4 
47 Friedman, 'The Inauguration: Clinton Takes Oath as 42 nd President, Urging Sacrifice to 'Renew 
America", Neit, York Times, 21 January 1993, p. 1 
48 John M. Goshko, 'Saddam May Force Saddarn to Bend on Oil Sales'. International Herald 
Tribune, 18 January 1994, p. 2 
'9 On U. S. policy towards Iraq, Kenneth Katzman, 'Iraq: Compliance. Sanctions and U. S. Policy', 
Congressional Research Service (CRS) Brief. fbr Congress, updated 2 January 2002, available 
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50 Richards, 'Clinton Leads Call to Keep Iraq Sanctions', The Independent, 4 August 1994, p. 13 
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Albright, repeatedly argued that Iraq 'has sought to evade, ignore and negotiate 
away its obligations', 51 and periodically presented the Security Council with 
evidence of the Iraqi defiant position towards the U. N. and Saddam Hussein's 
lavish life-style at the expense of the Iraqi population. 52 
Despite the noticeable progress in Baghdad's compliance with the U. N. 
resolutions and UNSCOM in 1994, the United States remained suspicious of 
Iraq's motives and advocated full compliance with all U. N. resolutions - and not 
only provisions related to disannament and recognition of Kuwait, before 
considering the lifting of sanCtionS. 53 
This difference of view on the matter among Security Council members 
was complicated by the conflicting wording of the two key sections of Resolution 
687. Paragraph 20 specified the conditions on which Iraq could import goods 
from the outside world, and determined that the Security Council was 'to review 
the provisions of paragraph 20 every 60 days in the light of the policies and 
practices of the government of Iraq, including the implementation of all relevant 
resolutions of the Council, for the purpose of determining whether to reduce or lift 
the prohibitions referred to therein'. However, paragraph 22 established a 
somewhat different set of rules for the lifting of sanctions by deten-nining that 
ýupon 
... Council agreement that Iraq has completed all actions contemplated in 
paragraph 8 to 13 [destruction of its weapons arsenal], the prohibitions against the 
51 Barbara Crossette, 'Threats in the Gulf. the U. N., Iraqi Attempts to Have Sanctions Lifted 
Quickly May Have Backfired', Neil, York Times, II October 1994, p. 13 ý2 Richard Lyons, 'U. N. Council Decides to Keep Economic Sanctions on Iraq', New York TiMeS, 
15 November 1994. p. 6ý Editorial, 'Too Soon to Lift Iraq Sanctions', Nell, York Times, 14 January 
1995, p. 22-, Elaine Sciolino, 'U. S. Says It's Won U. N. Votes to Keep Sanctions on Iraq', Nell, 
York Tintes, 5 March 1995, p. 1 
53 Secretary of State Warren Christopher in a televised interview, quoted by Paul F. Horvitz. 'U. S. 
Message to Iraq: Move Troops or Else', International Herald Tribune, 17 October 1994, p. I 
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import of commodities and products originating in Iraq ... shall have no further 
force or effect'. 54 
Russia and France regarded paragraph 22 as the crucial one, and insisted 
that Iraq had directly complied with the U. N. demands to destroy its weapons of 
mass destruction and that therefore the embargo should be lifted. The U. S. 
interpreted the resolution as meaning that Iraq had to comply with Resolution 688, 
which dealt with his treatment of the Shiites and the Kurds, before the sanctions 
could be ended. Britain supported the American position towards Iraq, 55 and 
regarded Saddam Hussein as 'untrustworthy', the Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd 
explaining that 'the leopard does not change his spots. 56 
However, while both, the U. S. and, to a certain extent, Russia, too, 
regarded Saddam Hussein as unreliable, there was a fundamental difference in 
their positions. For Washington, the unrellability of the Iraqi leader precluded 
57 dealing with Iraq as long as Saddam Hussein was in power, whereas Moscow 
believed in the necessity of maintaining the dialogue with Iraq in the belief that 
the Iraqi leader as a pragmatic politician would change if pressurised by the 
international community. In an interview with Izvestia, the deputy foreign 
minister Boris Kolokolov argued that is was 'naWe' to think that Saddani Hussein 
could be removed. In his view, the Iraqi leader was a 'flesh-and blood politician', 
54 United Nations Security Council Resolution 687, S/RES/687,3 April 1991 
55 Michael Evans, 'Sanctions Must Stay Foreign Office Says', The Tinies, II November 1994, p. 
13 
5" Michael Sheridan, 'Britain and U. S. Insist on Iraq Sanctions', The Independent, 25 February 
1995, p. 10 
57 On U. S. strategy towards Iraq, in partIcular the failed attempts to overthrow Saddam Hussein, 
Larry Everest, Oil, Poii, er and Enipire: Iraq and the U. S. Global Agenda, (Monroe: Common 
Courage Press, 2004), pp. 197- 204 
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and even if his behaviour did 'not conform to the generally accepted standards, if 
he takes positive steps, why not say so publicly? ý59 
Similarly, the Russian foreign minister, arguing that he was not 'an 
idealist', 'a romantic', but 'a pragmatist' and 'a politician, stressed that he wanted 
to 'do everything that depends on us to make sure Saddam holds his word. 59 In 
his opinion, the main problem of the American policy towards Iraq was the 
'everything or nothing' approach and the 'creation of constant stereotypes like 
60 'Saddam Hussein is bad' . In 
his address in Low Rotunda, Kozyrev also argued 
that given its economic requirements, Russia had to take a different diplomatic 
track from the U. S. In his opinion, it was essential that Moscow did not rule out 
the prospect that Saddam Hussein would 'soften' his extremism - 'How do you 
61 
engage Saddam in something positive is a challenge. This is a long road' . 
The essential difference in Russian and American approaches towards 
Baghdad and the extent of the deep division on the Iraqi question in the U. N. 
Security Council was highlighted by the Iraq ensis of autumn 1994. On 6 
October, Iraq issued a statement at the close of the meeting of the Revolutionary 
Command Council and the Central Committee of the Baath Party, which asserted 
that the U. S. with the assistance of UNSCOM Executive Chain-nan and the 
collaboration of others, in particular Kuwait, was determined to prolong the 
sanctions against Iraq to kill large numbers of Iraqis through a policy of starvation 
58 Eggert, 'Russian Foreign Ministry Proposes that Saddam Hussein be Considered a Good Man', 
Izvestia, 9 August 1994, p. 3 
59 Mikhail Karpov, 'Moscow Needs a Stable Peace, Washington a Small Victorious War', 
Nezavisiinaya Gazeta, 12 November 1994, pý 1 
60 Ibid. 
61 'Kozyrev Urges a New Partnership', Colunibia Univcrsit, v Rccord, 28 October 1994, Vol, 20, 
N2.8, available online at 




and deprivation . It concluded that this left Iraq no alternative, but to consider a 
new stand that would restore justice and relief the Iraqi people from the distress 
imposed on it. A day later, two divisions of the Iraqi Republican Guard entered 
the southern areas of Iraq in proximity to the demilitarised zone on the border 
with Kuwait. While they united with three other divisions stationed in the area, 
substantial parts of the Iraqi army were moved to the Kuwait border from the 
63 Iranian frontier . 
Whereas Baghdad declared the movement of troops to be a 'planned 
military exercise', arguing that 'Iraq is a sovereign state and has the right to move 
its troops on its own territory without limitations', 64 it was widely perceived either 
as the latter's determination to once again threaten Kuwait, or an attempt to 
demonstrate force in order to achieve the lifting of sanctions. 65 Whatever the 
reason, the U. S., supported by Britain and Kuwait, was detennined to rebuff the 
renewed Iraqi aggression by military means if required. 66 Washington therefore 
rapidly dispatched 36,000 troops, fighter planes and an aircraft carrier battle group 
to Kuwait. Britain and France decided to increase their military forces in the Gulf, 
while Kuwait moved most of its army to the frontier with Iraq. 67 
At the request of the U. S., an urgent Security Council meeting was 
convened on 8 October. The Council members warned Iraq against a renewed 
" The broadcast on Radio Baghdad reported by Reuters, 'Iraq Demands End to Economic 
Boycott', Inicrnational Herald Tribime, 7 October 1994, p. 7 
63 Shumilin, 'Iraq: Repetition of the Past', Mosk-ovskie Novosti, 9-16 October 1994, p. 13 
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aggression against Kuwait, expressed their 'profound preoccupation' with the 
movement of the Iraqi troops in the proximity of the Kuwait borders and 
68 
summoned Baghdad to continue the co-operation with UNSCOM . However, 
despite the show of unity among Council members, there were major differences 
among them concerning the political interpretation of the affair. 69 
Faced with the 'strength and speed of our response, 'O Baghdad in a 
statement to the Iraqi News Agency on 10 October, announced that 'the friendly 
parties' with which it had contact regarding the lifting of sanctions, had expressed 
concern that the presence of Iraqi troops in Basra might be used by the U. S. as a 
pretext to resist international pressures to change its stance of maintaining the 
sanctions regime. According to the statement, Saddarn Hussein therefore decided 
to move troops away from the southem area. 71 At the same time, the Iraqi 
Ambassador at the U. N., Nizar Hamdoon, reiterated that Baghdad 'reserves the 
right to move them at any time in the future to wherever we want within Iraqi 
territory' . 
72 
Undoubtedly, the Iraqi statement was received with relief by Moscow, one 
of the 'friendly parties', which had been active in trying to diffuse the renewed 
Iraq crisis, regarding it as a unique opportunity to mediate between Baghdad and 
the international community, and change the status quo with regard to Iraq at the 
U. N. by breaking the stalemate resulting from division of the Security Council. 
69 Statement of the President of the U. N. Security Council, 8 October 1994, United Nations 
Document, S/PRST/1994/58 
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On one hand, the active participation of Russian diplomats in a resolution 
of the crisis allowed Moscow to increase its international prestige, which had been 
damaged by its diplomatic debacle over Bosnia, and on the other hand to further 
strengthen its relations with Baghdad. It also provided President Yeltsin, 
weakened by the collapse of the rouble ('Black Tuesday'), corruption affair in the 
anny that surfaced following the murder of a Russian journalist in Moscow, as 
well as the growing tensions in the North Caucasus, with a great opportunity to 
appease his domestic opposition by demonstrating a policy approach independent 
to that of the U. S. 73 On the whole, the objectives of Moscow's diplomatic efforts 
appeared threefold: to broker a negotiated settlement of the crisis, prevent another 
American military operation in Iraq, and use the crisis to negotiate recognition of 
Kuwait, which in Russian eyes was a major obstacle to the lifting of sanctions 
against Iraq. 
Consequently, on 8 October the Foreign Ministry issued a statement on the 
situation in the Gulf, which stated that the 'development of events in this direction 
[military confrontation] ought to be stopped', and noted that the Security Council 
must have 'the will to continue efforts to provide for the fulfilment of Iraqi 
resolutions', first of all with regard to the 'necessity of the recognition of 
74 
Kuwait's sovereignty and its frontiers' . At the same time, the 
Russian foreign 
minister indicated that Moscow was working behind the scenes to broker a 
negotiated settlement to the renewed crisis. 
73 However, in the Russian media the Iraqi crisis had not received the same attention as in the 
West, rarely making it to the front pages due to the focus on pressing domestic affairs mentioned 
above. 
74 Yulia Petrovskaya, Dmitri Gornostayev, 'Conflict Ripening in the Persian Gulf', Ne. 7avisima-va 
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Following a telephone conversation with Warren Christopher, Kozyrev 
argued that a threat of renewed hostilities could be averted through dialogue: 'We 
are in close contact with the U. N. Security Council. As we see it, it is still possible 
to settle the problem by diplomatic and political means'. 75 He also expressed hope 
that 'there will be no over-reaction' and indicated that while Russia had warned 
Iraq against aggression, it had sought to discourage Washington from 
precipitating military action. 76 On the practical level, to mediate between Iraq and 
the allies, but also to prepare the ground for the subsequent Russian efforts to 
tackle the issue of recognition of Kuwait, President Yeltsin dispatched deputy 
foreign minister Igor Ivanov and his special envoy to the Middle East Victor 
Posuvalyuk, to the region. 77 
The Russian press, commenting on diplomatic activities to resolve the 
tensions, emphasised that Russia was 'well visible' and 'committed, unlike the 
U. S., not to resolve the crisis by forceful means straight away'. 78 Interestingly, in 
contrast to the American view, the Iraqi decision to withdraw was regarded as a 
result of Russian diplomacy, rather than the show of force on the part of the Gulf 
War allies. It was reported that Iraqi deputy prime minister Aziz had forwarded a 
notice about the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from the Kuwaiti border to the Russian 
79 
embassy in Baghdad . 
However, if for Moscow, the Iraqi retreat from the south opened the way 
for negotiations on the recognition of Kuwait, for Washington it meant an easily 
reversible concession on the part of the Iraq) leadership. Consequently, while 
75 Beeston, 'Kozyrev's Peace Moves Raise Boycott Suspicions', The Thnes, II October 1994, p. 
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Russia announced that Kozyrev would go to Baghdad to 'help easing the tension 
in the region and promote stability', 80 the U. S. continued to dispatch its troops to 
the Gulf, declaring that the military build-up would continue in order to exclude 
the possibility of Iraq threatening its neighbours. 81 In the American eyes, the 
Russian initiative was perceived as nothing more than an attempt to extract a 
statement from Iraq on the recognition of Kuwait in order to declare the crisis 
resolved and to call for the easing of sanctions. Thus, a senior Administration 
official, expressing Washington's scepticism, bluntly declared 'we are not buying 
it'. 
82 
At the U. N. Security Council, the renewed Iraq crisis raised the issue of its 
consequences for the Iraqi regime. While there was consensus that the future 
prevention of a potential Iraqi aggression was required, there were bitter 
disagreements as to the means to achieve this objective. The U. S. viewed the only 
possible solution in the demilitarisation of Iraqs southern area through permanent 
withdrawal of the well-equipped 20,000 Iraqi Republican Guards from the south, 
allowing only a 50,000-strong regular anny to remain in the area, subject to the 
use of force if Iraq violated these provisions. 83 
However, Russia and France considered the recognition of Kuwait by Iraq 
as the best long-terni solution and the most direct path to the lifting of the 
embargo against Iraq. 84 Moreover, in view of the tough American stance on Iraq, 
so Elaine Sciolino, 'Threats in the Gulf: the Overview', New York Times, 13 October 1994. p. I 
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both appeared suspicious of the U. S. demilitarisation plan, which they knew was 
unacceptable to Baghdad, and viewed it as a pretext for another military 
showdown between Washington and Iraq. 85 
The extent of the fissure within the Security Council on the Iraqi question 
was highlighted by the bitter battle of words between Paris and Washington. 86 
Even though France criticised Baghdad for sending its troops towards Kuwait and, 
like Britain, sent its frigate Georges Leygues to the area, 87 it argued that Iraq had 
not violated any U. N. resolutions and opposed the U. S. demilitarisation plan. The 
French Defence Minister, Franqols Leotard, went as far as to suggest that the 
American military build-up was 'not unconnected with domestic policies', 8K a 
view echoed by the French media, 89 which portrayed the American policy towards 
Iraq as President Clinton's attempt to repair his image ahead of the mid-term 
congressional elections following the Haiti debacle. 90 
However, despite accusations by Albright that the French position was 
motivated by its commercial interests in Iraq, 91 Washington, eager to obtain 
support for its proposal, amended its initial plan. It agreed to remove from the 
draft the word 'exclusion zone', which indicated a clear demarcation line beyond 
Iraq did not 'move on the demand on the recognition of Kuwait'. Reuter, 'Mise en garde', Le 
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which the Iraqi troops could not be deployed, but which kept the Republican 
Guards out of the area. 92 
In the meantime, Kozyrev in Baghdad held talks with the Iraqi leadership 
aimed at persuading Iraq to recognise Kuwait. Commenting on Kozyrev's trip, 
Nezavisimcýya Gazeta argued that there were reasons to believe that his talks 
would be beneficial for the settlement of the crisis in the Gulf due to the fact that 
Moscow and Baghdad had 'traditionally good relations'. It emphasised that 'no 
country in the West can conduct negotiations with Saddam Hussein regime 
directly', as any type of agreement reached through the U. N. 'could at any point 
be re-interpreted by the U. S. the way they want lt,. 
93 
On 13 October, Russia and Iraq announced that they had reached an 
agreement that would lead to the recognition of Kuwait. In the joint Russian-Iraqi 
communiqu&, Iraq 'confirmed its willingness to solve the issue of recognising 
Kuwait and its borders as demanded by the Security Council Resolution 833 in a 
positive manner'. The communiqu6 further stated that 'following Iraq's formal 
recognition of Kuwait's sovereignty and borders, Russia will support setting the 
date for the formal operation of the long-term monitoring system in accordance 
with the Security Council Resolution 715'. The parties emphasised that the 
monitoring period 'ought not to exceed six months', and that 'from the Russian 
point of view', the Security Council should then lift the sanctions if Iraq complied 
during that period. 94 
Even though the statement amounted to Baghdad's most explicit step 
towards the recognition of Kuwait, it failed, contrary to Kozyrev's assertion that 
92 Ibid. 
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the deal had no conditions attached and that keeping up the sanctions would be an 
act of 'vengeance', 9 5 to forr-nally declare recognition. Rather, it linked the Iraqi 
move to the agreement by the U. N. to set up a limited monitoring period, and 
therefore to the lifting of sanctions within a fixed time-frame. 96 
Not surprising therefore that while the agreement fully corresponded to the 
Russian view of the matter, it was rejected by the U. S. and Britain. Furthermore, 
having obtained support for its amended proposal from Britain and France, which 
in the final account appeared reluctant to mount any serious opposition to Saudi 
Arabia's wishes for U. S. -led action, 
97 Washington was deten-nined to bring 
through its plan in the Security Council and insisted on voting before Kozyrev's 
return to the U. N. 98 
Indicating a possible American unilateral military strike against Iraq, 
President Clinton declared at the White House that 'the U. S. will not allow Iraq to 
threaten its neighbours', and the U. S. Defence Secretary William Perry in Kuwait 
insisted that Iraq had not pulled its troops back far enough, and talked 'about 
military action'. 99 Warren Christopher, in explaining the American position, 
argued that any consideration to lifting sanctions was 'seriously misguided', and 
that there could be no question of rewarding the Iraqi leadership for its latest 
intimidation. 100 The White House Press Secretary Dee Dee Myers added: 'We are 
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not going to reward them for a belligerent posture'. ' 01 
Similarly, the British Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, on a tour of the 
Middle East at the time, argued that the Russians 'could not deliver', and called 
their agreement with Iraq 'clearly inadequate', as 'it appears to give Saddarn 
Hussein a reward for his provocative actions'. 102 In his view, the agreement failed 
to meet the concem of Iraq's potential threat to its neighbours, making it 
necessary 'to find a way of preventing that threat from coming again ,. 103 
Consequently, despite Moscow's objections and pleas to delay the vote until the 
return of the Russian foreign minister to the U. N. headquarters in New York, 
Washington insisted on going forward. The U. S. argued that while Kozyrev's 
talks pursued the recognition of Kuwait, the U. S. -sponsored resolution focused 
strictly on the renewed threat Iraq had posed in the Gulf. 104 
At the same time, while Iraq maintained that it had pulled back its troops 
by the night of 12 October, U. S. officials claimed that several thousand members 
of Iraqi elite units remained near the city of Naserlyah, and warned that the U. S. 
might attack Iraq with out without U. N. support. 105 In an interview with the 
Washington Post, Clinton warned that he would do 'whatever is necessary' to 
force Iraq to withdraw its units from the Kuwaiti border, and expressed irritation 
with Moscow for trying to negotiate the easing of sanctions. ' 06 
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The fundamental discrepancy betwcen Washington and Moscow's 
approaches to the Iraqi crisis 107 was also highlighted by the visits of William 
Perry, the U. S. Secretary of Defence, and the Russian foreign minister, Andrei 
Kozyrev to Kuwait on the same day of 14 October. The fonner, arriving at Kuwait 
airport, began his speech by declaring that he had 'brought good news to the 
people of Kuwait and the whole Middle East, good news that this day the 
independence of Kuwait is reinforced' and promised further U. S. troop 
reinforcements in the Gulf According to Perry, these troops would not be brought 
home 'as long as Iraq continues to threaten peace and stability in the Gulf, and 
would be expanded in consideration of an 'additional application of force as an 
appropriate response to the threat posed by Iraq ... if the 
heavy Iraqi units remain 
in the south'. 
108 
The Russian foreign minister, arriving at the same airport half an hour 
later, also brought 'good news for the people of Kuwait', namely Baghdad's 
declaration of the recognition of borders and sovereignty of the sheikdom, 
declaring that 'the difficult page in the relations between two countries had been 
turned', and that now 'what remains is to lift the sanctions against Iraq'. 109 
However, while the American line gained support from the rulers of 
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, the Russian approach raised suspicion regarding the 
real motives of Moscow's diplomacy. Even though Kozyrev later argued that the 
Russian initiative was misunderstood due to the 'bad translation, ' the fact that his 
press conference was held in English excluded any misinterpretation on the part of 
107 Belyakov, 'Two Approaches', Pravda, 20 October 1994, p. 3 
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the Gulf media. 110 
Nor did Russia find the expected support at the Security Council. Even 
though Moscow strongly objected to the timing of the vote on the resolution on 
Iraq, the vote was fixed for 15 October, making it impossible for Kozyrev to 
report back to the Council. Faced with the inevitability of the adoption of this 
resolution and lacking support from France and China, Russia chose to join ranks 
with all the other members of the Security Council and voted in its favour, in spite 
of the fact that the text did not include a position statement in the preamble about 
Iraq's promise to recognise Kuwait as advocated by the Russian representative. III 
Significantly, and contrary to Moscow's expectations, the resolution also refrained 
from acknowledging the Russian diplomatic efforts, and instead used the words 
'welcoming all diplomatic and other efforts to resolve the crisis'. 112 However, 
eager not to admit the failure of its diplomatic activities and showing itself 
conciliatory, the Russian representative Vasily Sidorov, in explaining Russia's 
position with regard to the vote, while calling the resolution 'an ovcr-hastily act', 
stated the need to put aside differences in the name of unity on an important 
principle. 11 3 
In commenting on Russian diplomatic efforts, The New York Times argued 
that despite the rejection of Moscow's deal, Kozyrev had achieved an important 
goal in getting the world's attention and making Russia's voice heard. ' 14 In 
contrast, Vladimir Lukin, former Russian ambassador to the U. S. and head of the 
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International Affairs Committee in the Duma, in an article in Moskovskie Novosti, 
re-assessing Moscow's policy in the Gulf since the Gorbachov era, argued that 
Russia's policy remained 'built on sand', as it attempted to join the West 'with an 
honest face', while pursuing 'its own game with changing directions'. 115 
Analysing whether Moscow's special role had benefited Russia's interests in the 
Middle East, Lukin concluded that it managed to destroy the working relationship 
with the U. S. Administration and allowed the Iraqi leader to strengthen his 
prestige, while failing to convince the world to lift the sanctions against Iraq. It 
concluded: 'If our national interest consists in bringing closer the start of Iraqi 
debt repayment while not making the relations with the West worse, as a result of 
recent diplomacy, we have made the situation more complicated in both 
directions'. 116 
Russian efforts were indeed dashed when Tareq Aziz, addressing the 
Security Council on 17 October, reiterated Iraq's willingness to consider 
recognising Kuwait, but failed to announce the unconditional recognition as 
demanded by the U. N. and hoped for by Moscow. 117 Just minutes before Aziz's 
speech, Kozyrev, reporting to the Council suggested that Iraq had no intention of 
invading Kuwait. He argued that Russia's joint communiqu& with Iraq proved that 
Baghdad understood the need of recognising the sovereignty and borders of 
Kuwait, and that it would be necessary for the international community to 
consider the lifting of sanctions if Iraq continued to co-operate with U. N. weapons 
115 Vladimir Lukin, 'A Sparkler in the Arabian Sands', Moskovskie Novosti, 23 October 1994, p 
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monitors. 118 
Eager to preserve his face in the light of Iraq's unexpected change of 
mind, the Russian foreign minister subsequently insisted that following the 
settlement of the crisis, the main task was to proceed to post-crisis settlement that 
consisted in the official recognition of Kuwait. In his opinion, the international 
community ought to refrain from the 'final "no" to Iraq', and the U. S. ought to 
show more restraint in serious political question. ' 19 In his report to the Security 
Council Kozyrev reiterated the earlier Russian position that it was possible to 
begin a long-terrn monitoring programme in Iraq within a month, and that if six 
months of monitoring saw full co-operation by Iraq, the Council ought to decide 
whether to lift the oil embargo. Thereafter, full Iraqi compliance with other 
sanctions ought to be met with the lifting of remaining sanctions. 120 This view was 
rejected by Britain and the U. S. who argued that Iraq needed to comply with 'all 
relevant U. N. resolutions' before it would consider the lifting of sanctions, and 
expressed doubt if this could ever be achieved while Saddam Hussein was in 
1 21 power. 
Subsequently, the Russian govemment continued its dialogue with 
Baghdad in the hope of persuading Saddam Hussein to recognise Kuwait. 122 This 
time, Moscow's efforts proved more successful, as during talks with Tareq Aziz 
in Moscow in the first week of November, the latter delivered a letter from 
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Saddam Hussein addressed to President Yeltsin. 123 Aziz, once again signalled to 
Russia that Baghdad was prepared to recognise Kuwait's sovereignty in return for 
Russia's voice of support for the easing of sanctions against Iraq. 124 This 
prompted Moscow's decision to send immediately Kozyrev to Baghdad to secure 
the announcement on the spot. 1 25 However, while the minister's much contested 
trip to Iraq was largely perceived as a victory for Russia's diplomacy, ' 26 his 
address to the Iraqi Parliament, in which he expressed his 'delight' with the 
'political wisdom' of Saddam Hussein who had decided to recognise Kuwait, 127 
was viewed at best as 'strange'. 128 
Commenting on his visit to Iraq, Kozyrev stated that Russia supported 
Iraq's call for the lifting of sanctions, and noted that while he was aware of the 
U. S. reaction to his initiative, he hoped that the Americans would overcome their 
1 129 emotions' . 
However, this hope proved to be wishful thinking, as Washington reacted 
coolly to the Russian report. The U. S. State Department argued that Iraq's 
recognition of Kuwait's sovereignty and borders was not enough to bring about 
the lifting of sanctions. According to the Department's spokesman, David 
Johnson, Kuwait's recognition 'would not in itself establish Iraq's peaceful 
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124 Beeston, 'Saddam Ready to Concede', The Tinies, 9 November 1994, p. 14 
125 Black, David Fairhall, 'Iraq and Russia Near Deal', The Guardian, 9 November 1994, p. 14 
126 Sergei Medvedko, 'Will Baghdad Return to International Community? ', Literatill-na. Va Gazeta. 
16 November 1994, p. 9 
127 Excerpts of the speech, in Karpov, 'Moscow Needs a Stable Peace. Washington a Small 
Victorious War', Nezai, isiina i7a Gazeta, 12 November 1994, p. 1 
128 Elmar Gusemov, 'In Two Visits to Baghdad, Kozyrev Persuades Saddam to Meet U. N. 's Four- 
Year-Old Demand', Izvestia, 12 November 1994, p. 3 
129 , Kozyrev on Russian Position on Iraq, Radio Free Europe (RFE)/Radio Liberty (RL) 
Newsline, 13 November 1994 
128 
intentions which were called into question by its provocation in October'. ' 30 The 
White House added that there were 'a number of other elements in U. N. 
resolutions that Iraq must adhere to before we can even discuss lifting of 
sanctions'. 1 31 
Similarly, other Security Council members, apart from China reacted 
cautiously to Iraq's recognition of Kuwait. Beijing welcomed the Iraqi move as a 
'major step toward the final settlement of the issues left over from the Gulf 
War', 132 and the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman, Shen Guofang, maintained 
that 'given the recent developments', the international community 'shall now 
consider the gradual lifting of sanctions ... so as to ease the Iraqi people's 
sufferings'. 
133 
Consequently, in spite of Iraq's presentation of the required documents, 
certifying its recognition of Kuwait to the Security Council at the routine review 
of the sanctions on 15 November, the U. S. Ambassador to the U. N., Madeleine 
Albright, argued that the recognition of Kuwait per se was not sufficient to 
warrant the lifting of sanctions, in particular in view of Iraq's recent troop 
movement along the border with Kuwait, and presented new evidence of Saddam 
Hussein's lavish lifestyle. 134 As a result, this time, too, the Council voted for the 
maintenance of sanctions. ' 35 
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Commenting on Baghdad's recognition of Kuwait, the Russian Foreign 
Ministry considered Iraq's step a 'historic event'. ' 36 A commentator in Pravda 
hailed the Iraqi decision as a 'major step towards normalisation of the situation in 
the Persian Gulf, once again reminding that it were Russian diplomats who 
'launched the initiative to diffuse the tension in the region'. ' 37 However, Viktor 
Posuvalyuk was against calling the Russian effort 'mediation'. In his opinion, 
Russia 'as a great power and the country that had bore the most tangible losses 
from the sanctions regime amid the members of the international community', had 
maintained the course taken by the U. N. in an 'honest and good conscious 
manner'. In his interpretation of the events, the Iraqi leadership was ready to 
recognize Kuwait, 'but did not have anyone, apart from Russia to be present at the 
adoption of the decision at least as a witness and a country that showed to the 
world community the need of adequate measures and responsive steps'. 138 
Following the failure to turn the October crisis into a positive force for the 
lifting of sanctions against Baghdad, the pro-Iraqi activity of the Russian 
representatives at the United Nations had visibly decreased. In the Russian press, 
this strategic move was explained as an attempt on Moscow's side to 'at least 
temporarily and partially' get rid of its image as an 'advocate' of the Iraqi 
regime, 139 which had damaged Russia's relations with the Gulf states and the 
country's international standing. 
On 20 December 1994, Ekeus reported to the Security Council that Iraq 
was 'falling far short' in complying on the question of biological and chemical 
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weapons and had been reluctant to provide inforination on past production and 
imports. Russia and France circulated a draft statement praising Iraq for its level 
of compliance, and calling on Baghdad to provide an immediate 'full and 
transparent accounting of its past prograrnmes ,. 140 But subsequently Moscow 
preferred to go along with the position of the majority of the Council members 
vis-ä-vis Baghdad. 
Consequently, on 14 April 1995, Russia voted in favour of a renewable 
plan set up by Resolution 986,141 which permitted Iraq to sell up to US$2 billion 
in oil within 180 days under the supervision of the U. N. to pay for badly needed 
medicine and food, 142 even though the plan was rejected by the Iraqi government 
as a 'dangerous violation of Iraq's sovereignty and national unity'. ' 43 Similarly, 
during the subsequent sanctions reviews, Moscow joined ranks with other 
pen-nanent Council members who declined to 11ft the sanctions 144 and expressed 
doubts over Iraq's compliance with regard to the disclosure of its biological 
weapons programmes, in particular following the information obtained after the 
defection of Chief Lieutenant Hussein Kamel al-Majid to Jordan in August 
1995.145 
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On I November 1995, Nezavisimaya Gazeta referred to an Arab 
newspaper, which quoted a high-ranking Russian Foreign Ministry official as 
stating that Moscow would not insist on the lifting of sanctions on Iraq in the near 
future. 146 The statement followed an unsuccessful car bomb attempt on the life of 
a Russian diplomat in Baghdad, which was perceived in Moscow as a sign of 
disapproval of its pro-Saddam policy by the Iraqi opposition. However, while 
temporarily reducing its pro-Iraqi lobbying at the United Nations, Moscow 
continued to maintain and expand its direct contacts with Baghdad, waiting for 
another opportunity to match its bilateral successes to its international efforts to 
lift the sanctions. 
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Chapter 4: The politics of trade and diplomacy, 1994-1995 
We ate the great presidential fish and drank beer with Saddam Hussein, talking for five 
hours - four hours me and one hour Saddam. 
Vladimir Zhirinovsky on his trip to Baghdad on the eve 
of the Iraqi Presidential Elections on 16 October 1995' 
When Yevgeny Primakov was appointed Russian foreign minister to 
replace the widely unpopular Andrei Kozyrev on 9 January 1996, his nomination 
was regarded by many Russian and Western political analysts as signalling a 
major turn in Russian foreign PoliCY. 2 This was not surprising considering the 
professional background of the new head of the Foreign Ministry. Primakov 
supported the 'Eurasianist' camp that rejected the 'Atlantists" one-sided 
orientation towards the West, favoured a diversified foreign policy and advocated 
the re-assertion of Russian power in the post-Soviet space. Prior to his political 
career, he had been Pravda correspondent in the Middle East during the 1960s, 
continued in academia at the Institute of World Economy and International 
Relations and Institute of Oriental Studies, earning membership of the Central 
Committee together with a full membership of Politburo, and ultimately became 
Gorbachov's key adviser during the Gulf crisis and the head of the KGB, which 
was subsequently transformed into the Federal Intelligence Service. 3 
Consequently, President Yeltsin's choice of Primakov, renowned for his 
experience of the Arab world and language, as well as for his long-standing ties of 
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friendship with Middle Eastern leaders, including Saddam Hussein, indicated the 
growing importance of the Middle East in Russian foreign policy and presaged a 
renewed focus on restoration of Russia's status as a global power. 
However, a closer examination of Moscow's foreign policy before January 
1996, revealed that the major changes in the country's external strategy had 
already occurred prior to Primakov's appointment. 4 The new dynamics in 
Moscow's approach to foreign affairs had become apparent by 1993, and over the 
next two years continued to be fuelled by the domestic opposition to Kozyrev's 
West-oriented policies, and its attempts to unden-nine the Yeltsin government. 5 In 
particular, the Parliamentary elections on 12 December 1993, while strengthening 
Yeltsin's power and bringing about a more co-operative Duma, increased the 
influence of the nationalist forces - Vladimir Zhirinovsky's Liberal Democratic 
Party received 22.79 percent of the votes .6 As a result, the communists increased 
their opposition to the President and his government on all foreign policy issues, 7 
inter alia, through their increased representation in the Durna Committees on 
Security, International Affairs, CIS Affairs and on the Questions of Geopolitics. 8 
As a consequence, the 'Zhirinovsky factor'9 - the influence of reactionary 
and radically anti-Western approach on Russian politics - came to be viewed with 
4 Robert 0. Freedman correctly argues that Kozyrev's replacement 'should be seen as an 
exclamation point for a series of major policy changes. ' 'Russian Foreign Policy in the Middle 
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concern in international political circles, and particularly in the Arab world, where 
the Russian nationalist openly presented himself as Saddam Hussein's friend. This 
even prompted a joint Russian-American declaration on the Middle East, which 
asserted that despite the election results, Russian policy remained unchanged. ' 
However, even if Moscow was not prepared to openly support the Iraqi 
leader, or advance the 'last push to the south' called for by Zhirinovsky, " by 
1994, its policy towards the Middle East was evolving into a more assertive and 
pragmatic approach. On one hand at aimed at reviving the economically beneficial 
ties with fon-ner Soviet allies in the region, and on the other hand at playing a 
more active role in the peace process in order to increase Russia's international 
prestige. 
Moscow's first opportunity to engage in the peace process diplomacy 
independent of the U. S. occurred on 25 February 1994, when a Jewish settler 
Baruch Goldstein shot dead 29 Palestinians in the Hebron lbrahimi Mosque, 
thereby prompting the PLO and Israel to suspend their peace talks. 12 In an attempt 
to bring about the resumption of negotiations, Moscow launched its own 
diplomatic initiative. It proposed to convene a second Madrid Conference, 
supported the PLO's call for adoption of a U. N. resolution condemning the 
Hebron massacre and advocated the establishment of an international presence in 
the occupied territories aimed at providing security for Palestinians. ' 3 
To secure support for these proposals, the Russian Deputy Foreign 
Minister, Igor Ivanov, on Yeltsin's order travelled to Jerusalem and Tunis on 3 
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March to urge both Israel and the PLO to return to the negotiating table without 
preconditions. 14 A week later, Kozyrev, identifying the objectives of Moscow's 
activities as attempts 'to see how we can save the peace process', paid an 
uninvited visit to Israel in an effort to advance the Russian initiative that had been 
coolly received in Jerusalem during Ivanov's earlier trip, and met with the 
Palestinian leader, Yasser Arafat in Tunis. 15 
Summarising the results of his trip, the Russian foreign minister praised 
the Palestinian leader for adopting 'a very simple dramatic decision to return to 
the negotiation table despite the Hebron tragedy'. ' 6 In his view, the latter's 
decision had been greatly influenced by the direct message from President Yeltsin 
and efforts undertaken by Russia and the U. S. In an inter-view, Viktor Posuvalyuk 
who had just been appointed Yeltsin's special envoy in the Middle East, 17 
emphasised that Moscow intended to play a significant role in the Middle East, 
arguing that 'Russia occupies its own broad niche in the region, a niche that 
owning to Russia's unique identity - primarily historical and spiritual, cannot be 
claimed by anyone. is 
Despite Russia's co-sponsorship of the peace process, the U. S. was 'more 
than irritated' by Moscow's diplomatic initiatives and regarding them as 
'meddling', as they conflicted with Washington's own efforts to restart the peace 
talks. 19 Even if Ivanov argued that Russia 'could be an equal partner with all 
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parties and not an advocate for one of them , 
20 Russia, having decided to 'show its 
21 face' 
, clearly supported the PLO 
line of delaying the resumption of talks to 
extract a maximum of concessions from Israel, whereas the U. S. insisted on the 
22 
rapid recommencement of talks. It was in that spirit that the U. S. Secretary of 
State Warren Christopher travelled to the Middle East a day before Kozyrev to 
meet with Arafat and urge him to resume talks uncondItIonally or face the U. S. 
veto of the U. N. resolution condemning the massacre. 23 Not surprisingly, Arafat 
during that meeting with Christopher said he supported Moscow's independent 
24 
v. 
This prompted the conclusion by The Guardian correspondent that PLO 
once again had found a 'powerful non-American friend to counterbalance 
America's pro-Israel tilt'. 25 Already before the meeting with Ivanov, the Israeli 
Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin raised concern about 'the possibility of an attempt 
to exploit it [the Russian-U. S. non co-operation] by some of the partners in the 
negotiations', implicitly criticising Russia's unilateral diplomatic initiative. 26 
However, Moscow dismissed suggestions that it was competing with 
Washington on the matter. Ivanov emphasised that 'we are not at the Olympic 
Games ... Russian-U. S. co-sponsorship provides 
for joint efforts of the two 
countries, but also for the independent diplomatic actions of each of them'. 27 
20 Igor Ivanov, 'What Russia Defends in the Middle East', Moskovskie Novosti, 6-13 March 1994, 
p. 5 
" Shurnilin, 'Middle East Before and After Hebron', Moskovskie Novosti, 6-13 March 1994, p. 12 
22 Dennis Ross, The Missing Peace. - The Inside Stot-y of the Fightfior the Middle East Peace, (New 
York: Farrar, Straus and Guroux, 2004), pp. 126-133 
23 Julian Ozanne, 'U. S. -Russian Split over Mideast Peace Talks', Financial Times. II March 1994, 
p. 4 
24 Ozanne. Financial Times, II March 1994, p. 4 
25 Brown, The Giiardian, 12 March 1994, p. 13 
2' Black, Brown, The Guardian, 4 March 1994. p. 12 
27 Igor Ivanov, Moskovskie Novosti. 6-13 March 1994. p. 5 
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More significantly, the Russian stance was clarified in an article in Izvestia 
by Andrei Kozyrev, who while reiterating that there was no 'sensible alternative' 
to partnership, rejected 'some illusions', in particular 'the fantasy that a 
partnership can be built ... on the principle of 'Russia should 
follow us in every 
, 28 way' . 
He emphasised that Russia was 'doomed to be a great power' and 
consequently 'can only be an equal partner'. More importantly, Kozyrev argued 
that a partnership based on common values did not mean 'renouncing a firm- 
aggressive policy of defending one's own national interests, or at times, 
29 
competition and disputes' . 
Accordingly, Moscow regarded its active participation in the Middle East 
peace process as 'natural', even though a Russian commentator admitted that co- 
operation between the co-sponsors 'is not proceeding without difficulties'. 30 At 
the same time, it was certainly recognised in the Kremlin that Washington was the 
main peace-maker in the region, whereas Moscow's role had only a forinal 
character. 31 It was this recognition that prompted another Russian commentator to 
complain that 'Russia has no means to practically influence the conflicting 
32 
sides' . 
In spite of its inability to contribute financially, Russia was eager to 'get 
rid of its image as Washington's junior partner' and received first Yasser Arafat 
on 19 April, and then Yitzhak Rabin on 24 April, in Moscow on official visits. 33 
During his stay, Arafat met with President Yeltsin, the Durna Speaker Ivan 
28 Andrei Kozyrev, 'Russia and the U. S.: Partnership Is Not Premature, It Is Overdue', Izvestia, II 
March 1994, p. 3 
29 Ibid. 
30 Karpov,, Vczavisitnal-a Gazeta. 9 April 1994, p. I 
31 Sergei Strokan, 'PLO and Russia: New Rapprochement', MoskovskieVovosti, 17-24 April 1994, 
P. 13 
32 Konstantin Kapitonov, 'Arafat Was Supported by Us', Literaturnaya Gazeta, 27 April 1994, p. 
9 
33 Strokan, Moskovskic Novosti, 17-24 April 1994, p. 13 
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Rybkin the Interior Minister Viktor Yerin, as well as Metropolite Alexei 11, and 
signed documents calling for the advancement of the peace process. 34 The 
Palestinian leader was assured of Russian support for Palestinian efforts to oppose 
the extremist forces that disturbed the peace process, and was offered assistance in 
creating the Palestinian police that would be responsible for maintaining order in 
Gaza and Jericho. 35 Commenting on Arafat's visit, Literaturnaya Gazeta 
concluded that it had been useful to Russia, as the PLO leader 'facilitated Russia's 
ambition to look more important on the Middle Eastern scene than it is in 
rea ty'. 
36 
In contrast to Arafat's visit that focused on the peace process, Rabin's 
meetings with President Yeltsin and high-ranking Russian officials concentrated 
on the expansion of bilateral economic relations, in particular co-operation on 
armament production. 37 In the political realm, Yeltsin during talks with Rabin 
emphasised that Russia was willing to sign 'any agreement with Israel in the 
38 
sphere of security' . Interestingly, 
despite the success of Rabin's visit, a 
commentator in Moskovskie Novosti argued that it was necessary for Russia to 
define its economic priorities in the Middle East, and concluded that 'following 
the logic of numbers', it was clear that 'Israel is not as interesting to Russia as the 
Arab states'. 
39 
Another opportunity for Moscow to increase its role in the peace process 
was provided with the agreement between Israel and the PLO to sign an accord on 
ý4 ITAR-TASS, 'Yasser Arafat Expresses His Thanks'.. Pravda, 21 April 1994. p. 3 
35 Kapitonov, Literaturncýya Gaýeta, 27 April 1994, p. 9 
16 Ibid, 
37 ITAR-TASS, 'Y. Rabin Positively Surprised', Pravda, 28 April 1994, p. 3 
38 ITAR-TASS, 'Talks Were Very Successful', Pravda, 29 April 1994, p. 3 
39 Dmitri Kulik, 'Middle East: Russia's Retum%, kloskovskie Novosti, 24 April-I May 1994, p. 12 
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Palestinian autonomy in Gaza and Jericho on 4 May in Cairo . 
40 This shifted the 
emphasis of the peace talks to Syria, a former Soviet ally that by 1994 once again 
became a focal point of Russian diplomacy in the Middle East. 41 In March, the 
First Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets visited the Syrian capital. It was 
reported that Moscow offered Syria military co-operation and was considering 
writing off Syrian debts of more than US$10 billion. 42 A month later, another 
Russian delegation travelled to Syria and reached a military and technical co- 
operation agreement with Damascus, the first since the disintegration of the 
USSR. 
Even though Rabin, during his visit to Moscow, had urged Russia not to 
supply advanced weapons to Syria, the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Boris 
Kolokolov argued that while he could 'understand Israel's concern' on the matter, 
'the Syrians, too, have concerns about the acquisition of advanced weapons by 
Israel from the West. If we don't sell to the Syrians, others Will,. 43 At the same 
time, he emphasised that Moscow would only sell Damascus defensive weapons 
and spare parts for arms purchased under the previous contracts, adding that 
'Russia will not sell offensive weapons to anyone'. " 
This view corresponded to the generally accepted belief in Moscow that if 
Russia refrained from selling weapons, others would fill the vacuum. In this 
connection, a commentator in Nezavisimaya Gazeta argued that 'we would not 
only lose the additional hard currency for the reform of the Russian economy, but 
in the conditions of limited spending for own defence, could finally ourselves turn 
40 Kapitonov, 'Israel is Exchanging Peace Land for Peace'. Moskovskic Noi, osti, 1-8 April 1994. p. 
13 
41 At the same time, Moscow was able to use the peace process to re-establish co-operation with 
Syria. 
42 Kapitonov, Moskoi, skie Novosti, 1-8 April 1994, p. 13 
43 David Hirst, 'Russia Agrees to Sell Arms to Syria', The Guardian, 29 April 1994, p. 14 
44 Ibid. 
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into arms importers'. 45 In confirming this opinion, Kozyrev in a meeting with a 
group of U. S. Congressmen in Moscow declared that Russia did not intend to give 
up the export of arms unilaterally and instead, proposed to work on common rules 
46 regulating the anns export . 
However, Russia's return to the international arms market, 47 which 
following the collapse of the USSR had been dominated by the U. S., led to 
periodic tensions between Moscow and Washington that were to intensify further 
with the Russian decision to sell nuclear reactors to Iran. 48 Analysing Russia's 
policy in the Middle East, a commentator in New Tinies argued that the essence of 
Ycltsin's policy was 'to make it clear to Washington that on some issues Russia 
would like to act on an equal footing with It,. 49 She labelled this the 'counter 
policy', 'a passive mirror reproduction of the policy of another state', arguing that 
it was harmful because it 'creates tensions in mutual relations' and 'owing to the 
unequal forces', cannot 'bring Russia success'. 
The new element in Moscow's global policy was indeed the willingness to 
risk tensions with the U. S. in order to advance Russia's national interests. Apart 
from grand Middle East initiatives, this was also expressed by the Kremlin's re- 
assertion of its position on the post-Soviet space '50 as well as its belligerent 
45 Sergei Akshintsev, 'Russia is Losing the Armament Market', Nezavisimqya Gazela, 26 April 
1994, p. 4 
46 Interfax, 'Kozyrev on Arms Export', Nez-avisimaya Gazeta, I June 1994, p. 1 47 In June 1994, Moscow signed a several multi-billion pound deal with Malaysia and Brazil. 
Richard Beeston, 'Kremlin's Arms Salesmen Return to the Offensive', The Times, 16 June 1994, 
P. 11 
48 Anthony Lake, 'Confronting Backlash States', Foreign Afifairs, Vol. 73, X2 2, March/April 1994, 
pp. 45-55 
49 Marie Silven, 'Autumn Marathon of Russian Diplomacy. Successes and Miscalculations', Neii, 
Times (International), October 1994, p. 43 
50 In mid-January 1994, Kozyrev. in a speech to Russian diplomatic representatives in the CIS and 
the Baltic States, identified the Commonwealth as a vital strategic priority and insisted that his 
government would defend the rights of the ethnic Russian in Near Abroad by force, if required. 
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posture with regard to NATO expansion, 51 and its open confrontation on the 
matter of Bosnia. 52 
The new rhetoric also appeared in Kozyrev's article published in Foreign 
, 
fairs in May 1994, in which the Russian foreign minister described mutual trust Af 
as a prerequisite for a partnership with the West, arguing that 'if a partnership is 
built on mutual trust, then it is natural to recognise other rules as well: the need 
not only to inforrn one another of decisions made, but also to agree on approaches 
beforehand' . 
53 In his opinion, 'it would be hard to accept an interpretation of 
partnership, in which one side demands that the other co-ordinate its every step 
with it, while the fon-ner retains complete freedom for itself. 
In fact, the substantial modification in Moscow's foreign policy was not 
just the response to external factors, but rather reflected the change in the 
correlation of forces within the Russian government. 54 The failure of Yeltsin's 
shock therapy struck a blow at radical refon-ners, many of whom were replaced by 
the representatives of the old Soviet bureaucracy, 55 and encouraged the opposition 
who challenged the government's policy, including foreign policy. 56 The pressure 
from opposition parties to pursue a policy independent of that of the U. S. greatly 
contributed to Yeltsin's 'shift to the right. As a New Times commentator 
observed, Russian diplomacy 'was not set in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the 
51 President Yeltsin in his State of the Nation Speech to the Federal Assembly on 23 February 
emphasised that Russia would make no foreign policy concessions, especially on defence and 
rejected the NATO expansion. RossivSkaya Gazeta. 25 February 1994, p. 2 
52 In his policy analysis in March 1994, the Russian foreign minister attributed the failure to create 
a partnership with the West to the 'discrimination of Russian goods on West European markets', 
the latter's enthusiasm for the NATO expansion and a 'sharp turn' in policy towards Yugoslavia, 
as it had supported the ultimatum on Sarajevo without consulting Russia. Ne: ýavisimaya Gazzeta, 2 
March 1994, p. 4 
53 Kozyrev, 'The Lagging Partnership', Foreign A&irs, Vol. 73, Nq 3, May/June 1994, p. 66 
54 Shumilin, 'Saddam Hussein and Kirsan lluymzhinov Have Seen the Trust of Their Peoples', 
Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 17 October 1995, p. I 
5 Yevgeny Bazhanov, 'Top Priorities of Russia's Foreign Policy', Alew Times (International), 
October 1995, p. 33 
56 Ibid. 
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Kremlin or the Parliament', but rather 'shaped in the rivalry and clashes between 
57 
the President and the opposition'. 
The situation was aggravated by the lack of an effective mechanism for 
adopting and implementing foreign policy decisions. According to the Russian 
Constitution, the planning and realisation of foreign policy was the prerogative of 
58 
the President . In April 1995, Yeltsm, in an attempt to conduct a unified foreign 
policy, also signed a decree on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, subordinating it to 
the head of state, and making it responsible for the co-ordination and control of 
59 
the activities of other federal offices and organisations . Yet, the Parliament 
continued to play an important role in the foreign policy-making process not only 
because it perceived itself as the defender of Russia's national interests, but more 
60 importantly, beeause it adopted the national budget . 
However, in the Parliament itself, deputies were split into an anti-Western 
majority and a Westernising minority, whereby the fon-ner camp played an 
important part in creating an atmosphere in which 'poorly concealed anti- 
Americanism and deliberate pitting of Russia's interests against all others, as well 
as attempts to establish close relations with former Soviet clients' had become 
important elements in Moscow's foreign policy. 61 
In addition, the growing influence of the military-industrial complex that 
had lost some power under Gorbachov, and the appearance of powerful financial 
industrial groups (FIGs) as a result of Yeltsin's privatisation policy during 1992- 
17 Silven, 'Russian Diplomacy in a New Situation', New Times (international), August 1994, p. 39 
58 Chapter 4, Article 80. Paragraph 3, Constitution of the Russian Federation, available online at: 
http: /w\vw. ibiblio. org/sergei! Law/ConstitutionIRI 4. html, viewed on 24 October 2005 
59 Vycheslav Yelanin, 'Russia Will Never Agree to the Role of 'Junior Brother' on World Arena', 
Rossi 
, iskie 
Vesti, 5 April 1995, p. 3 
" Ivan Rybkin, Speaker of the Parliament, 'Parliament and Diplomacy', Nezavisimqya Gazeta, 5 
November 1995, pp. 1,2 
"' Konstantin Eggert, 'A 'Great Power' Foreign Policy is Too Expensive'. Izvestia, 16 December 
1995. p. 3 
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62 1994, created a strong lobb y that exercised pressure on the govcrnmcnt to 
conduct a foreign policy that would best serve their interests. 
In particular, the military that had substantially increased its power 
following its intervention on Yeltsin's side during the latter's open conflict with 
the Parliament in October 1993, henceforth played an important role in 
determining Russia's foreign policy. This was expressed, inter alia, by the 
appearance of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, published in 
November 1993 . 
63 The military-industrial complex was ambitious to increase its 
share in the state budget for greater investment in the maintenance of domestic 
arms production and the development of advanced weapons technologies. It 
therefore lobbied for the revival of military co-operation with former Soviet allies 
around the world and for the return to the international weapons market where 
Russia could obtain additional hard currency and sell its military-related goods. 64 
Considering Iraq's importance as a Soviet military client, and Baghdad's great 
military needs following the devastating war with Iran and the unsuccessful 
invasion of Kuwait, it also demanded the expansion of military co-operation with 
Baghdad, in a desire to achieve 'guaranteed deliveries' of Russian weapons to 
Iraq. 65 
Similarly, major Russian business groups desired a reassertion of Russian 
influence in various parts of the world, as a means of advancing their economic 
62 Sergei Peregudov, Natalia Lapina, Irina Semenenko, Interest Groups and the Russian State 
(Russian), (Moscow: lzdatelstvo URSS, 1999), pp. 85-W Donald N. Jensen, 'How Russia Is 
Ruled - 1998: Informal Politics', Radio LibertliV Radio Frec Europe Special Report, 28 August 
1998, available online at: http: /, ýwww. rferl. orR/'specials,, 1-ussiaý'whorules/politics. asp, viewed on 6 
October 2005 
63 Yuri Afanasyev, 'Russia Fails, Again. to Escape the Totalitarian Trap', International Herald 
Tribune, I March 1994. p. 7 
64 Silven, New Tunes (International), July 1994, p. 39 




interests . Consequently, FIGs, supported 
by key figures within the 
government '67 
became a powerful driving force for pursuing aggressive policies 
which at times contradicted the officially stated governmental position. This was 
particularly true with regard to Iran, where the Russian minister of Atomic 
Energy, Viktor Mikhailov, with the support from the military-industrial complex 
and the political Mite, bypassed govemmental export controls, blocked the 
adoption of new ones and concluded deals with Iran that contradicted the official 
Russian policy. 68 Likewise, large Russian oil companies lobbied for a strong 
Russian presence in Iraq and more assertive steps in bringing about the lifting of 
sanctions against Baghdad as a way of securing their position in the Iraqi market 
and of ensuring the implementation of existing contracts, signed with Iraq during 
the sanctions period. 
At the same time, the Russian Foreign Ministry itself was divided over the 
conduct of Russian foreign policy, with Kozyrev's pro-Western stance challenged 
by those who felt that he was not taking into account the country's national 
interests. While emphasising its position of adherence to international law and 
support of the international community's decision, the Ministry was also deeply 
split over the Iraq policy. In some quarters, in particular among the Arabists, like 
the Head of the Middle Eastern Department Victor Posuvalyuk, the ambition to 
lift the sanctions against Iraq and restore Russia's close ties with Baghdad 
6" 'Political Lobbies in Russia', Biisiness in Russia, June 1995, cited by Donald N. Jensen, 'How 
Russia Is Ruled - 1998: Informal Politics', Radio Liber(yl Radio Free Europe Spccial Report. 28 
August 1998 
0 For instance, Viktor Chernomyrdin prior to his nomination as the Premier Minister was the 
Head of the largest Russian company Gazprom. On Gazprom and its involvement in politics, 
Vladimir Shelkov. "Gazprom'- State in the State', Pravda, 14 December 1995, p. 3 
" Strobe Talbott, flie Russia Hand: a Mcinoir of Presidential Diploniacli,, (New York: Random 
House, 2002), p. 159 
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corresponded to the interest of the pro-Iraqi lobby groups in the business and the 
military-industrial complex. 
However, other officials appeared deeply dissatisfied with the involvement 
of the business lobbies into the governmental policies. They argued that 'we do 
not intend to build the long-terrn state policy on the directives of the fuel-energy 
complex', and emphasised that while 'co-operation with Iraqis in the future is 
without doubt an advantageous affair, ... we should stop placing the bids on 
chosen partners in such and such region, as it was in the Soviet times ... there 
should be many points of support' . 
69 There were also those were highly sceptical 
about the fate of the Russian contracts in Iraq once the sanctions were lifted, 
predicting a struggle by the Western oil companies for the Iraqi oil and Saddam 
Hussein's unwillingness to share the oil profits in spite of his generous promises 
to Russia. 70 
As a consequence of the change in the domestic constellation of forces, 
Moscow's policy towards Baghdad was gradually moving away from the initial 
fervour of being a part of the U. S. -led Western coalition towards reassertion of its 
own interests. On one side, Russia stepped up its effort at the U. N. Security 
Council to bring about the easing of sanctions against Iraq. On the other side, it 
increased its bilateral contacts with Baghdad in the hope of obtaining the Iraq, 
debt repayment to the earliest possible date and, more importantly for the Russian 
business groups and the military-industrial complex, securing an advantageous 
position in the Iraqi market in the preparation for the lifting of sanctions. 
69 Eggert, 'In the Life of Andrei Kozyrev There is Always Place for Celebration', ki, estia, 10 
November 1994, pp. 1,3 
70 Ibid, 
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Clearly aware of Moscow's needs and ambitions, the Iraqi strategy was to 
promise that it would repay its debts to Russia as soon as sanctions were lifted, 
and to offer Russian companies advantageous contracts for the exploration of oil 
and gas and for the reconstruction of the Iraqi industry in return for Russia's voice 
of support .71 
Baghdad's pressure on the Russian government was particularly 
discernible on the eve of routine reviews of the sanctions regime at the U. N. 
Security Council, with Iraqi officials visiting the Russian capital in the hope of 
securing Russian backing. 
Before the session of the Security Council on the continuation of sanctions 
against Iraq on 19 July 1994, Baghdad asked for Tareq Aziz to be received in 
Russia. President Yeltsin allegedly gave the instruction to agree to this meeting, 
but feeling uncomfortable receiving Saddam Hussein's envoy on the eve of his 
72 
trip to Naples for the G-7 Summit, decided to keep it secret . Consequently, even 
though the news agencies reported on talks being held between Aziz and Kozyrev 
in St. Petersburg, the Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman refused to confirm or 
deny the visit. 
73 
During the Iraq crisis in October 1994, Baghdad once again attempted to 
pressurise Russia by sending the Iraqi oil minister Safa Hadi Jawad to Moscow, 
where he held talks with Russian officials concerning the realisation of a range of 
joint economic studies. Signifying Baghdad's satisfaction with the Russian 
position on the crisis, an agreement was signed between the two countries, 
71 Elmar Guseinov, 'Iraq Hopes to Bribe Moscow', Izvestia, 13 July 1994, p. 3 
72 Silven, New Tin? es (International), July 1994, p. 40 
73 Maksirn Yusin, 'Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister's Secret Visit to the Banks of Neva', Izvestia, 9 
July 1994, p. 3 
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providing for the 'Initiation of technical studies aimed at implementing economic 
projects and developing oil resources'. 74 
Another strategy used by Baghdad was to exploit tensions between Russia 
and the West in an attempt to split the anti-Iraq coalition. Not surprising therefore 
that Tareq Aziz was sent to Moscow on his third 'unscheduled' visit to the 
Russian capital in the previous four months, to deliver personally a letter with 
undisclosed content from Saddain Hussein to the Russian leadership in the 
immediate aften-nath of Yeltsin's 'cold peace' speech 75 at the Conference for 
76 Security in Europe (CSCE) Summit in Budapest on 5 December 1994 . In this 
speech, the Russian President, speaking about NATO's eastward expansion, 
warned that Europe was in danger of 'plunging into a Cold Peace' . 
77 On the eve of 
the visit, the Russian Foreign Ministry, in explaining the Russian strategy, 
substituted its argument of Iraqi debt repayment as a reason for increased co- 
operation with Iraq, by greater emphasis on another argument, namely the need to 
gain a foothold in the Iraqi market before sanctions were lifted to prevent being 
overrun by the Western firins . 
78 Following the talks, Aziz declared that 'the Iraqi 
leadership trusts Russia to defend its interests', and Kozyrev added that the 'U. N. 
Security Council ought to be flexible and not a hammer to satisfy political 
demands of such and such countries'. 79 
In the light of Russia's interests in Iraq, it appears that the use of contracts 
by the Iraqi regime throughout the sanction period indeed proved an effective tool 
74 Anatol Lieven, Michael Binyon, 'Russia Forges New EcoDomic Ties with Iraq', The Times, 19 
October 1994, pý 10 
75 ITAR-TASS, 'Opening of the Meeting CSCE', Pravda, 5 December 1994, p. 3 76 Gusemov, 'Saddam Hussein's Envoy Knows When to Come to Moscow', Izvestia, 8 December 
1994, p. 3 
77 Andrew Marshall, 'Russia Warns NATO of 'Cold Peace", The Independent, 6 December 1994, 
P, 1 
7' Gusemov, ki, estia, 8 December 1994, p. 3 
79 K. K., 'Tareq Aziz Again in Moscow', Alosk-ovskie Alovosti, 11-18 December 1994, p. 12 
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in undennining the support to the sanctions regime and in driving a wedge 
between Security Council members. 80 Baghdad's strategy was explained by the 
Iraqi Ambassador to Paris and Head of the Baath Party, Abdul Rezak al-Hashimi, 
who declared: 'Any country that helps Iraq now will gain when the time comes to 
award contracts. When you are in a jam and someone helps you, you help them 
back. Those, like Britain and America, who insist on making us suffer today, will 
pay in the future, that is for sure. ' 81 
Certainly, Russia was eager to be among those countries who 'gained' 
when it came to awarding future contracts. The Russian government therefore 
facilitated contacts between Russian companies and the Iraqi government in an 
effort to sign as many deals as possible befoye the lifting of sanctions, and more 
importantly, before the Iraqi market was flooded with much-feared competition 
from Westem companies. In August 1993, the Russian govemment signed a 
major agreement with Iraq on Trade, Econornic and Scientific-Technical Co- 
operation that provided for the development and deepening of co-operation 
between the Russian and Iraqi companies, the realisation of joint projects, the 
modernisation and expansion of the industrial sector with Russian assistance, as 
well as the creation of favourablc conditions for the conclusion of long-tenn 
contracts between the two countries. This agreement provided a broad framework 
for Russian-Iraqi co-operation in the subsequent years. 82 
For the purpose of control over the fulfilment of the Agreement, the 
document also provided for the establishment of a joint Russian-Iraqi Commission 
80 Beeston. 'Foreigners Scramble to Win Future Iraqi Deals'. The Pines, 21 October 1994, p. 16 
8' Ibid. 
82 Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the 
Republic of Iraq on Trade, Economic and Scientific-Technical Co-operation, signed in Baghdad 
on 5 August 1993, For full text, see Appendix A 
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on Trade, Economic and Scientific-Technical Co-operation, 93 which was created 
by a corresponding separate agreement signed on the same day. 84 The 
Commission had the task of 'helping restoring Russia's relations to Iraq to their 
previous level, add a new dynamic to bilateral co-operation and define its 
character and prospects' for the post-sanction period. 85 It was composed of both 
Russian and Iraqi representatives and intended to hold alternate meetings in both 
Russia and in Iraq. 86 
At the first meeting of the Commission in Moscow in September 1994, the 
Iraqi Minister of Trade, Mohammed Saleh, expressed gratitude to the Russian side 
for its efforts in bringing about the lifting of sanctions. He also reiterated Iraq's 
guarantee for the repayment of its debts to Russia in full, and emphasised that 
Baghdad hoped that 'Russia will continue to play the role of one of Iraq's main 
87 
partners in the future' , 
The same month, Russia signed a Protocol on Trade and Economic Co- 
operation with Iraq, which stipulated that immediately after the lifting of 
sanctions, Baghdad guaranteed Moscow the immediate and first-priority 
repayment of its accumulated debts and would conclude contracts with Russian 
firins for the construction of industrial facilities and the delivery of goods and 
equipment valued at US$8-$l 0 billion. 88 
83 Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the 
Republic of Iraq on Trade, Economic and Scientific-Technical Co-operation, Article 13, Appendix 
A 
94 Agreement between the Russian Federation and the Government of the Republic of Iraq on the 
Establishment of a Russian-Iraqi Commission on Trade, Economic and Scientific-Technical Co- 
operation, signed in Baghdad 5 August 1993. for full text see Appendix B 
95 'Russia and Iraq Prepare for Liftmg of Sanctions', Segodn , iw, 
9 September 1994, pý 3 
86 Agreement between the Russian Federation and the Government of the Republic of Iraq on the 
Establishment of a Russian-Iraqi Commission on Trade, Economic and Scientific-Technical Co- 
operation, Article 3, Appendix B 
87 Ibid. 
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This 'package' was allegedly presented to the Russian government by 
Tareq Azlz during his earlier meeting with Kozyrev in St. Petersburg and was 
rapidly translated into an official document. 89 Commenting on the protocol, a 
high-ranking Russian Foreign Ministry official argued that 'things are moving in 
the direction of lifting of sanctions ... and we have to be ready to return to the Iraqi 
market'. 90 However, whereas the official Iraqi press reported that the agreement 
meant the instant start to the contracts, Moscow denied immediate involvement. 91 
Commenting on the agreement, a Russian commentator described the signature of 
the document as the 'biggest success of Iraqi diplomacy since the Gulf War' and 
the 'result of years of effort by the pro-Iraqi lobby in the top echelons of Russian 
politics, which had never got tired of pointing out the benefits for Russia from co- 
92 
operation with Iraq'. 
Two months earlier, in July 1994, a Russian official delegation visited Iraq 
to discuss the development and reconstruction of three of the country's largest oil 
93 fields on the basis of production sharing contracts. A month later, an agreement 
was reached for a project involving US$2.3 billion of work on those fields. 
Reflecting the conflicting interests of Russian business groups and official 
governmental policy, the Interfax news agency suggested that work could begin 
before the lifting of sanctions, while the Russian deputy foreign minister Boris 
Kolokolov noted that Iraq had to recognise Kuwait's independence and borders, 
lbid 
Ibid. 
Black, 'Iraq Rebuffs Policy Shift That Would End Sanctions'. The Guardian, 14 September 
1994. p. 11 
92 Guseinov, 1: vestia, 15 September 1994. p. I 
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as well as provide full information about missing Kuwaitis before sanctions could 
be lifted. 
94 
In anticipation of a possible lifting of sanctions, large Russian oil 
companies LUKoil, Mashinimport and Zarubezhneft formed a consortium in the 
winter of 1994 to develop potential projects with Iraq. 95 Determined to secure the 
contract to develop the largest Iraqi oil fields, they had engaged in negotiations 
with the Iraqi officials over an extended period, with LUKoil reported to be 
willing to negotiate initial investments of US$800 million to US$l billion to 
exploit the West Quma and northern Rumaila oil fields in northern Iraq. 96 
In November 1994, in a follow-up to the St. Petersburg meeting with Aziz, 
and probably as a reward for Russia's position during the October crisis, Kozyrev 
signed a large anns and military equipment contract with Iraq, which provided for 
Russia's delivery of heavy equipment to replace armour, air defence and radar 
systems to Iraq destroyed during the Gulf War, as well as for modernising Iraqi 
military forces and re-building air-bases. As part of the deal, groups of Iraqi 
officers from the Air Defence Corps were to be trained in Russia for work on 
con, imuni cations and signal intelligence. More importantly for Russia, Baghdad 
agreed to give Moscow a 'preferential trade status and priority payment' before 
other suppliers, and promised to start payments for new contracts as soon as U. N. 
sanctions were lifted. 97 
While the expansion of Russia's co-operation with Iraq was regarded as a 
success within Russian business circles and on the part of the political 61ite 
94 , Impatient Russia Keen to Repair Iraqi Oilfields'. The Guardian, 4 August 1994, p. 10 
On the domestic restructuring of the oil sector, Ella Akerman, 'The Development of the Oil and 
Gas Industries in Russia', in Leo McCann (ed. ), Russian Tranýlbrniations, (London: 
RoutledgeCurzon. 2004), pp. 116-117 
96 John Thornhill. 'Russians Prepare for Iraqi Oil Trade Go-Ahead', Financial Tinies. 12 
September 1994, p. 4 
97 Adel Darwish, 'Moscow Poised to Reann Iraqis', The Independent, 19 December 1994, p. 10 
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determined to revive ties with this fon-ner Soviet ally, it was viewed with 
suspicion by those in the political establishment concerned that friendship with 
Baghdad might affect Russia's international prestige and its relations with the 
West, in particular the U. S. Commenting on Moscow's policy toward Iraq, a 
Russian political analyst argued that economic considerations should not 'act as 
pointers in the development of a long-term Middle Eastern strategy', but just as 
one element in the Russia's regional policy. 98 In her opinion, Russia's 
1-nanoeuvring with regard to Iraq had both positive and negative consequences. On 
the positive side, the creation of a region security system would be impossible 
within Iraq's recognition of Kuwait's sovereignty. On the negative side, Russia's 
return to the Middle East primarily through the development of ties with Baghdad 
created suspicion on the part of its neighbours. She concluded that it was 
important that Moscow did not to turn into Baghdad's advocate and emphasised 
the need for the diversification of Moscow's ties with other Middle Eastern 
countries to balance its relations with Iraq. 
Similarly, another commentator argued that saving the Iraqi regime would 
worsen Russia's relations with the West. He concluded that in the final analysis 
that was exactly what the Russian opposition was striving for, 'yet it seems that 
this goal is being achieved step by step by the politicians of the democratic 
bent'. 99 
Indeed, Russia's 'too flexible' approach to Iraq was viewed with suspicion 
in some government circles in the West, but also by the Arab world. 100 This 
'8 Irina Zvyagelskaya, 'The Middle East: Search of a Balance', Mosh-ovskie Nomsti, 13-20 
November 1994, p. 5 
'9 Shumilin, 'What is Hussein to Russia? ', Literalurna 
, va 
Gazeta, 16 August 1995, p. 9 
100 Concern for Russian position toward Iraq was expressed at the 9" meeting of the Damascus 
Declaration in Kuwait in early August 1994. Ivanov, 'Moscow's Actions Worry Arabs', 
Nezavisiincýý, a Gazeta, 5 August 1994, p. 4. Similarly, at the meeting in Riyadh of the ministers of 
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prompted a Russian analyst to argue that the consequences of Russia's policy on 
its relations with other states of the region 'would appear before long not only in 
the economic, but also in the political realm'. 101 It was probably for that reason 
that Moscow was keen to balance its intensifying relations with Baghdad with 
increased co-operation with the Persian Gulf states. 
In the second half of November 1994, the Russian Prime Minister Viktor 
Chemomyrdin embarked on a tour of four major oil-producing countries - Saudi 
Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Oman, aimed at reducing suspicion 
ainong Gulf states about Moscow's deepening relations with Baghdad and at 
advancing Russian economic interests in the region. However, while an agreement 
was signed with Saudi Arabia to increase investment and trade, opening the path 
for specific deals on trade, economic, culture and technology, ' 02 the economic 
content of Chernomyrdin's trip was overshadowed by the efforts to justify 
Russia's position with regard to Iraq. ' 03 
Moscow also focused on expanding bilateral ties with Iraq's immediate 
neighbour Kuwait with which the USSR had established diplomatic relations in 
the aften-nath of the Gulf crisis. This resulted in the development of advantageous 
economic co-operation, since the sheikhdom appeared interested in turning 
Moscow's attention from Baghdad and offering the Russian arms industry an 
alternative to sales to Iraq. Not surprising therefore that following the end of 
Russian-Iraqi negotiations on the activisation of Russian-Iraqi co-operation, 
foreign affairs of the six Middle Eastern oil countries, strong disapproval was voiced for Russia's 
policy toward Iraq. Ivanov, 'Problem of Sanctions Against Libya and Iraq', NezaOsimaya Gazeta, 
21 September 1994, p. 4 
101 Alexander Ivanov, 'Moscow's Actions Worry Arabs, Nezai, isimaya Gazeta. 5 August 1994. p. 
4 
102 Reuters, 'Saudi-Russian Trade Accord', Financial Times, 21 November 1994- p. 4 
103 Shumilin, 'Why No BreakthroughT, Moskoi, skie Noi, osti, 27 November-4 December 1994, p. 
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Kuwait for the first time since the collapse of the USSR signed a half million US 
dollar contract with Russia for the delivery of military equipment as the first step 
towards large Russian arms purchases. 104 
On a political level, during the Moscow meeting with the Minister of 
Information and a special representative from Kuwait, Saud Nasir as-Sabah, 
Kozyrev reiterated that Moscow did not intend to modify its position on the need 
for Iraq to unconditionally comply with U. N. demands, He also rejected 
accusations that Moscow was engaging in duplicitous diplomacy. Kozyrev stated 
that Russian 'policy on Iraq has been depicted as contrary to the interests of 
Kuwait. But the efforts we are making to induce Iraq to take the road of stability 
serve the interests of the entire region, and consequently those of Kuwait as 
well. "' 
However, Moscow's attempts to present itself as an impartial power 
motivated by the interests of the region were unconvincing, in particular when the 
pro-Iraqi lobby intensified the pressure on the Yeltsin government to change 
unilaterally Russia's position on Iraq. On 12 November 1994, the Russian 
government officially complained that 'for various reasons, including domestic 
ones, the U. S. appears increasingly insistent in pushing through unilateral 
decisions that are not in the framework of agreed collective action'. Even though 
the statement was a direct reference to the Clinton's Administration's decision to 
stop enforcing an-ns embargo on Bosnian Muslims, Russian officials emphasised 
104 Yuri Selivanov, 'Kuwait is Arming Itself, Segodnylu, 8 September 1994. p. 4 
1"5 Irina Grudinina, 'Moscow Rejects Charge of 'Duplicitous Diplomacy' Toward Persian Gulf 
Countries'. Segodn, va, 16 September 1994, p. 3 
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that it also referred to Iraq and the U. S. strategy of countering the Russian efforts 
to soften the embargo on Baghdad. 106 
On 31 January 1995, an Iraqi delegation headed by the Speaker of 
Parliament and an envoy of Saddarn Hussein, Saadi Mehdi Saaleh, arrived in 
Moscow on a three-day visit on the invitation of the Russian Parliament. The 
delegation was warmly greeted by the Duma and received by the Premier VIktor 
Chemomyrdin - the first time since the Gulf War that the Iraqi officials succeeded 
in obtaining an audience with such a high-ranking member of Security Council. 
As expected, Saaleh found widespread sympathy for Baghdad among the Russian 
political &fite, declaring that 'in the course of my meetings ... the Russian party 
expressed its readiness to encourage the lifting of sanctions against Baghdad'. 107 
Indeed, according to a source in the Duma, mentioned by kvestia, Rybkin 
told Saaleh that Russia would unilaterally declare that Iraq had met the 
requirements of the U. N. resolutions and announce that it considered October 
1994 to have been the starting point of the six months probation period during 
which Baghdad had to comply with U. N. demands. 108 At it expiration in March 
1995, Russia would then recognise the de facto end of sanctions, thus allowing its 
companies to start work in Iraq. 
Following the meeting with the Iraqi official, Rybkin declared that in the 
opinion of Russian parliamentarians, Iraq ought to 'see the light at the end of the 
tunnel', and noted that the Duma ought to play a role in eliminating 'the negative 
sentiments in Europe that are having an adverse impact on efforts to lift the 
106 Steven Erlanger, 'Yeltsin Tells Generals: Shape Up Anny, International Herald Trihime, IS 
November 1994, pp. 1,4 
107 Beeston, 'Russia Vows to Pressure U. N. on Easing of Iraq Sanctions'. The Tinles, 2 February 
199 5, p. 14 
108 Gusemov, 'Iraqi Diplomacy Scores One Victory After Another in Moscow', Izi, estia, 2 
February 1995, p. 3 
156 
embargo'. 109 In the press, the change in Moscow's stance was explained by the 
emphasis on 'material' bilateral relations, 'which help to create an infrastructure 
of real presence' in the Middle East. 1 10 Accordingly, Russia was seeking to 
become a 'truly necessary partner', 'respected not so much for its military might 
and great power policy, as for active trade and economic co-operation yielding 
concrete benefits'. 
On 26 February, Vladimir Zhinnovsky, accompanied by a 50-strong 
delegation, including 20 members of the Duma, paid a return visit to Baghdad to 
hold talks with the ministries of oil, trade, finance, defence, agriculture and 
education. During the visit, Zhinnovsky, speaking of the high esteem he held for 
Iraqi leader, promised to work for the lifting of sanctions and announced that be 
wanted Saddam Hussein to join a new coalition against the West. '' 1 
The pressure on the governrnent culminated in a vote by the Duma on 7 
April 1995, to place the discussion on the question of the unilateral lifting of 
sanctions against Iraq on its agenda, apparently in order to force the government 
to step up its efforts at the U. N. Security Council in support of Baghdad at the 
forthcoming sanctions review. ' 2A week later, the Durna initiated discussions on 
the project of the Federal Law 'On restoration of co-operation with republic of 
Iraq', which called for Russia's de facto unilateral exit from the sanctions regime 
against Baghdad. It was argued that the U. S. in 1994, initiated an analogous 
proposal concerning deliveries to Bosnia and Herzegovina in spite of international 
actions concerning embargo, considering American interests to be greater than 
)09 Ibid. 
"0 Vladimir Titorenko, 'Return to the Arab World', Areiv Times (International), January 1995, p. 
52 
Christopher Walker, 'Russian Extremist Arrives in Baghdad', The Times, 27 February 1995, p. 
112 Gomostayev, 'If Sanctions Against Iraq were to be Lifted', Ne-zavisimaya Gazeta, 8 April 1995, 
P. I 
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international collectivism. ' 13 Some Russian parliamentarians therefore thought it 
right to follow the U. S. example on the Iraqi question, arguing that as a result of 
sanctions Russia had lost US$43 billion, and would make a further US$8 billion 
losses. 
Others, however, pointed out that in case of Russia's unilateral actions, 
Iraq would not be allocated a quota within OPEC, which would result in the sharp 
fall of the oil price, affecting Russian oil exports, and end in annual losses of 
US$2.5 - US$3 billion, It was also argued that the Russian military-industrial 
complex that was interested in entering the lucrative arms market in the Persian 
Gulf would also lose out from any unilateral Russian decision. ' 14 
Even though the latter view finally prevailed, and the law was not adopted, 
the very existence of the proposal and the nature of the debates in the Durna 
reflected the growing impatience of the pro-Iraqi lobby with Moscow's official 
policy. It also highlighted its readiness to pursue an independent policy toward 
Baghdad even at the expense of the deterioration of Russia's relations with the 
West and the Arab world at large, which were already strained as a consequence 
of Moscow's invasion of Chechnya in December 1994.31 5 The Arab press accused 
Russia of forming an anti-Islamic triangle, Bosnia-Iraq-Chechnya, 116 and the 
European Union adopted a tough position towards Russia over the issue. ' 17 
113 Barbara Crossette, 'US is Ready to Ask U. N. to End Bosnia Arms Ban', New York Times, 20 
October 1994, p. 12; 'U. S. Bosnian Stance Causes Alann', Xciv York Tin? es, 12 NON7ember 1994, 
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Moscow, however, blamed the U. S., and in particular the Republican 
majority in the Congress, for causing trouble with Russia. 
H8 Whereas the Arab 
and European Union's objections were considered as surmountable, America was 
regarded as the main obstacle for advantageous Russian nuclear exports, a major 
driving force behind the much-resented NATO enlargement, and the key 
impediment on the path of lifting of sanctions against Iraq. 
Even though the actions of the Durna were related to the forthcoming 
review of the sanctions regime at the U. N., ' 19 another reason for the timing of the 
proposed law appeared to be the important visit of a Russian delegation led by the 
Minister of Fuel and Energy, Yuri Shafranik, to Baghdad that took place mid- 
April, at almost exactly the same time as the vote in the Parliament. At the close 
of the visit, Moscow and Baghdad signed a major Agreement on Co-operation in 
the Construction of Industrial Objects for the Petroleum and Gas Industry, which 
provided for co-operation in the realisation of new oil and gas projects, as well as 
the modermsation and expansion of a number of industrial projects, listed in a 
separate attachment. ' 20 
The agreement granted Russian companies the right to develop the North 
Rumaila and West Qurna oilfields that were among the biggest in the country, 
capable of producing about one fifth of Russia's total output, and, more 
importantly, apart from naming a number of concrete projects to be realised by the 
Russian side, provided that 'All other objects in the area of exploration and 
transportation of oil and gas... will be agreed upon by the competent Russian and 
... Bruce Clark, 'Survey of Russia: Back in Game of Nations, Finuncial Thncs, 10 April 1995, p. 
12 
119 Gornostayev, 'If Sanctions Against Iraq were to be Lifted', Xe. 7avishna_iýa Gazela, 8 April 1995, 
P. 1 
120 Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the 
Republic of Iraq on Co-operation in the Construction in the Area of Petroleum and Gas Industry, 
signed in Baghdad on 25 April 1995, for full text see Appendix C 
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Iraqi organisations additionally', 121 thus opening the way for the signature of 
future advantageous contracts between the Russian companies and Baghdad. The 
Russian Energy minister asserted that work on agreed projects would begin as 
soon as sanctions were eased. 
In commenting on the agreement, Yuri Agababov, the deputy general 
director of Zarubezhneft, noted that Russian companies were keen to maintain 
'the strategic initiative' before Western companies entered the market 'slowly but 
surely'. In the Russian press it was argued that even though it was right at the time 
to support sanctions against Iraq because it meant hope for developing a 
partnership with the West, 'something that was viewed as compensation of sorts 
for the loss of traditional markets, ' in the final account, it did not pay off, and the 
'illusions' were 'replaced by resentment on Moscow's part and its desire to 
recover what was lost'. ' 22 
This was true not only with regard to Iraq, but also Russia's relations with 
other countries in the Middle East. To balance its apparent tilt toward Baghdad 
and recover its erstwhile position in the region, Moscow attempted to once again 
become actively involved in the peace process. In March 1995, U. S. Secretary of 
State Warren Christopher went on a Middle East tour aimed at reactivating the 
Israeli-Syrian peace process. 123 Even though he gained agreement on the 
beginning of high-level talks between the two countries, one and a half weeks 
later, Kozyrev also embarked on a Middle East tour to accelerate the Syrian and 
Lebanese track of the peace process. The Russian foreign minister promised that 
121 Attachment to the Agreement of 25 April 1995: List of Objects of Co-operation in the Area of 
Petroleum and Gas Industry between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Iraq, Provision 9, 
for full text see Appendix D 
122 Andrei Smirnov. 'The Important Thing is... ', Kommersant Dai4l,, 17 April 1995, p. 1 
123 Ivanov, 'Christopher and the Oil'. Ne.: avisiniaya Gazeta, 17 March 1995, p. 2 
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Moscow would 'brush aside' obstacles facing Syrian-Israeli peace talks and 
insisted that the difficulties in negotiations 'require an active Russian participation 
to push them forward'. 
124 
At the same time, Yeltsin's envoy in the Middle East, Viktor Posuvalyuk, 
argued that the important thing was that Moscow succeeded in conducting a 
Middle Eastem diplomacy without any expense. He falsely claimed that 'If the 
American funding of the Middle East today is US$5.2 billion, Russia did not 
spend a penny. ' However, 'this is not explained by the fact that Russia can't pay, 
but by the high authority and close ties [with the Arab world]'. ' 25 
Despite high publicity of new Russian initiatives, Kozyrev's tour ended without 
any concrete results, )26 prompting a Russian commentator in Nezavisimaya 
Gazeta to argue that it was 'not important to reach sensational success, but first of 
all put a Russian mark in the region'. 127 On the economic front the trip proved 
more successful, as it contributed to the revitalisation of bilateral contacts with the 
countries of the region, 128 resulting in the signature of co-operation agreements 
with Egypt, Syria and Lebanon. ' 29 
In line with its policy directed at regaining its position in the Middle East, 
Russia also sought to revive ties with another traditional Soviet client, Sudan. In 
April 1995, a Russian military delegation visited Khartoum, where it agreed to 
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11 
125 Gornostayev, 'Diplomacy Without Expenses', Nezai, isitnava Gazeta, 29 March 1995, p. 1 
126 Shumilin. 'Concrete Initiatives', Moskoi, skie Noi, osti, 2-9 April 1995, p. 12 
12' Gornostayev, 'Example of Classic Diplomacy', Nezai, isitnaya Gazeta, 5 April 1995, p. 1 
129 Gregory Karasin, 'To the Middle East - Without Sensations, But Not Empty-Handed', 
Rossiyskie Vesti, 6 April 1995, p. 1 
129 Agreement with Egypt on Cultural and Scientific Co-operation, 28 March 1995. 
Diploniatichesk-y Vestnik, X25,1995, pp. 4-6; Agreement with Syria on Cultural and Scientific Co- 
operation, 30 March 1995, Bidleten Mezhdunarodn , 
i, kh Dogoi, orov, JV2 2,1997, pp. 63-66; 
Agreement with Lebanon on Trade and Economic Co-operation, 31 March 1995, Ministi-Y, of 
Foreign Affbirs: Russian Foreign Policy, Collection qf Docunients, 1995, (Moscow: International 
Relations, 2000). pp. 145-146 
161 
resume military co-operation. However, the establishment of contacts with 
Khartoum appeared primarily as an attempt on the part of Moscow to put 
pressure on the U. S. in the context of the NATO enlargement, as co-operation 
with Sudan, one of the poorest countries in Africa, unable to repay its current 
debts, did not have any financial advantages. ' 30 
In contrast, co-operation with Baghdad did. That was why, on 5 June 
1995, Kozyrev yet again held talks with Tareq Aziz in Moscow, reportedly calling 
him a 'dear friend'. 13 1 Even tough the nature of the talks remained undisclosed, it 
certainly related to Moscow's position at the Security Council following the 
forthcoming report by Ekeus to the Council scheduled for 19 June. This time, 
however, the meeting was not followed by another economically advantageous 
agreement with Moscow, but by the signature of a Protocol on Principles of 
Trade, Economic and Cultural Co-operation with one of Russia's regions, 
Tatarstan. A month later, the document was transfon-ned into an agreement 
between Iraq's Ministry of Industry and Minerals and Tatarstan's Ministry of 
Foreign Economic Relations. 132 In commenting on the co-operation between 
Tatarstan and Baghdad, the Russian press suggested that the government of 
Tatarstan may be acting on behalf of Moscow and would, 'without creating the 
furore that would accompany similar actions by Moscow, ' assume 'the role of a 
trailblazer'. 1 33 
Not surprisingly, Moscow's deepening co-operation with Iraq led to the 
alienation of the Persian Gulf States, with the exception of Kuwait, which was 
130 Ivanov, 'Moscow's New Challenge to the West', Nezavisinw. Ya Ga:: eta, IS April 1995, p. 2 
"' Valeria Sychova. 'Dear Friends Smack of Oil', Koi7vnc)-santDai4)-, 6 June 1995. p. 4 
132 Galina Pecbilina, 'Kazan is Prepared to Extend Credit to Baghdad', Konimersant Daiýj', 27 July 
1995, p. 2 
133 Ibid. 
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eager to establish close ties with Russia as a means of balancing Russian-Iraqi 
relations. Therefore, the Russian foreign minister used the opportunity to visit the 
sheikhdom on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the Iraqi invasion to allay 
suspicions about Russia's close ties to Baghdad. On this occasion, the Russian 
deputy foreign minister, Viktor Posuvalyuk, asserted that Russia was 'doing more 
work than others to normalise Kuwait's relations with Iraq'. However, he failed to 
reassure Kuwait, observing that Iraq's 'disarmament file is close to being closed 
and work on the biological file is proceeding in the same direction'. ' 34 
Moscow's optimism continued to persist even when the defection of 
Saddam Hussein's son in law, Hussein Kemal led to the disclosure of more 
information on hidden weapons. The Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman argued 
that 'it is unimportant what facts Iraq took into consideration in deciding to lift the 
previous veil of secrecy on military programmes. In the end, not motives, but the 
result plays a more important role'. 135 
After a period of intense co-operation between Moscow and Iraq 
throughout 1994 and the first part of 1995, bilateral contacts somewhat decreased 
in the second part of 1995 as a result of Moscow's focus on the crisis in Bosnia, 
and its unsuccessful attempts to prevent the NATO intervention In this part of 
former Yugoslavia. In addition, the Russian political establishment was 
preoccupied with the forthcoming parliamentary elections scheduled for 17 
December 1995. 
Moreover, during that time, Kozyrev who took an active part in dealing 
with Baghdad, once again came under great pressure not only from the nationalist 
and communist opposition, but also from the democratic camp that held him 
134 KrasnuYa Zvezda. 3 August 1995, p. 3 
'3' Interfax, Pravda, 24 August 1995, p. 3 
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responsible for all recent debacles in Russian foreign policy. At the end of 
September, the Duma adopted the recommendation to dismiss Kozyrev from his 
post, naming the collapse of the system of foreign policy forecasting and planning 
as reasons for this decision. ' 36 Similarly, during an unofficial exchange of 
opinions among representatives of the Russian academic 611te and the political 
establishment with the members of the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy, 
blame for Russia's failed policy was placed on the head of the Foreign Ministry. 
Personnel changes were recommended to strengthen the country's international 
position. 1 
37 
By the end of October, President Yeltsin himself was showing signs of 
preparing the ground for the dismissal one of his longest-serving ministers. 
Speaking at Moscow airport before his departure for Paris and the U. N., Yeltsin 
recounted that when Kozyrev asked him whether he should accompany him to 
France and the U. S., Yeltsin replied: 'Come, come for the moment'. ' 38 
Speculation about Kozyrevs dismissal increased throughout the 
autumn, 1 39 and it therefore came as no surprise, when in January 1996, the 
President announced his replacement by Yevgeny Primakov. 140 The latter, 
enjoying broad political backing, 'could do deals with the West' that the former 
136 Vladimir Trofimov, 'Everything Depends on the Personnel', Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 3 October 
1995, p. 2 
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140 While Primakov's appointment might have been a surprise for Western analysts. Russian 
newspapers began mentioning the former as a possible candidate already in spring 1995. 
164 
4 was too weak to do', 141 and was trusted by the pro-Iraqi lobby to advance 
Russia's interests in the region as a whole, and in Iraq in particular. 
141 Talbott, The Russia Hand, pp. 194-195 
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Chapter 5: Striving for influence: Moscow's diplomacy on Iraq 
1996-1997 
Maybe it is not yet visible to everyone, but I feel that the trust in Russia's policy is 
deepening. The world understands that the latter is emerging from the bad phase, the big 
problems, and is now aiming at pursuing an energetic and constructive foreign policy. 
Many countries trust the balanced line we adhere to. We are calling for the unconditional 
fulfilment of all U. N. resolutions. At the same time, we say that Iraq ought to see light at 
the end of the tunnel. Not fire, but light. 
Deputy foreign minister and special envoy in the Middle East, Viktor Posuvalyuk' 
From his first day in the office, the newly appointed foreign minister 
2 Yevgeny Primakov showed himself to be 'un-Kozyrev' , 
by undertaking his first 
overseas trip not to the West, but to the former Soviet republics of Tajikistan, 
Kazakhstan, Belarus and Ukraine. 3 Many analysts therefore predicted that 
Moscow's position with regard to the Iraq issue would also drastically change 
because Primakov, a man with the reputation as a 'friend of Saddam', 'would 
show what he could do'. 4 Primakov himself, while refraining from openly 
criticising his predecessor, 5 emphasised on various occasions that as Russia had 
not lost the Cold War, it could not allow itself to be 'led' in international affairs, 6 
' In an interview with Mikhail Karpov, 'We are not Baghdad's Advocates', Moskovskie Novosti 
23-30 November 1997, p. 3 
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March 1996, p. 8 
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or 'to follow the only superpower [by] trying to obtain admission to the civilised 
world at any price'. 7 According to him, the 'philosophy' of Russia's foreign 
policy was to 'defend national interests, while doing everything to avoid 
confrontation'. 8 
Under his leadership of the Foreign Ministry, precisely this premise 
became the main guideline in Moscow's foreign policy in general, and with regard 
to Iraq in particular. Not only did Moscow exhibit a new assertiveness in its 
relations with the U. S. due to Primakov's 'old Soviet' style of negotiation, 9 but it 
also toughened, albeit unsuccessfully, its stance on NATO's eastward 
expansion, 10 and continued to develop military and nuclear co-operation with Iran 
despite Washington's protests. " It also diversified its foreign relations by 
strengthening ties with its Near and Far Abroad, in particular China, 12 and moving 
towards a closer alliance with France. ' 3 This new dynamism in Russia's foreign 
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policy prompted The Economist to observe that 'the main surprise about the 
Russian foreign policy is that Russia seems at least to be arriving at one'. 14 
With regard to the Middle East, Russia succeeded in changing its title from 
'co-sponsor' to 'co-chairman' of the Middle East peace process, not simply to 
bring the diplomatic lexicon into accordance with the Russian language, but to 
signify substantial changes in Moscow's policy towards the region. is In particular, 
Primakov proceeded from the premise that the Madrid formula for a peace 
settlement needed to be given a new impetus, for instance, by assuring a new 
more active role for Russia that would boost the country's international prestige 
and its standing in the Arab world. 
Moscow appeared not to be discouraged even by the failure of its 
diplomatic efforts in settling the conflict over Lebanon in the wake of Hezbollah's 
shelling of northern Israel and retaliatory action by the Israeli army in Lebanon in 
April 1996,16 which drew negative reaction from Israel and the U. S. 17 Nor was it 
disheartened by being left out of the of the International Committee to Monitor the 
Implementation of the Lebanese- Israeli Cease-Fire Agreement, established by 
Israel, the U. S., Syria, Lebanon, and France. 18 
In an interview, the deputy foreign minister and special envoy in the 
Middle East, Viktor Posuvalyuk, emphasised that the time had shown that the 
failure to include Russia was 'a mistake', arguing that 'if it's a defeat [of 
14 'Russia Eyes the World: Under the Guidance of its Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov, Russia 
Has Been Carving Out a Tougher Yet More Pragmatic Foreign Policy', Tile Economist, 23 
November 1996, p. 57 
15 Leonid Gankin, 'We Have Become Mature Partners', Moskovskie Novosti, 9-16 June 1996, p. 11 
16 , Israel Bombs Beirut Office of Hezbollah Guerrillas'. Internationul Herald Tribline, 12 April 
1996. p. I 
" Konstantin Eggert, 'Russia Wants to be Equal to the U. S. in the Middle East', Izvestia. 26 April 
1996, p. 3 
18 Maksim Yusin, 'Washington No Longer Wants to Share the Laurels of Peacemaker with 
Moscow', Izvestia. 30 April 1996, p. 3 
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diplomacy], it's not ours'. 19 At the same time, he claimed that an attempt was 
being made to prevent Russia from playing an active role in the Middle East. In 
his view, the situation was a 'paradox': on one hand Moscow was accused of 
associating mainly with 'rogue states' like Libya, Iraq, or Sudan, and on the other 
hand, an attempt was being made to hinder the development of Russia's relations 
with other countries of the region. 
According to Posuvalyuk, Russia was encountering particularly tough 
resistance in the sphere of military and technical co-operation. He argued that, 
nevertheless, it would be mistake to get out of the profitable Middle Eastem arms 
market, where Russia had to find its own niche and back up any substantial arms 
deliveries by a 'substantial' policy. 20 Confin-ning this view, Primakov, in October 
1996, embarked on the first of a series of his Middle East tours, visiting Syria, 
Lebanon, Egypt, Israel, the Palestinian Authority and Jordan. 21 
However, the first real test for the viability of Primakov's new fon-nula for 
Russian foreign policy was provided by a new crisis over Iraq in September 1996. 
On 17 August, armed clashes took place in northern Iraq between the Kurdistan 
Democratic Party (KDP) under the leadership of Massoud Barzani and the 
22 Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) led by Jalal Talabani . While the 
latter 
sought logistic support from Iran, Barzam asked Saddam Hussein to dispatch 
troops to Kurdistan to bring an end to the feuds between the rivalling parties. The 
Iraqi leader decided to take this historic chance to impose his control over Iraqi 
Kurdistan. On 31 August, Saddam Hussein advanced his forces into the Kurdish 
19 Gankin, Moskovskie Novosti, 9-16 June 1996, p. 11 
20 Ibid. 
21 Alexander Shumilin, 'Primakov Meets Assad', Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 30 October 1996, p. 2 
22 Agence France-Presse, 'Kurds Clash as U. S. and Iran Vie to Spur Peace', International Herald 
Trihime, 28 August 1996, p. 8 
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territory, occupying the administrative centre Erbil, and executing over hundred 
23 
members of the Patriotic Union without trial . 
In response, the U. S. on 3 September, launched a missile attack on the 
, 24 Iraqi air defences in the territory covered by the 'no-fly zone , and extended the 
4no-fly zone' over southern Iraq from the 32 d to the 33 d parallel, just 30 miles 
from Baghdad. 25 A day later, the U. S. launched a second attack on Iraq aimed at 
liquidating the elements of the air defence system in connection with Clinton's 
decision to extend the 'no-fly zone. ' 
Hours after the attacks, Saddam Hussein in his address to the nation on 
national television and radio, rejected the validity of the northern and southern 
'no-fly zones' and ordered his an-ned forces to shoot down any hostile plane flying 
over Iraq. 26 Similarly, the Iraqi Prime Minister Tareq Aziz in a telephone 
interview with the CNN, declared that Iraq would not 'tolerate' the 'no-fly zones', 
which 'had been used as one of the means for aggression against Iraq'. He argued 
that the Iraqi military units involved in the assistance operation to the Democratic 
Party of Kurdistan had returned to their bases several hours before the beginning 
of the U. S. attack. Accordingly, the Iraqi leadership 'did nothing wrong, but 
27 
undertook a 'responsible, positive and limited operation to help our people' . 
23 Steven Lee Myers, 'White House Dismisses Pullback by Iraq as Insignificant', International 
Herald Tribune, 3 September 1996, p. M Valery Batuyev, 'Old Roots of the Kurdish Problem', 
Nezavisbna 
- va 
Gazeta, IS September 1996, p. 4 
24 Vadim Markushin, 'USA Launched a Missile Strike on Iraq', Krasnaya Zvezda, 4 September 
1996, p. 3 
25 Craig R. Whitney, 'Raid on Iraq: the Reaction: From Allies, US Hears Mild Applause or 
Silence'. New York Times, 4 September 1996, p. 10 
2" 'Iraqi Forces Ordered by Leaders to Ignore UN No-fly Zones, Attack on Iraq Baghdad 
Reaction', The Independent, 4 September 1996, p. 9 
27 Ibid. 
170 
While Britain enthusiastically supported the air strikes, and France 
accepted the need for some forin of Western response, 28 Russia objected to the use 
of force against Iraq. Instead, Moscow considered an agreement between Baghdad 
and the Kurds concerning Kurdistan's autonomy within the framework of the 
unitary Iraqi state as the best way for the settlement of the crisis. 29 
Following the strikes, Mikhail Demurm, first deputy director of the 
Inforniation and Press Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry confirmed that 
at the outset of the crisis Viktor Posuvalyuk was dispatched to Baghdad in search 
for a peaceful resolution of the confl 't. 
3 IC 0 Furthermore, at a joint press conference 
on 5 September, the deputy foreign minister Igor Ivanov and the deputy foreign 
minister Posuvalyuk revealed that the latter had received assurances from the Iraqi 
Prime Minister Aziz on 2 September that the Iraqi troops that had entered 
Kurdistan had been ordered to return to their original positions, and were to do so 
on 3-4 September. 31 At the same time, the deputy foreign ministers admitted that 
the Americans who had been in constant contact with Moscow on the Iraqi 
situation on 2 September, 'Indicated that a U. S. strike was inevitable', and 
accused them of derailing Russia's successful mediation efforts in Kurdistan. 32 
Similarly, an informed source in the Foreign Ministry in conversation with 
a Nezavisimaya Gazeta correspondent confirmed that Moscow had expected a 
show of force on the part of the U. S. 33 Allegedly, it warned Washington against 
28 John Lichtfield, David Usborne, 'Unity Among Allies Marks Trouble Abead', The Independent, 
4 September 1996, p. 8 
29 Markusbin, Krasncýya Zvezda, 4 September 1996, p. 3ý Idem, 'Moscoxv - for the Full-Fledged 
Autonomy for the Kurds'. Krasiia 
, 
i. -a Zvczda, 12 September 1996, p. 3 
1ý) , Tomahawk Blow to Russia's Interests', Koinniersant Daih% 4 September 1996, pp. 1,4 3' Leonid Velekhov, 'Military Part of Latest Lesson for S"addam Hussein is Apparently Over', 
Segodnya. 6 September 1996, p. 1 12 Ibid. 
33 The U. S. State Department's spokesman, Nicholas Burns., also confirmed at a briefing in 
Washington that Moscow had been notified in advance of the planned bombardment. Reutov, 
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the forceful measures, pointing to the dangerous international and regional 
consequences of a military action. However, the U. S. decision 'to act on its own' 
was 'an inadequate response to the events in Iraq'. 34 
Primakov who at the time of the attacks was on an official visit in 
Switzerland, told a news conference in Bern that he regarded the U. S. military 
action as largely connected to President Clinton's re-election campaign, by 
declaring that 'the attacks cannot be supported by anyone except those who put 
domestic politics, including pre-electoral questions above all else'. 35 The Russian 
foreign minister also emphasised that the attacks created 'a very dangerous 
situation', which could lead to 'anarchy' in the international arena. 36 
The Russian Foreign Ministry was particularly concerned about the 
unilateral decision by the U. S. to extend the 'no-fly zone' in southem Iraq and 
declared the action illegal. Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov stated that at the 
time there was neither a sanction by the U. N. to create such a zone, nor a 
37 
provision in U. N. Resolution 688 to which Washington referred . According to 
Ivanov, the renewed tensions around Iraq raised questions about the consequences 
of the endless delay in the post-crisis settlement in the Persian Gulf, which could 
have a negative impact on the Middle East peace process as a whole. According to 
him, Baghdad ought to see the real perspective of a possible exit from the 
'Second Strike on Iraq Confirms that U. S. Thinks it Can Do as it Pleases', Nczavisilnaya Gazeta, 5 
September 1996, p. 1 
34 Dmitri Gornostayev, Alexander Reutov, 'The Kremlin, it Seems, Was Notified in Advance by 
the White House, but was Ashamed to Admit it'. Alezavisinia. iw Ga--ela, 5 September 1996, pp. I 
2 
35 Whitney, New York Dines, 4 September 1996. p. 10 
36 Phil Reeves, 'Cloves Off as Enigmatic Primakov Squares up to West', The Independent, 5 
September 1996, p. 10 
17 Reutov, 'Moscow Against Washington's Attempt to Take on a Role of a Sole Arbiter in 
Circumvention of the U. N. ', NezavisimaYa Gazeta, 6 September 1996, p, I 
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sanctions regime, but only under the condition of a strict fulfilment of the 
corresponding U. N. resolutions. 38 
Similarly, France refused to join the patrolling of the extended 'no-fly 
zone'. Despite the U. S. attempts to persuade it otherwise, 39 the French 
government in its statement of 9 September declared that the country's 
participation in 'Provide Comfort' and the 'Southern Watch' was to be limited to 
the previously set boundaries. 40 
On 5 September, the Russian government issued a statement on the 
situation in Iraq, which in an unusually harsh tone condemned the U. S. missile 
attacks on Iraq. In particular, the document noted 'serious concern' raised by the 
fact that Washington was 'de facto aspiring to the role of the head arbiter, 
attempting to replace the Security Council, which in accordance with the U. N. 
Charter has the exclusive right to sanction the use of force'. 41 It rejected the 
unilateral extension of the 'no-fly zone' in southern Iraq, arguing that 'these 
actions, creating a dangerous precedent, contradict the international law and are 
unacceptable'. The Russian government called on the cessation of military actions 
in Iraq and appealed on all sides to 'reject the logic of force' and 'turn to the path 
of political settlement'. 
Commenting on the U. S. missiles attacks on Iraq, the Russian press echoed 
the statements of the Russian govemment and was united in condemning the U. S. 
military actions, portraying them as an attempt by Washington to impose its 
global leadership and ignoring Russia's interests. Kommersant Daily lamented 
" Ibid. 
'9 Steven Erlanger, 'Paris Offers Scant Backing but London is Supportive', Neil, York Times, 6 
September 1996, p, 17 
"' Ian Black, 'Iraq Crisis: Isolated Allies Sign Mutual Praises', The Guardian, 6 September 1996, 
P, 15 
41 , Statement of the Russian Government', Nezavisimcuw Gazeta. 5 September 1996, p. 2 
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that 'these days, the U. S. thinks it can ignore Russia and that Russia's multi- 
billion dollar economic interests can be discarded'. 42 Another commentator in 
Nezavisimaya Gazeta argued that 'once again Washington demonstrated its deep 
conviction that it can act with impunity', that 'it can undertake any military action 
in any part of the world against any state that in the White House's opinion is 
pursuing the wrong policies', and asked dramatically: 'Who will be declared the 
next villain" 43 Yet another political analyst observed that the U. S. missile attack 
on Iraq had led to the 'most serious friction' in Russian-U. S. relations in the past 
year. He argued that Russia had taken advantage of the Iraq situation to highlight 
its opposition to American aspirations to assume world leadership and had 
demonstrated its own desire to become the leader of the countries 'unhappy' about 
44 the U. S. dominance in the post-Cold War world . 
At the U. N. Security Council, Moscow, backed by France and China, refused to 
support the project of a resolution proposed by Britain on 3 September, which 
condemned Iraq's invasion of Kurdish territory, called on Baghdad to cease its 
military actions and justified the American military response. 45 Speaking about 
the Russian position, Primakov told joumalists in Moscow that such a U. N. 
resolution ought to be universal, condemning the use of force and demanding the 
immediate transition to political settlement. 46 Similarly, the Russian representative 
at the U. N., Sergei Lavrov, argued that the British proposal 'essentially places 
new demands on Iraq that are not envisioned in the previous decisions of the 
42 Komniersant Dai4y, 4 September 1996, p. 4 
43 Gornostayev, Reutov, 'Second Strike Against Iraq Confirms that U. S. Thinks it Can do as it 
Pleases', Nezavisima 
, iýa 
Gazeta, 5 September 1996, p. 1 
44 Vladimir Frolov, 'Difficult Period in Relations between Moscow and Washington', 
Nczavisirnaya Gazeta, 13 September p. 2 
45 Barbara Crossette, 'Clinton Finds Little Support at the U. N. for Iraqi Strikes, Neii, York Tinies, 
5 September 1996, p. 10 
46 Markushin, 'WasbiDgton Regards Itself as a Global Military Government', Krasn(ýi7a Zvczda, 5 
September 1996, p. I 
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Security Council adopted after the end of the Gulf War'. 47 In his view, the draft 
resolution in question did not reflect the true state of affairs and would not 
facilitate the settlement of the crisis in Iraq. 
Consequently, during a closed-door emergency meeting of the U. N. 
Security Council on 4 September, Russia circulated an alternative proposal of a 
Security Council statement that expressed concern about the situation in Iraq and 
the intervention by other countries, which created instability in the region, 
appealling to all parties to stop resorting to force. 48 As a result of the division of 
49 
opinions , the Security Council was unable to reach an agreement on the matter, 
and refrained from a public debate over how to respond to the new crisis in Iraq. 50 
Meanwhile, following Saddam Hussein's belligerent declarations in the 
afterinath of the U. S. bombardments, Iraq engaged in acts of defiance of the 'no- 
fly zones, for instance, by firing a SA-6 missiles at U. S. jets patrolling the zone 
over northern Iraq on II September. 51 In response, Washington dispatched F-I 17 
stealth fighters to Kuwait, despite Iraqi threats that the emirate would be 
committing 'an act of war 52 and moved B-52 bombers closer to the Middle East 
in preparation of a new attack on Iraq. The U. S. Defence Secretary William Perry 
threatened that the planned strike was to be 'disproportionate with the 
47 , Dinosaurs with Electronic Weaponry Inflict Second Strike Against Iraq', Pravda, 5 September 
1996, p. 1 
48 Gomostayev, Reutov. 'The Kremlin, it Seems, Was Notified in Advance by the White House. 
But Was Ashamed to Admit it', Nezai, isiniaya Gazeta, 5 September 1996, p. 2 
49 ITAR-TASS, 'Thc Iraqi Crisis Continues', Krasna 
, ya 
Zivzda, 6 September 1996, p. 3; Liven, 
'The British Project Resolution in the Security Council was Met with Opposition by Russia. 
France and China', Nezavisiina , iv 
Gazeta. 6 September 1996, p. 1 
50 Crossette, 'The UN. Council Members Negotiate Fruitlessly', Neii, York- Thnes, 6 September 
1996, p. 17 
S] Brian Knowlton, 'U. S. Bombers Head to Gulf', International Herald Tribune. 12 September 
1996, p. 1 
52 Black, 'Iraqi Crisis: Don't Count on Us, Say French', The Guardian, 13 September 1996, p. 10 
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provocations which are made against us'. 53 Similarly, President Clinton, at a 
campaign rally in Sun City, declared that the American determination to deal with 
Saddam Hussein ought not to be 'underestimated, vowing to do everything to 
ensure the safety of the U. S. pilots on missions in Iraq. 54 
The prospect of additional unilateral American attacks on Iraq raised 
concern in both Moscow and Paris about the escalation of the tensions in the Gulf 
While Paris implied that Washington could not count on its support, Primakov on 
12 September declared that the use of force by any state was 'absolutely 
unacceptable'. 55 At the same time, Russia continued to work behind the scenes to 
diffuse the situation and attempted to persuade Saddarn Hussein to halt attacks on 
the U. S. air patrols. 
While Washington continued to deploy its troops in the Persian Gulf, 
Moscow had indeed succeeded in obtaining Iraq's agreement to show restraint. 56 
Perhaps in order to cement the accord, the Iraqi deputy foreign minister and 
Saddarn Hussein's envoy, Riyadh QaisI, travelled to Moscow on 18 September to 
conduct talks with his counterpart Viktor Posuvalyuk. A communiqu6 issued by 
the Russian Foreign Ministry noted that during the meeting, the Russian deputy 
foreign minister emphasised the 'fundamental importance of the Iraqi leadership's 
decision to stop firing on U. S. aircrafts in the 'no-fly zones, and expressed hope 
that 'Baghdad will continue to show restraint and composure, so as not to provide 
a pretext for any escalation of tensions. 57 For his part, Qaisi praised Russia's 
53 Philip Shenon, 'U. S. is Preparing Bigger Air Strikes on Targets in Iraq', Neiv York Tilnes, 12 
September 1996, p. 1 
54 Ibid. 
55 Black, The Guardian, 13 September 1996, p. 10 
56 Reuters, 'Clinton Approves Dispatch of Troops, International Herald Tribune, 18 September 
1996, p. 8 
57 Interfax, 'Moscow Urges Baghdad to Show Restraint', Koinniersant Daily, 19 September 1996. 
p. 4 
176 
efforts to settle the crisis by political means and stressed that the decision by the 
Iraqi leadership to show restraint remained in force. 
During the press conference in the Iraqi Embassy in the Moscow, Qaisl 
explained the official point of view of the Iraqi leadership on the recent crisis in 
the Gulf, which regarded the 'aggression committed by Clinton during his election 
campaign' as 'an act of insanity, disregard for all international norms and a severe 
breach of the U. N. Charter'. 58 
Interestingly, Nezavisimaya Gazeta claimed that it had obtained some 
information concerning the real purpose of Qaisi's visit to the Russian capital, 
which allegedly consisted in acquiring from Moscow some intelligence data about 
the composition and capabilities of the American forces in the Gulf, planned U. S. 
action and the possible development of events in the region. 59 
Despite the Iraqi military withdrawal from Kurdistan, the situation in 
northern Iraq remained tense. According to official Iraqi sources, Baghdad 
continued to strengthen its positions in Kurdistan, assisting the DPK and opening 
the local offices of the Baath Party. 60 Barzani secretly visited Ankara to meet the 
Turkish foreign minister Tansu Ciller and the representative of the U. S. Secretary 
of State Robert Pelletreau and discussed the Turkish proposal to create a buffer 
zone against the penetration of the Kurdish guerrillas into Turkey. 61 Baghdad 
declared itself against the plan, citing the inadmissibility of the division of Iraqi 
territory, and regarding the anarchy in northern Iraq as a consequence of the lack 
58 Igor Korotchenko, 'Baghdad Accused Ekeus' Commission of Espionage', Nezavisirna. lva 
Ga--eta, 
19 September 1996, p. 1 
59 Ibid. 
60 Markushin, 'Persian Gulf: Maybe U. S. Will not Use Force, but Demonstrate it', Krasnaya 
Zvezda, 24 September 1996, p. 3 
61 'Kurds Flee Baghdad-Backed Force', International Herald Tribune, II September 1996. p. 8 
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of control over the area. 62 Instead, the Iraqi leadership asked Barzani to sign an 
agreement on the Kurdish autonomy within the Iraqi state. The proposal was 
rejected by DKP, one of its influential members in an earlier interview calling the 
alliance with Baghdad as a 'tactical and temporary partnership'. 63 
On 10 October 1996, Iraqi Prime Minister Tariq Aziz travelled to Moscow 
to conduct talks with Yevgeny Primakov on Iraqi disannament issues, but also to 
discuss the situation in northern Iraq, where the an-ned clashes between the 
Kurdish factions continued. During the press conference the Russian foreign 
minister declared that Moscow 'did not intend to undertake any sort of mediation 
at the present time', and expressed satisfaction with the position of the Iraqi 
leadership 'who have expressed willingness to arrange a meeting in Baghdad 
64 between the representatives of Barzani and Talabani' . 
However, in spite of Baghdad's efforts to bring an end to the feuds 
between the KDP and PUK and retain control over the area, Kurdistan became 
finally divided into two regions administered separately by the two parties. It was 
only after lengthy negotiations between Barzani and Talabani sponsored by the 
U. S. that the two parties signed a peace agreement in Washington in September 
65 1998 . 
If Russia's diplomacy in the Iraq crisis of autumn 1996 crisis failed to 
prevent the American air strikes against Iraq and to obtain the international 
recognition for Moscow's mediation efforts, a year later Russia succeeded in 
62 Reutov, 'Diplomacy Instead of Arguments of Force'. Nez-avisimaya Gazeta, 20 September 1996, 
P. 1 
63 Steven Kinzer, 'Kurd Leader Says Alliance with Saddarn was Just Tactical'. Intel-national 
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64 Abarinov, 'Moscow is Satisfied with Iraqi Authorities' Position', Segodliva, II November 1996, 
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playing a leading role in successfully resolving a new Iraqi confrontation with the 
U. N. by political mcans. 
Even though Baghdad on the rhetorical level had repeatedly pledged its 
co-operation with the U. N. Special Commission (UNSCOM) charged with 
disarming Iraq, in practice the Iraqi authorities since 1991 had consistently 
impeded the work of the inspectors. Later, Iraq repeatedly claimed that the 
international inspection teams were not composed of experts, but of American 
military personnel whose task it was to ascertain the location of the Iraqi air 
66 defences and collect information on the Iraqi military forces and security. 
When the Australian Richard Butler replaced Rolf Ekcus as the executive 
chairman of the Special Commission on I July 1997, he found himself involved in 
new controversy over Iraq's compliance with its disan-nament obligation and a 
deepening division at the U. N. Security Council concerning the Iraqi question. 
Encouraged by the growing disagreements between the permanent members of the 
Council on the conditions for the lifting of sanctions, Baghdad, in June 1997, 
initiated a new round of defiance of UNSCOM. Not only had the Iraqi authorities 
three times interfered with helicopters taking inspectors to the inspection sites, 
putting their lives in danger, but they had also on three other occasions kept the 
inspectors outside the facilities to be inspected long enough to remove any 
suspicious materia s. 67 
In response, the U. S. and Britain proposed a U. N. draft resolution 
imposing additional sanctions against Iraq. New measures included the suspension 
of the regular six-month sanctions reviews and a restriction on visas and 
66 Iraq's letter to the Secretary General on 7 September 1996, pointing to a report by Russian 
intelligence sources. United Nations Document, S/1996/729, United Nations Review 1996, p. 238 
67 Editorial, 'Unrepentant Iraq', New York Times, 30 June 1997, p. 10 
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international travel for the Iraqi officials and diplomats involved in blocking the 
inspections. However, Russia and France expressed reservation about the 
68 
proposal . 
Only after two days of negotiations, and President Clinton's personal 
intervention with Yeltsin at the Denver G-7 Summit, 69 not reported in the Russian 
press to avoid domestic political backlash, did Moscow agree to vote in favour of 
the resolution in exchange for a four-month delay in imposition of any new 
sanctions against Iraq . 
70 The resolution 1115 condemned the 'repeated refusal of 
the Iraqi authorities to allow access to sites' and demanded them to 'co-operate 
fully' with UNSCOM. It also suspended the sanctions reviews until Butler's 
forthcoming report and threatened to 'impose additional measures on those 
categories of Iraqi officials responsible for the non-compliance'. 71 
In late September 1997, before submitting his report on the work of 
UNSCOM to the Security Council, Richard Butler travelled to Moscow to meet 
the Russian foreign minister. Interestingly, both Butler and Primakov provided a 
conflicting account of that meeting in their respective memoirs. According to 
Primakov, it was the foriner who 'wanted to talk to us about the state of affairs 
with the Iraqi disarmament', 72 while Butler himself asserted to have accepted an 
invitation from Lavrov to undertake the trip. 73 In Primakov's account, the talks 
concerned the nuclear and missile dossiers, which Russia considered to be ready 
68 'US Persuade Nations to Join Plan for Tighter Iraq Sanctions', Neiv York Times, 22 June 1997, 
p. 6 
69 John M. Goshko, 'After Wooing Russia, U. S. Wins a Victory Against Iraq at U. N. ', 
Inlernational Herald Tribune, 23 June 1997, p. 2 
70 , US Persuade Nations to Join Plan for Tighter Iraq Sanctions', Neiv York Times, 22 June 1997., 
p. 6 
71 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1115, S/RES/1 115 (1997) 
72 Primakov, Years in Big Politics, p. 311 
7' Richard Butler, The Greatest Threat, Iraq, Weapons of'Mass Destruction, and the Crisis of' 
Global Security, (New York: Public Affairs, 2000), p. 105 
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for the ongoing monitoring instead of the inspections. Unable to provide any 
information indicating that Iraq had preserved missile launchers and remaining 
quiet on the nuclear dossier, Butler, when asked about why he insisted on 
preserving the inspection phase and opposed the transition to monitoring, 
according to Primakov, replied that 'it all depends on you reaching an agreement 
with the U. S., 
74 
In contrast, Butler described Primakov as declaring at the outset of the 
75 
meeting that 'Russia wants the Iraq problem solved" and urging him not to be 
'rigid', but more 'flexible and understanding'. 76 According to Butler, Primakov 
placed the burden of proof of the Iraqi weapons, not on Baghdad, but on 
UNSCOM, which had to prove that the weapons existed in order to make Iraq 
accountable for them, thus reversing the provisions of the U. N. resolutions. 77 He 
also described that Primakov 'without being asked' told him the motivations for 
the Russian position, namely the repayment of the Iraqi debts for the supply of 
military equipment. 78 
Apart from providing diverging versions of the same meeting, both 
accounts, more importantly, revealed a mutual dislike not only on the 
professional, but also on the personal level 79 that was to play an important role in 
Russia's subsequent dealings with Butler and its calls for his dismissal as the head 
of the UNSCOM. It also played a role in Butler's perception of Moscow's stance 
and motivations at the U. N. Security Council and, of what he viewed as Russia's 
74 Primakov, p. 311 
75 Butler, p. 105 
76 Idem., pp. 105-106 
77 Ibid., p. 106 
7S Ibid. 
79 However, while Primakov did not openly criticise Butler, but hinted his sentiments in the way 
he described the meeting, the latter portrayed Primakov's 'attitude as overbearing and somewhat 
bullying, redolent of the hard-line Soviet techniques I had experiences in previous undertakings. ' 
Butler, p. 106 
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attempts to exercise influence on the U. N. Secretary General. Interestingly, the 
government's dislike of Richard Butler was also echoed in the Russian media, 
which sometimes mistakenly described the head of UNSCOM as being an 
American national, and accused him of dealing with Iraq in a way that 
corresponded to the U. S. interests and objectives. 80 
On 8 October 1997, the Security Council discussed Butler's report that 
acknowledged some progress in the missile and chemical areas, but not on the 
biological programme. According to UNSCOM chairman, who was highly critical 
of Baghdad, Iraq failed to provide 'full, frank and final disclosure' of its 
biological weapons programmes and blocked the inspections. He concluded that 
UNSCOM could not close the first two dossiers as Iraq did not disclose further 
evidence and information requested from them. 81 
In response to the report, the U. S. and Britain called for the imposition of 
new sanction to punish Iraq for its failure to co-operate with UNSCOM. Both 
countries demanded the imposition of travel restrictions on all members of the 
Iraqi armed forces, police and intelligence services, employees of the Iraqi 
defence ministry and its military-industrial commission, as well the suspension of 
the periodic reviews of the compliance until April 1998.82 More importantly, the 
U. S. advocated an automatic application of the new measures in six months if the 
Iraqi government did not improve its accounting for the prohibited weapons 
programmes and failed to fully co-operate with UNSCOM. 
80 For example, Anatoly Shapovalov. 'One Dossier, But a Host of Inspectors' Rossi , vska * 
va Gazeta, 
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Not surprisingly, France and Russia strongly opposed that proposal. In 
general, Moscow was against the imposition of any new sanctions against Iraq, as 
they would limit the motivation of the Iraqi government to co-operate, and 
ultimately delay the lifting of the sanctions regime against Baghdad. In particular, 
Russia regarded the incidents of non co-operation by the Iraqi authorities with 
UNSCOM, listed in Butler's report, as insufficient reason for the immediate 
83 
adoption of additional measures against Iraq . In Moscow's view, new measures 
ought to be applied, if at all, not against the country as a whole, but those 
individuals who impeded the work of the inspectors. 84 
Finally, deeply distrusting to Richard Butler, Russia was particularly 
opposed to the automatic beginning of sanctions, as it would make the application 
of new measures dependent on Butler's report. RecognIsIng though that some 
forrn of response to the Iraqi defiance was needed, Russia circulated an alternative 
draft resolution which 'using strong language', imposed 'little action' against 
Iraq. 85 
In contrast, Paris, did not, in principle, exclude the possibility of the 
adoption of additional sanctions against Baghdad. However, like Russia, France 
was against placing the burden of determining the imposition of sanctions on 
Butler alone, thus advocating a Security Council review before putting them into 
effect. 86 In turn, Baghdad attempted to exercise further pressure on both Russia 
and France to avert the adoption of the U. S. draft resolution, by declaring through 
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its ambassador to the U. N. Nizar Hamdoon on 16 October, that Iraq would 'cease 
87 
all further co-operation' with the U. N. inspectors if new sanctions were adopted . 
In an attempt to negotiate a compromise with Russia that would preserve 
the threat while postponing the date for the application of the additional sanctions, 
the U. S. representative at the U. N., Bill Richardson, on 22 October met with the 
Russian representative Sergel Lavrov. Despite Lavrov's declaration after the 
meeting that there had been no change in the Russian position, Calvin Mitchell, 
Richardson's spokesman acknowledged 'some progress on the language of the 
text', noting that the technical aides of both representatives were continuing the 
talks. 8 8 
The Russian-American negotiations on the draft resolution resulted in a 
compromise that represented only a 'symbolic victory' for the U. S. and Britain, 
89 
and did not receive particular attention in the Russian media. On one hand, U. N. 
Security Council Resolution 1134 adopted on 23 October with the Russian, 
French and Chinese abstentions preserved the threat of new sanctions against Iraq 
as advocated by the U. S. On the other hand, it refrained from providing for an 
automatic start of the additional measures as demanded by Russia. 90 The 
resolution expressed the 'firin intention' of the Security Council to impose the 
travel ban following Butler's report in April 1998 if Iraq failed to meet its 
obligations, called for a list of the Iraqi officials who would be subject to the 
travel restriction to be drawn in the interim and condemned Iraq for impeding the 
work of the inspectors. 91 Speaking on the vote, Lavrov stated the 'imbalance' of 
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the resolution as it failed to reflect a number of essential elements of Iraq's 
fulfilment of its disannament obligations, as well as failing to mention the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report that stated significant 
progress in the nuclear area. 92 
in spite of being 'saved' from the immediate imposition of additional 
93 
sanctions, Baghdad, encouraged by the recent vote in the Security Council , 
continued its confrontational course with regard to the Special Commission. On 
27 October, the Iraqi Parliament adopted a decision to recommend to the 
Revolutionary Council to freeze the co-operation with UNSCOM. 94 
According to the Russian foreign minister Primakov, Moscow considered such a 
decision 'absurd' and 'leading to a cul-de-sac'. 95 Consequently, the briefing of the 
Foreign Ministry held on 28 October stressed that Russia advocated a strict 
fulfilment of the U. N. resolutions on Iraq, and declared that Iraq's 'constructive' 
co-operation with UNSCOM was the only 'true and realistic path' leading to the 
lifting of sanctions. 96 
However, Moscow's reprimand remained unnoticed in Baghdad, and on 
29 October, the Iraqi Revolutionary Council announced its decision to expel from 
the country all American citizens working for UNSCOM. 
97 The same day, Tareq 
Aziz in a letter to the President of the Security Council declared that Iraq was 
ready to resume co-operation with UNSCOM, 'provided that no individuals of 
American nationality shall participate in any activity of the Special Commission 
inside Iraq'. He further announced that Iraq would put this provision into effect on 
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30 October, demanding the American inspectors to leave the country within a 
week from that date. 98 To justify the Iraq's decision not to co-operate with the 
Commission, Aziz argued that UNSCOM was 'an institution influenced to a large 
extent by America's hostile policy, aimed at fulfilling its illegal and illegitimate 
objectives, ' and therefore was 'no longer a neutral institution operating impartially 
and objectively'. 99 
In response, the Security Council in an emergency meeting unanimously 
adopted a declaration that warned of 'serious consequences' if Iraq did not 
comply with its obligations, and demanded that Iraq co-operated with 
international inspectors without any limitations and conditions. 
In an effort to persuade the Iraqi leadership to reverse from its confrontational 
path, the deputy foreign minister Igor Ivanov invited the Iraqi ambassador in 
Moscow for a meeting, at which the latter was told that Baghdad's decision to 
limit the activities of the inspectors was considered by Russia as 
ý unacceptable'. ' 00 
On 30 October, Richard Butler, for the first time since the establishment of 
the Special Commission, decided to halt all activities of UNSCOM and 
announced his intention to postpone his visit to Baghdad scheduled for 7 
November. At the same time, he declared that the inspectors, including the 
Americans, would resume their normal work and would remain in the country in 
spite of the ultimatum. ' 01 
While the Security Council was able to reach rapid consensus on a strong 
verbal response to Iraq's defiance of UNSCOM, the Council members were 
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divided over the need for a punitive action against Iraq. Therefore, the infonnal 
consultations in the Council on 31 October first considered various diplomatic 
options, such as the dispatch of a high-level envoy to Baghdad and the extension 
of the suspension of the regular sanctions reviews. 102 Once again, Russia and 
France strongly opposed a military solution to the crisis and advocated a political 
settlement. Primakov, on his tour of the Middle East, declared in Cairo that Russia 
was 'against any use of force against Iraq', and referring 'some voices, 
particularly in the United Kingdom' that spoke about the use of force against 
Baghdad, added: 'We strongly object to this'. 103 
On I November, the French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin arrived in 
Moscow on an official visit. A joint communiqu& adopted after the consultations 
considered the Iraqi decision 'unacceptable' and called on the Iraqi leadership to 
reject it in order to allow the work of the Special Commission to continue. 104 The 
communiqu6 addressed the issue of the division of the Security Council on the 
Iraqi problem by stressing 'the great importance Russia and France attach to the 
unity of the Security Council on that question'. Furthermore, both countries put 
forward their preferred diplomatic option by declaring their support for the 
'intention, expressed by the Secretary General of the U. N., to dispatch to Baghdad 
a special mission of the U. N. to encourage Iraq to co-operate unconditionally' 
with UNSCOM. 1 
05 
Despite the French-Russian appeal to Baghdad, on 2 November, the Iraqi 
authorities barred two American members of the inspection team from entering 
Iraq on an inspection visit. This prompted Butlcr to issue the instruction to bring 
112 Ibid. 
103 Ibid. 
104 'Paris et Moscou: la d6cision irakienne 'inacceptable", Le Monde. 3 November 1997, p. 2 
105 Ibid. 
187 
these inspectors, as well as an American member of IAEA, back to the UNSCOM 
base in Bahrain. 106 When the following day, the Iraq, authorities hindered another 
inspection on the ground that that team contained U. S. citizens, Butler ordered the 
cessation of all inspection activities in Iraq, effectively freezing the work of 
UNSCOM. 107 
As a consequence, the Security Council on 3 November unanimously 
issued a presidential statement, warning Iraq of 'serious consequences' if it 
continued to defy UNSCOM. At the same time, Moscow repeatedly called on 
Baghdad to reverse its decision and return to 'normal relations' with the 
Commission. Such appeals were made orally and by written messages to Aziz, 
inter alia, by Primakov himself 108 The latter also asserted that Moscow was one 
of the initiators of the idea of a U. N. mission to Iraq. 109 According to Primakov, 
Posuvalyuk conducted a telephone conversation with the Iraqi leadership 
requesting it to receive the mission, ' 10 which had been appointed by the Secretary 
General Kofi Arman on 3 November and consisted of three personal envoys - 
Lakhdar Brahimi, the former Algerian foreign minister, Jan Eliasson, the U. N. 
Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs, and Emilio Cardenas, the 
Argentinean ambassador to the U. N. III 
However, the U. N. mission to Baghdad proved unsuccessful. At the press 
conference at the conclusion of the trip on 7 November, Tareq Aziz reiterated that 
the Iraqi government would not reverse its decision and handed the envoys a 
message from Saddam Hussein addressed to Kofi Annan. Focusing on the 
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misconduct of UNSCOM, it contained a set of demands on the composition of the 
Commission based on a strict balance among various nationalities, the suspension 
of the visits to the 'sensitive sites', the replacement of the U. S. U-2 planes by a 
plane from a neutral country, as well as the demand for the irnmediate lifting of 
sanctions due to Iraq's completion of its disarmament obligations. 112 At the same 
time, the Iraqi authorities proceeded with disabling the surveillance cameras and 
moving suspicious equipment from the sites under monitoring. 113 
While condemning Iraq at the U. N., Moscow supported the demands of the 
Iraqi leadership. On one hand, Russia attempted to obtain an 'adequate' reaction 
to any positive progress in Baghdad's conduct, and on the other hand it proposed 
to hold an emergency meeting of UNSCOM to discuss the ways to improve the 
effectiveness of the work of the Commission. ' 14 On 10 November, the Russian 
Foreign Ministry issued a statement noting that Iraq's decision contravened the 
Security Council's disarmament resolutions, and declaring that Russia 'intends to 
take a firm stand in favour of lifting the restrictions Baghdad had imposed on the 
U. N. Special Commission'. ' 5 At the same time, the document emphasised that 
Moscow would firmly oppose attempts to use the growing tensions between Iraq 
and the international community to justify military action against Iraq. Instead, it 
envisaged a solution in which the Iraqi leadership would lift the restriction of the 
Commission's activities, while the latter carried out its work 'without any 
artificial delays'. The Security Council was to evaluate objectively the progress 
made in disan-ning Iraq. 
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The same day in Beijing, after the Summit meeting between Yeltsin and 
Jiang Zemin, the Russian and the Chinese foreign ministers urged Baghdad to 
fully comply with all U. N. resolutions and called on all nations to show 
restraint. 116 A Russian spokesman in reiterating Moscow's position stated that 
Russia 'wants to express our decisive opposition to using the U. N. Security 
Council as a cover for military strikes against Baghdad'. 117 
Indeed, recognising the waning support for its tough approach to Iraq, both 
the U. S. and Britain, 118 while not excluding the use of force, initially favoured a 
diplomatic solution of the Iraqi crisis. Following a meeting with the Russian 
foreign minister Primakov and the Defence Minister Igor Sergeyev, British 
Defence Secretary George Robertson noted that despite concerns of Moscow's 
conciliatory line towards Baghdad, Britain and Russia had 'exactly the same 
policy' in demanding Iraq to back down. 119 Explaining the U. S. policy, State 
Department spokesman James Rubin declared that Washington was 'prepared to 
go extra mile diplomatically if that makes other countries take a firrn action, if 
necessary, later'. 120 At the same time he admitted that it was 'harder and harder to 
sustain support as memories of the Gulf War fade'. 
However, with the failure of the U. N. mission and the continuing Iraqi 
defiance of the U. N., Washington and London adopted a finner stance. While the 
British Defence Secretary argued that Saddam Hussein ought to not be allowed to 
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flout the world opinion, the U. S. Vice-President Al Gore declared that it was not 
up to Iraq to decide the composition of the inspection team. 
121 At the U. N. 
Security Council, the U. S. and Britain proposed a draft resolution that declared 
Iraq in 'material breach' of its obligations, providing a legal fon-nula for a military 
action against Iraq. In view of their respective positions in the crisis, Russia, 
France and China objected to this wording, 122 forcing the U. S. to water down the 
proposal by mentioning the unspecified 'further measures' against Iraq in case of 
continuing defiance. 
The resulting Security Council Resolution 1137, adopted unanimously on 
12 November, imposed new sanctions on Iraq, such as the foreign travel ban on 
Iraqi officials, cancelled the regular sanctions reviews until April 1998, and 
reiterated that the sanctions were to remain in place until UNSCOM certified that 
Iraq was free ftom prohibited weapons. ' 23 At the same time, the resolution made 
the lifting of the ban dependent on Butler's report that Iraq had given inspectors 
'immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to any and all areas, facilities, 
equipment, records and means of transportation which they wish to inspect'. 
124 
Even though the U. S. and Britain failed to include a fon-nula for the use of 
force in the document, they considered military action to be authorised already 
under existing U. N. resolutions and reinforced by the vague wording of 'further 
action' against Iraq if the latter did not rescind its order to expel the Americans. In 
contrast, the Russian representative at the U. N. Lavrov before the vote stated that 
the projected resolution did not contain any fon-nulations 'that could one way or 
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another lead to the adoption of force measures and attempts to use the U. N. to 
justify them'. 125 Similarly, speaking to reporters after the vote on 13 November, 
he argued that any proposal for the use of force had to be approved by the 
Security Council. 
In an unusual agreement with the Foreign Ministry and the President on 
Russia's position toward the Iraqi crisis, the State Duma on 14 November adopted 
the resolution 'On the exacerbation of the situation involving the republic of Iraq', 
in which it echoed the previous Russian statements by declaring that the Duma 
'categorically rejects a forcible solution of the international conflict' and 'believes 
that the use of military force ... should 
be considered only as an extreme last 
resort'. 126 The Duma advised the President to take all necessary measures to 
prevent the military solution of the crisis. It recommended Yeltsin to raise the 
question of the lifting of sanctions against Iraq at the Security Council, as well as 
the rescinding of the U. N. resolution 1134. Earlier, reflecting Russia's general 
attitude to the Iraqi crisis, a commentator in Krasnaya Zvezda asked: 'Why not 
accept the Iraqi demands? Would Washington's authority be damaged if it as a 
stronger and powerful state showed a gesture of goodwillT, concluding that the 
cwisest step would be to give Iraq a chance to light a fire at the end of the 
tunnel. 127 
Perhaps with the same questions in mind, the Iraqi authorities turned away 
the American inspectors on II November and insisted that Iraq would not back 
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down. 1 28 Moreover, in response to the newly adopted U. N. resolution, Iraq on 13 
November ordered the U. S. personnel to leave the country 'Immediately today', 
prompting Butler to evacuate all inspectors from Iraq apart from a few instructed 
to super-vise UNSCOM equipment left behind, a decision which was strongly 
criticised by Russia, France and China. 129 
While rejecting a compromise that would allow Iraq to specify the 
nationality of U. N. inspectors, the U. S. and Britain on 17 November proposed a 
joint plan that promised to make more food and medicine available to Iraq and 
gave further guarantees on the eventual lifting of sanctions. 130 To assist in the 
negotiations with the Iraqi leadership, the British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook 
had a telephone conversation with Yevgeny Primakov discussing a possible 
Russian mediation, which in contrast to Primakov's previous shuttle diplomacy 
was to have a full backing of the Security Council. 131 
The British proposal, not reported in the Russian press, reflected the 
acknowledgment of Russia's growing role in the international arena under 
Primakov's leadership, and in view of Kozyrev's dubious dealings with Iraq 
during the previous crisis, was probably an attempt to involve Russia in a joint 
Western strategy on Iraq in order to prevent a unilateral deal between Moscow 
and Baghdad that would further weaken the unity of the Security Council. 
However, Iraq subsequently rejected the Anglo-American proposal because it did 
not address Iraq's objective of having the sanctions lifted, with the Iraqi foreign 
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Minister Saeed al-Sahhaf arguing that Iraq was not 'a camp of refugees' that 
132 
would receive 'small food' . 
A day earlier, the Russian ambassador in Iraq Nikolai Kartuzov received 
the instruction to forward a message from President Yeltsin to Saddam Hussein, 
in which the Russian President asked him to 'not only publicly confirm that Iraq 
does not reject the co-operation with UNSCOM, but also to offer the inspectors of 
UNSCOM to return to Iraq for the normal continuation of work ... in their previous 
,, 133 composition' . Yeltsin 
further emphasised that in case of Baghdad's positive 
response, Russia would undertake a number of steps to obtain the improvement of 
the work of the Commission, which in case of a constructive co-operation on the 
part of Iraq, would lead to the closure of the nuclear dossier. 
On 17 November, Primakov had a telephone conversation with the Iraqi 
Foreign Minister al-Sahhaf who informed him that following the discussion of 
Yeltsin's message in the Revolutionary Council, Saddam Hussein had approved a 
response to that message that could be brought to Moscow by Aziz. ' 34 The latter 
arrived in Moscow the following day and conducted talks with Primakov, 
Posuvalyuk and President Yeltsin. 135 
During the negotiations, having expressed dissatisfaction with the work of 
UNSCOM, the Iraqi Prime Minister first hinted, and after his subsequent 
consultations with Baghdad, directly declared Iraq's readiness to resume co- 
operation with the Commission, including the American inspectors, in return for 
Russia's promise to raise the question of the balanced composition of UNSCOM, 
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of special provisions for the inspections of 'sensitive sites' and the use of 
additional surveillance planes. ' 36 
In specifying Moscow's obligations, the joint Russian-Iraqi statement 
declared that 
On the basis of Iraq's fulfilment of the relevant U. N. Security Council 
resolutions, Russia, for its part, will energetically work for the earliest 
possible lifting of sanctions against Iraq, and above all, for putting into effect 
paragraph 22 of the resolution 687. To this end, active steps will be 
undertaken to increase the effectiveness of the Special Commission's work 
while showing respect for the sovereignty and security of Iraq. 137 
A few hours after Aziz's meeting with Yeltsin, Saddarn Hussein at the 
meeting of the Revolutionary Council reviewed the Russian proposals and 
adopted the 'adequate decision'. ' 3' At the conclusion of the talks, Primakov 
announced that 'a specific programme has been worked out which, we believe, 
allows us to avoid military confrontation and the use of military methods, and to 
move towards the liquidation of the crisis, of course, with Iraq fulfilling the 
coff esponding U. N. resolutions'. ' 39 
Having secured Iraq's concession, President Yeltsin instructed Primakov 
to meet the American, French and British foreign ministers to discuss the results 
of the Russian mediation. 140 Consequently, a meeting of the five foreign ministers 
of Russia, the U. S., Britain, France and China took place in Geneva in the night of 
136 Primakov. p. 317 
1ý7 Gomostayev, 'Russia Succeeds in Averting a New War in the Persian Gulf'. Nezavisinla. va 
Gazeta, 21 November 1997. pp. 1.4 
139 Markushin. 'Russian Diplomacy Has a Chance to Show itself, Krasnall-a Zvezda, 20 November 
1997, p. 3 
1-19 Reuters, 'Russia Claims Plan to End Iraq Crisis', Financial Tinies, 19 November 1997, p. 6 
140 Ibid. 
195 
20 November, at which Primakov outlined the blueprint agreed with Iraq for 
ending the crisis. 
141 
The joint statement issued at the conclusion of the meeting emphasised 
'the importance of united efforts by the five permanent members of the U. N. 
Security Council towards the unconditional and complete fulfilment by Iraq of all 
relevant resolutions of the U. N. Security Council'. It welcomed Russia's 
diplomatic initiatives undertaken in contact with other Security Council members 
and expressed hope that it would lead to the rescinding of the Iraqi decision. 
Commenting on the talks in Geneva, the Russian foreign minister regarded 
them as a 'great success for Russian diplomacy, the one that is recognised 
absolutely by everyone'. 142 The same sentiment was echoed in the Russian press 
that proudly reported on Primakov's talks with Aziz, viewing Russia's mediation 
as a unique chance to play a 'visible and advantageous role' in the prevention of a 
military conflict 143 and as an opportunity to strengthen its positions in the Middle 
East. 144 Nezavisimaya Gazeta asserted that 'this success is the first of its kind in 
the past few years', observing that 'Washington has now been forced to content 
itself with a secondary role in a play a script for which it had tried to write'. 
145 
Similarly, the Western press perceived the successful Russian mediation as a 
'triumph for a nation that long felt neglected in the wake of its lost empire', 146 and 
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a 'reassertion of its [Russia's] right to be seen as something more than an ailing 
intemational giant'. 1 47 
Following up its promise to Iraq to support the restructuring of UNSCOM, 
aimed essentially at reducing the U. S. influence and undercutting the power of 
Richard Butler, Moscow urged to convene a meeting of the commissioners who 
provided technical advice to UNSCOM in order to transforin the advisory council 
into a governing body with the powers to provide political direction to Butler. 
Consequently, at the U. N. close door emergency meeting on 21 November, at 
which the commissioners reviewed the inspection efforts in Iraq and considered 
the ways to improve the effectiveness of the Commission, Russia proposed to 
increase the number of inspectors as a way to broaden the membership of the 
inspection teams. 148 Supported by China, Moscow demanded Iraq to be declared 
free of nuclear weapons and nearly free of prohibited missiles. 149 The Russian 
representative Gennady Gavrilov argued that Iraq was substantially disarmed, and 
that many of the concerns raised by the commissioners were 'illusory'. 150 
However, the UNSCOM commissioners rejected Russia's demands, instead 
proposing the toughening of the inspection regime, and in a report to the Security 
Council endorsing the Anglo-American view that Iraq had a long way to go to 
comply with its disarmament obligations. 151 
Meanwhile, Washington and London declared that Moscow's promise to 
work for the end of the sanctions against Iraq did not bind them. The U. S. 
ambassador to the U. N., Bill Richardson, argued that the U. S. and the U. N. 'have 
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made no deal, no concession. No carrots have been offered. We are not ready to 
lift the sanctions until all Security Council resolutions are complied with'. 152 
The U. S. also continued its military build-up in the Gulf. According to the 
U. S. Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, the U. S. had to be 'sure' that Saddam 
Hussein was serious about reversing his course. 153 On 23 November, President 
Clinton in a telephone conversation with the Russian President expressed the 
gratitude for the Russian efforts, but rejected Russia's call for the easing of 
sanctions because Iraq continued to impede the work of the inspectors, and cited 
Butler's report that Iraq continued to block access to suspected sites. 1 54 In his 
view, the ultimate judgement about the Iraqi compliance had to be made by the 
technical experts of UNSCOM, and not diplomats and politicians. 
Nevertheless, Russia continued, albeit unsuccessfully, to step up pressure 
at the U. N. to accelerate the progress of declaring Iraq free of prohibited weapons. 
When on 24 November, the Security Council planned to issue a letter thanking the 
Commission board for its report and the recommendations, Russia blocked the 
letter, demanding the adoption of a longer statement. Moscow proposed to list the 
Iraqi accomplishments and place the emphasis on the board's requests to the 
executive chain-nan, in particular the request for the latter to immediately travel to 
Baghdad for talks. 155 However, faced with the strong Anglo-American opposition 
to its proposals, but more importantly, with new tensions related to Iraq's refusal 
to admit the inspectors, who have returned to the country on 21 November, to the 
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4sensitive sites', Moscow temporarily backed away from its campaign to ease 
sanctions against Baghdad. 156 
Yet, an indication that Moscow still adhered to its promises made to the 
Iraqi leadership was provided by the deputy foreign minister Viktor Posuvalyuk, 
who in an interview, when asked about a possibility of another Iraq crisis, replied: 
While it is difficult to forecast anything, it is easier to plan our actions. On 
one side, they will be directed at demanding Iraq to fully fulfil its obligations, 
on the other side, at giving it signals that show that the international 
community was not deaf to the progress that was being achieved. 157 
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Chapter 6: Russia and the UNSCOM crisis, 1998-1999 
Yes, we can use the right of veto once, and we can use the right of veto twice. And what 
will happen? This would lead to the fact that other countries would disregard the U. N. 
and would start acting in circumventing us. What use would it be then to get angry? It is 
necessary to reach a compromise. 
Russia's representative at the U. N. Security Council Sergel Lavrov' 
Even though Baghdad's confrontation with U. N. Special Commission in 
autumn 1997 was resolved by political means, it was widely recognised that in 
spite of Iraq's decision to allow the inspector teams to return to the country in 
their previous composition and resume their disan-nament work, the crisis was far 
from over. 2 Not only had the recent events highlighted the intensifying 
disagreements between the Security Council members, in particular the U. S. and 
Russia, on how to deal with Iraq, but they also demonstrated Iraq's growing 
frustration with the sanctions regime, and its willingness to initiate new crises to 
turn attention to the Iraqi question. 
Not surprisingly, therefore, while the issue of the effectiveness of 
UNSCOM and the ways to improve its work was heatedly debated at the U. N. 
Security Council in the second half of November 1997, Baghdad yet again barred 
the inspectors from visiting certain suspicious sites on the grounds that it would 
infringe the country's security and national pride. Already in September, an 
Lavrov in conversation with the journalist Leonid Mletchin. quoted in Mlechin, Yelgeny 
Primakov. - a Historýý qf a Career, (Moscow: Zentropoligraph, 1999), p. 308 2 Michael Gordon, 'An Ex-Spy Master Revives Russia's Mideast Influence', Nell, York Times, 21 
November 1997, p. 17; Martin Woollacott, 'Diplomatic Cloak that Hides the Coming Crisis with 
Iraq', The Guardian, 22 November 1997, p. 23 
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inspection team, entrusted with the inspection of the Special Security 
Organisation headquarters, a military unit responsible for protecting Saddam 
Hussein, was threatened at gunpoint at the site. At the time, explaining the 
behaviour of the Iraqi authorities to the Commission's executive chain-nan 
Richard Butler, the Iraqi Prime Minister Tareq Aziz argued that the building 
constituted a part of a 'presidential site', which 'for the reason of the national 
dignity and sovereignty of Iraq', could 'never' be visited by the Special 
Commission. 3 As Butler reported, it was the first time that Iraqi authorities 
introduced the notion of 'presidential sites', making it clear that that were 'definite 
4 limits to Iraq's willingness to co-operate with the Special Commission' . 
As the Security Council, faced with this new obstacle to the inspection 
regime, was discussing how to obtain access to more than 70 sites declared off- 
limit by the Iraqi authorities, Saddam Hussein in an attempt to exacerbate 
divisions among the Secunty Council members and responding 'to the lies and 
fabrications issued by the American officials', 5 in a statement broadcast by the 
Iraqi Television on 26 November declared himself ready to open his palaces to the 
U. N. officials. He offered 'to invite two representatives for all the countries 
represented in U. N. Special Commission and five others for each of the permanent 
members of the Security Council, including experts and ambassadors, and host 
them in these palaces for a week, or more'. 6 Whereas Russia would have certainly 
accepted the Iraqi offer, the U. S. and Britain rejected the proposition, with the 
3 Richard Butler, The Greatest Threat, Iraq, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the Crisis of 
Global Security, (New York: Public Affairs, 2000), p. 89 
4 Ibid. 
5 Barbara Crossette, 'Iraq Opens its Palaces (But not to Those U. N. Inspectors)', New York- Times, 
27 November 1997, p. 3 
6 Julian Borger, 'Iraq Invites U. N. to Palaces', The Guardian, 27 November 1997, p. 16 
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British ambassador to the U. N., Sir John Weston, observing that 'we are not 
interested in political tourism'. 
Not having obtained the expected reaction to its proposal, and failing to 
reach an agreement in that respect with Butler, who during his trip to Baghdad 
argued that he suspected some prohibited weapons to be hidden in these sites, Iraq 
on 20 December again attacked the executive chairman, accusing him of making 
'unobjective and inaccurate' statements. In an interview, the Iraqi Petroleum 
Minister General Amir Mohammed Rashid summarised the problem as 'looking 
for a black cat in a dark room, when there is no cat' and asked: 'How do you look 
for something that does not exi st? 'S At the same time, Iraq threatened to cease co- 
operation with the Special Commission unless sanctions were lifted within four 
months, the governmental newspaper Al-Thawra declaring that Iraq 'has lost 
patience' with Butler and UNSCOM. 9 
In mid-January, the Iraqi authorities initiated a further confrontation with 
UNSCOM by blocking the inspections led by Scott Ritter, accusing him of being 
a spy. 10 In response, the Security Council expressed its support for the Special 
Commission and its chairman, and endorsed the latter's proposal to travel to 
Baghdad to convey to the Iraqi leadership the Council's views on Iraq's attempts 
to limit access to the 'presidential sites'. Butler also used the occasion to voice his 
rejection of Iraq's deadline for the inspections to be completed, arguing that it 
would make 'no practical sense', and that 'it will end when it ends'. 11 
7 Borger, The Guardian, 27 November 1997, p. 16 
81 Iraq Again Upbraids U. N. Arms Monitor', Neit, York Times, 21 December 1997, p. 15 9 Michael Theodoulou, 'Arms Check Chief Rejects Iraqi Deadline', The Times, 20 January 1998, 
overseas news 
'0 For Scott Ritter's account of the U. N. inspections and his work in UNSCOM, Scott Ritter, 
Endgaine. - Solving the Iraqi Crisis. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999) 
11 Ibid. 
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Meanwhile, at the 5 th session of the Barents Euro-Atlantic Council held in 
Sweden, the Russian foreign minister Yevgeny Primakov, after a meeting with the 
U. S. Assistant Secretary of States, Strobe Talbott, made a statement, outlining 
Russia's position on the Iraqi crisis. He echoed the Iraqi dernands and called for a 
proportionate reduction in American representatives in UNSCOM. 12 At a briefing 
in Moscow on 21 January, the Foreign Ministry's spokesman Gennady Tarasov 
reported that a list of about 60 Russian experts had already been submitted to the 
officials of the Special Commission. ' 3 Similarly, in an attempt to satisfy Iraq's 
objections over the use of the U. S. U-2 spy planes for the surveillance of the Iraqi 
territory for the U. N., the Russian Defence Minister Igor Sergeyev, during a visit 
to Paris declared that the Russian Air Force was ready to assist the Americans in 
that task, with the aircrafts and crews prepared for dispatch as early as February. ' 4 
However, in contrast to Moscow's accommodating policy on Iraq, and 
Russian Foreign Ministry's statement on 26 January that 'all scenarios providing 
for the use of force' were 'unacceptable and counterproductive', 15 Washington 
and London maintained their tough approach to Baghdad. They were prepared to 
consider a military solution 'if the diplomatic approach fails to shift Saddam 
Hussein's stance', 16 stressing that the 'diplomatic option was rapidly running 
Out,. 17 In fact, a senior Russian official reported in the Arab newspaper al-Hayat 
12 Andrei Smirnov, 'Russian Experts Could Get Anti-Iraqi Sanctions Lifted', Segodnya, 21 
January 1998, p. 6 
13 Ibid. 
14 Richard Beeston, 'Russians Offer Spy Planes for Gulf, The Times, 23 January 1998, overseas 
news; Vadim Markushin, "Presidential Sites' as the Main Irritant. Krasna. va Zvezda, 23 January 
1998, p. 3 
15 Phil Reeves, 'Iraq: Moscow Warns Against Using Force', The Independent. 27 January 1998, p. 
7 
16 Foreign Office Minister of States, Tony Lloyds, speaking to the Commons, cited in John 
Penman, 'Britain and U. S. Edge Towards Military Actions Against Iraq'. The Scotsman, 27 
January 1998, p. 12 
17 The U. S. State Department's spokesman, James Rubin, cited in Ibid. 
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that Washington had officially notified the Russian government that is was likely 
to launch an air strike on Iraq, targeting military units and sites. 18 
Concerned about the possibility of military actions against Iraq that would 
be adverse to Russian interests, President Yeltsin decided to dispatch his special 
envoy to the Middle East, Viktor Posuvalyuk, to Baghdad to meet top Iraqi 
officials and the Iraqi leader in an effort to persuade them to back down from the 
confrontational course. In commenting on Moscow's policy, Foreign Ministry 
spokesman Valery Nesterushin declared that Russia was 'sticking' to its 'constant 
line on Iraq; this is unchanged. The issue has to be resolved by political and 
diplomatic efforts'. 19 
Even though the U. S. did not object to Russia sending an envoy to Iraq, it 
was pessimistic about the Russian mediation, the U. S. State Department 
spokesman James Rubin arguing that 'the issue is not who the messenger is. The 
issue is the message: compliance, compliance, compliance and no more 
excuses'. 20 
In fact, the Russian government was itself aware of the difficulty of repeating its 
previous mediatory success. In his memoirs Primakov noted that 'in spite of 
Posuvalyuk's mastery, this task looked more difficult as during the previous 
negotiations because the issue of 'presidential sites' had not been included into the 
21 discussions before' 
. In the same spirit, several Russian diplomats in an interview 
with Izvestia expressed Moscow's frustration with Saddam Hussein, who 'in 
provoking another crisis', 'has very much let Moscow down', admitting that a 
18 Reeves, The Independent, 27 January 1998. p. 7 11) Laura Silber, 'Russia Tries to Head off Iraq Strike', Financial Times, 27 January 1998, p. 5 20 Ibid. 
21 Yevgeny Primakov, Years in Big Politics, (Moscow: Collection 'Very Secretly', 1999), p. 321 
204 
search for a compromise 'will now be far more difficult'. 22 
On his arrival in Baghdad on 28 January, Posuvalyuk told the Iraqi 
Television that President Yeltsin was 'deeply worried' about Iraq's confrontation 
with the U. S., and had sent him with a written message to Saddam Hussein, and 
instructions to discuss with Iraqi officials how to avert conflict over the 
23 inspections . During talks with the Iraqi leader, the latter allegedly expressed his 
gratitude to the Russian leadership for its efforts to find a settlement of the 
conflict between Baghdad and the U. N. The Iraqi Foreign Minister Mohammed 
Saced as-Sahhaf, speaking to the journalists after the departure of the Russian 
envoy, considered the visit 'fruitful and successful 24 but no breakthrough was 
announced. 
Consequently, the Russian foreign minister, upon his arrival in Madrid for 
a meeting with the U. S. Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, while still 
expressing optimism about a diplomatic solution to the Iraqi crisis, added that he 
was 'not sure' if Russia was 'able to do anything' to prevent the military action on 
Iraq. 25 Indeed, during the two-hour meeting at the VIP lounge at Bajas Airport, 
Albright, having received Primakov's report on Russia's mediation, showed 
herself sceptical, arguing that there was 'no concrete evidence Iraq is negotiating 
for anything, but delay', and stressing that the diplomatic options were 
, exhausted' . 
26 However, whereas the former emphasised that Washington's 
patience 'was running out', Primakov at the end of the joint press conference 
22 Konstantin Eggert. 'Moscow will be Hard-Pressed to Prevent Another Strike Against Iraq', 
Izvestia, 29 January 1998, p. 3 
2; , Clinton's Tough Words of Warning for Saddam', The Herald, 28 January 1998, p. 13 24 ITAR-TASS, 'Iraq Will not Tolerate Offences', Krasnam Zvezda, 30 January 1998, p. 3 25 Patrick Cockburn. 'Russia is Last Hope to Head off Gulf War', The Independent, 30 January 
1998, P. 19 
26 Eric Ritter, 'U. S. Calls for Military Action in Iraqi Crisis - Russia Sends Diplomats to Baghdad in Bid to Avert Armed Conflict', The Journal (Newcastle), 31 January 1998, p. 26 
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declared that 'we are a little more patient', 
27 
adding that it was 'only the beginning 
28 
of the process' . 
In line with that policy, Viktor Posuvalyuk, having briefed Primakov in 
Madrid, on I February embarked on his second mediation mission in Iraq, 
declaring on the Russian Television Station RTR that Russia wanted to do all it 
could to 'avoid a military and political explosion'. 29 Reporting on Posuvalyuk's 
mediation, Primakov asserted that the Russian envoy's task was to co-ordinate the 
general fon-nat of the inspections of 'presidential sites' with Tareq Aziz, whereby 
the project did not preview the dismissal of UNSCOM or Richard Butler, and did 
contain all the elements necessary for inspections. According to the Russian 
foreign minister, Moscow attempted to convince the Iraqi leadership that if it 
came to a military option, all the positive progress that had been made during 
previous negotiations was to be lost. Allegedly, Baghdad understood the Russian 
30 warnings, and made 'serious concessions' . 
Yeltsin's spokesman Sergel Yastrzhembsky, the following day had indeed 
surprisingly announced that Saddam Hussein had agreed to let the U. N. teams to 
inspect eight sites that they had been forbidden to enter on the condition of doing 
so as representatives of their governments, and not the U. N. and in the company 
of diplomatic representatives. The Iraqi leader also consented to meet with 
Richard Butler. 31 In emphasising the great role played by Moscow in peaceful 
settlement of the crisis, Yastrzhembsky proudly declared: 'As a result of efforts by 
27 David White, Laura Silber, 'Patience is Running Out, U. S. Warns Iraq', Financial Times, 31 
January 1998, p. 3 
" Cockburn, 'Iraq Crisis: Take Your Finger off the Trigger, Says Moscow', The Independent, 31 
January 1998, p. 13 
29 , Russia, France and Turkey Try to End U. N. Iraq Standoff, New York Times, 2 February 1998, 
P. 10 
30 Ibid., p. 325 
" Michael Specter, 'Russia Announces a Deal; Iraq Says 'No Such Thing", New York Times, 3 
February 1998, p. 8 
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Russian diplomacy, we can see a clear shift in the position of the Iraqi leadership. 
This shows vividly that the Russian leadership is right in thinking that diplomatic 
and political efforts in resolving the situation around Iraq have not been 
32 exhausted' . He also mentioned Yeltsin's efforts to solve the crisis by conducting 
'telephone diplomacy' on 3 February, discussing the Iraq problem with President 
Clinton for 25 minutes, and speaking to French President Chirac twice. 33 
Immediately after the Russian announcement, however, the Iraqi 
government in a statement read to the reporters, denied that any such agreement 
had been reached between the Iraqi President and the Russian envoy. The Iraqi 
deputy foreign minister Riyadh al-Qalsi emphasised that 'no such thing has been 
discussed. 34 The Iraqi statement in turn led to deep confusion within the Russian 
Foreign Ministry, with one ministry official admitting: 'I do not know who is 
lying to whom. But something strange is going on in Baghdad today ,. 35 Iraq's 
agreement to allow the inspection of eight 'presidential sites' was subsequently 
36 confirmed , 
but the reason for its initial confusion remained unexplained. 
However, the compromise did not represent a breakthrough in the crisis, as it did 
not provide for unrestricted and unconditional access to all identified 'presidential 
37 sites' as demanded by the U. N . 
Despite the failure to reach an acceptable agreement with Baghdad, 
Russia's commitment to a peaceful settlement of the crisis remained unshaken, 
while its opposition to the use of force against Iraq intensified internationally, but 
32 Ibid. 
33 Sergei Knyazkov, 'Possibilities of Political Settlement of the Conflict are not Exhausted', 
Krasnaya Zvezda, 4 February 1998, p. 3 34 Specter, New York- Times, 3 February 1998, p. 8 1ý Ibid. 
36 Vladimir Kuzar, 'Threatening Baghdad, USA is Threatening the Whole World', Krasnaya 
Zve--da, 5 February 1998, p. I ;7 Specter, New York- Times, 3 February 1998, p. 8 
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also domestically. The conservative deputy Vyacheslav Nikonov reported that he 
could not remember a time 'since the fall of the Berlin Wall, [when] events abroad 
became the main domestic issue. ' 38 He observed that 'the possibility of the U. S. 
strikes on Iraq and the death of the civilian population caused such political 
activism and anger in the political establishment that had not been observed even 
when thousands of Russians were dying in Chechnya'. 39 The parliamentarians 
postponed the discussions on the most important and heatedly debated domestic 
issue, the federal budget, and for two days discussed the adoption of a document 
on Iraq. In this document, they not only condemned any future use of force and 
called for a political settlement of the Iraq crisis, but also put forward a number of 
recommendations for Moscow's policy in case of U. S. strikes on Iraq, and most 
importantly, advocated the unilateral lifting of sanctions against Baghdad. 40 
The irrational conduct on the part of the Duma and the precedence given to 
Iraq over domestic issues of utter importance, once again demonstrated the special 
role of Iraq in Russian domestic politics as an indicator of Moscow's international 
status and an instrument of its relations with the U. S. More importantly, Iraq, as a 
highly contested issue, not only illustrated the ongoing debates on foreign policy 
orientation within Russia's political establishment, but also highlighted the 
generally-felt frustration with Russia's weakness and the loss of its superpower 
status. Despite its inability to influence the Anglo-American position on Iraq, 
Moscow wanted to believe that its diplomatic activities and mediation efforts 
contributed to the resolution of the Iraq crises and advanced Russia's objectives of 
ending the sanctions regime. 
38 Vycheslav Nikonov, The Epoch of Changes. - Russia in the Eves of a Consen, ative, (Moscow: 
Languages of Russian Culture, 1999), p. 711 39 Ibid. 
40 Kuzar, Krasnaya Zvezda, 5 February 1998, p. I 
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In accord with the pro-Iraqi mood of Russian parliamentarians, the 
Russian President on the same day made a statement in which he indicated that 
Russia was prepared to exercise its right of veto if the Security Council were to 
vote on the use of force against Iraq. Strongly criticising the American policy on 
Iraq, Yeltsin, reflecting the rumours printed in the Russian press that the U. S. was 
planning to use nuclear weapons in Iraq, warned that Washington's actions could 
lead to a world war: 
One must be careful in a world that is saturated with all kinds of weapons. By 
acting this way in Iraq, he [President Clinton] may run into a world war. He 
is making too much noise over this, too much noise. These weapons must be 
handled with care, and no threats should be made that Iraq will be inundated 
with planes and bombs. 41 
Continuing his diplomatic offensive, Yeltsin, on 4 February, also 
conducted telephone conversations with Chirac and the British Prime Minister 
Tony Blair, while Primakov talked on the phone to the U. S. Secretary of State 
Madeleine Albright. 42 Furthermore, in a letter to Albright on 6 February, 
Primakov argued that the adoption of any resolution on Iraq 'in the period when 
diplomacy efforts continue' would be 'counterproductive', making clear that 
Moscow could not support it. He stated that 'concerning the use of force, Saddam 
knows about it anyway', and inforined Albright that Moscow continued to 
conduct 'active work' with the Iraqi leadership', with Posuvalyuk remaining in 
41 Robin Lodge, 'Yeltsin Fears 'There Will be World War", The Times. 5 February 1998, overseas 
news 
42 Specter, 'Yeltsin Says Clinton Could Blunder into a World War', Neiv York- Times, 5 February 
1998, p. 6 
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Baghdad for this very reason. 43 
Baghdad appreciated the support of the Durna, and on 5 February, the 
National Assembly of Iraq adopted a decision to invite a delegation of Russian 
parliamentarians to visit unconditionally any 'presidential sites' of their choice. 44 
Having accepted the invitation, 45 26 Russian deputies accompanied by 120 
journalists boarded a Russian plane carrying 15 tons of humanitarian aid to Iraq 
without having obtained pen-nission to fly to Baghdad from the U. N. as advised 
by Primakov, and despite deputy foreign minister Ivanov's insistence that a flight 
to Iraq was impossible at that time. The plane was indeed grounded at Yerevan 
airport in Armenia after Iran refused to let the plane fly over its territory, 
providing Vladimir Zhirinovsky, a member of the delegation, with an opportunity 
to initiate a major controversy and engage in physical violence against Russian 
diplomatic officials. 46 
In the end, Russian diplomats in Tehran succeeded in securing an 
agreement on opening the airspace over Iran to Iraq, and reduced the number of 
passengers as requested by the Sanctions Committee, 47 making it possible for the 
deputies to continue their journey to Baghdad. This episode amply illustrated the 
clash between domestic Iraq sympathisers and Russian diplomats eager to present 
Moscow's approach to Iraq as balanced to the outside world. It also highlighted 
the disagreements within Russia's political establishment on the question of Iraq. 
The Russian deputy Alexander Yavlinsky observed, the situation was 
43 Primakov, p. 324 
44 Vasily Safonchuk, 'Hunters on Ostriches', Sovetskaya Rossia, 7 February 1998, p. 3 
4' Robert Serebrennikov, 'Deputies of the Duma Fly to Iraq', Sovetsk, ýýva Rossia, 7 February 1998, 
p. 3 
46 Leonid Gankin, Germady Sysoyev, 'Deputies Don't Make it to Baghdad', KoInmersant Daily', 
10 February 1998, p. 3 
47 Yuri Chubchenko, 'Zhirinovsky Mounts 'Cabin Storm", Kommersant Dail. v, 12 February 1998, 
p. 5 
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'humiliating': 'a parliament of a great country is sending a delegation, but is not 
allowed to leave the airport because the decision of its dispatch was Silly,. 
48 
In the meantime, Yeltsin embarked on an official visit to Italy. Speaking to 
an ITAR-TASS correspondent on the eve of his departure, the Russian President 
reiterated Moscow's position in the Iraq crisis, pointing to the fact that it received 
support from France and Italy, while Britain was 'still wavering a little,. 49 He 
indicated that Russia 'brought the U. N. into it', and that the U. N. Secretary 
General Kofi Annan 'has taken up the matter' and 'has agreed with the Russian 
position and proposal'. Expressing his optimism, Yeltsin emphasised that Russia 
would not allow the U. S. to conduct a military operation 'under any 
circumstances'. 50 The joint statement by the Russian President and the Italian 
Prime Minister Romano Prodi published on 10 February, despite the objections of 
some members of the Italian Foreign Office to its accommodating tone, called for 
a political settlement of the Iraqi crisis, and echoing Yeltsin's earlier proposal, 
51 
advocated a diplomatic mission by the U. N. Secretary General . 
However, Washington objected to this idea, with Albright in a telephone 
conversation with Primakov on 12 February considering it too early for Annan to 
travel to Baghdad, as such a trip would be counterproductive as long as Iraq 
refused to co-operate. 52 In her opinion, it was necessary to delay a U. N. mission 
until the U. S. was convinced that a real solution had been reached. In his turn, 
Primakov argued that if Annan went to Baghdad with a proposal, there was a 
greater chance that it could be discussed and accepted by Iraq. In preparation for a 
48 Gregory Yavlinsky., 'Duma Appeared in the Genre of Farce', On the situation in Iraq, article in 
Obchaya Gazeta, 12 February 1998, reprinted in On Russian Policy (Speeches and Articles 1994- 
1999), (Moscow: Epizentr., 1999), p. 292 
49 ITAR-TASS, 'Yeltsin's Road Also Leads to Rome', Rossiyska. ya Gazeta, 7 February 1998, p. 7 
50 Ibid. 
51 Primakov, p. 324 
52 Ibid. 
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possible U. N. mission, Posuvalyuk met with Aziz in Baghdad the same day. In the 
name of the Russian leadership, he made it clear that the Secretary General's 
potential mission had to succeed and that Moscow did not see any other solution 
to the crisis. 
53 
While trying to persuade Iraq to back away from its confrontation with the 
U. N., Moscow stepped up diplomatic pressure on Washington to show restraint. 
The Russian Defence Minister Igor Sergeyev, during a news conference in the 
aftennath of a meeting on arms control and other security issues, warned his 
American counterpart, William Cohen, that a U. S. military strike on Iraq would 
undermine efforts to improve military ties between Moscow and Washington, and 
that the U. S. was moving too hastily towards confrontation with Iraq. 
54 Sergeyev 
agreed that Iraq must comply with U. N. resolutions, but argued that there were 
compromises that would not undercut the inspections. He suggested that Russia 
could provide qualified inspectors to complement the international teams, or offer 
spy planes to join the American U-2 planes. Reflecting Moscow's concern about 
America's potential use of nuclear arms, Sergeyev expressed his worry about the 
possibility of the release of chemical or biological agents by any military attack 
that could spread to other countries, including the post-Soviet space. 
55 Reiterating 
Moscow's favourite idea of a U. N. mission and indicating that Russia would 
continue to press for its realisation, Primakov after the meeting with Cohen 
declared that 'one should not speak about failed diplomatic efforts and announce 
53 Ibid. 
54 Steven Lee Myers, 
February 1998, p. 8 55 Ibid. 
'Russian Official Scolds Cohen on Threats to Iraq', New York Times, 13 
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the verdict on this question before the visit of the U. N. Secretary General to 
56 
Baghdad' . 
Kofi Annan was indeed pushing for a compromise with Iraq by lending his 
support to a plan devised by Russia and France that called for 'white-glove' 
inspections of the living quarters of the Iraqi leadership. 
57 According to his plan, 
the U. N. inspectors would be accompanied by Baghdad-based diplomats from 
member states of the Security Council. In return, Iraq would allow the inspectors 
unlimited and unconditional access to other parts of the 'presidential sites'. While 
Moscow informally confin-ned that Baghdad was ready to accept the proposal, 
London signalled its support only if the special arrangements applied to the real 
presidential palaces within the SiteS. 
58 
At the same time, the Secretary General was consulting with the Security 
Council members over whether he should go to Baghdad. Whereas the U. S. and 
Britain appeared sceptical about the purpose of the mission, Russia strongly 
advocated the idea, and attempted to secure Butler's agreement to the diplomatic 
accompaniment of the inspectors to the presidential sites. The executive chairman 
of UNSCOM was invited to attend a meeting between the permanent Council 
members on 16 February, during which the Russian representative Sergei Lavrov 
asked him whether he believed that UNSCOM would be able to carry out its 
activities effectively if the 'presidential sites' were inspected with a diplomatic 
escort .59 
Butler replied that 'if the technical capability and responsibility of 
UNSCOM were preserved, he believed that the inspections could be conducted, 
56 Safonchuk, 'Annan Will Fly to Baghdad', Sovetskaya Rossia, 17 February 1998, p. 1 
57 Butler reported that the French were at some point even discussing the type of clothes that might 
be worn on those special inspections, the French idea of diplomatic accompaniment subsequently 
described in the U. N. corridors as the 'white-glove brigade'. Butler, p. 129 
58 James Bone, Theodoulou, 'U. N. Pushes for Compromise with Baghdad', The Tinles, 16 
February 1998, overseas news 
59 Butler, p. 135 
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but subsequently wrote a letter to the participants of the meeting refuting his 
earlier response. 60 
Angered by the latter's change of view, Lavrov wrote Butler a letter in 
which he rejected the idea of distinguishing between the palaces themselves and 
the wider areas around them, as advocated by Butler, and stressed that Russia 
4cannot accept the idea of abandoning the modalities for sensitive sites, which 
have been worked out as a practical solution aimed at providing UNSCOM with 
access, while taking into account Iraq's legitimate security concerns as stipulated 
in relevant Security Council resolutions'. 61 
To Moscow's satisfaction, the Security Council finally agreed to Annan's 
mission to Baghdad. However, while President Yeltsin in a joint statement with 
the visiting Chinese Prime Minister Le Peng insisted on a political solution to the 
Iraqi crisis that 'would ensure Iraq carries out in full the relevant decisions of the 
Security Council, ' Washington continued its military preparations. The U. S. 
warned that it would reject any agreement with Baghdad that deviated from the 
principles of unrestricted access to all sites, including the 'presidential sites, ' or 
that compromised the integrity of UNSCOM's work. 62 On the eve of Annan's 
departure, Yeltsin forwarded a message to Saddam Hussein, calling for maximum 
efforts to reach a compromise, 63 while Posuvalyuk continued the discussion with 
64 
the Iraqi leadership to secure Iraqi agreement with the U. N. Secretary General . 
In spite of wide scepticism, the Secretary General's mission proved 
successful in reaching a compromise with Iraq and resulted in the signature of the 
60 Ibid., p. 13 6 
61 Ibid., p. 137 
62 Christopher Wren, 'Annan to Go to Iraq to Seek Solution to Arms Impasse', New York Times, 
18 February 1998, p. 8 
13 Primakov, p. 325 
64 Gankin, 'Iraq Will be Able to Avoid a Strike', Kommersant Daily, 20 February 1998, p. 5 
214 
Memorandum of Understanding on 23 February between Annan and Aziz. 65 The 
agreement outlined Iraq's readiness to provide unlimited, unconditional access to 
all sites, including the territories of eight presidential sites, as long as the 
sovereignty, security interests and national dignity of Iraq was respected. The 
document spelled out the special regime for the inspections of the presidential 
sites, which were to be inspected by group consisting of high-ranking diplomats 
nominated by the U. N. Secretary General and the U. N. inspectors. 66 
The same day, the Russian President announced that the Iraqi crisis was 
'essentially resolved', and emphasised that Russia from the outset advocated a 
diplomatic solution of this crisis and opposed the use of force, 'since it would not 
have stopped with Iraq, but would have covered a larger area, and who knows 
who else would have been drawn into it'. 67 Speaking on Iraqi Television on 25 
February, Tareq Aziz expressed particular gratitude to Russia and President 
Yeltsin for Moscow's consistent political support. 68 
While Russia considered the imminent threat of a military action to be 
over, the closed-door consultations in the Security Council on the project 
resolution for the realisation of the Memorandum indicated a deep division on that 
issue. The U. S. and Britain considering the language of the memorandum too soft, 
insisted on the inclusion in the text of the threat of the use of force in case of 
Iraq's non-compliance with the Annan-Aziz agreement. In contrast, Russia, 
France and China advocated the inclusion of a formula that previewed that any 
military operation against Iraq could only be authorised by a special decision of 
65 1 In the Last Hours', Sovetskaya Rossia. 24 February 1998, p. 3 
66 Full text of the Memorandum in Butler. pp. 141-142 
67 , Iraq Crisis Resolved', Rossýyskie Vesti, 24 February 1998, p. 1 
6' Leonid Velekhov, 'Baghdad Wants Peace But Prepares for War'. Segodn. Ya, 26 February 1998, 
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the Council on the basis of a separate resolution. In explaining Moscow's 
position, Lavrov told a NTV correspondent: 'We consider it not right to threaten 
Iraq now, thereby putting into doubt the agreement reached by the U. N. Secretary 
69 General' . 
Even though the Security Council unanimously endorsed Annan's 
agreement with Baghdad on 2 March by Resolution 1154, without authorising an 
automatic military response in case of Iraq's non-compliance, 70 Washington 
argued that it did not prohibit the use of force, which the U. S. considered to 
already exi St. 71 However, Moscow regarded the resolution as a success for 
Russian diplomacy, and Foreign Ministry officials considered the formula 
4 severest consequences' as a political warning rather than the threat of the use for 
force. 
In a statement issued on 3 March, the Foreign Ministry spokesman 
Gennady Tarasov expressed Moscow's satisfaction with the resolution, as it 
'clearly offers a light at the end of the tunnel, by affirming that, with respect to the 
current sanctions regime, the Security Council will be guided by the provisions of 
, 72 the Resolution 687, including paragraph 22 . Underlining the importance of Iraq 
in Russian domestic politics, a group of Russian diplomats who directly 
participated in the settlement of the Iraq crisis, among them, Viktor Posuvalyuk 
73 
and the Russian ambassador in Iraq, was nominated for high state awards . 
Having assisted in the political settlement of Iraq's confrontation with 
UNSCOM, Moscow also stepped up its efforts to expand its influence on the 
69 Safonchuk, 'After Storm', They Desire a 'Thunder", Sovetskaya Rossia, 3 March 1998, p. 1 70 United Nations Security Council Resolution It 54 S/RES/I 154 (1998) 
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Special Commission. It requested the Secretary General to appoint a Russian co- 
deputy to Richard Butler, 74 in spite of American insistence that the Commission 
was perfortning effectively and there was no need to change its existing make- 
75 
up. 
At the same time, Sergei Lavrov also asked for a ruling frorn the U. N. 's 
most senior lawyer on whether UNSCOM officials were breaking the staff rules 
when they spoke to the press about alleged Iraqi deceit. The move was perceived 
at dislodging two Russian inspectors, Nikita Smidovich 76 and Igor Mitrokhin 77 
who had tense relations with Moscow due to their participation in what was latter 
described by the Russian government as the 'most aggressive inspections , 78 in 
order to replace them with more complaint experts. 79 Implicitly indicating what 
was expected of Russian inspectors in Iraq, a Duma deputy, commenting the 
inspections of the 'presidential sites' in April 1998 in Sovetskaya Rossia, argued 
that Russian diplomats 'showed maximum efforts in assisting Iraq to withstand 
74 Crossette, 'Russia Seeking Senior Role on Inspection Teams in Iraq', Neiv York Times, 7 March 
1998, p. 4 
75 Reutov, 'Moscow's Man in Special Commission on Iraq', Ne. -avisimqya Gazeta, 12 March 
1998, p. 2 
76 Smidovich, whose encyclopaedic knowledge of Iraq's missile programme had made him 
unpopular in Iraq, was described by David Underwood, chief of the State Department's UNSCOM 
support, as 'the ultimate diplomat'. He was Ekeus' prot&g6, dating back to the time when they 
worked together on disarmament issues in Vienna, and worked in a team with Scott Ritter, 
frequently serving as chief interlocutor with Iraqi counterparts, such as Amer Rashid. Barton 
Gellman, 'Saddam's Concealment Strategy', Washington Post, 11 October 1998, p. 1; Interview 
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the U. S. pressure' and to 'pass this humiliating procedure of inspections, 
elaborated within the walls of the Security Council under Washington's dictate'. 80 
Despite Russian diplomatic activities at the U. N., the pennanent Council 
members, during the sanctions review on 27 April, voted to prolong the embargo 
on the basis of Butler's report that cited 'virtually no progress' over the past six 
months in the efforts to detennine if Iraq has dismantled its chemical and 
biological weapons programmes, 81 and in spite of UNSCOM's failure to uncover 
any evidence of the weapons programmes during the inspection of the presidential 
82 
sites in April 1998 . 
Nevertheless, as a result of a positive report by IAEA that declared itself 
ready to move from the inspections to the long-term monitoring, Moscow and 
Washington reached an agreement in the Security Council under which the 
Agency was to submit a supplementary report by 31 July, requiring Iraq to answer 
all remaining questions about its clandestine nuclear programme. 83 Concerning 
the other disannament files, it was agreed that Butler be requested to give a 
'technical briefing' to the Security Council in early June to assess the work that 
needed to be conducted before the closure of the dossiers. 94 
After Butler's talks with Iraqi officials in New York and Baghdad aimed at 
reaching an agreement on the disarmament procedure, Iraq on 16 June agreed to 
the 'road map' -a two-month work schedule proposed by the executive chain-nan 
80 Yuri Nikiforenko, 'Not Found What They Were Looking For', Sovetskava Rossia. 14 April 
1998, p. 3 
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of UNSCOM that for the first time outlined the remaining areas of work under 
each of the missile, chemical and biological dossiers. 85 
Following the supplementary report by the IAEA that noted that Baghdad 
made no progress in providing information on its weapons designs, uranium 
enrichment or nuclear exports, Russia on 29 July unsuccessfully tried to put 
through a Security Council resolution that would declare that Iraq had complied 
with the demands to liquidate its nuclear weapons programme and was ready to 
move from intrusive inspectors to long-term monitoring. 86 
Insisting that Iraq was still hiding evidence, in particular on its chemical and 
biological weapons, Butler travelled to Baghdad at the beginning of August to 
propose to Iraq an 'accelerated work programme' on the verification and 
dismantling of Iraq's weapons programmes. 87 However, the talks collapsed after 
Tareq Aziz rejected the proposal. He requested Butler to report to the Security 
Council that Iraq had complied with the disarmament requirements and no longer 
possessed the weapons of mass destruction, demanding the immediate lifting of 
the sanctions. 88 
Following Butler's insistence that he had not the 'sufficient evidence to do 
that report', 89 Saddam Hussein in an emergency session with senior aides revoked 
the earlier Annan-Aziz agreement and decided to freeze all co-operation with 
UNSCOM and IAEA in protest of the ongoing sanctions regime. In a statement, 
he listed a number of conditions for the resumption of its relations with the 
85 Roula Khalaf, 'Iraq Hails Deal with U. N. to 'Close Files", Financial Times, 17 June 1998, p. 6 
96 Crossette, 'Russia Fails to Free Iraq from Intrusive Inspections', Neiv York Pines, 30 July 1998, 
p. 7 
Borger, 'Baghdad Talks Collapse', The Guardian, 4 August 1998, p. 12 




Special Commission. " In an attempt to diminish American influence over the 
disarmament work, the Iraqi leader demanded the dismissal of UNSCOM, and the 
creation of a new executive bureau to direct the activities of the commission and 
the staff. The new office had to include 'an equal number of members 
representing permanent members of the Security Council' with a rotating 
chairmanship and Iraqi participation as observers. In turn, the Security Council 
was required to 'legally, politically and practically adhere to conditions that will 
respect Iraq's sovereignty and legitimate rights', including the 'no-fly zones'. 91 
In response, the Security Council on 6 August, condemned Iraq for ceasing 
its co-operation with UNSCOM and demanded that the Iraqi government reverse 
its decision, but refrained from taking any further action due to the divisions 
92 
among the Council members. In particular, Russia questioned the role of Butler 
93 
in the new dealing with Baghdad, hinting that Moscow wanted his dismissal . As 
Russian ambassador to the U. N. Yuri Fedotov argued: 'Sometimes, when you are 
in a deadlock, you replace the negotiator'. 94 
Following an August statement that instructed the inspectors to continue 
their work reporting any further Iraqi obstructions and that made a military threat 
in case if Iraq's non-compliance, 95 the Security Council on 9 September, 
unanimously voted to maintain sanctions against Iraq and to suspend all future 
sanction reviews until the country resumed co-operation with UNSCOM. 96 
" Theodoulou, 'Saddarn Revokes Arms Deal with U. N. ', The Times, 6 August 1998, overseas 
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Outlining Moscow's position on the vote, Lavrov explained: 'This resolution 
clearly speaks for itself. I believe it clearly states that the Council doesn't like the 
current situation'. 97 
At the same time, the Council declared itself ready to consider a 
'comprehensive review' of Iraq's compliance with all the relevant resolutions. 
This concept was for the first time put forward by the Secretary General in his 
conversation with Tareq Aziz on 6 August, when the fon-ner argued that it was the 
right time 'to stand back and make a comprehensive assessment of where we are, 
where we are going and how to get there'. 98 In October, Kofi Annan presented his 
proposals for such a review to the Security Council. He suggested that the review 
be held 15 days after Iraq's resumption of co-operation with UNSCOM and be 
conducted in two phases, the first focusing on how far Iraq had moved on 
disarmament, and the second considering Baghdad's compliance with its other 
U. N. obligations. At the same time, Annan not only proposed that the inspectors 
ought to provide proof that Iraq had not yet complied with all its obligations, but 
that Baghdad would also be allowed to make its own presentation to the Security 
Council. 99 
Essentially, the main question was henceforth not whether Iraq still 
possessed the weapons of mass destructions, but whether it 'constituted a military 
threat to the region. 000 Richard Butler claimed that 'while reflecting the thinking 
of the Secretary General's senior staff, it was apparent that the proposal had been 
largely influenced by Russia - and, even further behind the scenes by Iraq'. 
101 
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Indeed, both Baghdad and Moscow favoured the proposal in the belief that 
a review would demonstrate that Iraq had done much to eliminate its nuclear, 
chemical, biological and missiles programmes and in return could have the 
sanctions lifted, or at least modified. 102 In mid-October, Baghdad presented the 
Secretary General with a list of nine 'clarifications' containing demands of how 
such a review had to be conducted. In a new strategic move, Iraq, having 
discovered a growing sympathy for the plight of the Iraqi people suffering from 
the consequences of the sanctions in the office of the Secretary General, 
henceforth preferred dealing only with Kofi Annan himself. 
Similarly, Moscow increasingly relied on the latter to defend Iraq against 
the pressure maintained by the U. S. and Britain. Russia supported strongly the 
Secretary General's proposals, as they fully corresponded to its own ideas 
expressed during Primakov's meeting with Butler a year before. Moscow 
advocated a more flexible approach to Iraq, arguing that any assessment ought to 
take into account 'the tremendous humanitarian cost of sanctions and the political 
changes which occurred in the region since 1991', and insisting that the Security 
Council 'should acknowledge that a certain degree of incertitude [with regard to 
103 Iraq's weapons programmes] was acceptable' . In his memoirs, Primakov 
explained that he believed that the conduct of such a review 'would not only allow 
the discussion of the fulfilment of Iraq's obligations, but also set a path for the 
lifting of sanctions'. ' 04 
Washington and London were also willing to accept the plan, but in the 
belief that the process would backfire, providing for an opportunity to bold Iraq 
102 Youssef Ibrahim, 'U. N. Tries to Cajole Iraq Into Co-operating on Arms Inspections'. Nell, York 
Tirnes, 14 October 1998, p. 7 
103 Butler, p. 177 
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accountable for the failure to fulfil a broad range of its obligations. 105 However, 
they strongly objected to the proposed timetable for the commencement of the 
6 comprehensive review', to the burden of proof being placed on the Special 
Commission, and more importantly, to Baghdad dictating its rules to the Security 
Council. 106 Therefore, on the British proposal, the Council members in a letter to 
the Secretary General on 30 October expressed their intention to remain in charge 
of deciding the format of the comprehensive review, which was to take place only 
in case of Iraq's full co-operation with the U. N. inspectors. Even though the 
Security Council in that letter agreed to conduct the review in two phases as 
initially proposed, 107 Washington refused to include in the text the reference to 
paragraph 22 of the Resolution 687, hinting that the U. S. insisted on Iraq meeting 
all its other obligations apart from disarmament, before considering the lifting of 
sanctions. 
In response to that letter, but also reacting to the VX nerve gas report by 
UNSCOM, which concluded that fragments of missiles in Iraq showed the traces 
of the gas, which was confinned by independent laboratory in the U. S., Saddam 
Hussein yet again hardened his stance. On 31 October, he took the decision to ban 
the inspections of sites already checked and to shut down all the monitoring 
work. 108 According to Primakov, even though the Russian Foreign Ministry 
remained in constant touch with the Iraqi leadership via the Russian Embassy in 
Baghdad and the Russian representative at the U. N., Moscow was not infon-ned of 
that decision. He further observed that these 'saltos mortales' was a common 
115 Ibid. 
106 Khalaf, 'Iraq Seeks Details of Sanctions Review'. Financial Pines, 8 October 1998, p. 4 
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tactic of Baghdad, and that he had repeatedly warned Aziz about the 
unacceptability of such unexpected moves, 'especially if the Iraqi leadership 
wanted Russia to continue all efforts to diffuse the situation'. 109 
On 5 November, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1205, 
condemning Iraq for ceasing its co-operation with UNSCOM as 'flagrant 
violation' of its obligations and demanding that Baghdad rescind unconditionally 
and immediately its decision of 5 August and 31 October. The resolution also 
reaffirmed the Councils readiness to conduct a 'comprehensive review' once Iraq 
resumed co-operation with the Special Commission and the IAEA. I10 
While discussing the diplomatic options for the resolution of the Iraqi 
crisis, the U. S. continued its preparation for a military operation in Iraq. 
Following talks in Europe, William Cohen on 3 November travelled to the Persian 
Gulf for talks with America's Arab allies over the response to Baghdad. ' 11 On II 
November, the U. S. dispatched more forces and warplanes to the Gulf, while U. N. 
inspectors and humanitarian personnel were suddenly withdrawn from Iraq. 
Speaking at the Veterans' Day wrath-laying, President Clinton declared that, 
while the U. S. 'continues to hope that Saddarn will comply', 'we must be 
prepared to act if he does not'. ' 12 
Similarly, the British Foreign Secretary George Robertson warned Iraq of 
a military action. 113 Echoing his trans-Atlantic ally, Prime Minister Tony Blair 
109 Primakov, p. 328 
''0 United Nations Security Council Resolution S/RES/1205 (1998) 
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112 Khalaf, 'U. S. Boosts Gulf Force as Pressure Grows Over Strike', Financial Tinles, 12 
November 1998, p. 1 
113 Andrew Marshall, 'West to Deliver Iraq Ultimatum', The Independent, 10 November 1998, p. 
15 
224 
declared: 'we will act if he doesn't immediately come back into compliance with 
the U. N. resolutions and abide by the agreements he has made'. 114 
Concerned with the imminent threat of the use of force on the part of the 
U. S., as indicated by the evacuation of the U. N. personnel from Iraq, Russia the 
same day called for an emergency Security Council meeting to discuss the 
situation. In Moscow, the Russian foreign minister Igor Ivanov reiterated that 
'Russia considers that use of force will not provide a way out of the situation, will 
not pennit the solution of this problem'. ' 15 
At the same time, Russia continued to work behind the scenes to resolve 
the crisis by peaceful means. In Baghdad, the Russian ambassador Nikolal 
Kartuzov met Saddam Hussein on 12 November and forwarded him letters from 
President Yeltsin and Prime Minister Primakov containing an appeal to 
immediately resume co-operation with UNSCOM and the IAEA. 116 The official 
Iraqi news agency reported that the Iraqi leader told the Russian envoy that Iraq 
was ready to respond positively to any initiative which would meet its 'just and 
balanced demands', which would require the U. S. and the Security Council to 
'commit themselves to the letter and spirit of the resolutions'. ' 7 According to the 
report, Saddam Hussein admitted that his decision to stop co-operation with the 
inspectors was intended 'to get responses to Iraq's legal demands', and thanked 
Moscow for its effort 'in supporting Iraq's just cause'. ' 18 The same day, Iraq 
forwarded Russia, as well as France and China, the so-called 'nine points', which 
114 Khalaf, 'U. S. Boosts Gulf Force as Pressure Grows Over Strike', Financial Times, 12 
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contained its demands for the format of the 'comprehensive review', prompting 
Moscow's response that Baghdad ought not to raise its demands too high. 119 
Similarly, Tareq Aziz in response to Annan's latest letter to Saddam 
Hussein, which urged him to reverse his decision of 31 October and reiterated the 
offer by the Council to undertake a 'comprehensive review', on 14 November 
delivered a conciliatory letter to the Secretary General. The message contained an 
annex consisting of nine points, which outlined the circumstances under which 
Iraq would like the Security Council to open the 'comprehensive review'. 120 
According to Am, Baghdad's objective was 'not to severe the relationship with 
UNSCOM and the IAEA, nor to cease the implementation of its obligations under 
Section C of the Resolution 687', but 'to end the suffering of its embargoed 
people', and to obtain 'the implementation of paragraph 22 as a first step of lifting 
the other sanctions'. 
121 
The Iraqi Prime Minister further declared that Iraq was ready to engage in 
a 'comprehensive review', which had been proposed by Annan, but not in a way 
agreed by the Security Council under the pressure from the U. S. Baghdad was 
eager to engage in the review within 'a very short time' after the resumption of 
work of the Special Commission and demanded a fixed time-frame for the 
completion of outstanding disarmament issues if such were determined through 
'an objective study'. Thereafter, paragraph 22 of Resolution 687 was to be 
implemented immediately, without any Council member being able to impose 
additional conditions. 
122 
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During the ensuing debates on the Council's response to Iraq, Lavrov 
described the letter as indicating Baghdad's intent to resume co-operation with the 
U. N., arguing that the annex was simply a statement of its preferred position with 
regard to the 'comprehensive review'. The U. S. representatives, however, 
regarded the letter 'unacceptable', showing that Iraq had no intention to back 
down. 123 Richard Butler in his memoirs recalled that when the Security Council 
was adjoumed, he witnessed a Russian and an Iraqi diplomat in the corridor 
outside the chambers drafting Iraq's official response to the Council clarifying the 
meaning of the annex. 124 The 'j . oint effort' 125 resulted in a second letter signed by 
the Iraqi representative to the U. N., Nizar Hamdoon, which characterised Aziz's 
letter as a 'decree of the Iraqi leadership regarding the resumption of the co- 
operation', and prompted Lavrov to insist that the matter was thereby answered 
and closed. According to Butler, during the subsequent adjournment of the 
Security Council, Russians and Iraqis drafted a third letter addressed to the 
American representative to the U. N. Peter Burleigh, 126 which asserted that the 
annex of Aziz's letter was 'not linked to the clear and unconditional decision of 
the Iraqi government to resume dealing with UNSCOM'. 127 As a consequence, the 
Security Council, on 15 November, agreed to accept the Iraqi statements as a 
rescinding of its decision to freeze co-operation with UNSCOM, while stating that 
the Council's confidence in Iraq's intentions needed to be established by 
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'unconditional and sustained co-operation' with UNSCOM and the IAEA on the 
part of the Iraqi govemment. 128 
While the Iraqi declaration prompted President Clinton on 15 November to 
abort the air strikes against Iraq only 18 minutes prior to their launch, 129 both 
Washington and London vowed to launch military strikes if Saddam Hussein did 
not keep his promise to permit unconditional access to the U. N. inspectors. 
President Clinton warned that 'until we see complete compliance, we will remain 
vigilant, keep up the pressure and be ready to act'. Similarly Tony Blair stressed 
that Saddam Hussein was 'not a person we trust', and reiterated that it was 'not 
over yet' . 
130 The Russian representative Lavrov welcomed President Clinton's 
decision to accept Iraq's promise, declaring that it allowed the Security Council to 
reach consensus on its statement. 131 
Despite its promise to resume full co-operation with the inspectors, and 
despite the imminent threat of a military attack, Iraq on 20 November refused to 
hand over to UNSCOM documents on chemical and biological weapons and 
missile systems, which Butlcr considered necessary to a full accounting of the 
countries weapons programmes. 132 Stepping up its accusations against 
UNSCOM's executive chain-nan, the Iraqi deputy foreign minister Riyadh al- 
Qaisi wrote directly to the Security Council explaining that the issue of the 
documents had been successfully resolved under the previous chairman Rolf 
Ekeus, and arguing that Butler 'wants to manipulate the timing and substance of 
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the comprehensive review'. 133 In response, the Securlty Council took no action, 
agreeing to give Iraq time to show its intentions. At the same time, Russia blocked 
a British-drafted statement that Iraq's actions 'did not constitute full co- 
operation', with Lavrov describing the confrontation over the documents as a 
situation that had to be worked out between Butler and Iraq. 134 
By December, Moscow was pressurising Butler to end the period of testing 
and go over to the 'comprehensive review', and urged him to visit the Russian 
capital to discuss the progress of Iraqi compliance. Butler arrived in Moscow on 4 
December and had meetings with deputy foreign minister Posuvalyuk and the 
foreign minister Ivanov. Posuvalyuk argued that a military action against Iraq 
would solve nothing and would only lead to UNSCOM's disintegration. He 
therefore expressed his hope that the Commission would rapidly complete the 
testing period and move on to the 'comprehensive review'. 135 
Similarly, Ivanov stressed the importance of moving forward on the Iraqi 
question and emphasised the disastrous consequences of the use of force against 
Iraq. In his view, as the search for an unambiguous solution was 'probably futile', 
the main objective ought to be minimising the Iraqi threat to the region, while 
making sure that other countries, like Israel and Iran did not constitute a regional 
threat either. He warned Butler not to provoke a new confrontation with Baghdad, 
arguing that even though Russia was UNSCOM's partner, it was the latter's 
personal responsibility to avoid a crisis. ' 36 Finally, Ivanov argued that Butler's 
forthcoming report to the Security Council would determine whether a military 
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action against Iraq was to take place, therefore have an impact on Russia's foreign 
policy, in particular on the ratification of the START-2 treaty with the U. S. by the 
Duma. Butler was urged to bear this in mind as he wrote his report. 137 In 
Primakov's account, Butler at the meeting with the Russian officials appeared 
optimistic, and insisted that following the forthcoming review at the U. N., the 
Commission could close three of the four disarmament dossiers on Iraq. ' 38 
In the effort to speed up the beginning of the 'comprehensive review', 
initially blocked by the U. S. on the grounds that Baghdad had first to show full 
co-operation with the inspectors, the Iraqi press on 6 December repeated the 
demands for the rapid commencement of the process. ' 39 To secure Russia's 
support for its demands, Tareq Aziz travelled to Moscow on 7 December for talks 
with Igor Ivanov and Yevgeny Primakov. In defending Baghdad's position, 
Ivanov advocated a review 'without delay', arguing that it 'could bring us to the 
lifting of the oil embargo'. 140 
However, this appeared less likely following Butler's report to the Security 
Council on 16 December, in which the latter declared that Saddam Hussein 
continued to obstruct the inspections. 141 In particular, the report listed a number of 
Iraq's refusals to provide inspectors with access to certain sites, nor with 
requested documentation. It concluded that 'in the light of this experience, that is, 
the absence of full co-operation by Iraq', UNSCOM was not able not conduct its 
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disarmament work, and 'thus give the Council the assurance it requires with 
respect to Iraq's prohibited weapons programmes'. 142 
Visibly angered by Butler's report, Lavrov in his speech during the 
meeting accused Butler of 'lying' during his visit to Moscow, or in the report, 'or 
both', charging him with curtailing the inspections and tailoring the report to 
provide the U. S. with a justification for a military action against Baghdad, while 
'we were only weeks away from fully disarming Iraq'. 143 Lavrov also claimed that 
Iraq had co-operated greatly with UNSCOM, attacking the Commission's 
accounts of the Iraqi obstructions. 
Paradoxically, as the Russian representative was concluding his remarks, 
the Security Council was informed that the U. S. had launched a missile attack on 
Baghdad. 144 Butler reported that Lavrov 'seized the news', declaring that 'all was 
now revealed' and arguing that the attacks proved that the Commission helped 
facilitate American aggression. According to him, UNSCOM 'was dead, and there 
would be no point discussing the report any further because it was not worth the 
paper it was written on. ' When Butler after the resumption of the meeting asked to 
take the floor to respond to the Russian representative, the latter immediately left 
the room. 
145 
The Anglo-American military operation against Iraq known as 'Desert 
Fox', which targeted sites that could be used to store and produce weapons of 
mass destructions, 146 prompted harsh criticism on the part of Russia. It his 
statement issued on 17 December, President Yeltsin argued that the Security 
142 Excerpts from Butler's report in 'U. N. Report: 'Iraq Did not Provide the Full Co-operation', 
, Vew York Times, 16 December 1998, p. 4 143 Butler, p. 211 
144 Butler, p. 212 
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Council resolutions on Iraq 'do not give any basis for such actions', accusing the 
U. S. and Britain of 'brutally breaching the U. N. Charter and the generally 
accepted principles of international law, the norms and rules on responsible 
conduct of states in the international arena', thereby 'undermining the whole 
system of international security' with the U. N. as its central link. 147 He reiterated 
that Russia 'consistently undertook intensive efforts for the rapid settlement of the 
Iraqi problem', and expressed the conviction that 'the potential for the political- 
diplomatic solution-had not been exhausted'. The Russian President argued that 
the resolution of the crisis was only possible by political means and called for the 
end of the military actions, declaring that they could have 'the most drarnatic 
consequences' not only for the Iraqi settlement, but also the stability in the region 
as a whole. 
Similarly, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov who interrupted his visit 
to Spain and returned to Moscow, condemned the use of force against Iraq and 
warned of serious consequences if the lives of Russian citizens in Iraq were under 
threat. Arguing that 'no one has the right to act independently in the name of the 
U. N., or take on the role of a global arbiter, ' 148 he also declared that 'Russia had 
been forced to think about the real objective pursued by an action against 
149 Baghdad' . 
Conveying his displeasure, the Russian Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov, 
claimed that 'Russia's opinion was ignored' and missed out a meeting with 
147 , Statement of the President of Russia', Krasna " i-a 
Zvezda, 18 December 1998, p. 1 
148 Markushin, "Tomahawks' in the Role of the Global Arbiter', Krasnaya Zvezda, 18 December 
1998, P. 1 
149 Yevgeny Popov, 'The Masks of Peacekeepers Were Thrown Away'. Sovetska-va Rossia, 19 
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NATO officials to fly back to Moscow. ' 50 The Director of the Department of 
International Military Co-operation of the Russian Ministry of Defence, Leonid 
Ivashov, argued that if Moscow's opinion was be ignored in the future, Russia 
would be forced to change its military-political approach and could become the 
leader of those members of the world community who did not agree to the U. S. 
dictates. ' 51 
In a telephone conversation, the Russian Prime Minister Primakov asked 
the U. S. Vice-Presidcnt Al Gore to stop the bombing, while President Yeltsin 
remained unreachable by President Clinton who called him to discuss the 
situation. In an unprecedented move, on 17 December, Moscow in protest of the 
Anglo-American strikes against Iraq also recalled its ambassadors from 
Washington and London for consultations. In Russia, all political factions 
overcame their bitter disagreements to unite in their opposition to the U. S. attacks 
and abandoned plans for the ratification of the long-negotiated START-11 Treaty 
with Washington, which was scheduled for 25 December. 
In the Security Council, Russia was particularly infuriated by the fact that 
the attacks took place at the time when the Council was discussing the Iraqi 
question. 152 Moscow called the meeting of the Security Council to discuss the 
U. S. strikes and demanded the resignation of Richard Butler, accusing him of 
being dishonourable in his dealing with the Council and working together with the 
150 Michael Gordon, 'Moscow Orders U. S. Envoy Home to Protest Air Strikes', New York Times, 
18 December 1998. p. 25 
151 Jeanna Kasyanenko. 'Terrorists with 'Tomahawks", Sovetskaya Rossia, 19 December 1998, p. 
3 
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U. S. to set Iraq up for attack. 153 This echoed Primakov's view, expressed in the 
conversation with Al Gore, that the latter's provocative role made him unsuitable 
to deal with Iraq in the future. 
154 
Following the air strikes, Baghdad announced that it had decided to halt all 
co-operation with UNSCOM. Aziz, at a news conference on 21 December, 
declared: 'The weapons inspections were killed by the American and British 
missiles. I cannot give them another life'. 155 Instead, Iraq demanded that if the 
inspections work was to resume, UNSCOM had to be restructured to become 
similar to the IAEA, composed largely by international bureaucrats, and popular 
with the Iraqis due to its willingness to close the nuclear dossier. 156 
During the discussions on a statement outlining the Council's policy on 
Iraq, Russia in its version of the draft proposal suggested 'three important things', 
which fully rcflected Moscow's concerns with regard to the military operations 
against Iraq. ' 57 First, Russia was eager to preserve the central role of the Security 
Council in the settlement of international crises in an attempt to prevent any future 
unilateral actions by the U. S. That is why it demanded the statement to explicitly 
mention that the Council was 'in charge and remain in favour of political 
settlement of international crises'. Second, Moscow was pleased with the position 
of the Secretary General's office, which shifting its previous stance on Iraq and to 
Washington's dissatisfaction advocated a more flexible approach to the issue. 
Hence, the Russian draft statement emphasised that the Secretary General 'must 
153 Crossette, 'At the U. N., Tensions of Cold War Renewed', Neiv York Times, 18 December 1998, 
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continue to Play his important and meaningful role in the crisis'. Finally, Moscow, 
echoing Iraq's demands, was interested in establishing a precise plan and a time- 
frame for the completion of the inspections and the ensuing the lifting of 
sanctions, its draft statement pointing out 'the need for the determination of what 
needs to be done in order to resume the implementation of Security Council 
resolutions on Iraq'. ' 58 
Following Iraq's rejection of UNSCOM, the Security Council was seeking a 
solution to continue the inspections of Iraq's disannament efforts. While arguing 
that it was impossible to resurrect UNSCOM, France on 13 January, calling for 
the lifting of sanctions against Iraq, proposed replacing the Special Commission 
with a 'renewed control commission' which would have a preventative rather than 
investigative role. Paris also advocated the transition to ongoing monitoring and 
suggested the establishment of a financial surveillance system to watch Iraqi 
expenditures. 
159 
Similarly, Russia on 15 January proposed abolishing UNSCOM in favour 
of a new monitoring system, which was to be created 'within the framework of the 
U. N. Secretariat'. 160 In particular, Moscow called for the dispatch of an 
assessment mission made up of representatives of 15 Security Council members 
and international technical experts with the aim of agreeing with Iraq how best to 
resume co-operation. 161 According to the plan, UNSCOM would not participate in 
the new team, but solely provide some 'purely technical support' through 
individual experts taking part as individuals. Furthennore, all past weapon 
... Ibid. 
159 Crossette, 'France in Break with U. S.. Urges End to Iraq Embargo', New York Times, 14 
January 1998, p. 6 
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dossiers were to be closed and a new long-term monitoring system established, 
allowing the sanctions to be lifted. UNSCOM's base in Baghdad was to be 
replaced by a monitoring centre that was to house an export-import control group, 
built around the Commission's existing operations, which would watch the 
imports of 'dual-use' equipment into the country. 162 
With the growing calls for the lifting of sanctions, the U. S., by continuing 
to advocate the preservation of the existing inspection system and the right to use 
military force to endorse it, found itself increasingly isolated, especially since the 
core group opposing its policy - Russia, France, China, and sometimes, Brazil - 
was strengthened with the entry of two new Security Council members, Malaysia 
and Namibia, which were to hold seats for two years. 163 While rejecting the 
French and Russian proposals on the ground that any arms control system in Iraq 
had to remain independent of the U. N. bureaucracy, technically competent and 
have the freedom of action within the Security Council resolutions, 164 Washington 
offered to remove the limit on Iraqi oil sales under the U. N. 'oil for food 
programme', but maintained strict limits on what Baghdad can import. 165 
The tensions between Russia and the U. S. over Iraq further intensified as a 
result of Butler's regular report to the Security Council in mid-January in which 
he reiterated that Baghdad was still trying to actively conceal its weapons 
programmes. In an unprecedented move, Moscow not only effectively suppressed 
the publication and distribution of the report, but also called for Butler's dismissal 
162 Crossette, New York Times, 16 January 1999, p. 6 
163 Crossette. 'U. S. More Isolated in U. N. on Keeping the Iraq Sanctions, Neil, York Times. 12 
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164 Crossette, New York- Times, 16 January 1999, p. 6 
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news 
236 
and refused to recognise UNSCOM. 166 Following bitter disagreements over the 
Iraqi question, both Russia and the U. S. by the end of January finally agreed to 
support the Canadian plan for the establishment of three panels to review Iraq's 
relations with the U. N. 167 However, Butler's participation in the disarniament 
panel was vetoed by the Russian representative. 168 
By the end of March 1999, the disarmament panel concluded that because 
of Iraq's unwillingness to provide complete information on its weapons, the U. N. 
needed to continue to inspect, monitor and investigate the weapons 
programmes. 169 At the same time, the panel recommended the restructuring of 
UNSCOM, but refrained from calling for the dismissal of the Commission or the 
creation of a new body, as Russia and France had advocated. While Moscow was 
not pleased with the findings of the disannament panel, it welcomed the 
recommendations of the second panel that studied the humanitarian situation in 
Iraq and concluded that the 'food-for-oll programme' was inadequate. The panel 
further recommended foreign companies to be allowed to make investments in the 
Iraqi oil industry. 170 
Iraq rejected the recommendations of the three panels as they fell 'short of 
the goal, which should have been putting an end to the prolonged regime of 
sanctions', and provided 'the enemies of Iraq with the pretext for future 
166 Crossette, 'Iraq Still Trying to Conceal Arms Programmes, Report Says'. New York- Times, 27 
January 1999, p. 8 
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aggression'. 171 Iraq's refusal to co-operate in spite of the conduct of the review it 
had so eagerly sought, created a dilemma for Moscow, that on one hand called for 
the lifting of sanctions and on the other hand recognised the need for Iraq to 
resume co-operation with the U. N. 
The Russian frustration with the situation focused on the person of Richard 
Butler, whom Moscow considered as the one to blame for the state of affairs with 
regard to the Iraqi issue. Sergel Lavrov not only called the latter's latest report 'a 
waste of time', but also twice, on 8 and on 15 April, barred the executive 
chairman of the Commission from the Security Council discussions on the future 
of UNSCOM, by warning that he himself would not enter the room if Butler was 
present. 
172 
The disagreements within the Security Council, and in particular, Russia's 
unwillingness to accept any proposal that would not imply the lifting of sanctions 
on Iraq, resulted in a months-long stalemate on the future Iraq policy. By mid- 
November Russia became increasingly isolated in the U. N. as a consequence of its 
controversial and unclear position, which consisted in calling for the lifting of 
sanctions as demanded by Iraq, while proposing to somewhat strengthen the U. N. 
inspections, 173 in spite of Baghdad's calls that the system be abolished. 174 
In particular, Moscow refused to support a plan introduced by Britain and 
the Netherlands on 15 April that previewed the replacement of UNSCOM by a 
new inspections body - the United Nations Inspections, Monitoring and 
Verification Commission (UNIMOVIC) - with the task of conducting more 
"' Miller, 'Iraq Rejects Panel's Efforts to End Impasse on Security'. Nell, York Times. 9 April 
1999, p. 3 
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174 Tareq Aziz in a statement after the meeting of the Revolutionary Council on 20 September 
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intrusive inspections, while abolishing the limit on the amount of oil Iraq could 
export, 1 75 on the grounds that it 'would lead to the deterioration of the 
situation'. 1 
76 
Under the plan, UNIMOVIC was to commence its work in spring 2000 and 
following a test period would report back to the Security Council, which would 
make the suspension of sanctions dependent on Iraq's co-operation, subject to 
review every four months. The U. N. would also maintain 'effective financial 
controls' over Iraq's revenues to ensure that it was not used for weapons purchase 
or production. 177 It was further previewed that the executive chain-nan of the 
Commission appointed by the Secretary General would have the responsibility for 
setting the tasks Iraq had to accomplish and for judging the disarmament progress. 
The points of contention between Moscow, Washington and London with 
regard to the proposal focused on three main issues: conditions for the suspension 
of sanctions, the time-frame for the suspension and the linkage between the 
disan-nament resolution and the 'oil for food' programme. While Washington 
supported the British plan as it required a high level of compliance on the part of 
Baghdad, Moscow rejected it, instead advocating a mere demonstration of co- 
operation with the inspectors, but not a requirement of meeting all disannament 
tasks as a condition for the suspension of sanctions. 178 
In addition, in contrast to other pen-nanent Council members, Russia 
backed the reduction of the time it would take to consider the suspension of the 
sanctions and lengthening the time the suspensions would last. Secondly, whereas 
175 Bone, 'Lift Oil Limits on Iraq, Says Britain', The Times, 16 April 1999. overseas news 
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the U. S. argued that the sanctions could only be suspended after Iraq satisfied the 
'key remaining tasks' by disclosing the remaining information on its secret 
weapons programmes, Moscow was eager to obtain specifications in advance of 
what Iraq was required to do and set a fixed date for the suspension of sanctions 
by the end of 2000.179 
Russia also rejected the idea of linking the disannament policy with the 
subsequent phase of the 'oil for food' programme. The scheme was extended on 
19 November for two weeks instead of six months in order to give the Council 
time to decide on the broader disarmament resolution and on how it would relate 
to the programme. 180 Whereas the U. S., Britain, and, to some extent, France, were 
eager to have that resolution ready for vote before the expiry of the postponement, 
Lavrov who 'asked for a second chance to speak to make his point twice', argued 
that there could be no 'artificial timetables', or links between the two issues, 
accusing other nations of holding the Iraqis hostage to policy differences. 181 
Instead, Moscow, albeit unsuccessfully, ' 82 advocated the introduction of changes 
on the 'oil for food' programme by proposing to relax travel restrictions on Iraq, 
double the amount of money allowed for spending to upgrade the country's oil 
industry and advocating to allow Iraq more flexibility with the available funds. ' 83 
On the eve of the expiry of the two weeks extension of the scheme, Aziz 
travelled to Moscow for four days to hold talks with Igor Ivanov, the Prime 
Minister Vladimir Putin and the Russian representative at the U. N. Sergel Lavrov, 
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who returned to the Russian capital for that purpose, on the disannament 
resolution and the issue of sanctions. In particular, Baghdad was eager to 
pressurise Moscow to continue to oppose the inspection plan and insist on the 
adoption of a resolution that would lead to the lifting of sanctions. However, the 
Russian government made it clear that the adoption of such a resolution depended 
on Iraq's resumption of co-operation with the Special Commission, and refrained 
from making any public promises to the Iraqi leadership, 184 with Lavrov merely 
stating that Moscow was still studying the draft resolution. 185 
Interestingly, Moscow had earlier attempted to use its position on Iraq to 
bargain with Washington on the issue of Chechnya. 186 During the OSCE Summit 
in Istanbul on 18 November, the Russian foreign minister Ivanov forwarded U. S. 
officials a diplomatic paper requesting President Clinton not to raise the question 
of Russia's actions in Chechnya before the Security Council in return for Russia's 
flexibility on Iraq. However, Washington was reported to have rejected the 
deal. 187 This episode amply illustrated that Iraq was not only important to 
Moscow in econornic terms, as generally emphasised, but also as a political 
instrument in its relations with the U. S. It also indicated that Russia was willing to 
sacrifice its close relationship with the Iraqi regime in return for the preservation 
of its major interests on the post-Soviet space, considered as vital for the country's 
security, such as Chechnya, and later Georgia. 
Acknowledging the improbability of Moscow's vote in favour of the 
resolution, Washington and London concentrated their efforts in finding a 
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consensus that would avoid a Russian veto and at least, secure Russia's 
abstention. 188 In fact, the U. S. was interested in fixing a vote on the resolution 
before the end of the year, when five new members, four of which were expected 
to be less sympathetic to American policy on Iraq, were due to join the Council. 189 
In an attempt to resolve the dilemma of supporting Baghdad while allowing the 
resolution to go into effect, Moscow indeed decided to abstain. At the last 
moment France, threatened by Baghdad to end economic co-operation together 
with China also abstained on the vote of the Security Council Resolution 1284, 
which was adopted on 17 December. 190 
According to Lavrov, the resolution contained many weaknesses. To him, 
it was unacceptable to allow the repetition of the situation when the fate of the 
whole country was in the hands of an inadequate leadership of the foriner Special 
Commission. 191 The Iraq leadership was not pleased with the resolution either and 
a day later forinally rejected the new inspection plan, Aziz arguing that the 
resolution 'failed to meet Iraq's legitimate demand for a lifting of sanctions'. 192 
Paradoxically, in spite of the general belief that the establishment a new 
inspection regime for the disarmament of Iraq would bring the lost unity to the 
Security Council's policy toward Baghdad and would be more likely to 
accomplish the difficult task of liquidating the remnants of the country's 
clandestine weapons programmes, the question of the Iraqi WMD continued to 
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remain a major point of contention between the Council members, and a powerful 
driving force in the U. S. confrontation with Iraq. 
243 
Chapter 7: Russia's economic co-operation with Iraq 1996-2001 
If Baghdad had less oil, and the Russian companies were not attracted to the Iraqi 'black 
gold' pie, would Moscow break its spears in vocal arguments with the West? Is it 
possible that in this case the search for the Iraqi WMD would preoccupy our country 
much more than the attempts to free Baghdad from international sanctions? 
Russian commentator Vladimir Dunayev' 
If in the late 1990s, Moscow's political influence on Baghdad had 
diminished substantially compared to the Gorbachov cra, 2 Russia's economic co- 
operation with Iraq during the same period had intensified greatly during the same 
period. 
While Russia was eager to obtain the repayment of Iraqi debts and secure a 
strong position on the Iraqi market for the aftermath of post-sanctions era, 
Baghdad was interested in maintaining close relations with Moscow as a means of 
ending its international isolation. Whereas Russia was able to use the ongoing 
Iraqi problem as means of boosting its international prestige and increasing the 
sympathy for Moscow in the Arab world in order to re-establish economic and 
diplomatic standing in the region, Baghdad obtained a valuable partner to lobby 
for its interests at the U. N. Security Council. Finally, as Iraq enabled the Russian 
government to demonstrate domestically that it was pursuing an assertive foreign 
policy, and show internationally its ability to oppose the U. S., Moscow allowed 
Baghdad to conduct daring political moves to draw international attention to the 
Iraqi question in the knowledge of Russia's untiring efforts in assisting Saddam 
1 'A Selfish Friendship', Lvestia, 30 November 2000, p. 4 
2 Interview with the Russian deputy foreign minister and special envoy to the Middle East, Viktor 
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Hussein to retreat without losing face. 
Russia's economic co-operation with Iraq developed in three ways: the 
conclusion of large-scale contracts, mainly in the oil industry, to be implemented 
after the lifting of the economic embargo; agreements between the Iraqi 
government and Russian companies within the U. N. 'oil for food' programme; 
and illicit deals between Moscow and Baghdad, which surfaced periodically in the 
Western press, but were generally hard to prove. 
By the late 1990s, Baghdad stepped up pressure on Russian companies to 
implement immediately the bilateral agreements in spite of the U. N. embargo in 
return for extremely attractive terins. For its part, Moscow, too, was eager to find 
a loophole in the sanctions regime that would allow some realisation of the signed 
deals. The Russian-Iraqi Commission on Economic, Technical and Scientific Co- 
operation, established in 1993 to promote bilateral relations, remained an 
important mechanism for the facilitation of contacts between the Russian 
businesses and the Iraqi government, providing a framework for the conclusion of 
a number of important accords for Moscow's participation in the Iraqi oil industry 
and the reconstruction of the country's shattered economy. 
A new dynamism in economic relations between Moscow and Baghdad 
was provided with the start of the 'oil for food' agreement between Iraq and the 
United Nations in December 1996.3 Although this relief programme was 
established by the Security Council Resolution 986 on 14 April 1995 as a 
'temporary measure to provide for the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people, 
until the fulfilment by Iraq of the relevant Security Council resolutions, including 
3 Patrick Cockburn, 'Saddam Taps Back into Oil World', The Independent, II December 1996. p. 
9 
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notably Resolution 687', 4 Baghdad persistently refused its implementation 
regarding the ten-ns of the scheme as infringing Iraq's sovereignty and 
independence. 5 The agreement permitted Iraq to sell up to US$ I billion worth of 
oil every 90 days to pay for the urgent needs of the civilian population, while 
setting aside one third of the money for a compensation fund for victims of the 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and reserving US$130 million to US$ 150 million of the 
relief goods for the Kurdish population. 
Moscow supported the Iraqi opposition to the programme, arguing that it 
would make it easier to keep the sanctions in place indefinitely and remove the 
argument for the lifting of the embargo to provide for the needs of the civilians. 
However, the U. S. and Britain advocated the implementation of the plan for the 
very same reason. 7 Furtherinore, Washington and London were eager to impose 
strict procedures to prevent Saddam Hussein from obtaining control over the 
proceeds. Following year-long negotiations between the U. N. and Baghdad, the 
Iraqi government finally consented to the plan, 8 under a Memorandum of 
Understanding with the U. N. on 20 May 1996.9 
By that time, Russia had also shifted its position with regard to the 
programme, considering the scheme as providing Moscow with a great 
opportunity to increase economic co-operation with Iraq within the U. N. 
framework, while it was working to obtain the lifting of sanctions altogether. At a 
4 United Nations Security Council Resolution S/RES/986 (1995) 
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briefing at the Russian Foreign Ministry on 23 July 1996, Vladimir Andreyev, 
Head of the Information and Press Department, urged Russian organisations and 
businesses to become actively involved in buying Iraqi oil and delivering 
humanitarian goods to the country, promising the Ministry's assistance in this 
endeavour if required. 10 In September, Russian deputy foreign minister and 
special envoy to the Middle East, Viktor Posuvalyuk, argued that in view of 
agreements concluded with the Iraq leadership, Moscow was a leading candidate 
for closer economic partnership with Baghdad. ' 
In turn, Baghdad regarded the 'oil for food' programme as an effective and 
structured reward mechanism that would allowed it to apply stronger pressure on 
those governments who were interested in participating in the scheme. Iraq's 
choice of oil recipients was deterrnined by its ambition to influence international 
public opinion in favour of the lifting of the economic embargo, and later by the 
attempt to generate illicit income outside the control of the United Nations. 12 
By applying a preference policy in favour of companies from 'friendly' 
countries during the oil allocation process, Baghdad was able to exercise greater 
pressure on the Russian government to step up efforts at the U. N. to obtain the 
lifting of sanctions against Iraq, and made Moscow's status in the programme 
dependent on the latter's position at the Security Council with regard to the Iraqi 
question. This was amply illustrated by the visit of the Iraqi Prime Minister Tareq 
Aziz to the Russian capital on 4 March 1997 for talks with the foreign minister 
Yevgny Primakov. During the meeting, the latter once again expressed Moscow's 
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support for Baghdad's call for the rapid lifting of sanctions. ' 3 Satisfied that 
Moscow, in Aziz's opinion, took a 'friendly, balanced and fair position' towards 
Iraq, the same month Baghdad granted Russia most-favoured-nation status in 
selling the Iraqi oil. 
14 
Consequently, Russian companies purchased almost one third of the oil 
sold under the 'oil for food' scheme, whereby the Russian Energy and Fuel 
Ministry together with the Iraqi Oil Ministry co-ordinated the allocation of oil to 
Russian firms. 15 During the first phase of the programme, eight participating 
Russian companies were allocated 29.8 million barrels of oil out of the total of 
128.7 million barrels, compared with 12.42 million allocated to two French 
companies, albeit only 4.55 million more than the five participating American 
companies. 
16 
In the second phase of the scheme, the number of participating Russian 
companies increased to ten, with their allocation share reaching 40.2 million 
barrels of oil out of the total 129.09 million barrels, whereas the allocation share 
of the five U. S. companies dropped by 0.95 million barrels, and the two French 
companies were allocated 12.52 million barrels of oil. 17 In the third phase, twelve 
Russian companies participated in the programme, receiving the allocation of 
63.01 million barrels of oil, compared to 12.6 million barrels allocated to three 
American companies and 28.57 million barrels allocated to the same number of 
13 Marina Kalashnikova, "The Oil-Based Future' of Russian-Iraqi Friendship', Konnnersant Daily. 
6 March 1997. p. 4 
14 Natalia Gurushina, 'Russia-Iraq Economic Relations Get a New Boost, Radio Free 
EuropelRadio Libert 
,v 
Neivshne, 19 March 1997 
15 Paul Volcker. 'Report on Programme Manipulation', Chapter 11, p. 9 
16 Charles Duelfer. Contprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the Director of Central 
Intelligence on Iraq's WMD, 30 September 2004, Annex B, Figure 4, p. 1 
17 Ibid., p. 2 
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French companies. ' 8 Interestingly, during that period, the Russian Communist 
Party was for the first time allocated a large share of 13 million barrels of oil. In 
the fourth phase eleven Russian companies were allocated 89.6 million barrels of 
oil, 80.6 million more than two American and 45.6 million more than the four 
French companies that participated in the programme. In addition, the Peace and 
Unity Party, newly founded by Vladimir Putin, received an allocation of 5 million 
barrels of oil, a million less than the son of the Russian ambassador in Baghdad. 19 
In the fifth phase thirteen Russian companies were allocated 111.15 
million barrels of oil, whereas only one participating U. S. company received 3 
million barrels, and three French companies 40.2 million barrels out of the total of 
366.6 million barrels of oil. 20 During this period the amount of oil allocated to 
political entities and individual businessmen of various nationalities had increased 
dramatically. The number of Russian political parties receiving an allocation was 
also on the rise: Zhirmovsky's Liberal Democratic Party was allocated 7 million 
barrels, the Russian Communist Party 14 million barrels and the Peace and Unity 
Party 3 million barrels of oil. This trend continued until the end of the programme, 
when during its final 13 th phase, the number of Russian companies receiving oil 
allocation had decreased to five, whereas the number of political organisations 
and individuals allocated the Iraqi oil remained constant, with the Russian Foreign 
Ministry, the Peace and Unity Party, and Yuri Shafranik, the former minister of 
Fuel and Energy and the head of the Russian-Iraqi Friendship Committee together 
receiving a large share of Iraqi 01 1.21 
18 Ibid., p. 3 
'9 Ibid., p. 4 
20 Ibid., pp. 5-6 
21 Ibid., pp. 30-32 
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Consequently, Baghdad's abuse of the oil allocation process played a 
major role in influencing policy and behaviour towards Iraq on the part of the 
members of Russian political and economic establishments who directly profited 
from this system. 22 This was illustrated by the case of Vladimir Zhirmovsky, the 
leader of the ultranationalist Liberal Democratic Party. In 1997, he wrote a letter 
to Iraq's Ambassador in Moscow, in which he requested contracts from the Iraqi 
government under the 'oil for food programme', asserting that his party 'stood 
firmly against the enforcement of the U. N. economic sanctions' and describing 
how it had used its influence to persuade the Duma to facilitate more economic 
co-operation with Iraq. His request was granted, and between 1997 and 2002, 
Zhirinovsky made a profit of US$8.7 million. 23 
Similarly, the Russian Communist Party that since the Gulf crisis of 1990- 
1991 had shown itself an ardent supporter of the Iraqi regime, was from the third 
phase of the 'oil for food programme' onwards continuously rewarded with a 
large share of Iraqi 011.24 It was undoubtedly these economic interests that 
provided a great motivation for the Russian communist- and nationalist- 
dominated Parliament to advocate continuously Russia's unilateral exit from the 
sanctions regime against Iraq and apply a strong pressure on the Russian 
government and the Russian diplomats at the U. N. Security Council to step up 
efforts to obtain the lifting of the embargo. 
The pressure on the govemment was complemented by pressure on the 
part of Russian companies, which continued to conclude large-scale co-operation 
agreements with the Iraqi authorities, mainly in the oil industry, to be 
22 Justin Blum, Lynch, 'Oil-for-Food Benefited Russians, Report Says, Washington Post, 16 May 
2005, p. 1 
23 Ibid. 
24 Duelfer Report. Annex B, Figure 4, p. 3 
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implemented following the lifting of sanctions. In mid-February 1996, following a 
series of meetings between the Iraqi first deputy minister for Industry and Mines, 
Qahtan al-Anbari, and the Russian Fuel and Energy Minister, Yuri Shatranik, 
Moscow and Baghdad signed accords for a number of large projects worth US$ 10 
25 
billion aimed at assisting Iraq in re-building its destroyed power industry. In 
addition, in a separate deal, Russia agreed to train Iraqi oil experts at the Russian 
Gubkin Oil and Gas Academy and to dispatch Russian petrochemical specialists 
to Iraq. 26 To ally concern on the part of the U. S. about the implementation date of 
the agreements, the Russian foreign minister Primakov, in a meeting with the U. S. 
Secretary of State Warren Christopher in Helsinki the same month, assured the 
latter that the accords would only go ahead after the lifting of sanctions. 27 
In mid-March 1997, an official Russian delegation headed by the minister 
of Fuel and Power Poytr Radionov travelled to Baghdad to negotiate the signature 
of another major oil accord. Following 'extremely lethargic' negotiations on the 
part of the Iraqi authorities, who appeared 'hesitant' to make the 'fundamental 
28 
political decision of permitting the Russians to enter the Iraqi oil market' ,a 
production sharing agreement for the development of the second phase of the 
largest Iraqi oil-field West Quma for the duration of 23 years and worth US$3.5 
billion was signed between the Russian companies LUKoil with the largest share 
of 52.5%, Zarubezhneft and Mashinoimport each with 11.25%, and the Iraqi state 
oil company SCOp. 29 
25 David Hearst, "Giant' Iraq-Russia Oil Deal', The Guardian, 12 February 1996, p. 11 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Alexander Tutushkin, 'Russia's Oil Companies Stake Out Iraqi Oil Fields', Kommersant Daily, 
26 March 1997, p. 10 
29 Yevgeny Antonov, 'The Clock is Running Against Primakov', Moskovsky Konisomolets, 4 
December 1997, p. 3 
251 
Interestingly, while The Times quoted Radionov as declaring that the 
agreement was to be implemented 'Independently of the lifting of sanctions' 
following its ratification by the parliaments of both countries, 30 the Russian 
newspaper Kommersant Daily explained that the contract would 'not officially 
enter into force until the sanctions were lifted'. According to the newspaper, only 
some preparatory work, which did 'not conflict with the sanctions', such as 
geological exploration, the preparation of documentation for tender and 
equipment purchases, as well as construction work using local resources, was to 
begin immediately. 31 
In April 1997, the Iraqi parliament had indeed ratified this oil agreement 
with Russia, prompting Western concerns that it would undennine the sanctions 
32 
regime. Even though Moscow continued to argue that the deal did not violate the 
U. N. embargo and that works would not begin until the lifting of the sanctions, 
Russia's immediate commitments outlined in the Iraqi newspapers, included 
spending US$200 million on activities related to the project and another US$ 100 
million as a loan to Iraq for the purchase of equipment, despite the fact that U. N. 
sanctions prohibited any investments in the country. 33 
While internationally presenting its commercial co-operation with Iraq as 
remaining within the acceptable limits of the sanctions regime, domestically, 
Russia's policy encouraged close economic ties between Russian businesses and 
Baghdad. However, there was a major difference in approach towards the issue 
between the Russian diplomats and those Russian policy-makers, aggressively 
30 , Pounds 2bn Iraq-Russia Oil Deal Flouts U. N. Ban', The Thnes, 22 March 1997, p. 21 
11 Tutushkin, Konnnersant Dail v, 26 March 1997, p. 10 
12 Robert Corzine, Roula Khalaf, 'Russian Deal Challenges Iraq Oil Ban', Financial Tilnes, 15 
April 1997, p. 5 
33 Corzine, Khalaf, 'Russia and Iraq Reach Agreement to Develop Oil Field', Financial Tinies, 15 
April 1997, p 
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lobbied by the oil companies and the military-industrial complex. Whereas the 
fort-ner were primarily concerned with the projection of Moscow's international 
irnage as a law-abiding great power even at the expense of short-ten-n commercial 
losses that were to be substituted by the long-term benefits deriving from Russia's 
position, the latter were interested in securing immediate gains as a means of re- 
establishing the country's economic and political influence. The divide was 
particularly deep within the Russian parliament, dominated by the communists 
and ultranationalists greatly sympathetic to the Iraqi regime, some of whom had 
personal ties with the Iraqi leadership and received Iraqi oil through the 'oil for 
food prograrnme'. On several occasions they attempted to bring about Russia's 
unilateral exit from the sanctions regime, or at least to undermine the country's 
adherence to the embargo against Iraq. 
Thus, on 4 June, the Durna passed the law 'On Measures to Develop Co- 
operation with the Republic of Iraq', under which Russia was to cease the use of 
budget funds to maintain sanctions against Iraq. The law, stating that it was 
consistent with the generally acceptable principles and norms of international law 
and international treaties of the Russian Federation, also pennitted Russian state 
institutions, individuals and legal entities to resume commercial relations with 
Iraq, including the purchase of oil and petroleum products, the implementation of 
suspended and new projects, and the sale of equipment and spare parts to Iraq. 
Furthen-nore, the document authorised state institutions to initiate activities 
relating to the collection of Iraq's debts to Russia. 34 Even though the law was not 
approved by President Yeltsin and the Federation Council, who were eager to 
avoid an adverse reaction in the West and favoured an evolutionary approach to 
34 Dmitri Chemogorsky, 'Law Passed on Co-operation with Iraq, Neý: avisilllaya Gazeta, 5 June 
1997, p. 2 
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the Iraqi question with a gradual easing of sanctions, 35 its adoption by the 
parliament illustrated the growing impatience in some political and business 
quarters to resume full-scale economic co-operation with Baghdad. 
The irritation of the Russian oil companies with the cautious approach of 
Russian diplomats was also apparent in the aftermath of Moscow's successful 
mediation of the Iraq crisis in autumn 1997. In an interview with Moskovsky 
Koinsomolets, vice-president of LUKoil, Dzhevan Cheloyants, argued that it was 
too early to celebrate and that it was 'high time' to take tougher measures, namely 
to declare Iraq a zone of vital national interest to Russia. 36 
While Russian oil fin-ris were pressurising the Russian government to pursue 
more active steps to secure their interests in Iraq, the West was concerned about 
Moscow's co-operation with Baghdad, and, in particular about the illicit 
commercial and military co-operation between the two countries. According to 
some sources in the Middle East, in autumn 1998, at least three Russian 
companies sold missiles and other military material to Iraq in violation of the 
sanctions regime. It was confirmed that the sale for US$160 million previewed the 
deliveries to Iraq of modem Russian military equipment, including MiG-29 and 
air defence systems. 37 The journal Inside claimed this deal was signed in 
December 1998, during the meeting between the Iraqi Prime Minister Tareq Aziz 
and the Russian foreign minister Yevgeny Primakov in Moscow and represented 
38 the start of a series of military accords . According to Israeli sources, Russian 
companies Techmashinimport, Vneshtekhnika and Mashinoimportinvest had sold 
Baghdad components necessary for the production of surface-to-surface missiles, 
3' Ibid. 
36 Antonov, Mosk-ovsk y Komsoinolets, 4 December 1997, p. 3 
37 ITAR-TASS, Pravda, 23 February 1998, p. 3 
38 Inside, March 1998, quoted by ITAR-TASS, 23 February 1999 
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as well as naval equipment for destroyers and anti-air missiles. Rameskoe, a 
company, which specialised in navigation systems and air dynamics for the planes 
and missiles, was also alleged to have participated in the deal . 
39 
Earlier, on 15 February 1998, The Washington Post published a report 
about a document discovered by the U. N. inspectors, which suggested a Russian- 
Iraqi agreement concluded in 1995, to build a large plant that could be used to 
manufacture biological weapons. 40 According to the document, the decision to 
conclude the deal was taken at the highest level of the Russian government, 
prompting The Times to argue that Moscow assisted Iraq's efforts to acquire 
weapons of mass destruction. 41 In a letter to the Russian representative at the 
U. N., Sergei Lavrov, the executive chain-nan of UNSCOM, Richard Butler, 
further reported that the documents, describing the talks between the Russian 
companies and the Iraqi officials in Moscow in June 1995, were discovered in 
September 1997. They revealed that the objective of the meetings was 'a project 
for a programme of co-operation' on single-cell protein production that could be 
used for civilian but also biological warfare purposes. 42 
Not having discovered any evidence that the project had ever came to 
fruition, UNSCOM, on 5 January 1998, unsuccessfully requested Russia to 
provide information about the identities and respective duties of the Russian 
delegation that participated in the talks with the Iraqis. Russia vehemently denied 
the allegations, Lavrov in private conversations with Butler demanding UNSCOM 
to repudiate the press reports. The Russian Foreign Ministry called the account 
39 Interfax, 'Russian Firms are Suspected in Agreement with the Baghdad Regime', Segodnva, 24 
February 1999. p. 3 
40 Steven Erlanger, 'Russians Deny Report of '95 Deal with Iraq', Neii, York Times, 13 February 
1998, P. 8 
41 'From Russia with Love', The Times, 13 February 1998, features 
42 Judith Miller, 'Officials Confirm Russia-Iraq Deal on Plant', New York Times, 18 February 
1998, p. 8 
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'crude inventions' and declared that 'Russia has never made any deals with Iraq 
that would violate international sanctions, moreover deals involving the supply of 
banned technologies. 43 
A year later, on 4 February 1999, The Sunday Telegraph argued that 
Russia had signed agreements for the delivery to Iraq of new air defence systems 
and military planes worth US$100 million, claiming the deal was concluded 
during the visit to Moscow of the Iraqi Transport Minister Ahmed Murtad Halil 
on 13-14 January 1999.44 This time, too, Russia categorically rejected the report. 
The Head of the Department for International Military Co-operation of the 
Russian Defence Ministry, Leonid Ivashov, called the allegations 'pure invention, 
even an arranged provocation', 45 and Foreign Minister Ivanov reiterated that 
Russia firmly adhered to its obligations in accordance with the U. N. resolutions, 
which did not pennit the sale of arms to Iraq. 46 
Interestingly, commenting on the allegations, a Russian journalist in 
SegOdnya observed that in spite of the decision of the Soviet government, on I 
September 1990, to halt the supply of all military equipment to Baghdad, the Iraqi 
army eight years later was still functioning, and Soviet-era weapons were still 
working. 47 To him, there was only one explanation for this anomaly: all these 
years secret supplies had continued. In support of this claim, the journalist quoted 
a senior engineer of a large Russian arms company as confinning that Russian 
specialists travelled to Baghdad on business trips to 'bring the Iraqi military 
equipment, inter alia, the newly acquired one, into working condition'. He further 
43 Miller, New York- Times, 18 February 1998, p. 8 




47 Paul Felgengauer. 'Buy the Russian One! '. Segodnya, 15 February 1999, pp. 1,2 
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cited an infon-ned source in the U. N. Secretariat as reporting that the U. N. Office 
had for years known about the illicit Russian contracts with Iraq, whereby Iraqi 
officials on several occasions met the Russians in Turkey and Bulgaria to 
purchase not only spare parts, but also large quantities of MI-24 helicopters. The 
equipment was then delivered in containers and assembled on the spot by Russian 
specialists. 
According to the Journalist, illicit Russian military sales had in fact suited 
Washington, as it was not interested in the dismantlement of Iraqi armed forces. 
The preservation of the functioning Iraqi anny contributed to the maintenance of a 
threat to the Gulf states and consequently boosted the American military sales to 
the Gulf monarchies. It also provided a justification for the maintenance of its 
presence in the region. 48 
Apart from the allegations of illicit commercial and military agreements 
with Baghdad, the Western press in March 1999 also accused the Russian foreign 
minister, Yevgeny Primakov, of participating in illicit deals with Baghdad and 
having a personal interest in supporting the Iraqi regime. The New Yorker 
Magazine reported that the British intelligence services discovered that the latter 
had received US$800,000 from Iraq as a pay-off for allowing Russian companies 
to illegally ship nuclear equipment to the country. 49 In fact, Richard Butler in his 
memoirs reported that he had received the very same information in late 
50 September 1997, and was assured by his sources that it was 'rock solid' . 
48 lbid 
49 James Bone, 'Britain 'Uncovered' Iraq Payment to Primakov', The Dines, 29 March 1999, 
overseas news 
50 Richard Butler, The Greatest Threat, Iraq, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the Crisis of 
Global Security', (New York: Public Affairs, 2000), p. 106 
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Addressing the issue, The Guardian also reported that Russian companies 
had long been suspected of shipping banned missile equipment to Iraq, referring 
to the Israeli intelligence, which in August 1995 inforined the U. N. inspectors that 
a Russian company had been selling Baghdad gyroscopes and guidance devices 
salvaged from ballistic missiles in decommissioned Russian submarines. 51 
However, the Russian Embassy in Washington dismissed the allegations against 
Primakov as 'a lie and a personal insult', its spokesman Mikhail Shurgalin 
observing that 'the whole story is so stupid that it does not deserve further 
comment'. 
52 
Even though Russia's illicit commercial relations with Iraq were difficult to 
prove, on a few occasions the U. S. succeeded in showing that some Russian 
companies were indeed violating the U. N. embargo. On 2 February 2000, for the 
first time a Russian tanker was detained in the Persian Gulf by U. S. naval forces, 
in charge of controlling the embargo regime, on the grounds that it was smuggling 
Iraqi oil. 53 
The following day, the Russian government issued a vehement protest about 
the 'unprecedented detention', insisting that Volgonýft-147 was legitimately 
transporting Iranian heating oil to the United Arab Emirates. 54 In spite of 
Moscow's assertions that the tanker had not entered the Iraqi territorial waters, 55 
the expertise conducted by the U. S. not only showed that it was transporting Iraqi 
oil, but the State Department also confirmed that there was an Iraqi officer aboard 
51 Mark Tran, 'Russian PM 'Took Pay-off from Iraq", The Guardian, 29 March 1999, p. 12 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ian Traynor, Ewen MacAskill, 'U. S. Impounds Russian Oil Tanker in the Gulf. The Guardian, 
4 February 2000, p. 16 
54 Corzine, Stephen Fidler, John Thornhill, 'Moscow Angry at Tanker Search', Financial Thnes, 4 
February 2000, p, 12; Gennady Charodeyev, 'Persian Prisoner', Nezallsimaya Gazeta, 5 February 
2000, p. 2 
55 Charocleyev, 'Tanker Seized Without a Battle', Lvestia, 4 February 2000, p. 2 
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56 
the vessel . Two months later, another Russian tanker Akademik Pustovoyt was 
stopped by the U. S. forces in the Gulf on suspicion of smuggling oil from Iraq. 57 
The fact that the U. S. State Department had already in December 1999 
informed Moscow about suspicious vessels working in the Persian Gulf under the 
Russia flag, and wamed of possible inspections, 58 the Russian govemment's 
failure to conduct an investigation into the issue indicated if not government's 
support for the prohibited actions of private companies, then at least a high level 
of tolerance of such conduct, that could also be interpreted as a tacit 
encouragement of embargo violations. Commenting on the issue, Izvestia argued 
that the incidents 'put Russia in a bad light', undennining Moscow's position at 
the U. N. Security Council, where the Russian representative 'would not be able in 
the next months to raise his favourite subject - the lifting of sanctions against 
59 Iraq' . 
However, this was not enough for the Iraqi government that in June 1999 
resorted to an extreme measure by posing an ultimatum to twelve Russian 
companies to choose between the immediate realisation of the West Quma-2 
project, or withdrawal from Iraq altogether . 
60 Following intense negotiations, the 
Iraqi Petroleum Minister, on 29 July, declared that Baghdad would not cancel the 
contracts with the Russian companies, while Moscow assured that the companies 
61 
would begin the work on the projects 'as soon as possible' . 
Possibly in an attempt to mend relations and to obtain assurances of 
continuing Russian support, Tareq Aziz just a week later travelled to Moscow to 
56 'Tanker Test Positive', New York- Tinies. 7 February 2000, p. 8 
" Charodeyev, 'Another of Our Tankers Caught', lzivstia, 8 April 2000. p. 2 
'8 Elisabeth Becker, 'U. S. Seizes Russia Tanker Said to Carry Oil from Iraq', New York Tiines. 4 
February 2000, p. 4 
59 Maksim Yusin, 'In Heating Oil, Up to the Ears', Izvestia, 8 February 2000, p. 1 
60 Interfax, 'Baghdad Criticises Moscow and Peking', Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 24 June 1999, p. 6 
61 XeZavisimaya Gazeta, 30 July 1999, p. 6 
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meet the Russian foreign minister, who emphasised that 'in the light of the Balkan 
events', it was 'necessary to undertake efforts for the political solution of other 
tense intemational conflicts'. 62 
Subsequently, Moscow and Baghdad established yet another Committee 
for International, Cultural, Scientific and Commercial Co-operation, headed by 
the fon-ner Russian Minister of Fuel and Energy, Yuri Shafranik, with the 
officially stated objective of 'assisting the lifting of sanctions against Iraq'. The 
nomination of the fon-ner energy minister to head the Committee clearly indicated 
the increased involvement of Russian oil companies in Moscow's Iraq policy, and 
more importantly, the interconnectedness between Russian business interests and 
policy objectives. During the constitutive meeting of the Committee in Moscow in 
September 1999, the Iraqi Ambassador to Russia, Hassan Fahmi Dshuma, 
declared that Baghdad wanted Russia to obtain the lifting of sanctions in the 
exchange for the preservation of the latter's oil interests in Iraq. 63 
In the beginning of October 1999, the Russian Fuel and Energy Minister, 
Vlktor Kaluzhny, representing the interests of Russian companies concerned over 
Iraqi ultimatum, travelled to Baghdad for the meeting of the Commission for 
Economic, Technical and Scientific Co-operation. He also had meetings with 
senior Iraqi officials and was presented with an 83-page proposal on future 
Russian-Iraqi co-operation. On his return to Moscow, Kaluzhny, in a controversial 
interview with the newspaper Vremya on 6 October suggested that Russian oil 
companies should work in Iraq in violation of the sanction regime, rhetorically 
62 Interfax, 'lvanov Met Aziz', Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 7 July 1999, p. 1 
63 Kommersant Dai4v, I October 1999 
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asking: 'Why should we give away a juicy chunk [of oil reserves]? 64 He also 
argued that the Russian government could not prevent private companies like 
LUKoil, in which the government possessed only minority shares, from investing 
in the development of co-operation with Iraq if the management of these 
65 
companies decided to violate the sanctions . 
However, the president of LUKoil, Vagit Alekperov had a different view 
of the matter, at least publicly. In an interview in August 1999, when asked about 
the activities of Russian oil companies in Iraq, Alekperov emphasised that the 
sanctions posed a great difficulty, but asserted that preparatory work could already 
be conducted, making it possible to start the exploitation of the oil-fields within a 
very short period after the lifting of the embargo. 66 At the same time, he admitted 
the 'ambition' on the Iraqi part to make Russian companies 'run faster than the 
events, conducting works before the easing of sanctions. ' According to Alekperov 
'we do not want to do it. We as a public company that represents the interests of 
the Russian Federation cannot allow ourselves to violate the sanctions signed for 
by the state'. 
67 
In another interview over a year later, the vice-president of the company, 
Leonid Fedun, noted that 'we very much rely on the Foreign Ministry and our 
President', expressing hope that 'the leadership of our country finds a possibility 
to help Russian companies to start oil exploitation in Iraq' and 'will not let the 
Russian oil specialists in Iraq down'. 68 He argued that 'we are not only defending 
64 Andrew Jack, Corzine, 'Russia Claims Sanctions Against Iraq Violated', Financial Times, 7 
October 1999, p. 14 
65 ITAR-TASS. Pravda, 28 October 1999, p. 3 
66 Ludmilla Romanova, Vladimir Sanko, 'Everything Needs Counting, Nezal, isinlaya Gazeta, 27 
August 1999, p. 4 
67 Ibid. 
68 Marianna Belenkaya, Sergei Pravosudov, 'USA is Ousting Russia from Iraq', Nezzavisinla. ya 
Gazeta. 29 November 2000, p. 6 
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our own commercial interests there, but also interests of Russia', and that the 
'Americans are waiting until we are ousted from Iraq' to lift the sanctions and 
take our place. 
The Russian government was indeed eager to promote bilateral economic 
relations with Baghdad and to assist Russian businesses in gaining a strong 
foothold in the Iraqi market in preparation of the lifting of sanctions. Throughout 
2000, the number of meetings between the members of the governments of the 
two countries, aimed at promoting bilateral co-operation had dramatically 
increased. In mid-April, the Iraqi minister of defence, Sultan Hashim Ahmed, 
secretly visited Moscow to discuss bilateral military and military-technical co- 
69 
operation with his counterpart Igor Sergeyev. In the Western press, the visit was 
later related to Iraq's secret negotiations with Russian companies to set up a plant 
producing key components of ballistic missiles. 70 At the beginning of May, 
President Vladimir Putin's special representative, Sergel Kortunov, travelled to 
Baghdad to forward Aziz a personal message from Putin to Saddarn Hussein on 
71 the question of bilateral relations, whose content remained undisclosed . On 20 
July, Russia's minister of finance, Alexei Kudrin, met his Iraqi counterpart, 
Hikmat al-Azawi, in Moscow to discuss Russian-Iraqi economic co-operation, 
and reportedly expressed his apprehension that bilateral co-operation was 
72 
restrained by U. N. sanctions. 
More importantly, a week later, Tareq Aziz travelled to Moscow for a 
69 M. O., 'Secret Visit of the Minister of Defence of Iraq to Moscow, Nezzai, isinwya Ga--eta, 19 
April 2000, p. 6 
70 Michael Evans, 'Saddam Seeks Russian Missile Deal', The Tinies, 14 August 2000, overseas 
news 
71 V. F.. 'Saddam Hussein Was Forwarded a Personal Message from Putin', Xezaiishna-ya Gazeta, 
2 May 2000, p. 6 
72 M. B., 'Vice-Premier of Iraq Tareq Aziz Will Meet With Putin', Nezzavisinlaya Gazeta, 21 July 
2000, p. I 
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much publicised working visit at the invitation of the Russian government, 
carrying a personal message from Saddam Hussein to President Putin. 73 In spite of 
criticism on the part of the U. S. Administration that declared that no Security 
Council member ought to receive Iraqi officials, 74 President Putin had a meeting 
with Aziz, discussing the question of the possibility of the lifting of sanctions 
against Iraq and the development of bilateral relations. Commenting on the results 
of the meeting, Putin declared himself to be 'satisfied with the level of contacts' 
and promised to 'consistently continue the position of support of Iraq, inter alia, 
at the United Nations'. 75 
Similarly, foreign minister Ivanov during a meeting with the Iraqi Prime 
Minister reiterated that Russia 'advocates the soonest possible lifting of sanctions 
against Iraq in return for the re-establishment of the system of international 
monitoring as previewed by the U. N. Security Council'. At the same time, 
commenting on the U. S. negative assessment of the meetings, and demonstrating 
Moscow's determination to pursue its interests even at the expense of tensions 
with Washington, Ivanov declared that 'Russia is a sovereign and independent 
state, and we will determine ourselves with whom and to what extent to build our 
re at ons'. 
76 
Indicating that Moscow was serious about pursuing an Iraq policy that did 
not correspond to the positions of other Security Council members, Ivanov and 
Aziz during the meeting also discussed the question of opening an air connection 
between Moscow and Baghdad, which Russian diplomats considered not to be 
73 Vladimir Dunayev, 'Saddam Writes to Putin'. Izvestia, 27 July 2000, p. 4 
74 Belenkaya, 'Putin is Not Going to Baghdad', Nezavishnaya Gazeta, 28 July 2000, p. 6 
" Sergei Sumbayev, 'Iraqi Prime Minister in Moscow', Krasna 
, 
ya Zve. -da, 28 July 2000, p. 1 
7' Belenkaya, 'Tareq Aziz Completed Visit to Russia', Nezavisimay-a Gazeta, 29 July 2000, p. 2 
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subject to the sanctions regime. 77 Not surprising therefore that following the 
opening of Saddam International Airport in Baghdad by the Iraqi authorities in 
violation of the sanctions, it was a Russian plane carrying humanitarian aid that 
was the first to land in the Iraqi capital on 19 August 2 000.78 
A month later a second Russian airliner, carrying not only humanitarian 
aid, but this time also a delegation of Russian oil executives, landed in Baghdad. 
The head of the delegation, Amgolt Becker, director of the largest Russian 
pipeline company Stroitransgaz, was quoted by the Iraqi News Agency as 
considering the trip 'as an expression of Russia's rejection of the flight ban 
illegally imposed on Iraq'. 79 A week later, continuing to challenge the sanctions 
and deepening the disagreement between the Security Council members 
concerning the legality of flights to Iraq, another Russian plane belonging to 
Vnukovo Airlines arrived in Baghdad carrying medical supplies, a football team, 
musicians, 80 as well as a delegation of the Commission for Economic, Technical 
and Scientific Co-operation and the Committee for Russian-Iraqi Friendship 
headed by Shafranik. 81 
In mid-September, the government-controlled airline, Aeroflot, held talks 
in Baghdad on plans to resume regular flights to Iraq, and declared that it 
considered commercial flights to be a non-political issue. 82 The talks with Iraqi 
Airways continued in the Russian capitaI83 and resulted in Moscow's decision at 
" Ibid. 
78 Charodeyev, 'Air Blockade Breached', Izi, eslia, 21 August 2000, p. 3 
79 Traynor, 'Jordan Backs Russia on Flights to Iraq', The Guardian, 18 September 2000, p. 15 
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the end of September to resume scheduled passenger flights to Baghdad in mid- 
October in spite of U. S. and British objections that it would breach the sanctions 
84 
regime against Iraq. 
In commenting on the govemment's decision, a Russian spokesman in 
London stated that 'we have to do something'. He not only indicated that Russia's 
move ought to be taken as a signal that the intemational community had to act to 
overcome its impasse over Iraq, 85 but more importantly, revealed Moscow's 
frustration with the stalemate over the Iraq policy at the Security Council, and its 
ambition to move towards the resolution of the question by taking independent 
actions, which defiýcto undermined the embargo against Baghdad. Indeed, flights 
from Russia were followed by those from France, which was the first European 
country and permanent Security Council member to follow Moscow's lead, 86 as 
well as Jordan, Syria, and later, Turkey, Lebanon and the United Arab Emirates, 
indicating the diminishing Arab support of the sanctions against Iraq. 97 
The opening of Russian flights to Baghdad prompted a new wave of 
bilateral contacts between Duma deputies, government officials and 
representatives of large Russian companies, such as Zar-ubezhneft, 
Technomashimport, Sibur, Vneshtorgbank, Vnukovo Airlines and ZIL with Iraqi 
authorities. The visit of the delegation of Stroitransgaz in mid-September on the 
second plane from Russia, apart from constituting a pubic relations exercise, was 
84 MacAskill, 'Russians to Defy U. N. Ban by Resuming Flights to Iraq, The Guardian, 3 October 
2000, p. 19 
85 Ibid. 
86 Jon Henley, 'French Defy Ban to Land in Iraq', The Guardian, 23 September 2000, p. 18 
87 Sumbayev. 'Iraq's Chances Are Growing', Krasnaya Zvezda, 29 September 2000, p. 3; Peter 
Beaumont, 'Lure of Black Gold Fuels Urge to Embrace Saddam', The Observer, 5 November 
2000, p. 21 
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aimed at officially opening the representation of the company in Baghdad. 88 The 
delegation which was comprised of members of the Committee of Russian-Iraqi 
Friendship, Russian businessman, as well as parliamentarians, was received in the 
National Assembly, various ministries and by the Iraqi Prime Minister who noted 
that Baghdad 'wan-nly welcomes the effort by the new Russian leadership to re- 
establish friendly relations with Iraq'. He praised the fact that Moscow not only 
undertook steps at the U. N. to raise the question of the lifting of sanctions, but 
also took concrete actions by resuming flights to Iraq and dispatching delegations 
to Baghdad. 89 Answering journalists' questions after the meeting with the 
delegation, Aziz confinned that following the lifting of sanctions against Iraq, 
Russian companies would receive priority status in the Iraqi economy. 90 
This episode yet again demonstrated that Russian policy toward Baghdad 
was to a large extent influenced by its economic interests. Moscow's strategy of 
supporting Iraq's attempt to bring an end to the sanctions regime, not by fulfilling 
its U. N. obligations, but by gradually eroding the economic embargo, 9' indeed 
resulted in the immediate reward and the promise of future profit for Russian 
businesses on the part of the Iraqi authorities. At the same time, it also showed the 
pressure exercised by Russian companies on the Russian government to conduct a 
policy that would advance their economic objectives in Iraq. The Russian foreign 
minister, in a letter to U. N. Secretary General, Kofi Annan, in September, had 
indeed complained that the Putin Administration was coming under growing 
88 Belenkaya, 'Baghdad is Attracting Business People', Nezavishnalva Gazeta, 22 September 2000 
p. 6 
S9 Belenkaya, 'First Arab Plane Landed in Baghdad', Nezavisiniaya Gazeta. 28 September 2000, p. 
6 
90 Ibid. 
91 In the beginning of November 2000, Iraq had also begun pumping oil to Syria through a long- 
disused pipeline in violation of the sanctions. Brian Whitaker, 'Baghdad Starts Oil Flowing in 
Pipeline to Syria', The Guardian. 3 November 2000, p. 19 
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pressure from the 'Federal Assembly, many social and political interests and 
business and industrial circles ... in favour of mitigating the limitations imposed on 
Russia by the sanctions in the field of its commercial and economic relations with 
92 Iraq' . 
Not surprisingly, therefore, Russian diplomats stepped up efforts to 
achieve the settlement of the Iraqi question. On 13 November 2000, Ivanov during 
his tour of the Middle East was the first foreign minister to visit Baghdad after 
1994 93 to 'reanimate the process of Iraqi settlement that today finds itself in an 
impasse 94 and to reach a dialogue between the U. N. and Iraq on disarmament. 95 
Before his trip, Ivanov met with the chairman of the new disarmament body 
UNMOVIC, Hans Blix, 96 reminding him that during the drafting of Resolution 
1284 'the Russian side made a serious compromise', and now believed that 'in the 
process of the realisation of this resolution, it was possible to correct the situation 
97 
in a way as to really ensure progress in the Iraqi settlement' . 
Earlier, during the discussions at the Security Council concerning the 
nomination of the new executive chain-nan of UNMOVIC, Russia blocked the 
appointment of Rolf Ekeus, the first executive chairman of UNSCOM who had 
also been rejected by Iraq on the grounds that 'we need a new beginning and not 
the continuation of the old'. Moscow also initially insisted on the participation in 
92 Carola Hoyos, 'Russia in a New Push to Lift Iraq Sanctions'.. Financial Times, 13 September 
2000, p. 8 
93 Reuters, 'Le minister russe des affaires 6trang&res a Bagdad', Le Monde, 15 November 200, p. 6 
94 . Head of the Foreign Ministry Plans to Visit Iraq', Nezailsiniaýya Gazzeta, II November 2000, p. 
I 
" Belenkaya. 'Ivanov Again Timely', Nezavisinia 
, 
ya Gazeta, 15 November 2000, p. 6 
96 In fact, Russia supported his nomination after disagreements with regard to Ekeus. Alexander 
Reutov, 'A Swede to Deal with Iraq'. NezaOsima , ya 
Gazeta, 2 January 2000, p. 6 
97 , Head of the Foreign Ministry Plans to Visit Iraq, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, II November 2000, p. 
267 
the Commission as an observer. 98 Following the approval of the inspection 
Commission by the Security Council, Moscow warned that it would be 'on 
lookout for anyone named to the panel who might be troublesome to Iraq', and 
attempted to block the re-appointment of the two Russian inspectors, Nikita 
Smidovich and Igor Mitrokhin, who since the 1990s had poor relations with the 
Russian government. 99 With regard to the settlement of the Iraqi question, 
Moscow continued to advocate the idea of a comprehensive settlement, which 
included disarming Iraq while simultaneously showing to Baghdad the prospect of 
lifting the sanctions. ' 00 
On 28 November 2000, Tareq Aziz arrived in Moscow on a two-day 
working visit, his second in six months, and held talks with foreign minister 
Ivanov and his deputy, Vasily Sredin, on Iraq's recognition of the Resolution 
1284. Despite Moscow's efforts, this resolution had so far been rejected by 
Baghdad, which continued to pressurise Russian companies in Iraq to embark on 
projects in violation of the sanctions. 10 1 
In spite of the growing enthusiasm on the part of the Russian diplomatic 
establishment in autumn 2000 over the prospect of the rapid lifting of sanctions, 
which had already been weakened by the continuing stalemate over Iraq, 102 
Baghdad appeared increasingly displeased with Moscow's inertia, and irritated by 
the cautiousness of Russian companies in implementing the signed contracts. 
Similarly, the majority of Russian oil companies grew more and more dissatisfied 
98 Reutov, 'Lavrov Against Ekeus', Nezai4simaya Gazela, 19 January 2000, p. 6ý Barbara 
Crossette, 'Annan Faces Growing Split Over Arms Inspector for Iraq', Neu, York- Times, 19 
January 2000, p. 10 
99 Crossette, 'Security Council Approves New Arms Inspection Agency for Iraq', New York Times. 
14 April 2000, p. 12 
"'0 Dmitri Gornostayev, 'Solution on Iraq', Nezai, isimaya Gazeta, 14 September 2000, p. 6 
WI Belenkaya, 'Moscow Between the Nile and the Euphrates'. Nezavisimqya Gazeta, 30 
November 200, p. 6 
102 Belenkaya, Pravosudov, Neza0simaya Gazeta, 29 November 2000, pp. 1.6 
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with the Russian Foreign Ministry, which they believed did not defend their 
interests energetically enough. 103 
In late February 2001, in spite of earlier negotiations between LUKoil and 
the Iraqi Oil Ministry, Baghdad warned the company that it would cancel its 
contract for exploration of West Quma. The Iraqi deputy Oil Minister, Fais 
Shakhin, emphasised: 'Any exploration contract loses its force if it is not 
rea ise .' 
104 
Interestingly, while showing its displeasure with the cautious LUKoil, 
Baghdad continued negotiations with more Slavneft, which showed itself 
determined to intensify co-operation with Baghdad in spite of the sanctions 
regime. 105 In May 2000, the company opened is representation in Baghdad and in 
autumn 2000, signed a preliminary agreement for exploration of the Shoubba oil- 
field with estimated oil reserves of 10 million tonnes. 106 A high-ranking official at 
LUKoil explained, however, that 'it was not about us. We have fulfilled 
everything possible for the concluded contracts, and the works have approached a 
phase that is prohibited by the U. N. sanctions'. He argued that 'now everything 
depends on policy'. ' 07 
The same belief was shared by President Putin who during a meeting at the 
Foreign Ministry in April 2001, instructed Russian diplomats to defend actively 
Russia's economic interests abroad. 108 This objective also dominated the talks 
between the Russian government and the Iraqi Vice-President Taha Yassin 
103 Nadezhda Spiridonova, 'Sanctions Against Iraq Again Discussed at the U. N. ', Nezavisimqya 
Gazeta, 9 February 2001, p. 6 
104 Maria Ignatova, 'Passionate Desire, Baghdad is Displeased with Russia', Izi, estia, 26 February 
2001, p. 4 
105 Ibid. 
106 Yevgeny Kluyev, 'Slavneft Strengthened its Iraqi Basis', 1--vestia, 9 November 2000, p. 5 
107 Alexander Shumilin, 'Saddam's Oil Blackmail', Izvestia, 7 March 2001, p. 7 
" Spiridonova, 'Business Visit of Ramadan', Nezai, ishnaya Gazzeta, 19 April 2001, p. 6 
269 
Ramadan who arrived in Moscow on a working visit on 17 April 2001.109 During 
the meeting with Putin, Ramadan transmitted him an oral message from Saddam 
Hussein who expressed interest in a strategic partnership between the two 
countries. 
According to Ivanov, the Iraqi Vice-President and Putin reviewed projects 
to facilitate the development of bilateral relations and the reconstruction of the 
Iraqi economy, but also agreed to conduct the examination of Iraqi debts to Russia 
on the expert level, and to review ways of debt repayment. 
110 Speaking about 
Russian-Iraqi economic co-operation, the Russian foreign minister noted that the 
sanctions regime against Iraq 'brings suffering not only to the Iraqi people, but 
also losses for the Russian economy', "' yet again admitting that Moscow's Iraq 
policy was to a great extent influenced by Russia's economic interests. Indeed, in 
2000 alone, the sum of contracts signed between Russia and Iraq amounted to 
US$200 million, whereas the agreements for the reconstruction of the Iraqi 
economy in the aftermath of the sanctions were estimated at being worth US$40- 
50 billion. ' 12 
In an attempt to draw advantage from Moscow's ambition to secure a 
strong position in the Iraqi market in order to breach the sanctions regime, 
Baghdad tried to find a legal loophole to induce Russian companies to work in 
Iraq. It called upon Russia and other countries that faced losses from the embargo 
to refer to Article 50 of the U. N. Charter, ' 13 which gives a state 'which finds itself 
confronted with special economic problems arising from the carrying out of those 
109 M. B., 'Vice-President of Iraq is Arriving in Moscow', Nezavishnay'a Gazeta, 17 April 2001. p. 
I 
110 Belenkaya. 'Business Visit of Ramadan', Nezavisiniaya Gazeta, 19 April 2001 ý p. 
6 
III Ibid. 
112 Spiridonova, 'London 'Pitied' the Iraqis'. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 18 May 2001, p. 6 
113 M. B., Neza"isimaya Gazeta, 17 April 2001, p. I 
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[preventive or enforcement] measures', the right 'to consult the Security Council 
with regard to a solution of these problems'. 114 However, while Baghdad 
interpreted this provision as a way for foreign companies to realise projects in 
Iraq, and Russian businessmen viewed it as a pretext for starting the 
implementation of the contracts, Russian diplomats believed that the conduct of 
consultations as previewed by Article 50 did not mean obtaining the permission to 
work in Iraq, and were therefore reluctant to raise the issue at the U. N. 11-5 
Instead, Russia continued to advocate the lifting of sanctions against Iraq 
at the Security Council in the belief that Iraq's rejection of Resolution 1284 and 
the difficulty of reaching a consensus in the Council on the issue ought not to 
further delay the settlement of the Iraqi question. ' 16 Therefore, Russia proposed a 
'packaged approach', which previewed the casing, and the subsequent lifting of 
sanctions in return for the establishment of a system of international monitoring 
on the Iraqi territory. '' 7 In Russia's view, if the inspectors failed to uncover any 
prohibited activities on the part of the Iraqi government related to military 
programmes, the Security Council was then to agree to lift the sanctions. 118 In 
spite of its new title, Moscow's proposal was essentially the same idea it 
presented to Richard Butler during the latter's visit to Moscow in September 
1997, and subsequently advocated in the Security Council during the debates on 
the fate of UNSCOM. This underlined that Russia's approach towards the Iraqi 
question remained largely unchanged. 
114 Article 50, Chapter VII, Charter q/ the Unitcd Natioils. available online at: 
http:,, "ý'www. un. org/aboutun'charter/, viewed on 23 March 2006 
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In contrast, the Anglo-American position on Iraq underwent a substantial 
shift as a consequence of their growing isolation at the Security Council on the 
Iraqi issue. 119 At the end of February 2001, Britain, which for over a year had 
worked behind the scenes to reach a compromise that would allow the 
implementation of Resolution 1284, proposed the idea of replacing the 'oil for 
food programme' with 'smart sanctions' to facilitate the flow of civilian goods 
into Iraq, while maintaining controls over Iraqi funds and toughening the embargo 
on the purchase of dual-use goods and military equipment. 120 In view of the 
continuing stalemate at the U. N. over the Iraq policy, the plan that was 
subsequently enthusiastically supported by the U. S., was designed to re-energise 
the international consensus on the sanctions regime. 
However, while reanimating the debate on the future of Iraq, the proposal 
led to further divisions among Security Council members, notably the U. S., 
Britain and Russia. Continuing to advocate the complete lifting of sanctions, 
Moscow rejected the plan and threatened to use its veto. Russia argued that it was 
'not about easing the sanctions, but about strengthening them' '12 
1 and stressing 
that the proposals did not go far enough, put forward a rival resolution based on 
its preferred 'package deal'. 122 
Similarly, Baghdad rejected 'smart sanctions' and demanded the complete 
lifting of sanctions. First Tareq Aziz, 123 and subsequently, Saddam Hussein, called 
119 Anton La Guardia, 'Britain and U. S. Isolated Over Iraqi Sanctions', The Daily Telegraph, 10 
January 200 1, p. 4 
120 Kevin Brown, Khalaf, Robert Shrimsley, 'Britain Made Secret Moves to Boost U. N. Relations 
with Iraq', Financial Thnes, 21 February 200 1, p. 3 
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on Moscow to use its veto at the Security Council to prevent the adoption of the 
Anglo-American plan. 124 In response to the Council's decision to extend the 'oil 
for food programme' for one month instead of the usual six months in order to 
consider the proposal of the 'smart sanctions', 125 Baghdad haltered its supplies of 
oil to the world market. 
Russian oil companies also publicly exercised pressure on the government 
to block the adoption of the 'smart sanctions'. On 25 June, representatives of 
Russian oil and gas companies with stakes in Iraq, in a meeting requested the 
Russian government and the Duma 'to adopt all necessary measures' to prevent 
the Anglo-American project from going through. 126 Subsequently, in a letter to the 
U. S. Secretary of State, Colin Powell, Russian foreign minister Ivanov explained 
that by agreeing to 'smart sanctions', Russia would be damaging its own 
commercial ties with Baghdad, jeopardising US$5.5 billion of Iraqi oil supplies to 
Russian companies and more than US$2 billion in business contracts. 127 He also 
argued that the resolution could lead to a 'humanitarian catastrophe' at a time, 
when Iraq and the U. N. ought to be pursuing a 'constructive dialogue' to increase 
humanitarian aid to the country. 128 Similarly, at the Security Council meeting on 
26 June, the Russian representative argued that the proposed plan 'led away from 
the implementation of the relevant U. N. resolutions and froze the present 
situation', containing nothing about 'investments and economic projects'. He 
124 Interfax, 'Iraq is Asking Russia', Nezavisinia 
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M. B.. 'Iraq Rejected 'Smart Sanctions'. Nezavisinia 
, va 
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reiterated that 'smart sanctions' could 'damage legitimate trade and economic 
interests of many countries, including Russia'. 129 
Faced with strong opposition on the part of Russia and its threat to use the 
veto to block the adoption of the resolution, the U. S. and Britain, on 3 July, agreed 
to extend the 'oil for food programme' and not to put forward the draft resolution 
for vote until the end the of year. 130 
On the eve of the decision, a Russian delegation comprising 
representatives of large Russian companies and headed by Vladimir Zhirmovsky 
travelled to Baghdad on the initiative of the Russian-Iraq' Committee for 
Economic, Cultural and Scientific Co-operation. There, it was received by Tareq 
Aziz, the Iraqi Parliament and the Ministers of 011, Industry and Transport. 13 1 
During the visit, Iraqi officials assured the Russians that Iraq was to resume its oil 
export if the 'oil for food programme' was extended without any changes, 132 Aziz 
hinting 'the right policy would lead to economic advantages'. ' 33 
In mid-July Saddam Hussein received Russia's special ambassador, 
Nikolai Kartuzov, and having expressed his gratitude to the Russian government 
for preventing the adoption of the 'smart sanctions', discussed the perspectives of 
commercial and economic co-operation between the two countries. ' 34 On I 
August, the Iraqi Oil Minister, Amer Rashid, declared that Baghdad would 'in the 
first place' favour Russia in concluding oil agreements because of its opposition 
129 , In Security Council debate, Governments Stress Need to Alleviate Humanitarian Situation in 
Iraq While Ensuring Full Compliance with Council Resolutions', U. N. Press Release, SC/7085, 
Security Council Meeting 4336 on 26 June 2001 
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to the Anglo-American draft resolution. ' 35 More importantly, in autumn 2001, 
Moscow and Baghdad in the framework of the Russian-Iraqi Commission on 
Economic Co-operation signed a long-term programme for economic co- 
operation, which was proposed by the Iraqi Vice-Presidcnt Ramadan during his 
earlier visit to Russia. ' 36 
In the light of the objectives of Russia's Iraq policy, Moscow's obstruction 
of the 'smart sanctions' in July 2001 represented an important victory for Russian 
diplomacy, which for the first time since 1990 succeeded in preventing the 
adoption of an Iraq resolution that did not correspond to Moscow's own interests. 
Undoubtedly, Russia's growing economic stake in Iraq and the increasing 
involvement of its companies working in Iraq in the debates and the policy- 
making decisions concerning the Iraqi question, played a significant role in 
toughening of Moscow's position, ultimately overriding the cautious policy 
hitherto adhered to by the Russian diplomatic establishment. 
135 'Iraq Takes Economic Action on Sanctions', Morning Star, 2 August 200 1, p. 3 1'6 'Russia and Iraq Develop Economic Co-operation', Nezavishnaya Gazeta. 4 October 2001. p. I 
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Chapter 8: Moscow and Operation 'Provide Freedom': key policy 
drivers at the time of crisis 
Saddam Hussein is not interesting enough for Russia to support him in any 
situation. 
An anonymous source in the Russian government' 
Russia's failure to secure any role in the post-war settlement and 
reconstruction of Iraq, or to preserve its major economic interests in that country 2 
closed the decades-long chapter of Moscow's policies towards one of its erstwhile 
most important allies in the Middle East. Russia's diplomacy during the months 
leading to the U. S. military operation against Iraq in March 2003,3 provided an 
excellent example of the underlying dynamics, but also contradictions and 
miscalculations that became a pen-nanent feature of Russian foreign policy 
4 following the collapse of the USSR . More 
importantly, it brought to the fore the 
main factors that influenced Moscow's policy toward Iraq since the Gulf crisis of 
1990-91: the strategic competition with the US.; the desire to protect its economic 
interests in Iraq; the efforts to appease domestic opposition; as well as the 
ambition to develop and expand Russia's political and economic relations with the 
I Vladimir Dunayev, 'Bye, Iraqi Oil', Izvestia, 14 December 2002, p. 6 
2 Paul Wolfowitz Directive, issued on 9 December 2003, barred nations who opposed the war, 
among them, Russia, from bidding for reconstruction projects in Iraq. Tom Reid, 'Anti-War 
Nations Excluded from Contracts in Iraq', The Times, II December 2003, p. 23 
3 For a detailed account of the U. S. war against Iraq, for example, Micah Sifrey, Christopher Cerf 
(eds. ), The Iraq War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 
2003); Lawrence Kaplan and William Kristol, The War over Iraq: Saddam's Tyranny and 
America's Mission, (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2003); Kenneth Pollack, The Threatening 
Storm: the Casefor Invading Iraq, (New York: Random House, 2002); Williamson Murray, Major 
General Robert H. Scales Jr., The Iraq War. - A Military History, (London: Harvard University 
Press, 2003) 
4 For a discussion of Russia's Iraq policy in the context of Russian foreign policy as a whole, 
Charlotte Wagnsson, 'Russia's Choice: Preserve the Status Quo', in Jan Hallenberg, Hakan 
Karlsson (eds. ), The Iraq War, (New York: Routledge, 2005), pp. 61-76 
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Gulf states, and more generally, improve Russia's standing in the Middle East. It 
also demonstrated that in spite of the political and economic consolidation of the 
Russian state and the evolution of Russian foreign policy throughout the 1990s, 
Moscow's policy and objectives with regard to Iraq until the beginning of 
operation 'Provide Freedom' remained largely unchanged. 
Consequently, Mikhail Gorbachov's dilemma of joining the intemational 
community in condemning Iraq and co-operating with the U. S. on the Iraq issue, 
while preserving close ties with Baghdad, continued to pose the same irresolvable 
problem for Vladimir Putin. Similarly, the interests of the business community 
with large stakes in Iraq, which proved powerful drivers in detennining Boris 
Yeltsin's policy toward Iraq, remained a major factor in influencing Putin's 
decision-making with regard to the U. S. plans of regime change in Baghdad. At 
the same time, Yeltsin's ambition to expand the relations with the Gulf states and 
to re-build Russia's weakened position in the Middle East, remained on the 
foreign policy agenda of the new Russian president, who continued to pursue an 
active economic policy in the region, even at the expense of tensions in the 
country's relations with the U. S. Furthermore, as demonstrated by Russia's 
responses to the U. S. military operation, Putin, like his predecessors, faced a 
strident opposition to his Iraq policy on the domestic level and had to balance 
between appeasing the opposition, and conducting a policy of co-operation with 
the U. S. that he believed would benefit Russia in the long-tenn. 
Finally, Russia's opposition to the war against Iraq also revealed 
Moscow's ongoing concerns about the American unilatcralism and the 
diminishing role of the United Nations, the only international tribune where 
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Moscow could still claim a leading role, 5 explaining its unflagging attempts to 
keep the issue of Iraq within this international framework. At the same time, 
despite the rhetoric of friendship and support voiced in some quarters of the 
Russian political establishment throughout the decade, the choices made by the 
Kremlin during the Iraq crisis amply illustrated Russia's indifference to the person 
of Saddam Hussein, confin-ning the pragmatic nature of Moscow's interests in 
Baghdad. 
Following his accession to power, carefully prepared by retiring President 
Yeltsin 6 and confirmed during the March 2000 Presidential elections, Vladimir 
Putin, 7 like his predecessor, was ambitious to improve Russia's interriational 
standing and to restore the country' superpower status. 8 In an article published 
prior to becoming president, Putin, having analysed the state of Russia's 
economy, concluded that even at the highest growth rate it would take the country 
15 years to reach the per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) level of present- 
day Portugal. 9 Acknowledging that a superpower status depended foremost on a 
strong economy, the core of Putin's domestic and foreign policies therefore 
related to strengthening Russia's economy as a means to regaining the country's 
superpower position. In this endeavour, the main task of foreign policy was to 
create conditions that would allow the state to concentrate efforts and resources on 
' Russian foreign minister Igor Ivanov. The New Russian Diploniacy, (Washington D. C.: 
Brookings Institution Press, 2002), p. 71 
6 Boris Yeltsin, Midnight Diaries, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2000), pp. 351-357 
7 D. R. Herspring, J. Kipp, 'Understanding the Elusive Mr. Putin', Problems qt"Post-Conununisin, 
Vol. 48, N2.5,200 1, pp. 3-17 
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266 
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solving the country's socio-economic problems. 10 
Even though Putin recognised that the modernisation of Russia's economy 
required increased co-operation with the West, he rejected the notion of 
partnership at all levels at any cost. In contrast to Kozyrev who regarded Russia' 
partnership with the West as 'inherently logical', Putin believed that due to its 
geopolitical position Russia had national interests everywhere. '' The emphasis on 
the ubiquity of Moscow's interests represented not only the continuation of a 
foreign policy course pursued by the fon-ner foreign minister Yevgeny Primakov, 
but a more realistic and pragmatic approach to foreign affairs, based on the 
necessity to match ambitions to resources. 12 
On a practical level, stressing his rejection of a 'unipolar world' dominated 
by the U. S., Putin embarked on the policy of restoring Soviet-era ties with North 
Korea, China and Libya, and intensifying Russia's relations with Iran and Syria, 
developed during the Yeltsin era. 13 In December 2000, Igor Sergeyev was the first 
Russian Defence Minister to visit Tehran since the Iranian Revolution in 1979, 
marking the resumption of military co-operation between Russia and Iran and 
abrogating the secret 1995 agreement with the U. S. to halt the sales of 
conventional weapons to the country. 14 In March 2001, in spite of Washington's 
attempt to prevent Russia from exporting arms to Iran, the new alliance was 
cemented by the signature of the Russian-Iranian co-operation pact aimed at 
to Address at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 26 January 2001, published as 'President Putin on 
the Tasks of the Russian Diplomacy', Me-hditnal-odnaya Zhizn, X2.2,2001, p. 3; Igor Ivanov, 
'Directions of Russian Foreign Policy', in Igor Ivanov, Russian Foreign Polic. v in the Epoch qf 
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12 Labelled by Richard Sakwa as 'new realism'. Putin's Choice, (New York: Routledge. 2004) 
13 Robert Freedman, 'Russian Policy Toward the Middle East: The Yeltsin Legacy and the Putin 
Challenge', Middle East Journal, Vol. 55,. N2.1,200 1, pp. 58-90 14 Ian Traynor, 'Kremlin's Arms Salesmen Target US Foes', The Guardian, 5 December 2000. p. 
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establishing the multi -billion-doll ar anns trade. 15 The same year, Moscow 
announced its plans to inodemise the military forces of Libya and Algeria, 
discussed potential arms deliveries to Yemen, and offered Syria a wide-ranging 
arms package to upgrade its Soviet-era weapons systems. 16 Already in 2000, 
Russia's military exports had risen by 22 per cent over the previous year, 
increasing its share of the world market by 50 per cent. 17 
However, in spite of the new dynamics in Russian foreign policy that 
inevitably led to a cooling down in its relations with the U. S., Putin continued to 
regard Washington as Moscow's most important political and economic partner. 
Underlying this view, the Russian president, following the terrorist attacks on 
New York and Washington D. C. on II September 2001, was the first leader to 
condemn the attacks, 18 joined the U. S. -led coalition against international 
terrorism, and later, in an unprecedented way, supported the American-led 
military operation against the Taliban in Afghanistan'9 in spite of the growing 
opposition on the part of the anti-American military and conservative sections of 
the Foreign Ministry. 20 Even though some perceived Russia's rapprochement with 
the U. S. as an easily reversible strategic move, Putin himself in an interview with 
the America's ABC News on 7 November 2001, asserted that Russia had chosen 
the partnership with Washington 'a long time ago', but that 'unfortunately' until 
,5 Susan Glasser, 'Russia, Iran Renew Alliance Meant to Boost Arms Trade', Washington Post, 13 
March 2001, p. 14 
16 Igor Korochenko, 'RF Will Strengthen the Military Potential of Damascus', Nezavisimaya 
Gazeta, 24 April 2001, p. 6 
17 Ed Blanche, 'Russia Steps Up Mid-East Arms Drive', The Middle East, July/August 200 1, pp. 
20-21 
18 President Vladimir Putin's Address to the Nation, ORT Channel, II September 2001 
19 Elena Stepanova, 'U. S. -Russia Co-operation in Afghanistan and Its Implications', East 
European Constitutional Rcvieir. Vol. 10, X2.4.200 1, pp. 92-95 20 Yuri Fedorov, 'Quiet Opposition of the Generals', Moskovskie Novosti, 16-22 October 2001, p. 
5 
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II September it remained 'unnoticed. ý21 
In view of Russia's unprecedented strategic rapprochement with the U. S., 
it was not surprising that the Bush Administration believed that Moscow and 
Washington could also co-operate in resolving the issue of Iraq. 22 Even though 
Baghdad's involvement into the II September attacks and the link between the 
Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and terrorism could not be proved, the U. S. was 
deten-nined to prevent such a development in the future and to ensure the 
definitive disarmament of Iraq, 23 preferably with Moscow's support. The 
assumption that the Kremlin was prepared to move on with regard to Iraq 
appeared to be correct, as Russia, at the U. N. Security Council, for the first time 
agreed to a revision of the sanction regime by the mid-2002 in return for the 
American clarification of Resolution 1284, which set out the conditions for the 
24 lifting of sanctions . However, securing Moscow's backing for a potential 
military campaign against Baghdad proved to be wishful thinking on the part of 
the White House. 
While the U. S. military operation against the Taliban largely corresponded 
to Moscow's own interests of removing a major security threat from the country's 
southern frontiers, 25 the American plans with regard to Baghdad were 
diametrically opposed to Russia's objectives in Iraq. Sceptical about 
21 Krasnaya Zvezda, 9 November 200 1, p. 3 
22 Stephen Fidler, Carola Hoyos, 'U. S. Looks to Moscow for Help to Curb Iraq', Financial Times, 
7 November 200 1, p. 9 
23 Lawrence Freedman, 'War in Iraq: Selling the Threat', Survival, Vol. 46, X2.2, Summer 2004, 
P. 9 
24 Brian Whitaker, 'U. N. to Impose New Sanctions on Baghdad', The Guardian, 30 November 
2001, p. 6 
25 After the start of the Chechen conflict in 1999, Russia had repeatedly expressed concern about 
the Taliban supporting the Chechen separatists. In September 2000, during his visit to Pakistan, the 
Presidential envoy, Sergei Yastrzhembsky, claimed that terrorist training camps had been run in 
Afghanistan, and later asserted a link between the Taliban and anti-Russian forces in Chechnya. 
Russia's concern about the Taliban led to speculations in May and June 2000 about the possibility 
of Russian air strikes against the Taliban, but ultimately no action was taken. Michael Gordon, 
'Russia Warns Afghanistan Not to Aid Rebel Groups', Neiv York Times, 25 May 2000, p. 7 
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Washington's attempts to link international terrorism and Iraq, Moscow 
considered the situation in Iraq as being substantially different from that in 
Afghanistan. Speaking at an international conference in Rome, the Russian 
Defence Minister, Sergei Ivanov, stated that although Russia approved of the 
strike against Afghanistan, it was not willing to approve of an operation against 
Iraq. 26 Similarly, Russia's deputy foreign minister, Vyacheslav Trubmkov, in an 
interview with the newspaper Vreinya Novostei, while reaffin-ning Russia's co- 
operation with the U. S. in the fight against international terrorism, argued that 
'war on terror' and the issue of Iraq 'are completely different things'. 27 Therefore, 
Russia, in the aftermath of the successful completion of the military operation in 
Afghanistan, not only warned the U. S. against making Iraq its next target in the 
'war on terror', but the Russian deputy foreign minister, Alexander Saltanov, also 
signalled that Moscow would leave the international coalition if Iraq was attacked, 
arguing that there was no evidence of Baghdad's involvement in the events of II 
September. 28 
Considering the substantial economic interests of Russian oil companies in 
Iraq and the much-anticipated prospect of Iraqi debt-repayments, Moscow was not 
interested in a military campaign against Iraq, and even less in a regime change in 
Baghdad. Throughout the 1990s, Russian diplomatic activities had been directed 
at obtaining the lifting of sanctions against Iraq and expanding economic and 
commercial ties with Baghdad. Moscow was therefore not prepared to see its 
efforts rendered meaningless. 
26 'The Axis of Evil', Izvestia, 5 February 2002, p. 1 
27 Traynor, 'One Year On: Kremlin Gives Short Shift to U. S. Hawk over Iraq', The Guardian. 12 
September 2002, p. 2 
28 Richard Owen, James Bone, Christopher Walker, 'America Warned Against Making Iraq Next 
Target', The Thnes, 29 November 2001, overseas news 
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In particular, Russia was deeply concerned about the prospect of being 
ousted from the lucrative Iraqi oil market and from the participation in the 
reconstruction of the country's shattered industry by the American and other 
foreign companies in case of a U. S. invasion. In exemplifying this concern, 
Nikolai Tokaryev, General Director of Zarubezhneft, in an interview with Vremya 
Novostei, expressed anxiety about the future of Russia's contracts signed with 
Baghdad, and argued that 'the Americans won't share this market with anyone. 
They don't need us there'. 29 
Consequently, in an attempt further to consolidate their economic position 
in Iraq in the face of a potential U. S. military threat, Russian companies 
throughout the crisis continued to negotiate and sign major co-operation 
agreements with Iraqi authorities. In what was widely perceived as a 'major blow' 
to Bush's attempts to build international support against Iraq, 30 Russia, on 19 
August 2002, announced a highly symbolic USS40 billion trade agreement with 
Iraq, consisting of a dozen separate deals on chemical products, irrigation, 
electrical energy, railroad construction and transport, to be implemented over the 
subsequent five years. 31 On 10 December 2002, Zarubezhneft and Rosneft 
publicised the forthcoming signature of a contract to develop the Nahr Umr oil 
field, containing about three billion tonnes of crude oil and worth E350 billion. 32 
Furthermore, following the visit to Iraq of the representatives of Russian oil 
companies, accompanied by the deputy foreign minister Alexander Saltanov and 
the first deputy Energy minister Ivan Matlashov in mid-January 2003, Baghdad 
29 Ibid. 
30 Sylvia Pfeifer, 'Russia to Sign US$40 Billion Trade Deal with Iraq'. The Business, 18 August 
2001 p. 5 
31 David Rennie, Ben Aris, 'Blow for Bush as Russia Agrees E27 Billion Iraq Deal', DailY 
Telegraph, 19 August 2002, p. 12 32 Paton Walsh, 'Russian Oil Giants Try to Beat U. S. to Iraqi Reserves', The Guardian, II 
December 2002. p. 17 
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granted Russia a number of additional oil projects. 33 
Russia's concerns about its position in Iraq were further nourished by Iraq 
itself that while granting advantageous contracts to Russian companies, also 
pressurised Moscow not to support the U. S. military operation. In December 
2002, Baghdad cancelled the major deal for the development of West Qurna-2, 
signed with LUKoil in 1997 '34 in response to reports that the company's President 
Vagit Alckperov was conducting talks with the U. S. in an attempt to secure 
guarantees for the contract in case of the regime change in Iraq. 35 Being given to 
understand that the duration of the advantageous agreements concluded with Iraq 
corresponded to the lifespan of the present government in Baghdad and to 
Moscow's efforts in bringing about the lifting of sanctions, Russia was interested 
in preventing a military threat to Iraq, and to resolve the issue within the 
framework of the U. N. without delay. 
In addition, Russia's ambition to avert a war against Iraq was greatly 
influenced by the vulnerability of the Russian oil-dependent economy to the 
sudden swings in the global price of oil. As Russia's federal budget for 2003 was 
calculated on the basis of US $21.5 for barrel of oil, 36 the fall in oil price of just 
US$l meant budget losses of about US $1 billion. 37 At the same time, even 
though the rapid rise in the price of oil due to the instability in the Persian Gulf 
would have increased Russian revenues, it would also have further deepened the 
33 Maria Ignatova, 'Oil Bouquet from Baghdad', Izi, estia, 18 January 2003, p. 5-1 Paton Walsh, 
'Iraq Reverses Russia Oil Ban', The Guardian, 21 January 2003, p. 4 34 Richard Beeston, 'Baghdad Pulls Plug on Russian Oil Deal', The Times, 13 December 2002, p. 
18 
35 Tareq Aziz in an interview with the Canadian newspaper National Post, quoted by Alexei 
Yefimov. 'Hussein Punished Alekperov', Nczai, isimal)a Gazeta, 19 December 2002, p. 3 36 Interview with the head of the Duma Committee on Budget and Taxation, Mikhail Zadornov. 
'Oil Dollars Are Hidden Under the Blanket'. Komsomolsk-a 
, ya 
Prai, da, 10 March 2003, pp. 13,14 37 Tatiana Netreba, Dmitri Piskarenko. 'Terminator George', Argumenýy i Fak-tY, N2.8, February 
2003, pp. 1,4ý According to some estimates, even USK billion. Robin Shepherd, 'Oil Fear Prompt 
Putin to Send Fnvoy to Baghdad', The Tin7es, 24 February 2003, p. 14 
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country's dependency on its oil sector at the expense of investments in other 
sectors, a development that Russian policy-makers were eager to avoid. 38 
Russia was also eager to maintain the presence of its oil companies in the 
Iraqi industry. According to the Committee on Economic, Technical, Scientific 
and Cultural Co-operation, at the beginning of 2002 around 200 Russian 
companies were working in Iraq, and contracts worth US$2.4 billion were 
concluded with Baghdad . 
39 It is not surprising therefore that the president of 
Souyzneftegaz and the former Energy minister, Yuri Shafranik, at a special press 
conference at the end of October 2002, called on the Russian government to settle 
the Iraqi crisis without the resort to war. 40 
In Moscow's eyes this could be achieved by retuming the intemational 
inspectors to Iraq on the basis of the existing U. N. resolutions and to 'assure the 
international community that Iraq does not possess the weapons of mass 
destruction' 
.41 At the same time, in Russia's view, the inspectors' failure to 
uncover the Iraqi weapons of mass destructions 'within a reasonable time limit', 
and their final verdict on the Iraqi weapons programmes, was to lead to lifting of 
sanctions against Iraq . 
42 
Whereas Moscow believed that the question of lraq's possession of 
weapons of mass destruction could only be answered as a result of the inspections, 
the White House considered the problem to be not the return of inspectors, but the 
3' For impact of oil on Russian policy choices. Moises Naim, 'Russia's Oily Future', Foreign 
Polic 
, v, 
January/February 2004, pp. 95-96 
39 'Oilmen Agitate for Peace', Nezavisbna., iv Gazeta, 28 October 2002, p. 6 
40 Ibid. 
" Natalie Nougayrede, 'Moscou s'oppose a toute action militaire', Le Monde., 16 February 2002, 
p. 4 
42 Russian defence minister Sergei Ivanov in an interview with the PBS Radio in the U. S.. full 
transcript available online at: Online Nciishozir, PBS. 20 September 2002, 
http:, ',, ", ýN, -ýN7-vN,,. pbs. orL, /newsliour'bb/euroLie,,, iulv-decOllýi-ussia 9-20.1nm], viewed on 10 May2006 
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liquidation of the banned weapons and Iraq's fulfilment of all U. N. resolutions. 43 
44 Consequently, while the U. S. supported by Britain , favoured a tougher 
resolution to prevent further Iraqi deception, Russia regarded the existing U. N. 
resolutions sufficient to force Iraq to comply . 
45 Moscow therefore opposed the 
U. S. proposals for the adoption of a new resolution on Iraq, which was to contain 
the fact of Iraq's breach of the previous resolutions and agreements concerning 
the admission of the U. N. inspectors and the liquidation of weapons; the time- 
frame for Baghdad's compliance with the demands posed by the U. N.; and the 
actions the U. N. would adopt in case of Iraq's refusal to accept the new 
resolution. 46 In particular, Russia was concerned that it would place new 
unfulfillable demands on the Iraqi leadership and therefore further delay the lifting 
of sanctions. More importantly, Moscow objected to the automatic use of force 
advocated by Washington in case of Iraq's non-compliance with the new intrusive 
inspection terms, perceiving it as a pretext for the U. S. unilateral military strike 
against Iraq. 
Even following its agreement to a new resolution on Iraq, Moscow chose to 
support the French proposal, which advocated a two-stage approach to the 
resolution of the Iraqi crisis, and aimed at preventing the possibility of an 
automatic use of force by the U. S. in case of Iraq's defiance of the inspection 
47 regime. Speaking about the plan, the Russian deputy foreign minister, Fedotov, 
43 Sergei Sumbayev, 'Everything Depends on the Resolution', Krasna_va Zvezda, 17 September 
2002, p. 3 
44 On Britain's policy in the Iraq crisis, Robin Cook, The Point of Departure: Diaries From the 
Front Bench. (London: Pocket Books. 2003), in particular, pp. 186-190,198-221 45 Marcus Warren. 'West Woos Russia over Tough Line on Iraq', The DailY Telegraph. 19 
September 2002, p. 16 
46 Alexander Shumilin, 'Condemn Saddam', Jzvestia, 17 September 2002, p. 7 47 Paton Walsh, Watt, The Guardian, 24 September 2002, p. 5; Shumilin, 'Moscow Refused to 
Give Up Iraq', Izvestia, 30 September 2002, p. 2ý Yevgeny Grigoriyev, "Working of Moscow' 
Did Not Succeed', Nezavisintaya Gazeta, 30 September 2002, pp. 1,6 
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in an interview with ITAR-TASS stated that the French draft 'meets our 
positions', emphasising that 'Such a resolution, first of all, must not include new 
unfulfillable demands. Second, it must be based on all the preceding Security 
Council resolutions on Iraq, and third, it must not contain clauses that can be used 
for the automatic use of force. ' 48 
Despite these declarations, Moscow, in an effort to accommodate the U. S. 
position on Iraq, cautiously declared its willingness to consider approving military 
force against Iraq if Baghdad failed to comply with the new conditions for the 
arms inspections. 49 While arguing that the inspectors should be given a chance to 
test Iraq's promise to co-operate, foreign minister Ivanov in October 2002, 
outlined the desirable course of action in case Baghdad failed to comply: 'If ... in 
the course of this [inspectors'] work, problems appeared, the inspectors should 
report what problems have arisen. Then, the Security Council should again 
consider and decide whether harsher measures, right up to the use of force, are 
required. 50 However, despite its modified rhetoric, Moscow continued to perceive 
the sole purpose of a new resolution on Iraq as creating favourable conditions for 
the return of the inspectors to Iraq and for their successful mission. 51 
On the official level, Moscow justified its unwillingness to adopt harsher 
decisions on Iraq by the lack of infori-nation concerning Baghdad's possession of 
weapons of mass destruction. 52 This question was raised by president Putin during 
his talks in Moscow on 10 October 2002 with the British Prime Minister Tony 
48 , Russia Agrees with France to Oppose U. S. on Policy on Iraq', Morning Star, 9 October 2002, 
p. 2 
49 Yulia Rusanova, 'USA is Seeking an Unclear Formulation', Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 21 October 
2002, p. 6 
so Anton La Guardia, Philip Delves Broughton, 'U. N. Deal in Sight with Russia Set to Back U. S. ', 
The Daily Telegraph, 19 October 2002, p. 21 
51 Ibid. 
12 On the search Iraq's weapons of mass destruction by the U. N. international inspectors, Hans 
Blix, Disarniing 
-1raq, 
(London: Bloomsbury, 2004) 
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53 Blair , and echoed by Lavrov at the Security Council in December 2002, when he 
argued that having heard the accusations against Iraq, 'we have not seen the proof 
that confirins that'. 54 Even after being presented with what the U. S. Secretary of 
State, Colin Powell, described as 'irrefutable and undeniable evidence' of Iraq's 
possession of weapons of mass destruction and its attempts to conceal them from 
the inspectors, based on satellite images and audio intercept of conversations 
between Iraqi officers, 55 Russia showed itself sceptical. It advocated the 
continuation of the inspectionS56 and demanded more time to study the evidence 
presented by the U. S. 57 
In fact, the Russian government did not believe initially that the U. S. 
would be able to extend its military campaign to Baghdad without an international 
mandate. The Russian foreign minister Ivanov therefore emphasised the need of a 
'firm legal basis' in the 'war on terror' and advocated a strong role of the United 
Nations in co-ordinating any joint international effort. 58 Similarly, President Putin 
in an interview with Wall Street Journal, also declared his opposition to extending 
the 'war on terror' to Iraq and argued that only the U. N. could sanction such a 
move. 59 More importantly, revealing a major miscalculation on the part of the 
Russian government, the Foreign Ministry was confident that in view of its newly 
53 Ekaterina Grigoriyeva, 'Without an Oriental Market', Izvestia, 12 October 2002, p. 1; Michael 
White, 'Putin Demands Proof over Iraqi Weapons'. The Guardian, 12 October 2002, p. 2 54 Quoted in ITAR-TASS, 'Guilty of Being Saddam', Krasnaya Zve--da, 21 December 2002, p. 1 55 Usborne, 'Powell: The Case Against Iraq', The Independen't, 6 February 2003. p. 1 51 'Iraq Crisisý Colin Powell Speech: World Reaction', The Independent, 6 February 2003, p. 3ý 
Yevgeny Verlin, 'Powell Will Finish Saddam off With Compromate', Xezavisilnaya Gazeta, 8 
February 2003, pp. 1,6 
57 Ibid. 
58 Michael Binyon, 'Russia Warns Off U. S. ', The Titnes, 26 January 2002, overseas news 59 , Go Easy on Saddam, Putin Warns Americans', Dail), Mail, 12 February 2002, p. 15 
288 
forged strategic partnership with the U. S., it 'will convince the Americans not to 
go that far'. 60 
Even though by January 2003, Russia had realised that it would not be 
able to dissuade Bush from attacking Iraq, the Russian government still thought it 
possible to delay the start of the military operation in the hope that in the 
meantime the inspectors would complete their work in Iraq and provide a 
definitive answer to the question of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. Moscow 
believed that as long as the inspectors continued their work without impediments 
on the part of Baghdad, Washington would not have a strong enough justification 
for launching an attack on Iraq. 
This belief was indeed confin-ned by the Russian representative at the 
U. N., Lavrov, in an inter-view with Nezavisimaya Gazeta in mid-January 2003. 
When asked if war against Iraq was unavoidable, Lavrov declared that the Russian 
delegation at the U. N. did 'not see the situation as critical' .61 He emphasised that 
the Iraqi govemment had not created obstacles for the work of the inspectors, but 
admitted that there were still questions that required clarifications. He reiterated 
that Moscow did not have any infon-nation on the Iraqi weapons of mass 
destruction and required 'concrete confirmation' for the allegations that Iraq did 
possess such weapons. 
Responding to the question of whether the U. S. could return to a peaceful 
settlement of the Iraqi question after having invested colossal sums in the 
preparation of war, Lavrov argued that it was 'Irresponsible' to approach the 
solution of the problem 'that could have a great impact on the whole region' with 
60 Ibid., Quoting an anonymous Russian diplomat 
61 Alexander Kuranov, 'Sergei Lavrov: There Are No Pre-given Decisions', Nezai, isimalw Gazeta, 
Supplement Dipkurier, No. 2,27 January 2003, p. 13 
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this single criteria in mind. To him, the main question was whether Iraq did or did 
not possess weapons of mass destruction, and 'only afterwards one can talk about 
any further steps in accordance with the relevant Security Council resoluti 62 i ons'. 
Expressing the same belief, Russian foreign minister told the al-Jazeera TV 
channel that the chances that the Security Council would agree on the use of force 
were 'practically nil'. 63 
While searching for a compromise at the U. N., the Russian government 
continued to maintain close ties with Iraqi authorities, prompting Iraq's foreign 
minister, Naj'i Sabri, who travelled to Moscow on 28 April 2002 to meet with his 
Russian counterpart, to declare that relations between Russia and Iraq 'are 
developing from good to great'. 64 Moscow was eager to use its relationship with 
Baghdad to mediate in the crisis, pressuring Saddam Hussein to re-admit 
international inspectors into the country and to co-operate with the new intrusive 
inspection regime. 
Interestingly, Russia perceived Baghdad's agreement in September 2002 
to return the inspectors to Iraq as a result of its successful diplomacy. Moscow 
emphasised that it was following a series of meetings between Ivanov and Sabri, 
and the latter's meeting with the Russian representatives at the U. N., that Aziz 
announced Iraq's decision, forwarding the Russian side a copy of a letter, which 
had been dispatched to the U. N. Secretary General Kofi Annan. 65 
At the same time, indicating the pragmatic nature of Russia's interests in 
Iraq and its indifference to the regime of Saddarn Hussein as long as its interests 
62 Ibid. 
63 Shepherd, 'Russia's Oil Interest Fear', The Times, 28 January 2003, p. 13 64 Shumilin, 'Iraqi Minister Came to Ask Political Protection from the U. S.. Izvestia, 29 April 
2002, p. 2 
65 Dmitri Gornostayev, 'Saddam Gave Up', Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 18 September 2002, p. 5 
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were secured, Moscow for the first time in Russian-Iraqi history entered in contact 
with the Iraqi opposition. In August 2002, Russian diplomat, Andrei Kroshin, 
conducted talks in Washington with a representative of the National Congress on 
the future of Russian economic interests in Iraq in case of regime change in Iraq. 66 
However, eager to play down the importance of the talks to the Iraqi leadership, 
the Russian foreign minister at a press- conference with his Iraqi counterpart in 
Moscow asserted that 'these contacts do in no way mean the change of course of 
Russian policy on the question of the Iraqi settlement'. 67 
Commenting on Moscow's position, a group of Russian analysts in 
Izvestia argued that Russia was indifferent to Iraq, and even more so to Saddam 
Hussein, and that the question of war was 'secondary, as Russia itself does not 
refrain from using military means to resolve problems'. According to them, 'what 
matters, is economics and concessions promised by Saddam to Russian 
companies'. They concluded that 'as long as Russia does not receive guarantees 
from the U. S. for the preservation of its economic interests in Iraq after Saddam, 
Russian position is unlikely to change'. 68 
This argument reflected the position of the Russian government, which, 
responding to the insistent demands of Russian business elite '69 attempted to gain 
major concessions from the U. S. in return for its flexible position on Iraq, for 
instance, guarantees for the contracts signed by Russian oil companies with Iraqi 
66 Maksirn Yusin, 'Russia Entered in Contact with the Iraqi Opposition', Izi, estia, 31 August 2002, 
P. 1 
67 Gennady Charodeyev. Elena Shesternina. 'Iraqi Minister Asked Russia to Protect Saddarn from 
the U. S. ', Jzvestia, 3 September 2002, p. 2 
68 Ibid. 
69 For example, President of Yukos, Mikhail Khoclorkovsky, 'Mikhail Khodorkovsky Expressed 
the Opinion that Washington Ought to Compensate Russian Losses... ', ITAR-TASS, 23 October 
2002. available online at: http: //, A, Nvwjnte, -rum. ru , viewed on 3 March 2006 
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authorities, the repayment of the Iraqi debts by a new Iraqi government, and 
Russia's participation in the post-war economy of Iraq. 70 
During his visit to Moscow in February 2003, the U. S. Congressman Tom 
Lantos indeed hinted that the repayment of the Iraqi debts would be honoured 
following the regime change, indicating that the likelihood for Russia to receive 
the money 'clearly would be dramatically enhanced if Russia stood with us in this 
encounter ,. 71 Already before that, the Bush Administration had courted the 
Russian government with promises of further concessions. During the annual 
session of the Russian-U. S. Business Council on 4 October 2002, the U. S. 
Secretary of State, Colin Powell, declared that President Bush would continue to 
work with the Congress on the cancellation of the much-resented Jackson-Vanik 
Amendment72 with regard to Russia. 73 
However, in spite of the recognition on the part of Washington that Russia's 
position in the Iraqi crisis largely depended on economic considerations, 74 the 
Bush Administration refrained from offering Moscow concrete guarantees with 
regard to the future of its oil contracts or debt repayment, merely promising to 
take Russia's interests into account. 75 Ultimately, it did not uphold its promise 
concerning the Jackson-Vanik amendment, nor did it accelerate Russian entry into 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO). 
70 Lilia Shevtsova, 'Russia is Discussing Price Lists', Mosk-ovskie Novosti, 22-28 October 2002, p. 
5; Will Stewart, 'Putin Holds Out Olive Branch to White House', The Express, 28 February 2003, 
p. 5 
71 Tony Allen-Mills, David Cracknell, Sarah Baxter, 'All We Are Saying Is 
... 
Give War a Chance', 
Sunday Times, 23 February 2003, p. 13 
72 Signed into law in January 1975. Denied normal trade relations to certain countries with non- 
market economies that restricted emigration rights, and therefore applied to the Soviet Union. 
73 Shumilin, 'Saddam is Getting Better', Izvestia, 5 October 2002. p. 6 74 For instance during the visit of U. S. State Department officials to Russia in connection with Iraq 
in September 2002. Dan Morgan, David B. Ottaway. 'In Iraqi Scenario, Oil is Key Issue'. 
Washington Post, 15 September 2002, p. 1 
75 Bush-Putin Summit in St. Petersburg, 22 November 2002, Vasily Safonchuk. 'To NATO to the 
East', Sovetskaya Rossia, 26 November 2002, p 
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Moscow's inability to obtain guarantees for its interest in Iraq created a 
sense of pessimism on the part of the Russian political establishment with regard 
to Moscow's future in that country. 76 Reflecting this sentiment, Duma deputy 
Andrei Kokoshin upon his return from the U. S. where he had meetings with 
members of the political establishment, in an interview with Nezavisimaya Gazeta 
argued that Russia's ability to exercise any influence on the political situation in 
Iraq in the aftermath of the war would be 'very limited, if not non-existent' due to 
Russia's limited resources. 77 
At the same time, on the domestic level, it was generally believed that if 
the Kremlin was not able to protect its economic interests in Iraq and assist 
Russian oil companies in securing their future participation in the Iraqi energy 
market, then its foreign policy was flawed and had to be modified. Even though 
Putin succeeded to overcome the domestic opposition in his rapprochement with 
the U. S. in the aftermath of II September 2001 due to his high prestige in the 
78 
society, the situation was very different during the crisis in Iraq. Given the 
strong anti-war positions of France and Gennany, and the general feeling in 
Russia that it had received nothing in return for its support of the U. S. war in 
79 Afghanistan , Putin was 
forced to adopt a tougher position on the side of the 
opponents of war, and lacked the decisiveness to continue his previous course of 
providing support to George Bush. Furthen-nore, the Russian president could not 
afford to back the U. S. over Iraq due to the forthcoming parliamentary elections in 
76 Alexander Dugin, Advisor to the Head of Duma Committee on Problems of Geopolitics and 
National Security, 'End of the 'Multipolar World' Dream', Izi, estia, 12 October 2002, p. 6ý 
Sumbayev, 'War for Iraq, Consequences for Us', Krasnaya Zvezda, 5 December 2002, p. 3 
77 Alexei Usov, 'Action in Iraq Lifts all Taboo', Alezavisiinaya Gazeta, Supplement Dipkurier, _N9. 4,3 March 2003, p. 9 
7S On Putin's standing in the Russian society, Roy Medvedev., Putin- The Acting President, 
(Moscow: Vremya, 2002), pp. 302-309 
79 Lidia Andrusenko, Olga Tropkina, 'Misalliance with America', Nezavisiinaya Gazeta, II 
September 2002, pp. 1,2 
293 
December 2003, and the subsequent presidential elections in March 2004.80 
Although Putin did not have any viable challengers for his re-election, his 
domestic agenda depended heavily upon maintaining control over the Duma, with 
his Unity Party defeating the strong communist and ultranationalist factions. 81 
Putin's strong opposition to the war resonated with the Russian public who 
82 
were suspicious of the American objectives in Iraq . In contrast to the previous 
Iraq crises, which caused a great wave of resentment within Russia and prompted 
the communist and nationalist dominated Duma to abandon all important 
domestic issues to discuss the country's responses to the American Iraq policy, 
this time, the large sections of the political establishment supported Putin's 
position on Iraq and refrained from any radical measures. This was clearly the 
case, when during the Duma session on 19 March 2003, deputies from the central 
factions refused to discuss the situation in Iraq, prompting the factions of the 
Communist party, the Agrarian- Industrial Group and Liberal Democrats to leave 
83 
the hall . 
Apart from the attempts to obtain concessions from the U. S., Moscow, in 
an effort to extract maximum benefits from its position, perceived the renewed 
Iraq crisis as an opportunity to advance its interests in the post-Soviet space, by 
using Baghdad as an instrument in its relations with the U. S. This tactic was not 
new, as already in 1999, Russia attempted to exchange its position with regard to 
Iraq for the U. S. lenience with regard to its policies in Chechnya. This time, 
80 1 The Conflict Will Assist the Election PR', Nezavisimaya Gazzeta, 21 March 2001, p. 2 
81 Editorial, 'Putin Takes Us Back to the Future', Moscoiv Times, 15 March 2004, p. 1 
82 As demonstrated by a number of Public Opinion Polls in Russia by the Public Opinion 
Foundation, for example, The U. S. or Iraq. - Which Side are We On?, 19 September 2002, available 
online at: http:, "/bd. eiiý! lish. fom. ru,, "reportllýcat. ý'frontier, ý'inteniationaI relations/Iraq , var/ed023732, 
viewed on 30 May 2006; Is It a Warfor Oil?, 10 February 2003, 
littp:,, "/bd. enL, Iish. fom. ru, "reportý'cat! 'frontier, 'internationaI relations/Iraq wanVeofQ30501, viewed on 
30 May 2006 
83 , There is No Foreign War, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 20 March 2003, p. I 
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Moscow sought to obtain Washington's acknowledgement of the Kremlin's 
concerns with regard to Chechen terrorists in Georgia 84 in return for considering 
85 
toughening the rules on inspections in Iraq . 
In an effort to align Russia's fight against terrorism with the U. S. 
campaign against Iraq, Putin at the anniversary of II September threatened to 
launch an attack on Pankisi Gorge on the Chechen border to drive out the rebels, 
claiming they were using the area as a safe haven from which to launch operations 
in Chechnya. 96 However, Russia's strike on villages in the gorge in August 2002, 
and its plans of a pre-emptive strikes citing Article 5 of the U. N. Charter which 
provided for the right of collective defence, prompted a harsh criticism in the 
White House that demanded respect for the former Soviet republic's 
sovereignty. 
87 
Consequently, in an effort to obtain support for its operation in Georgia, 
the Russian Defence Minister during his trip to Washington forwarded to the CIA, 
the National Security Agency and the U. S. Secretary of Defence 'irrevocable' 
evidence of some Georgian officials' direct implication in ties with Chechen 
rebels on the Georgian territory. 88 Even though Moscow was reluctant to admit 
publicly that Russia would be willing to soften its position on Iraq in return for the 
American support of its campaign in Georgia, 89 the media speculated that 
Moscow and Washington had reached an agreement by which Putin 'would turn a 
blind eye' to the U. S. operation in Iraq in return for the same policy by George 
84 Traynor., The Guardian, 12 September 2002, p. 2 
85 Toby Hamden, Ben Aris, 'Putin Bows to Blair and Bush over Iraq Resolution', The Daily 
Telegraph, 21 September 2002, p. 20 
86 Hamden, Aris, The Daiýy Telegraph, 21 September 2002, p. 20 
87 Paton Walsh, Nicholas Watt, 'Russia Lifts Objections After Chechen Deal'. The Guardian, 24 
September 2002, p. 5 
88 Inter-view with Sergei Ivanov by PBS Newshour, http: //www. pbs. org/'newshour/bb/europe/Jýuly- 
dec02/russia 9-20. html 
89 Ibid. 
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Bush with regard to Russia's campaign in Georgia. 90 
On a larger scale, Moscow attempted to use the Iraq crisis to advance its 
cherished idea of the 'multipolar world', that was to replace the American 
unilateralism in international affairs. Therefore, Russia readily exhibited its 
participation in the anti-war camp, dominated by France and Gen-nany, and 
enthusiastically supported the French proposals for Iraq's disannament at the U. N. 
Security Council. In fact, President Putin used every occasion to emphasise the 
increased co-operation between Moscow and its European allies. Speaking to 
journalists after the talks with the German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder on 10 
February 2003, the Russian president declared that the positions of the three 
countries on the Iraqi problem 'do essentially coincide. We do not see a reason for 
the use of force and unilateral action could only bring suffering to millions of 
people and lead to the escalation of the situation in the region'. 9 I Arriving in 
France the same day, Putin demonstratively emphasised, 'we are against the 
war'. 92 
The common position of the three nations was summarised in the joint 
declaration on Iraq, which declared their detennination 'to ensure that everything 
possible is done to disarm Iraq peacefully' and proclaimed their preference for the 
4continuation of the inspections and a substantial reinforcement of their human 
and technical capacities through all possible means and in liaison with the 
inspectors' . 
93 In an interview with Koinsomolskaya Pravda, when asked whether 
'0 Shepherd, 'U. S. Tempts Russia with profits from Ousting Saddam', The Tinles, 13 September 
2002. p. 13 
" Vladimir Markushin, 'Europe Does Not Intend to Give Up Its Interests', Krasnaya Zvezda, II 
February 2003. p. 1 
92 Charles Bremner, 'Moscow Joins Paris-Bonn Peace Pact', The Thnes. II February 2003, p. 12 
93 Joint Declaration from Russia. Germany and France, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, II 
February 2003, available online at: httl2:, "/www. iraq watch. org/pýovernm ent, "Russia/russi arussia- 
mfa-withfrancecýermaliv-021103. htlii, viewed on 3 May 2006 
296 
the Joint Declaration with Gennany and France could be viewed as a 
breakthrough in Europe's relations with Russia, Putin indeed asserted that it could 
94 
be seen 'as the first step towards multipolar world' . He argued that 'no one 
wants the war, and if we continue to work consequently and delicately, maybe the 
number of supporters of this position will increase', adding that 'maybe, we 
would be able to persuade our American partners'. 
Putin's European orientation during the Iraq crisis not only allowed 
Moscow to counterbalance the U. S., and to appease the domestic opposition 
which disapproved of close relations with Washington, but also to demonstrate its 
peaceful intentions to the Arab world, and to improve its standing in the region. In 
the afterinath of II September, the Russian diplomacy had not spared efforts to 
develop and strengthen political, economic and cultural ties with the Gulf states, 95 
opening a new chapter in relations previously marked by a historical legacy of 
hostility and suspicion. At the same time, the considerable cooling off in the U. S. 
relations with the Arab world, accused of constituting a centre for international 
terrorist activities, also turned Russia into a desirable political and economic 
partner for the Middle Eastern political Oite. 96 In addition, Moscow's importance 
as the second largest oil producing country, able to substitute for the Arab oil in 
case of a major crisis in the region, increased the need for co-operation on the part 
94 Alexander Gamov, 'To Tell the Truth, No One Wants a War in Iraq', Komsolnolskaya Pravda, 
13 February 2003, p. 2 
95 Nikolai Gorshkov, 'Putin's Vision of "Great Russia", BBC Neivs, 15 April 2003, available online 
at: http: //ne, ýý,, s. bbc. co. uk, "ýýo"pr, ýfr/'-, 1/hilworld'europe,, 303491 I. strn, viewed 6 September 2003 
96 Hinclawi Hussain, 'Saudis Look for Better Ties with Russia, The Washington Tinles, II July 
2003, available online at: http:, '/, ýN,, ashinýýtontinies. conL,, "upi-breakint4/ý20030711-0229"0-7020r. htin, 
viewed 8 September 2003 
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of OPEC, and in particular, on the part of the world's larger oil producer, Saudi 
Arabia. 97 
Throughout the Iraq crisis and in the aftennath of the U. S. invasion of 
Iraq, Moscow therefore maintained contact with the governments of the Gulf, 
conducting consultations and exchanging views on the situation regarding Iraq. 
98 
The array of diplomatic activities between Moscow and the Gulf states culminated 
in the historic three-day visit to Moscow of the Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah in 
September 2003,99 which introduced a new phase of co-operation between the two 
countries. The visit resulted in the signature of a five-year co-operation agreement 
in the oil and gas sector aimed at stabilising oil prices, which had the potential to 
deals worth up to US$25 billion, and opened the way for large Russian energy 
companies to conclude partnership agreements with Saudi Arabia. 
100 
At the same time, in an effort to balance his participation in the anti-war 
camp with his ambition to preserve its strategic partnership with the U. S., the 
Russian president adopted a wait-and-see policy. Putin left it to his ministers to 
make strong statements on Iraq, while he himself in his infrequent declarations on 
the issue was eager to please both sides, by on one hand arguing that the 
inspectors ought to be given more time and that a political settlement of the crisis 
9' On Russian-Saudi relations before September 11, Mark N. Katz, 'Saudi-Russian Relations in the 
Putin Era', The Middle East Jow-nal, Vol. 55, X2.4, autumn 200 1, pp. 603-622 
98 1 Russian-Saudi Consultations on International and Regional Problems', Press Release 1449-20- 
06-2003 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 20 June 2003, available 
online at: http: //, Aww. mid. ru, viewed 5 September 2003, 'On Russian-Omani Consultations', 
,f 
ffiairs ofthe Russian Federation, 4 July 2003, available Press Release bv the Ministi-y o Foreign Af) 
online at: http:,,, "/In. mid. ru, Viewed 2 September 2003 
99 Sophie Lambroschim, 'Russia: Saudi Sate Visit to Moscow Forges New Ties Based on Oil, 
Global Politics', Radio Free Europe Radio Libert 
* 
v. 2 September 2003, available online at: 
littp: /,, ", A, -\xTw. rferl. orlý/features/2003,09ý'0292003 165 812. asp, viewed 4 September 2003 
100 In a joint statement the Saudi leader and the Russian President agreed on 'the need to interact in 
oil policy to achieve stability and predictability' in the global oil market. More details in 'Saudi 
Leader's Visit to Russia Brings Key Oil Accord, Closer Ties', CDI Russia Weekl , 
v, 4 September 
2003, available online at: http:, ý/cdi. orti/russia/1272- I 0. cf: m. viewed on 6 September 2003 
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ought to be found, 101 and on the other hand by declaring that he did not 'exclude 
the fact that Russia could change its position' towards undefined tougher 
measures if Iraq was obstructive. 
102 
Following the second report to the Security Council by Hans Blix on 14 
February 2003, in which the UNMOVIC chain-nan declared that the inspectors 
had not found any weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, but only a small number 
of empty chemical munitions which should have been declared and destroyed, and 
also stated that many weapons were not accounted for, 
103 Putin tried to find a 
balance between the Anglo-American and the Franco-German approaches. 
104 On 
one hand, Moscow joined the Franco-German memorandum of 24 February on 
the necessity to continue inspections, which stated that 'while suspicion remains, 
no evidence has been given that Iraq still possesses weapons of mass destruction 
105 
or capabilities in this field'. On the other hand, Russia announced that it was 
willing to work on a new resolution aimed at authorising Iraq's disan-nament by 
force, but 'on the basis that would mean not a step to war, but a step to further 
work, including that of the inspectors, for the disarmament of Iraq'. 
106 
As a result of the dilemma posed by its desire to co-operate with the U. S., 
Moscow, contrary to its established position as the leader of the opposition against 
the tough Anglo-American policy at the U. N. Security Council during the 
previous Iraq crises, this time remained in the background. Instead, it preferred to 
"' Ibid. 
102 Verlin, Nikolai Zlobin, 'Moscow is Giving In to Washington', Nezal, isimava Gazeta, 30 
January 2003., p. 5 
103 Hans Blix, 'We Need Evidence Weapons Were Destroyed'. The Times, 15 February 2003, p. 18 
104 Usborne, 'United Nations: Russian Condemns U. S. for Adding Pressure on Weapons 
Inspectors', The Independent, 21 February 2003, p. 2 
105 John Hooper, Ian Black, 'A Triple Alliance Puts Case for Delay: U. N. Resolution European 
Axis Proposes Route to Peaceful Solution as Bush and Blair See Fast-Track to Conflict', The 
Guardian, 25 February 2003, p. 5 
' 0' Svetlana Babayeva, Yevgeny Bovt, 'Peacekeepers Prepare for War', 1--vestia, 27 February 
2003, p. I 
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render support to French proposals for a peaceful settlement, without claiming the 
leading role. Only once during the crisis, on 26 October 2002, did Russia take the 
initiative by presenting the Security Council with its own draft resolution on Iraq, 
which removed the most rigorous inspections terms advocated by the U. S. and 
contained no clear consequences, or threat of consequences if Iraq refused to 
Comply. 107 Speaking about the Russian proposal, the deputy U. N. Ambassador, 
Gennady Gatilov, stated that Russia offered its proposal 'to illustrate that there are 
some other ideas about how we can deal with the Iraqi situation, and what we can 
do in order to send the inspectors back on the ground as soon as possible'. 108 
Russia's concern about U. S. unilateralism was also expressed in 
Moscow's ambition to preserve the issue of Iraq within the framework of the 
U. N., which since the Gorbachov era was perceived as the main forum to pursue 
Russia's interests. Consequently, following its initial refusal to place Iraq on the 
top of the agenda in the 'war on terror', Russia by March 2002 refrained from 
threatening to pull out of the coalition against terror if the U. S. attacked Iraq. 
Foreign minister Ivanov in an interview with The Times declared that 'it would 
not be expedient to issue any ultimatums to say that we would withdraw from the 
coalition', adding that 'Participation in the coalition is not a present or gift to give 
to someone, but in our own interests I. 
109 
To keep the Iraq issue on the collective track, Moscow, after initial 
reservations, agreed to support the adoption of a new resolution on Iraq advocated 
107 Full text of Russia's draft resolution on lraq of 23 October 2002 in Royal United Services 
Institute (RUSI) Iraq Resources, available online at: 
http: //wNA, Tw. iraqcrisis. co. uk, 'resources. php'? idtaý-, -R3DC8FDEADFCF3, viewed on 17 April 2006 
'0' Colum Lynch, 'At U. N., Russia Challenges U. S. on Iraq', Washington Post, 26 October 2002, 
p. 20 
109 Binyon, 'Russia 'Will Stand by Coalition if Iraq is Attacked", The Times, 15 March 2002, 
overseas news 
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by the U. S. and supported by Britain. 110 However, as demonstrated by the 
numerous declarations of the Russian government, it had never wholeheartedly 
supported the idea of a new resolution on Iraq because it imposed additional, 
tougher terms for Iraq's compliance with the U. N. and did not correspond to its 
ambition to having the sanctions lifted. Instead, Russia regarded the work on a 
new resolution as a means of engaging the U. S. in the international framework of 
the U. N., where Moscow's position still mattered, and where American ambitions 
were checked by other permanent members, notably France and China, which like 
Russia were opposed the U. S. unilateralism. 
Explaining the Russian vote for the Resolution 1441 unanimously adopted 
on 8 November 2002, the Russian representative at the U. N., Lavrov, in his 
statement declared that Russia 'made its choice based on the principle to support 
the resolution, guided by its special responsibility, as a permanent member of the 
Security Council, for the maintenance of international peace and security. "'' 
Hinting at the main reason for Moscow's support of the resolution, Lavrov 
emphasised that 'what is most important, is that the resolution ... opens the road 
towards further work in the interests of a political diplomatic settlement'. 
Implicitly referring to the U. S. readiness to undertake a unilateral action against 
Iraq, the Russian representative underlined that the 
Implementation of the resolution will require goodwill on the part of all those 
involved in the process of seeking a settlement of the Iraqi question. They 
must have the willingness to concentrate on moving forward towards the 
declared common goals, not yielding to the temptation of unilateral 
110 Shumilin, 'Condemn Saddam', Izvestia, 17 September 2002, p. 7 
111 Explanation of Vote on Resolution 144 1, Statement by Ambassador Sergei Lavrov of Russian 
Federation, 8 November 2002, RUSI Iraq Resources, available online at: 
htý2: /,,, 'www. iraqcrisis. co. uk/resources. php? idtai4=R3EB293F8B4A62, viewed on 17 April 2006 
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interpretation of the resolution's provisions and preserving the consensus and 
unity of all members of the Security Council. ' 12 
Further revealing Moscow's preoccupation with American unilateralism 
with regard to the Iraqi crisis, President Putin during the meeting with George 
Bush in St. Petersburg on 22 November 2002, argued that 'positive results' in 
disan-ning Iraq could be gained if both countries acted 'jointly', urging 
Washington to remain within the framework of the resolution 1441.113 In this 
spirit, both presidents in the Joint Russian-American Statement on Iraq pledged 
their 'full support for the implementation of the Security Council resolution 
1441', expressed their 'finn support' for the work of UNMOVIC and the IAEA, 
and called on Iraq 'to co-operate fully and unconditionally in its disarmament 
obligations or face serious consequences I. 114 Similarly, speaking at the Security 
Council meeting on 'Combating Terrorism' on 20 January, Russian foreign 
minister, Ivanov, in his statement, addressing the fight against international 
terrorism, argued that 'we must be careful not to take unilateral steps that might 
threaten the unity of the anti-terrorist coalition'. ' 15 He reiterated that Russia 
favoured a political settlement of the Iraqi question, 'in strict conformity with the 
relevant Security Council resolutions'. 116 
Interestingly, in spite of the general sense of resignation at the Security 
Council on the question of Iraq by March 2003, Russia, even at this point, 
112 Ibid. 
113 Paton Walsh, Jonathan Steele, 'Russia Tells U. S. to Stick to U. N. Script, The Guardian, 23 
November 2002, p. 17 
114 Full text of the Statement, Office of the U. S. Press Secretary, available online at: 
http: /,, "www. whitehouse. ýzov, 'neNN, sreleases, ý'2002ý]lýýprint, "ýý0021122-I. htnil, viewed on 18 April 
2006 
115 Statement of Igor Ivanov. Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation, Security Council, 46881h 
meeting, 20 January 2003, S/PV. 4688, provisional verbatim transcript 116 Verlin, 'Disagreements in the U. N. on Iraq',, Vc--ai, ishnaYa Gazeta, 22 January 2003, p. 6 
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appeared to have believed that war could still be avoided, or at least delayed, and 
remained deten-nined to find a political compromise. It seized every opportunity, 
such as Iraqs delivery of a 25-page document on its VX gas programmes to the 
inspectors, as a proof of Iraq's co-operation with the U. N, and a confirmation that 
inspections ought to continue. 117 It also seemed that President Putin believed that 
considering his personal friendship with George Bush and the newly forged 
strategic alliance between Russia and the U. S., the latter would refrain from 
unilateral actions which would offend Moscow. 118 Therefore, when Washington 
withdrew the draft resolution from vote on 17 March 2003, just before the closed- 
door Security Council session on the question was due to begin, Putin, after weeks 
of silence, at the meeting with spiritual leaders of Chechnya declared that a war 
without a U. N. approval 'would be fraught with the gravest consequences, will 
result in casualties and destabilise the international situation in general. " 19 He 
reiterated that Russia 'stands for resolving the problem exclusively through 
peaceful means', emphasising that 'any other option would be a mistake'. 120 
At the same time, indicating that he was not prepared to worsen Russia's 
relations with the U. S. because of the disagreements on Iraq, the Russian president 
in a telephone conversation with Bush on 18 March, expressed Russia's regret 
about Washington's ultimatum to Iraq, 121 but according to a statement issued by 
the Kremlin press service, 'both parties emphasised that despite differences in 
approaches and assessments, bilateral ties in critical situations similar to the 
117 Usbome, 'On the Eve of War: A War of Words in the Azores, As Our Troops Prepare for 
Battle'. Independent on Siinda 
, ý% 
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current one are of special importance. ' 122 At the same time, yet again 
demonstrating Moscow's policy of balancing between the U. S. and its European 
allies, Russia in the Security Council joined France in condemning the move 
towards the war on Iraq, with the Russian foreign minister declaring that the 
Anglo-American actions were violating the U. N. Charter and arguing that 
previous resolutions were directed at Iraq's disannament, and not regime 
change. 
123 
Following the beginning of the U. S. air strikes on Baghdad on 20 March 
2003, President Putin, expressing his frustration with Washington, in his 
declaration in the Kremlin emphasised that the military operation was 'conducted 
against the world public opinion, against the principles and non-ns of international 
law and the U. N. Charter. ' 124 He argued that the military action 'cannot be 
justified by anything, not by the accusations against Iraq in the support of 
international terrorism, (we have never had such information in this regard), nor 
by the ambition to change the political regime in this country'. Declaring the war 
against Iraq 'a big political mistake', Putin, in line with the established Russian 
position, argued that the central role in the settlement of the Iraqi conflict ought to 
be given to the U. N. Security Council, and asserted that Russia intended to return 
the situation onto a political path to achieve the Iraqi settlement on the basis of the 
Security Council resolutions'. 
On a larger scale, Moscow's frustration about its inability to prevent a 
military operation against Iraq, and more importantly, about its failure to preserve 
122 Henley, Hooper, Sophia Arie. Paton Walsh, 'Europe: Critics Renew Their Attacks and 
Warnings', The Guardian, 19 March 2003, p. 2 
123 Usbome, 'The Iraq Conflict: U. N. Opposition; Warmongers Must Bear the Cost of an Illegal 
Conflict, Council Members Wam', The Indcpendent, 20 March 2003, p. 6 
124 , Vladimir Putin: War in Iraq Is a Political Mistake', Declaration of the Russian President, 
Ne.: avisiniayw Gazeta, 21 March 2003, pp. 1,4 
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its major economic interests in that country, demonstrated Russia's strategic 
weakness, and the continuing loss of its superpower status despite Putin's 
attempts to boost Moscow's intemational standing. At the same time, Russian 
responses to the Iraq crisis indicated that Baghdad continued to play a special role 
in Russia's Middle Eastern policy and remained an indicator of Russia's policy in 
the region. 
On the domestic level, Iraq had highlighted the debates within Russia 
concerning the country's foreign policy orientation, demonstrating Moscow's 
desire to integrate with Europe, while further expanding its partnership with the 
U. S. In addition, Russia's policies during the Iraq crisis once again showed that 
Moscow continued to regard Baghdad as an instrument in its relations with the 
U. S., willing to exchange its interests in Iraq for larger concessions offered by 
Washington. However, a series of miscalculations on the part of the Russian 
government, which underestimated the U. S. determination to settle the Iraq issue 
once and for all with or without Moscow's support, meant that Russia was left out 
from the participation in the reconstruction of Iraq in the aftennath of 'Provide 
Freedom', and had lost Iraq as its economic and political ally. 
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CONCLUSION 
Following the start of the war in Iraq in March 2003, political 
commentator Yevgeny Satanovsky, observed: 'What we, as Russia, want, greatly 
differs from what we can.... We can have great ambitions, but no one really 
believes we can realise them'. ' This is particularly true with regard to Iraq, where, 
contrary to its declared objectives, Russia failed to prevent the first Gulf War, 
obtain the lifting of sanctions against Baghdad in the U. N. Security Council and 
stop the U. S. invasion of Iraq, which led to the loss of one of its most important 
Cold War allies in the Middle East. 
This thesis has provided a comprehensive account of Russia's Iraq policy 
during the 1990s and has shown that Moscow lacked the means to achieve its 
foreign policy objectives. By examining the role of Iraq in Russian politics, it has 
demonstrated that Russian-Iraqi relations can be used as a case study for the 
examination of post-Soviet Russia in general, and its foreign policy in particular. 
The present study has also shown that in spite of the de-ideologisation of 
external strategy and the reconstruction of the theoretical framework first initiated 
by Mikhail Gorbachov in the late 1980s, Russia's foreign policy goals throughout 
the 1990s greatly resembled Soviet ones - namely, the extension of Moscow's 
power; the limitation of the U. S. global influence; and the elimination of pretexts 
for U. S. military involvement in any part of the world. As during the Cold War, 
Washington, in the first decade following the Soviet collapse, remained the single 
most important external reference for Russia's new foreign policy. 
Yevgeny Satanovsky, 'Another Re-division of the World is Coming', Nezavisilna. va Gazeta, 
Dipkurier (supplement), N25,24 March 2003, pp. 9,1 33 
306 
In that sense, Moscow's Iraq policy can be largely viewed as a function of 
Russian-U. S. relations. In the early post-Soviet years, Moscow's need for U. S. 
political support and economic assistance resulted in a pro-American foreign 
policy and Russia's backing of Washington's tough stance on Iraq. However, the 
consolidation of the Russian state by the mid- I 990s led to the modification of the 
country's foreign policy course towards a more assertive and independent 
approach. Moscow's shift to the right reflected the change in the correlation of 
forces within the Russian government, brought about by the failure of Yeltsin's 
shock therapy, which led to the replacement of radical reformers with the old 
bureaucracy as well as increased pressure from opposition parties and various 
powerful interest groups. Moscow began to distance itself from the U. S. position 
on Iraq and became increasingly active in mediating between Baghdad and the 
U. N., albeit with mixed success. 
By the late 1990s, Russia's newly found assertiveness and pragmatism in 
foreign affairs, together with its willingness to risk tensions with U. S. to achieve 
its foreign policy objectives, resulted in Moscow's bitter opposition to the U. S. 
stance with regard to the Iraq question, and its attempts to unden-nine the U. N. 
sanctions regime, as illustrated, for example, by the opening of direct air travel 
between Moscow and Baghdad. 
At the same time, Moscow repeatedly indicated that it was prepared to 
accommodate the U. S. policy in Iraq in exchange for U. S. support on issues, such 
as Chechnya, Georgia and Washington's acknowledgment of former Soviet 
republics as part of Russia's sphere of interests. Similarly, during the second Iraq 
crisis in 2002-2003, Russia was willing to support the U. S. invasion of Iraq in 
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exchange for Washington's guarantees for the preservation of its existing 
contracts with Baghdad. 
The study of Iraq's role in Russian domestic and foreign policies has also 
highlighted the growing importance of analysing Russia's political landscape 
when examining foreign policy issues. Since the Gorbachov era, strong domestic 
opposition exercised great influence on the conduct of the country's foreign policy 
in the attempt to undermine the Kremlin government. As the analysis of Russia's 
Iraq policy has demonstrated, the opposition, by urging a more aggressive and 
assertive policy on Iraq, was not concerned with allegiance to the erstwhile Soviet 
ally and the long-standing friendship with Saddam Hussein. Rather, it was 
expressing frustration with the decline of Russia's superpower status and the 
break with Soviet imperial thinking, as well as the refusal to accept the 
replacement of the bipolarity with the new unipolar world order. 
Considering the pronounced anti-Americanism prevailing in Russia, 
Washington's disregard for Russia and its attempt to assume the role of an 
enforcer in the region where Moscow had substantial interests, rallied various 
sections across Russia's political spectrum, and more than any other foreign, or 
even domestic policy issue, mobilised the Russian population. Iraq became a 
symbol of Russia's assertiveness in the international arena and a barometer of the 
country's recovery from the politico-economic crisis of the early post-Soviet 
years. The Kremlin's foreign policy success and failure was increasingly 
measured by its ability to oppose U. S. policy on Iraq, with the parliamentary 
debates concerning the unilateral abolishment of the U. N. sanctions constituting 
the apogee of Russia's attempts to conduct an independent foreign policy. 
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However, the notion that 'what's good for America, is not necessary good 
for Russia 2 did not mean there existed a generally accepted idea of what was 
good for Russia. In contrary, debates on Iraq have highlighted the lack of vision 
with regard to the country's long-terin strategy and the friction within Russia with 
regard to the country's foreign policy orientation between those who have been 
willing to sacrifice Iraq for the full-fledged integration with the West and those 
who have been ambitious to re-establish Moscow's superpower status at any cost. 
The issue of Iraq has also revealed the conflicting interests of various 
interest groups within Russian politics and their impact on foreign policy 
formation. Whereas Russian diplomats were anxious to maintain Russia's image 
as a balanced power in international affairs, the recovering military industrial 
complex and the growing financial industrial groups were eager to obtain 
favourable conditions for co-operation with Iraq. This resulted in political activity 
which appeared contradictory and erratic. While Russian representatives at the 
U. N. voted in support of tough measures with regard to Iraq, Russian 
businessmen, with Kremlin's blessing, travelled to Baghdad to sign advantageous 
economic agreements aimed at securing Moscow's position in that country in the 
aftermath of the UN embargo. 
Indeed, Moscow's co-operation with Iraq proved fruitful: following the 
establishment of the U. N. 'oil for food programme' in 1996, Russia received the 
'most favoured nation' status in purchasing Iraqi oil, while Russian, political 
entities, but also individuals, greatly profited from this system, which allowed 
Saddam Hussein to reward his supporters through oil vouchers and concessions. 
2 Alexei Arbatov, 'Foreign Policy Consensus in Russia', Nez-avisima. va Gazeta. 14 March 1997, p. 
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As this thesis has shown, Baghdad was therefore of great significance to 
Russia not only symbolically, but, in contrast to many otber fon-ner Soviet clients 
in the Third World, politically and economically. In conditions of a deep 
economic crisis, Baghdad's willingness to repay its billions of dollars of debts to 
Russia and the prospects of participation in the reconstruction of the Iraq's 
shattered economy resonated well not only with the political establishment and the 
business community, but also with the general population. 
During the second Gulf crisis it was commercial considerations such as 
these that prompted Russia to search for ways to safeguard its interests in Iraq. 
For the first time Moscow entered in contact with the Iraqi opposition in an 
attempt to minimise the darnage to its position in Iraq in case of a regime change 
and to obtain guarantees for the preservation of its existing contracts with 
Baghdad. Even though Russian diplomats subsequently tried to downplay the 
significance of the talks, this episode, together with attempts to negotiate with 
Washington on the same issue, highlights the opportunistic nature of Russia's Iraq 
policy, something that this thesis has addressed throughout. 
Finally, this study has demonstrated that Russia's Iraq policy has been 
marked by a series of miscalculations and the failure of the Russian government to 
understand the dramatic changes in international affairs following the 
disintegration of the USSR. 
One of the main miscalculations on the part of Moscow was the 
misunderstanding of Iraq's role in U. S. foreign policy. As much as Iraq was a 
symbol for Russia's new foreign policy in the post-Cold War world, for 
Washington, Baghdad became an emblem for the new world order marked by 
American primacy. To the U. S., disarming Iraq and forcing it to obey to the rules 
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imposed by the international community was a question of principle that could not 
be compromised by its nascent partnership with Russia, at a time when, excluding 
few cases, such as the pressure applied to Washington by the Russian government, 
in postponing the ratification of the START-11 Treaty, Moscow's bargaining 
position with regard to the U. S. remained relatively weak. 
Whereas Moscow needed the U. S. for its transition to a market economy 
and for its political consolidation, Moscow also required Washington's support, or 
at least flexibility, on a number of extremely important political issues, such as 
Chechnya, Georgia and Russia's position in the post-Soviet space. The 
significance of these issues is highlighted by the fact that Moscow was repeatedly 
willing to use Iraq as a bargaining chip in its negotiations with the U. S. At the 
same time, all Russian presidents, from Gorbachov to Putin, put greater emphasis 
on establishing and maintaining good personal contacts with the American 
leadership in the erroneous belief that undesirable policies could be averted in the 
name of friendship. 
Russia's second miscalculation was its belief that as long as the question 
of Iraq stayed on the U. N. agenda, Washington would be kept on the multilateral 
track and could be prevented from acting unilaterally. While it was true that 
following the disintegration of the USSR, the U. N. remained the only 
international forum where Russia retained its status and some of its influence, the 
new constellation of forces, marked by Anglo-American dominance, meant that 
Moscow, despite its right of veto, could no longer oppose undesirable decisions or 
mobilise enough support among other members to achieve its goals. On the 
contrary, Russia's manoeuvring between co-operation with the international 
community on the issue of Iraq and attempts to protect its interests in that country 
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left it with an image as Baghdad's advocate and a weak link in the coalition, 
substantially diminishing the credibility of Moscow's diplomatic efforts in the 
eyes of the West. 
Russia was also wrong to believe that by supporting Iraq in its challenge to 
U. S power at the U. N. on such issues as the composition of UNSCOM or the 
work of the weapon inspectors, and by playing on the sympathies of the Secretary 
General Kofi Annan and other U. N. members, frustrated by the lack of progress 
with regard to Iraq, it could exercise pressure on the U. S. to modify its stance. 
Another miscalculation on the part of the Russian diplomacy was a 
complete underestimation of Saddam Hussein and his willingness to oppose the 
U. S. even at the expense of losing power. Until the end Moscow believed that 
Saddarn as a 'pragmatic' politician would back off from his confrontational 
course, if not to ease the heavy burden of the economic sanctions on his country, 
then to save his own regime. At the same time, Russia's Iraq policy was impeded 
by the fact that Iraq, despite proclamations of partnership and co-operation with 
Russia, used Moscow in its confrontation with the West to drive a wedge between 
the UN members and oppose the US. Russia's diplomatic efforts were therefore 
limited to Iraq's willingness to co-operate and to fulfil its promises. The episode 
regarding Iraq's recognition of Kuwait in 1994 allegedly obtained by Kozyrev in 
Baghdad and then refuted by Aziz at the UN, amply illustrated how Iraq's strategy 
undennined Russia's intemational standing. 
Russia also erroneously believed that sanctions could not be maintained 
indefinitely, and that the growing friction among the U. N. Security Council 
members could result in the collapse of the embargo regime at any point. It 
therefore opposed any new resolutions on Iraq, anxious that they would pose new 
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unfulfillable demands on Baghdad. The main miscalculations on the part of 
Moscow during the second Gulf crisis was the belief that the U. S. would not be 
able to extend their military campaign to Iraq without an international mandate 
and that the new strategic partncrship in the war on terror would prevent 
Washington from acting against Russia's interests. 
Finally, Russia failed to comprehend the nature of the new world order 
that evolved following the end of the Cold War and d's'ntegratIon of the USSR. 
Moscow believed that the bipolar world had been replaced by a multi-polar one, 
marked by the existence of various centres of influence, with Russia constituting 
one of them. While Russia acknowledged its diminished influence in international 
affairs, it erroneously believed that co-operation with what it perceived to be other 
main centres of influence, Europe and China, would create a counterbalance to the 
U. S. In spite of its attempts to project an image of a balanced power that adheres 
to international law and co-operates with the international community on pressing 
global matters, Russia's highly reactive policy on Iraq has shown that Moscow 
was guided by opportunism and a lack of vision. 
In fact, in spite of a changed politico -economic situation in Russia by 
2003, parallels can be drawn between Gorbachov and Putin's Iraq policies. Not 
only did both Russian leaders face similar limitations with regard to their Iraq 
policy in the forin of strong domestic opposition to their co-operation with the 
U. S. and the resources available for the conduct of foreign policy, but also on both 
occasions, during the first Gulf crisis in 1990-91 and the U. S. war against Iraq in 
2003, unprecedented rapprochement with Washington failed to prevent undesired 
policies on Iraq. 
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On the eve of the U. S. invasion of Iraq, Boris Nemtsov, the leader of the 
'Union of Right Forces' party, in an article in Nezavisimaya Gazeta argued that 
for Russia the war in Iraq was 'very serious', as it was about 'a new division of 
the world, and the fateful question: what place in this world will Russia takeT 
Russia's unsuccessful policy on Iraq, which culminated with Russia's exclusion 
from the reconstruction of Iraq, and de facto exclusion from all Iraqi affairs since 
spring 2003, has demonstrated that despite its efforts to prove otherwise, 
Moscow's ambitions to play a leading role in international affairs must remain 
limited for the foreseeable future. 
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Appendix A 
Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the 
Government of the Republic of Iraq on Trade, Economic and Scientific- 
Technical Co-operation 
(Baghdad 5 August 1993) 
The government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the 
Republic of Iraq, hereafter named the Agreeing Parties, considering their mutual 
ambition to expand and diversify commercial exchange and deepen economic and 
scientific-technical co-operation on the basis of equality and mutual benefit, 
have agreed upon: 
Article 1: 
The Agreeing Parties will collaborate in the development of trade, 
economic and scientific-technical co-operation on a long-term basis. 
Article 2: 
The Agreeing Parties will collaborate in the development of co-operation 
between Russian and Iraqi organisations and companies; in the realisation of 
projects using modem technologies; in the modernisation and expansion of 
industrial objects, constructed with the assistance of the Russian side; and the 
creation of favourable conditions for the conclusion of contracts, in particular, 




The Agreeing Parties will encourage scientific and technical organisations 
of their respective countries to co-operate by exchanging scientific-technical 
information, conducting joint research and symposiums, exchanging delegations 
and other similar events. 
Article 4: 
The Agreeing Parties offer each other the most favourable status in all 
sPhercs and in all that concerns: 
Customs regulations, applied for imports and exports, including the methods of 
deten-nining and collecting such custom taxes; 
Regulations concerning the custom clearance, transit, storage and loading; 
Taxes and all domestic taxes of any kind, collected directly or indirectly from 
exported goods; 
Regulations relating to sale, acquisition and transportation, distribution and use of 
goods on the domestic market. 
Each Party will offer production, originating or imported on the territory of 
the other Party, the same regime with regard to the application of quantity 
limitations and issue of licences as offered to production of any third country. 
The provisions of Paragraphs I and 2 of the present Article will not 
include advantages and concessions offered at present and in the future by the 
Agreeing Parties: 
To countries aiming to create a custom union or a free trade zone, or as a 
consequence of the creation of such a union or a zone; 
Developing countries on the basis of international agreements; 
Neighbouring countries aiming at developing border trade; 
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Countries - members of the Commonwealth of the Independent States, or 
countries of the fornier republics of the USSR; 
Arab countries. 
Article 5: 
Export and import of goods and services between the Russian Federation 
and the Republic of Iraq will be realised of the basis of contracts, concluded by 
the legal and physical bodies of both countries on the basis of competition in 
accordance with the jurisdiction in each respective country and on the basis of the 
prevailing prices in the world markets. 
Articlc 6: 
Payments for commodities supply and provision of services will be 
conducted in the freely convertible currency if not provided for otherwise between 
the legal and physical bodies of the respective countries in accordance with the 
jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Iraq. 
Article 7: 
Competent organs of the Agreeing Parties will offer Russian and Iraqi 
legal and physical bodies the required permits for the export and import of goods 
and services in accordance with the jurisdiction of their respective countries. 
Article 8: 
The Agreeing Parties will encourage participation of organisations of their 
respective countries in international exhibitions, fairs and seminars on the territory 
of the other Agreeing Party. 
Article 9: 
The Agreeing Parties, in accordance with their respective jurisdiction will 
exempt from customs and other taxes related to external economic activity: 
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Samples and advertising materials without commercial value; 
Tools and products imported for construction, montage and repairs under 
guarantee of their return; 
Objects and materials for the conduct of experiments and research; 
Objects for fairs and exhibitions imported under obligation of return; 
Special containers and packaging that are used in international trade on the basis 
of their retum. 
Article 10: 
Conditions for financing, loans and payments, provided by the Russian 
organisations for the construction of industrial objects and commercial 
transactions, economic and scientific-technical co-operation will be detennined on 
the basis of agreements between the organisations of the respective countries in 
each individual case separately by the signature of according contracts in the 
framework of the present Agreement, or on the basis of other intergovernmental 
agreements. 
Article 11: 
The Agreeing Parties will adopt all necessary measures via their interested 
organisations for the realisation of economic projects in Iraq, in particular in the 
following areas: industry and energy, oil and oil-production, agriculture and 
irrigation, watcr-management construction, transportation and communication. 
The extent and volume of co-operation, related to the realisation of these 
projects will be detennined by the interested organisations of the respective 
countries by the signature of according agreements, protocols and contracts 
separately in each individual case. 
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Article 12: 
The Agreeing Parties will do everything in their power for the expansion 
and improvement of scientific-technical co-operation between the two countries in 
the following directions: 
a) expansion of co-operation and exchange of experience in the areas of training 
and preparation of national cadres; 
b) transfer to Iraq of modern technologies upon agreement by interested 
organisations of both countries; 
c) exchange of scientific-tcchnical information and experience, conduct of joint 
scientific-technical research; 
d) exchange of scientific staff and specialists in the areas upon agreement by the 
Agreeing parties; 
e) encouragement of contacts between the competent organisations of both 
countries in the spheres of science and technology; 
f) organisation of pro fes sional-techni cal training and provision of studying places 
in the educational establishments in various subjects of economics, science and 
technology; 
g) exchange of teaching staff of universities and colleges, conduct of joint 
research; 
co-operation in any other areas upon agreement between the Agreeing Parties. 
Article 13: 
For the purpose of control over the fulfilment of the present Agreement, 
the Agreeing Parties will establish the Russian-Iraqi Commission on Trade, 
Economic and Scientific-Technical Co-operation. 
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Article 14: 
For the realisation of the present Agreement, the Agreeing Parties may 
conclude accords and protocols, and develop prograrnmes of co-operation. 
Article 15: 
The present Agreement enters in force from the day of the exchange of 
notes via diplomatic channels, in which the Agreeing Parties inform each other in 
writing about the completion of internal measures necessary for its entering in 
force, and will remain in force until one of the Agreeing Parties informs the other 
Agreeing Party about its decision to terminate its application. In this case it will 
cease to be valid upon the end of a six-month period from the day of notice. 
Following the termination of the present Agreement, its provisions will 
continue to apply on all contracts which had been signed in accordance with this 
Agreement until their complete fulfilment. 
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Appendix B 
Agreement between the Russian Federation and the Government of the 
Republic of Iraq on the Establishment of a Russian-Iraqi Commission on 
Trade, Economic and Scientific-Technical Co-operation 
(Baghdad, 5 August 1993) 
The Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the 
Republic of Iraq, hereafter named the Agreeing Parties, 
expressing their mutual ambition to expand and diversify commercial 
exchange and deepen the economic and scientific-technical co-operation on the 
basis of equality and mutual benefit, 
taking into account the jurisdiction in their respective countries, 
in accordance with Article 13 of the Agreement between the Government 
of the Russian Federation and the Government of Iraq on Trade, Economic and 
scientific-technical Co-operation of 5 August 1993, 
have agreed upon the following: 
Article 1: 
The Agreeing Parties are establishing the Russian-Iraqi Commission on Trade, 
Economic and Scientific-Technical Co-operation, hereafter named the 
Commission. 
Article 2: 
The tasks of the Commission are: 
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Control over the fulfilment of the Agreement between the Government of the 
Russian Federation and the Government of the Republic of Iraq on Trade, 
Economic and S ci enti fic- Technical Co-operation of 5 August 1993; 
Preparation of recommendations and proposals for the development of trade and 
its diversification, as well as for economic and scientific-technical co-operation 
between the two countries; 
Development of recommendations and ways to remove obstacles in developing 
trade, economic and scientific-technical co-operation in all areas. 
Article 3: 
The Commission consists of the Russian and the Iraqi components and 
will conduct alternate meetings in the Russian Federation and in Iraq. 
Upon proposals by a part of the Commission, additional meetings of the 
heads of the Commission and their representatives will be conducted. 
Article 4: 
The Commission conducts its activity in accordance with the Regulation 
on Commission, attached to the present Agreement and constituting its integral 
part. 
Article 5: 
The present Agreement enters in force from the day of the exchange of 
notes via diplomatic channels in which the Agreeing Parties inforin each other in 
writing about the completion of internal measures, necessary for its entry in force, 
and will remain in force until the termination of the Agreement on Trade, 
Economic and Scientific-Technical Co-operation between the Russian Federation 
and the Republic of Iraq of 5 August 1993. 
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Appendix C 
Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the 
Government of the Republic of Iraq on Co-operation in the Construction of 
Objects in the Area of Petroleum and Gas Industry 
(Baghdad 25 April 1995) 
The Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the 
Republic of Iraq, hereafter named the Agreeing Parties, 
expressing their mutual ambition to expand and diversify commercial 
exchange and deepen the economic and scientific-technical co-operation on the 
basis of equality and mutual benefit, 
taking into account the jurisdiction in force in both countries, 
ambitious to diversify economic and scientific-economic co-operation in the 
area of petroleum and gas industry, as well as in petroleum refining, 
have agreed upon the following: 
Article 1: 
The Agreeing Parties will co-operate in the realisation of new projects, as 
well as in the modemisation and expansion of objects listed in the appendix to the 
present Agreement. 
Competent organisations of the Agreeing Parties will study the 




For the purpose of the realisation of the co-operation previewed by the Article I 
of the present Agreement: 
Competent Russian organisations: 
Will conduct necessary proj ect- searching works; 
Will supply the equipment and material produced in the Russian Federation, 
as well as equipment and materials produced in third countries on the 
conditions agreed upon with the Iraqi side; 
Will realisc the construction and montage, and other necessary works; 
Will dispatch Russian specialists to Iraq for collection of initial data, conduct 
of project-research and other works, which the Iraqi side is not able to conduct 
on its own, for the production-technical training of Iraqi citizens, as well as 
montage, tuning and running of the equipment supplied by the Russian 
Federation. 
Iraqi organisations will hand over to Russian organisations initial data, 
necessary for the project planning and will co-operate with the Russian 
organisations in the collection and preparati 1 'on of other required data, provide 
input for the division of the volume of work to be conducted, taking into 
account the collected experience and their own capabilities in the conduction 
of works in the areas of petroleum and gas industry. 
Competent Russian and Iraqi organisations will create joint Russian-Iraqi 
enterprises for the conduct of geological research, projects and scientific 
research, drilling of wells, the development and management of the oil and gas 
fields and will deten-nine the precise volume of work. 
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The Agreeing Parties will assist their organisations in the creation of joint 
enterprises in the area and on objects of co-operation agreed upon by the 
Agreed Parties. 
Article 3: 
Competent Russian and Iraqi organisations will conclude contracts on the 
basis of the present Agreement, in which they detennine the concrete areas, 
objects and conditions for co-operation, previewed by the present Ageement, 
taking into account the legislation in force in their respective countries. 
The conditions for financing will be determined by organisations of both 
countries in the process of negotiations on the signature of contracts on the 
basis of principles, laid out in the Agreement on Trade, Economic and 
Scientific-Technical Co-operation between the Russian Federation and the 
Government of the Republic of Iraq of 5 August 1993, as well as in the 
Memorandum of 9 September 1994 
Article 4: 
In all other matters, not mentioned in the present Agreement, the 
conditions of the Agreement on Trade, Economic and Scientific-Technical 
Co-operation between the Russian Federation and the Government of the 
Republic of Iraq of 5 August 1993, will apply. 
Article 5: 
The present Agreement enters in force from the day of the exchange of notes 
via diplomatic channels, in which the Agreeing Parties inform each other in 
writing about the completion of internal measures necessary for its entering in 
force, and will remain in force until one of the Agreeing Parties informs the other 
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Agreeing Party about its decision to ten-ninate its application. In this case it will 
cease to be valid upon the end of a six-month period from the day of notice. 
Following the tennination of the present Agreement, its provisions will 
continue to apply on all contracts that had been signed in accordance with this 
Agreement until their complete fulfilment. 
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Appendix D 
Attachment to the Agreement of 25 April 1995 
List of Objects of Co-operation in the Area of Petroleum and Gas Industry 
between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Iraq 
1. Development of the West Qurna oil field. 
2. Modernisation and expansion of industrial capacities for collection, 
preparation and transportation of oil and gas, as well as water pumping at 
North Rumaila. 
3. Construction of 6 plants for the desalination and dehydration of oil with 
the capacity of 8,000,140,000 and 190,000 bar/24 hours, on the separating 
points 'Quraynat', 'Shamia', 'Rumaila' and Djanubla'. 
4. Construction of the second stage of the oil pipeline Rumaila - Hadita, with 
a diameter of 1067 millimetres and the length of 232 kilometres. 
5. Drilling of 100 production wells (vertical, slanting and horizontal) with the 
depth of 2300-5500 metres on various fields. 
6. Construction of 55 reservoirs with the volume of 100 cubic metres to 
82,000 cubic metres for the storage of oil and oil products. 
7. Supply of equipment and materials for drilling, development and capital 
repairs of wells. 
8. Supply of equipment and spare parts for the existing objects for the system 
of water pumping at the North Rumaila oil field. 
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9. All other objects in the area of exploration and transportation of oil and 
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